


CONFINED
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF
DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT AND
MANAGEMENT SERVICES

REPORT ON
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SECTOR STUDY
IN BANGLADESH



Prepared by an independent team of
experts sponsored by UNDP for
the Government of Bangladesh

JULY 1993

25 AUG 1993

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
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July 1993

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****Note:** Volume II is under preparation and will be submitted later. However, Formulation Mission Report is being submitted along with Volume I to the Government.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Public Administration Sector Study was undertaken by the Public Administration Branch of the United Nations Department of Development Support and Management Services (UNDDSMS), New York, and sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Dhaka, for the Government of Bangladesh. This Study commenced with the 1992 UNDDSMS Formulation Mission, which developed through intensive discussions with over 50 officials from public and private sectors, the focus, scope and terms of reference for the Study.

The Formulation Mission was followed by a research component utilizing the services of eight national consultants, who carried out primary data collection and analysis in five major areas: (1) organization and structure; (2) civil service management; (3) decision-making issues; (4) performance and accountability; and (5) human resources development, education and training. In early 1993, another research area was added: the role and status of women in public service. Two areas of major importance--local government and financial management--were the subjects of recent and extensive studies, and not included in the terms of reference for this Study. The results of these related reviews were considered in the course of this Study, and those recommendations that are consistent with the findings of this Study are included herein.

In this Study, the extensive use of consultation in the formulation of terms of reference and the utilization of national consultants demonstrates the intention to reflect the felt needs of the people, as expressed by different groups and segments of society.

The Study Team consists of the Chief, Public Administration Branch, and a Special Adviser in Public Administration of UNDDSMS. They were assisted by an international consultant. During the data analysis and report writing stage, two additional international consultants and one national consultant were added to the Team.

Methodology of the Study included primary data collection through personal interviews, surveys, and analysis of computer-generated information on personnel in the Bangladesh civil service. The Study represents a compilation of the findings and analysis in the reports of the national consultants, as well as from related reports, papers and other secondary data.

The Report was drafted in June, 1993, and finalized by the UN Final Mission Team in July, 1993. The Report is divided into three parts: (1) Introduction; (2) Critical Issues Emergent from the Study; and (3) Findings and Recommendations. The Recommendations are further elaborated in Appendix 2.

The Study Team found evidence of both strengths and weaknesses in the Bangladesh public administration. As Government moves to institutionalize parliamentary democracy through an open, transparent and accountable administrative system, it needs to overcome many obstacles from the past. This process has begun and needs to be carried forward in line with the conclusions of this Study. The administrative machinery that has served Bangladesh up to the present will not be adequate to meet the challenges of the years ahead.

There is widespread concern about Government performance, and a perception that accountability measures and institutions are neither sufficiently transparent nor adequately strict to ensure effective, fair and efficient policy and programme implementation. Government needs to focus on establishing a more rational arrangement of Government machinery, more effective use and development of the human resources, more extensive, appropriate utilization of information technology, and more careful allocation and monitoring of financial resources.

Greater accountability and high performance depend upon clear goals, objectives, programmes and performance targets, as well as the development of measures to determine levels of achievement, both organizational and individual. These are challenging tasks. There is evidence that the political and administrative leadership teams are motivated to tackle these challenges in order to achieve higher levels of performance.

The results of this Study indicate that weaknesses include: (a) inadequate system for defining functions, including inefficient distribution of Government responsibilities among too many Ministries and Divisions; (b) ineffective allocation of resources, monitoring and controlling, including the need for an efficient relationship between budget, development programmes and external resources; (c) slow and complex decision-making processes; (d) excessive pushing upwards of decisions on matters of implementation in a highly centralized manner; (e) inadequate information bases which are insufficiently shared among key decision-makers, including Parliament; (f) unfamiliarity with proper relations between civil service and politicians in a parliamentary democracy; and (g) awkward central-local relationships negatively impacting on delivery of services.

Many strengths in the public administration are also revealed; namely, (a) widespread concern for greater effectiveness and efficiency; (b) commitment to fairness and equity; (c) willingness to build consensus and understanding with interest, expert and beneficiary groups in the development of appropriate policies and programmes; and (d) commitment to a process of continuous improvement in the public administration sector.

These and other findings have led to the major recommendations of the Study. These recommendations are presented in two categories: (1) consolidation and (2) reform. Consolidation measures build upon existing realities and perceptions and require immediate remedial actions which will signal the changes necessary for reform. The reform measures are geared to developing a more responsive, transparent and accountable administrative system and a performance-oriented civil service to support parliamentary democracy as well as durable development. The linkage between the consolidation and reform measures is close and may be seen as an on-going process of change involving stages. The gains obtained from consolidation measures will not be sustained unless reform measures are introduced as soon as possible. Both the consolidation initiative and the reform initiative should go forward simultaneously. Should that not be feasible for any reasons, the Team recommends that the initiatives be implemented in quick sequence.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. ORIGINS OF THE STUDY

1.01 Following the elections of 1991 and the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh in the personage of Begum Khaleda Zia reiterated the pledge to establish a transparent, accountable system of public management. The Prime Minister on several occasions indicated her desire to restructure the public management system to better serve the people of Bangladesh.

1.02 A major objective of the Fifth Country Programme for Bangladesh approved by the Government of Bangladesh and the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme is "economic management and administrative restructuring" in order to assist the desire of the Government of Bangladesh to promote economic growth with equity. The Fifth Country Programme was approved in June 1991.

1.03 In the course of visits during 1991-92 by Dr. A. T. R. Rahman of the United Nations Public Administration Programme of the United Nations Department of Development Support and Management Services (UNDDSMS--formally the United Nations Economic and Social Development or UNDES), discussions were held with officials of the government and UNDP on the need for a comprehensive study on the public administration sector. Following these discussions, a proposal was prepared by UNDDSMS for the proposed study under TSS-1 financing.

1.04 After subsequent discussions in the fall of 1992 between the

Government of Bangladesh and the United Nations Development Programme, Dhaka, an agreement was reached to engage in an exercise to develop recommendations for change in the public management system. A proposal was made by UNDP, Dhaka, to the Ministry of Establishment and the Planning Commission to field a Formulation Mission to develop the research design for the Public Administration Sector Study. This proposal was approved by government in September 1992.

2. THE STUDY

A. The Formulation Mission

2.01 The Formulation Mission was fielded in Bangladesh from October 8-29, 1992. Members of this Mission included Dr. A. T. R. Rahman, Chief, Public Administration Branch, and Dr. Jeanne-Marie Col, Special Technical Adviser, Public Administration Branch, United Nations Department of Development Support and Management Services (UNDDSMS). Based on interviews with over 50 individuals in the public and private sectors of Bangladesh, the Mission developed the overall research design for the Study, the Terms of Reference for the Local Consultants and made initial contact with the Local Consultants.

2.02 The purpose of the Study is:

. . .to assist the Government of Bangladesh in developing a performance-oriented neutral civil service and a responsive and accountable administrative system to support parliamentary democracy as well as sustainable development. The scope of the study will encompass the main administrative system, the civil service (personnel) system, and related topics.¹

2.03 Previous studies on public administration as noted in

Appendix 1 dealt with one or more aspects concerning mostly services, pay and structure. This study designed by the Formulation Mission was distinct

. . .from previous studies of the public administration sector in that the current study attempts to be comprehensive, to follow the suggestions of key Government officials, and to utilise credible and competent local consultants who are so much a part of the process that their participation will likely assist in the eventual acceptance and implementations of the final report. . .this one will generate primary data, rather than overly rely on secondary sources.²

B. Issue Areas Examined in the Study

2.04 The Formulation Mission identified five key areas to be examined in the Study. These included:

- (1) organization and structure of government;
- (2) civil service management;
- (3) performance and accountability;
- (4) decision-making issues; and
- (5) human resource development, education and training.

2.05 In addition, three contextual factors were also studied. They included:

- (6) administrative culture and norms;
- (7) policy development and analysis capacity; and
- (8) administrative challenges arising from the evolving context of government.

Finally, a ninth issue (reform implementation) was identified for study:

- (9) Reform Implementation, Strategies, Approaches and Institutions.

2.06 In February 1993 as the work of the Local Consultants began, a tenth area was added to the research agenda of the Study.

- (10) Role and Status of Women in Government

C. Leadership of the Study

2.07 The leadership of the study was undertaken by Dr. A. T. R. Rahman, Chief, Public Administration Branch, United Nations Department of Development Support and Management Services. He has been assisted by Dr. Jeanne-Marie Col, Special Technical Adviser, Public Administration Branch, UNDDSMS. The Terms of Reference for the Local Consultants and the international consultants were developed by them and approved by the Government of Bangladesh.

D. Local Consultants Involved in the Study

2.08 After considerable thought and negotiation, eight local consultants were contracted to conduct the research. They included:

Mr. S. M. Al-Husainy, former Chairman, Public Services Commission, Government of Bangladesh;
Dr. Shaikh Maqsood Ali, former Principal, Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre;
Mr. Juned A. Choudhury; formerly with Bangladesh Gas Limited, Chittagong
Dr. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, Professor of Public Administration, University of Dhaka;
Mr. Mohammad Siddiqueer Rahman, former Cabinet Secretary, Government of Bangladesh;
Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelley, Chairman, Centre for Development Research, Bangladesh (CDRB)
Mr. M. Munir Uz-Zaman, former Secretary, Government of Bangladesh
Dr. Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, Professor of Public Administration, University of Dhaka.

Ministry of Establishment graciously provided two serving civil servants to work on the study in February 1993. They were:

Ms. Parag, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Establishment;
and
Mr. M. Safiur Rahman, Member, Directing Staff, BPATC.

E. Guidance of and Interaction with the Local Consultants

2.09 To assist the Local Consultants and to coordinate the total research effort, an international consultant was fielded by UNDP, Dhaka and UNDDSMS, New York, from mid-February to mid-March 1993. This consultant worked with each local consultant in designing his/her part of the total research effort as indicated in the Terms of Reference developed by the Formulation Mission.

2.10 The Local Consultants began their research in mid-February 1993 and completed their work in July 1993. Interim reports (which were the research designs of the consultants) were submitted to UNDP, Dhaka, and UNDDSMS around the middle of April. Both agencies provided input into the research efforts of the Local Consultants based on their analysis of the interim reports.

2.11 In May 1993, the international consultant returned to Dhaka to (1) review and comment upon the draft reports of Local Consultants (which were submitted between 11 June 1993 and 3 July 1993); and (2) prepare the comprehensive report.

2.12 Throughout the research effort, the Local Consultants benefitted from international experience in the areas for which they were responsible. Voluminous amounts of materials produced by donor agencies and technical literature on other countries were examined along with voluminous amounts of documents and other materials produced in Bangladesh.

3. ROLE OF UNDP

3.01 UNDP, Dhaka, financed the Study and provided many of the logistics required by the Local Consultants, the international

consultant, the Formulation Mission and the Final Mission.

4. ROLE OF UNDDSMS

4.01 UNDDSMS, New York, provided the international technical expertise required by the Local Consultants. It organized the Formulation Mission in 1992 and the Final Mission in 1993, completed the study, reviewed it with government officials and finalized the report for submission to the Government.

5. ROLE OF OTHER DONORS

5.01 Other members of the donor community in Bangladesh have expressed keen interest in the Study and shared information and data with the Local Consultants on programs and projects they have completed or are currently involved in, that touch upon components of the Study.

6. ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH

6.01 The Ministry of Establishment has been the key government organization which has facilitated this Study. From the Minister (who established and Chaired the Advisory Committee) down to Class IV level staff, the cooperation and willingness to patiently answer numerous questionnaires, assign personnel to the Study, share statistical data and facilitate the cooperation of other ministries, divisions, departments and directorates was forthcoming and, of course, essential to the completion of the Study.

7. ROLE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

7.01 The role of the Advisory Committee (see Annex 5 for the Membership of the Advisory Committee) was to provide the study

with individual and collective inputs into the soundness of the findings from the empirically-based data generated by the Local Consultants. The Terms of Reference of the Advisory Committee are found in Annex 6.

8. METHODOLOGIES EMPLOYED AND THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE DATA BASES DEVELOPED

8.01 A total of 1,132 individuals were interviewed by the team of Local Consultants. Structured, semi-structured and open-ended questionnaires were designed and administered to political leaders, government officials, business leaders, officials of the donor community, officials of Non-Government organizations, journalists, students, and members of the general public.

8.02 Government documents as well as manuals were reviewed.

8.03 A number of mini case studies were developed to illustrate in detail the issues that are present in the areas examined in this Study.

8.04 Some of the data bases developed and/or utilized for this Study are described below (a more detailed description of the data bases may be found in Annex 4):

- (1) data from interviews from 34 respondents using a technique best described in the survey research literature as "approaching a stratified sample." This was an elite survey and respondents were selected from elected political leadership, the civil service, the business community (both domestic and international), the donor community, and the mass media. The questions asked related to performance and accountability. The questionnaire contained open-ended questions. The responses were then content analyzed to discover similarities and differences in responses.
- (2) data from surveys of recent graduates of the University of Dhaka (58) and from technical universities and colleges (21). The questions asked related to

perceived status of the civil service as well as other attitudinal questions on such topics as corruption and whether or not the respondent would accept a position in government. The questions were structured.

- (3) data from interviews with BCS Administration cadre (30 respondents) and 25 BCS technical-functional cadre officers. In this survey research, the questions were structured. The topics covered related to civil service management.
- (4) data base from the responses to four open ended questionnaires administered to: (1) a random sample of 25 women BCS (Administration) officers; (2) 24 superior officers (controlling officers--all male) of the women officers; (3) 25 male colleagues of the women officers; and (4) 21 subordinate officers/staff (all male) of the women officers. The questions asked related to problems women officers encountered in the service, what the civil service should do to attract more women, and working relationships between women and men officers and staff.
- (5) data from a structured questionnaire distributed to approximately 250 secretaries/additional secretaries, joint secretaries and heads of departments, deputy secretaries and senior field officials, Class II and III officials, journalists, and teachers and other non-officials.
- (6) data from responses to semi-structured questions administered to over 600 deputy commissioners, thana nirbahi officers (TNOs), deputy secretaries, joint secretaries and mid-level officers (trainers) serving in training institutions. The questions covered such subjects as effectiveness of parliament, means of making parliament more effective, and the policy making process.
- (7) data from responses to structured questions administered to approximately 500 farmers, labourers, service-holders, businessmen, and other citizens regarding their perceptions of civil servants. These questions were structured.

8.05 The following section examines the critical issues that emerged from the research conducted by the Local Consultants.

End Notes

1. A. T. R. Rahman and Jeanne-Marie Col. Public Administration Sector Study in Bangladesh: Formulation Mission Report. Public Administration Branch, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development, November 1992.
2. Ibid..

II. CRITICAL ISSUES EMERGENT FROM THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SECTOR STUDY

1. PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

A. Perceptions of Government Performance: From Policy Through Implementation

1.01 In one of the areas researched by the local consultants on the Study, respondents¹ were asked to evaluate the performance of government. Of the total number interviewed, few were satisfied with government performance.

1.02 Senior government officials were cautious in defending the performance records of their ministries. One senior official stated:

It is for the public to judge the performance of the Ministry in its day to day business. But the performance in addressing present day issues under changing circumstances and taking initiative in addressing future issues, is "poor." (Interview with senior government official, February 23, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.03 Those in the private sector were more negative in their assessments:

Performance of government is not at all satisfactory. It is a non-performing government. Interest of the ministers lies more in opposing other parties than doing governmental duties. Unless the ministers work, secretaries do not work and so on down the line. Moreover, the minister remains in his district for 15 days in a month and the rest of the time he attends political rallies; so files remain pending. They are also busy in intra-party cliques. That is why there is inaction in government. Except for a few, ministers have no previous experience in running administration. All this has a cumulative effect on the performance of government. (Interview with a business executive, March 27, 1993, in Chittagong.)

1.04 Some business leaders contend that policy formulated by elected political leadership is not being implemented:

Policy of political leadership [is] being jeopardised at [the] bureaucratic level. Political leadership [is] committed towards development, but coolness, apathy, ill-motivation and inefficiency in [the] bureaucracy mar the prospects [of development]. Possibly, perceptions of political leadership [are] not permeating downwards. (Interview with business executive, February 22, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.05 Other business leaders maintain that government performance is beset with both policy and implementation problems:

In terms of policy, the government is on the right track. But it appears that it is doing so reluctantly, being forced to move by outside agencies. Hence, there is inadequate commitment to implement the policy statements. . . Too much is being funnelled up to the P.M.--no one is willing to take decisions. . . There is a lack of commitment to see through the implementation of the policies. . . When you come to the government agencies, we face practical difficulties in getting reasonable interpretation or sensible application of rules. For example, VAT is a good idea, but [the] people implementing it do not understand the intention of the tax. They have rigid, narrow-tunnel vision. . . (Interview with business executive, March 27, 1993, in Chittagong.)

1.06 The reasons given for poor performance included "apathy" [on the part of civil servants], "narrow vision" [of civil servants], "lack of commitment" [again, on the part of bureaucrats], and inexperience in democratically-based governance [the ministers and members of parliament]. Some of those interviewed maintained that the problem of poor performance was the result of the civil service being unwilling to give up power. It was suggested that a prime cause of the poor performance of government is an unwillingness by the bureaucracy to accept the concept of parliamentary democracy. This has resulted in uncertainties and tensions between ministers and secretaries about their respective roles. The tensions have been expressed in confrontational terms by some interviewees who also noted that all executive powers

have been transferred to the minister and administration is being politicized.

B. Descriptions of the Delivery of Government Services

1.07 To illustrate more specifically the problems in government performance, it is useful to examine some descriptions or cases in service delivery. The first is in the area of industrial development and involves securing a loan from the Bangladesh Shilpa Bank (BSB) to finance the establishment of a new factory. The second describes the service delivery system that has evolved in the critical area of poverty alleviation. The third describes the misuse of government-owned commodities.

i. Establishing a New Factory

1.08 The following description was provided in an interview with a business executive that occurred on March 27, 1993, in Chittagong.

For getting a BSB loan for a new factory, a clearance certificate from the Department of Environmental Control had to be obtained. When the representative of the private firm concerned contacted officials in this department, he was given a form to complete. According to the private firm's representative, the form was more complicated than the bank loan application itself. Once the form was completed, it was submitted together with copies of all the catalogues of the machinery required by the factory.

The factory was to be a supplier of accessories used in the garment industry. It was to be located in an established industrial area. The private firm was informed by mail that an IEA (Initial Environmental Assessment) report also had to be completed and submitted. The Department of Environmental Control office in Chittagong is staffed by one officer and one clerk. This office could not provide the private firm with any guidance in preparing the IEA report. However, the office provided the private firm with the names of two consulting firms in Dhaka. When the private firm contacted one of the two consulting firms, the consulting firm indicated that it would take two months to prepare the IEA

report and would cost Tk 120,000 to prepare. The cost to the private firm of the feasibility report for the proposed factory was only Tk. 20,000.

When the private firm informed the Managing Director of BSB about this situation, he was very annoyed and contacted the Ministry of Forest and Environment who instructed the Chittagong office to issue the Clearance Certificate. The office did this immediately.

The factory that is now being set up is a backward linkage factory for the garment industry with provision for a bonded warehouse and payment in U.S. dollars for the materials to be supplied to the garment industry. As such, it is to be treated as an export industry as are the garment factories according to the Industrial Policy and Gazette Notification of the Ministry of Finance. The relevant department in BSB was not aware of this fact and the department did not have a copy of the Gazette.

When the private firm who is setting up the factory provided them with a copy, the BSB department was not satisfied. They still wrote to the Board of Revenue to obtain confirmation.

ii. The Case of Poverty Alleviation

1.09 In poverty alleviation, a critical development area, both government and international donors have struggled over many years to improve the living conditions of Bangladesh's poor.

1.10 Severe flooding in 1988 produced a food shortage and the government's response demonstrated its inability to provide food to those in critical need. Although the Government of Bangladesh with assistance from the World Food Programme had begun to discuss food aid related issues in January 1988, the floods of 1988 underscored government's inability to respond effectively and efficiently to such crises.

1.11 After several years, the SIFAD (Strengthening the Institutions for Food Assisted Development) Project funded by the sale of wheat donated by the Australia, the European Economic

Community, UNDP and the Government of Bangladesh was launched on December 4, 1992.

1.12 One of the first products of this project was a "Position Paper of SIFAD Project" issued in June 1993. In this paper, the consultants describe the inadequacies of the food assistance delivery system and how these inadequacies (as well as those in health care and education) have been dealt with:

In the absence of a coherent GOB poverty alleviation strategy and in view of the enormity of the problem, the international donor agencies have resorted to creating a plethora of different institutional and organizational solutions intended to address the problem.

The only institution with an official mandate for poverty alleviation is the **Bangladesh Rural Development Board** (BRDB). Its inflexible bureaucratic mode of operation has repeatedly been criticised as an impediment to effective poverty alleviation work.

Several international donors. . .sought to channel their aid through this government agency. . .However, they usually insisted on special separate organizational set-ups for their projects in the hope that in doing so they could avoid the crippling effects of its bureaucratic operational culture and safeguard a satisfactory level of accountability. . ." [However, the] ". . .long-term sustainability from an economic and institutional point of view is seriously jeopardized by the dismantling of these parallel organisational structures at the end of the project period.

Discouraged by the difficulties of working jointly with government organizations, donors are increasingly channelling their aid through **the large NGOs** [non-government organisations] since they usually combine efficient and committed service delivery in well targeted programmes with transparency and accountability. . .On the whole, large national NGOs have turned out to be a better institutional mechanism for poverty alleviation than GOB/donor implemented projects and programmes.

There have been two other promising institutional developments in the domain of poverty alleviation. The first one is the emergence of **collaborative ventures between large NGOs and GOB line agencies**. . .The second development

is a new tendency on the part of some donors, line-agencies and large NGOs to strengthen and support **small local NGOs** for the purpose of creating a more extensive system of development service delivery to the rural poor. . .

The preliminary general findings of the study suggest that, while the chief problem of the sustainability of target group institutions has not been conclusively solved by any of the different institutional and organisational arrangements for poverty alleviation, the large national NGOs so far represent the least problematic and most efficient institutional channel. The two more recent collaborative constellations of the large national NGOs and line-ministries, on the one hand, and of large development partners with small local NGOs, on the other, may well turn out to be effective supplementary approach. The systematic strengthening of local institutions (local government bodies as well as non-government informal organisations) for the purpose of nation-wide bottom-up development and poverty alleviation would seem to be the most promising undertaking in the long run from the point of view of democratic development and sustainability of popular institutions. ("Position Paper of SIFAD (Strengthening the Institutions for Food Assisted Development) Project," June 1993, pp. 12-14.)

iii. Misuse of Government Commodities: The "Wheat Game"

1.13 When a superior officer visits a thana, the Project Implementation officer (PIO) is asked to make arrangements for food. The problem becomes, how is the PIO supposed to secure the resources to make these arrangements. The answer, unfortunately is from government resources (wheat) which has been provided to the thana level for distribution to the population as the need arises.

1.14 The PIO has at his disposal wheat from different projects, most of which is to be distributed to the Union Parishad Chairmen. However, the PIO is to keep a margin for such extra-legal expenditures.

1.15 Wheat is received from the Ministry of Relief for the Food

for Work Programme, the Vulnerable Group Feeding Programme, or for the Rural Works Programme through the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives. But this wheat "leakage" has now become so deeply rooted in local management that it has not only corrupted many civil servants but also many elected officials.

1.16 The receipt, management and distribution of wheat has led to litigation in many parts of the country. One case from one Union Parishad will illustrate the above.

1.17 An ex-Chairman of a Union Parishad discovered that the new Chairman was engaged in illegal transfers of wheat. The ex-Chairman sought the assistance of a Magistrate.

1.18 A case was moved against the Chairman but the Magistrate needed to have someplace to store the wheat seized until the case was finally disposed of. The storage place that the Magistrate selected was the house of the ex-Chairman.

1.19 During the case against the Chairman, both the Magistrate and his superior officer were transferred.

1.20 Almost immediately after the Magistrate was transferred, the Chairman made several attempts to steal the wheat from the ex-Chairman's house.

1.21 To guard against theft, the ex-Chairman and his son stood watch.

1.22 The ex-Chairman also petitioned the new Magistrate several times to get the wheat removed. His appeals were not heeded.

1.23 Three years passed. The wheat became rotten.

1.24 A lawyer advised the ex-Chairman to submit a bill to the Magistrate's office for godown charges and wages for his son's guard duty over the three year period.

1.25 The ex-Chairman was afraid to do so.

1.26 The experience of the ex-Chairman and his son may have taught them not to approach law enforcement authorities when you discover an illegal activity.

iv. Who is to Blame?

1.27 Another side of the service delivery problem was presented in an interview conducted by the local consultants:

A serious problem [with performance of government organisations] is that because of a great dependence on aid, an unhealthy relationship has developed between donors, civil service and consultants. Every department in the government must have had consultants for institution building for 20 years. It should be a self-limiting process. Institution strengthening for certain departments has a negative effect. Donors are very much responsible. For every project, there is a project implementation structure. The project structure undermines the strength of the Ministry/Department. Road and Highway staff should supervise road building, but there are consultants for it. Ministry of Education lost Primary Education; it has gone to the Prime Minister's Office along with the Non-Government Organization Bureau and others. (Interview conducted on 16 May 1993 in Dhaka.)

C. What Should Be Done?

1.28 Part of the policy-implementation-evaluation equation is accountability. Accountability may be broadly divided into two categories, financial and performance. Accountability in any government sector relates to the questions of accountability for what and to whom?

i. Organisational Unit Performance and Accountability

1.29 When the question of what should be done to improve the

performance of government organisations is raised, it is important to begin the answer with a description of the accountability process already in place in government.

1.30 One senior civil servant described the accountability process as follows:

Every section/unit in [each] Ministry has defined roles and distribution of work [known as the "Distribution of Work"], but no laid down goals, objectives, targets. No objective criteria for evaluation exists. Certain assignments have to be completed within a timetable. . . [for example] annual import/export policies, holding of a certain number of exhibitions, single country fairs. The country's export target is monitored and steps [are] taken to help meet the target. [The] Price Monitoring Cell ensure stabilisation of prices of essential goods. . . Standing parliamentary committees [exist] for each Ministry headed by the Minister concerned. These committees meet once a month [and] review various activities of the Ministries and units/sectors under them. [The] agenda for [the] following month [is] prepared on suggestions of [the] members [of the committee]. [The] Ministry then prepares papers for presentation. [The] Public Accounts Committee covers all Ministries. [It is] not very effective as it examines audit reports which relate to actions taken several years ago. (Interview with senior civil servant, February 23, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.31 Still other senior civil servants added to the above description:

Each Ministry prepares a printed Annual Report of about 30 to 40 pages which is sent to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet Division's Annual Report is sent to the Prime Minister [and every] Secretary and Minister of each Ministry. Every officer in the Division gets a copy. The Annual Report of 1991-92 was published in January 1993 and has been circulated. All the activities carried out by the [Cabinet] Division cannot be enumerated in the Annual Report. Some confidential matters have to be left out. (Interviews with senior civil servants, March 9, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.32 Break downs of the accountability process occur in two areas, the Jatiya Sangsad and the Office of the Auditor General and Comptroller (which is located in the Ministry of Finance).

According to one Member of the Jatiya Sangsad:

There are two types of committees [in the Jatiya Sangsad], the statutory ones, such as those for Public Accounts, Public Undertakings, Privileges, etc. These committees serve their purposes well. The other type are the committees for the various ministries. The Rules of Procedure for the committees were framed during the Presidential form of government when the purpose of the committees was to discuss affairs of various ministries and not necessarily to make the ministries accountable to the Parliament. They were "talking clubs" and have essentially remained so under the present parliamentary form of government, as the rules governing them have not been altered to reflect the change in system of government. (Interview with Member of the Jatiya Sangsad, April 11, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.33 The audit function which is carried out by the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) is very slow. An article entitled "Audit faults accounts of 19 missions abroad" which appeared on June 23, 1993, in The Daily Star described irregularities in the finances of the 19 Bangladeshi embassies based on the Report of the Auditor General for 1988-89 fiscal. In many public budgeting systems, the three years that have the most "firm" figures and which are considered by executives and legislators in their deliberations regarding levels of expenditure, taxation and debt are (1) the immediate past year (i.e., 1991-92), (2) the current or fiscal year (i.e., 1992-93) and (3) the projected or budget year (i.e., 1993-94). In financial accountability terms, the Office of the Auditor General and Comptroller is three year's behind.

1.34 A conclusion that may be drawn from the data collected for this Study which is presented above is that government organisations are not held accountable financially or for program

performance.

ii. Individual Performance and Accountability

1.35 In some government units, job descriptions exist--a result of the efforts of the Martial Law Committee on Organisational Set-up (the Enam Committee) which was chaired by Brigadier Enamul Huq Khan and functioned between 1982 and 1984. However, for most government units, what is commonly referred to as a "job description" is a "work distribution."

1.36 The distribution of work for each ministry is found in the ministry's printed booklet entitled List of Work Distribution. The booklet lists the distribution of work among the various units and subunits in the ministry.

1.37 For example, in the Cabinet Division, the List of Work Distribution contains the work distribution for the Secretary, the Additional Secretary, four Joint Secretaries, nine Deputy Secretaries, 24 Assistant Secretaries, one Assistant in Charge of Unit, and one Accounts Officer.

1.38 An example of what is indicated in the work distribution for the Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Division is as follows:

1. Rules of Business and general service to Ministers/Advisers;
2. Administration of the Division and Establishment;
3. Budget and Accounts;
4. State Gifts and Independence Day Awards;
5. NGO related matters;
6. Magistracy;
7. District/Upazila Administration; and
8. Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board.

1.39 For one of the nine Deputy Secretaries who is in charge of the Cabinet Branch, the Work Distribution consists of two lines:

(1) all matters relating to Cabinet meetings; and (2) follow up of implementation of Cabinet decisions.

1.40 In the normal use of the term, a job or position description informs the incumbent of his/her duties and responsibilities as well as to whom the incumbent reports and who the incumbent supervises (if supervision is a responsibility of the incumbent).

1.41 For most if not all government positions, position descriptions do not exist. In the absence of position descriptions, evaluation of individual performance cannot be made on objective criteria.

iii. The Annual Confidential Report (ACR)

1.42 A tentative conclusion that may be drawn from the data collected for this Study which is presented above is that individuals are neither objectively assessed nor held accountable for performance.

1.43 However, an argument might be made that individual performance is evaluated through the Annual Confidential Report and is used in personnel transactions such as promotion.

1.44 Those government officials interviewed with regard to performance and accountability referred to the Annual Confidential Report and how officers are evaluated.

1.45 One senior civil servant remarked:

[The] ACR form has been improved slightly. [However] It is very much subjective. Everyone patronises his own officers giving more marks so that they may be called for [the] promotion review. (Interview with senior civil servant, February 24, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.46 Another senior civil servant stated:

[The] ACR is [the] only means of individual evaluation.
[The] ACR is diluted by [the] interview system. Liaison is made to get maximum marks out of the 40 percent. (Interview with senior civil servant, February 24, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.47 Finally, several senior civil servants provided the following description of the ACR process:

- * [The] ACR is too subjective and does not reflect the true performance of an officer. Marking is too generous-- normally, it is expected that the top 5 percent of performers would get above 90 percent marks, but in practice it has been found that 15-20 percent [of the] officers [evaluated] get above 90 percent marks. Marks given and remarks made by superior officers are not kept secret and on coming to know [the results], the assessee complains to the superior why he has [been] given so low marks or [that the superior officer] made such remarks. To avoid such embarrassment, superiors are generous. Moreover, various affinities also influence assessment, such as belonging to the same district. (Interviews with senior civil servants, March 16, 1993, in Dhaka.)

1.48 Given the fact that there are few position descriptions, it is, perhaps, unreasonable to expect that any performance evaluation form and the process used to administer it could objectively assess the performance of an individual in a specific position.

1.49 Drawing on the data collected for this Study and presented above, the tentative conclusion presented in 1.43 becomes a conclusion. That is, the performance of individuals is not evaluated using objective criteria and, therefore, individuals are not held accountable for performance through the ACR process.

ENDNOTES

1. The researchers selected 34 respondents using a sampling technique best described in the survey research literature as "approaching a stratified sample." This was an elite survey and respondents were selected from elected political leadership, the civil service, the business community (both domestic and international), the donor community, and the mass media. The questionnaire contained open-ended questions. The responses were then content analyzed to discover similarities and differences in responses.

2. CONTROL OF AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES

2.01 The Study did not examine the budgeting and financial management systems of the Government of Bangladesh. These areas were not specifically part of the Terms of Reference of the national consultants.

2.02 However, there have been recent efforts on the part of the Government of Bangladesh with assistance from the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA) to redesign budgeting and expenditure control. This section of the Report will examine how efforts which are underway in the area of control of and accountability for financial expenditures might interface with the Public Administration Sector Study's recommendations.

2.03 The examination is based on a review of two documents: International Management Consultants Limited, Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control, Final Report. Colchester, Essex, UK: June 1993; and International Management Consultants Limited, Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control, Final Report. Project Implementation Documentation. Colchester, Essex, UK: June 1993.

A. Introduction

2.04 The Final Report begins with the three functions of the budget: (1) the allocation of resources; (2) a management tool; and (3) a means of controlling and monitoring public expenditures.

2.05 Financial administration has been left in a half-way situation between decentralisation, departmentalisation and

separation of audit and accounting functions. These problems are compounded by the lack of up to date financial rules and regulations and a shortage of trained personnel especially at the district level. Because of this, the budget does not carry out its three functions properly, the budgeting process (the preparation of the budget) is not adequate and there is ample evidence for instance that budgetary control is not effective.

B. The Budgeting Process

2.06 There is substantial evidence that the budgeting process and the accounting systems do not function properly. No finance accounts have been published since 1987/88 and bank reconciliations showed a large unexplained difference (e.g. 5.2 Billion Taka). The institutional structure indicates a number of problems, one of which is a fundamental problem with the lack of institutional separation between the accounting and the auditing functions. Both functions have to be treated together since they remain very closely related in Bangladesh. According to the Bangladeshi Constitution, the Ministry of Finance presents the budget to the parliament. The annual accounts are prepared by the Controller of accounts but the Comptroller and Auditor General submits them to the President who lays them before the parliament. Therefore, the independence required for a proper audit does not exist and the lack of clear cut definitions regarding the roles of both contribute to their ineffectiveness. Additionally:

- (1) The flow of accounts from local to central offices is not timely and should be improved through

computerization but also through decentralization. The accounts are prepared by the Districts Accounts Offices and sent to the regional Offices and then to the CAOs of each ministry. The accounts prepared should be sent directly to the ministries from the District Accounts Offices;

- (2) Rules, regulations and compliances are generally out of date or not available; and
- (3) Accounting standards are lacking in such areas as definitions of revenue and capital, treatment of food accounts, etc.;

2.07 The findings of the ODA-sponsored study in terms of budgeting are the following:

- (1) rules and regulations relating to the budget should be compiled and published in one single document;
- (2) the calendar for the development of the budget is too lengthy and should be revised;
- (3) the development and revenue budgets should not be amalgamated, however a better coordination between the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance should improve the efficiency of the process and allow the GOB to combine the ADP with the development budget;
- (4) The minister should be involved in the budget process and a ministerial committee chaired by the secretary of each ministry be established.

C. The Accounting Function

2.08 There should be no change from the present "Cash Accounting" basis of accounting. However, the Finance Accounts and the Appropriation accounts should be combined into a single set of accounts since their separation induces unnecessary duplication of documents.

D. Recommendations

2.09 The following are the recommendations of the design team:

- (1) the rules and regulations relating to budget should be compiled in one document;
- (2) the budget calendar should be compressed and integrated;
- (3) planning and budgeting should be more integrated: the budget should be more forward looking;
- (4) development and revenue budgets should be better coordinated and the ADP and the Development Programme should be amalgamated;
- (5) the budget format should be simplified and the revenue and development budgets should show a three year perspective;
- (6) accounts and audit should be formally separated (constitutionally);
- (7) the CAG and personnel under him should be included within the budget of the Finance Division. CAOs should be included within the budget of the line ministries. However, the Audit and Account Cadre should be retained for both Audit and Accounts;
- (8) to provide more meaningful information on resource allocation, the secretariats of ministries should be included within the budgets of those ministries;
- (9) the District Accounts Office should be made the main accounts centre. The compilation of accounts for transmission to the CAO should be made by the DAO;
- (10) rules and regulations should be replaced by New Accounting Standards and new Departmental Manuals. The publishing should be done by a special Finance Division unit;
- (11) a crash programme should start immediately to bring the accounts up to date and to reconcile the balances. Any difference should either be written off or transferred to a single suspense account;
- (12) additionally, to simplify accounting and reconciliation work, separate bank accounts should be used for receipts and payments. Each ministry/division should have two bank accounts, one for receipts and one for payment;

(13) the use of suspense and personal ledger account should be restricted; and

(14) a budgetary control unit should be established within the Ministry of Finance, Finance Division.

2.10 The recommendations listed above, were synthesized from more than 79 separate recommendations.

2.11 The Public Administration Sector Study supports the implementation of these recommendations.

3. ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING

A. Central Government

i. Introduction

3.001 Since December 6, 1990, when power was transferred to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as Acting President, Bangladesh has been making the transition from a authoritarian, presidential system of government to Westminster-type parliamentary democracy.

3.002 With the general elections of February 27, 1991, a new era of governance was introduced. Elected leadership assumed control of the government and, as a consequence, a new set of relationships is being developed between the elected leadership and the civil service.

3.003 The unanimous passage of the 12th Amendment bill to constitution (28th Rule of 1991) by the newly elected fifth parliament on August 6, 1991, made it possible to introduce a parliamentary system of government with the Prime Minister as the chief executive and the President's role substantially reduced.

3.004 As in the case of all major political changes, the perception of change has outpaced the reality. The change from the authoritarian to the democratic system has neither been as fast nor as thorough as the perception of change. Specifically, the less visible and more bureaucratic processes of government have remained relatively rigid and replete with delays.

3.005 Bangladesh still maintains its unitary government with Dhaka as the capital capturing the attention and controlling the

resources, financial, human and informational.

3.006 However, both continuity and change may be observed in such basic elements of governance as policy making; policy implementation process; structural characteristics; functions; allocation of governmental activities; missions, goals and objectives of government units; and central government-local government relationships.

3.007 As well, the tight central control of the economy is beginning to loosen as government begins the processes of deregulation, disinvestment and privatization.

3.008 The political and economic imperatives which have resulted from a decade of authoritarianism and a rapidly changing global economy have caused the new political system to redefine the meaning of governance and to narrow the scope of government involvement in the economy.

3.009 At the same time, there are demands to redefine the nature of the unitary system and questions are being raised regarding the traditional practices of government that go back as far as the British colonial period.

3.010 A fundamental issue with regard to redefinition which has yet to be answered is: Can a parliamentary democracy at the centre politically afford to maintain a variant of the vice regal system at the local level?

3.011 In the section which follows, the critical issues that emerged from this Study will be raised and analyzed. These issues involve governmental organization, structure, policy

making, decision making, the respective rôles of the central and local governments, the changing role of government in the economy and the institutions and processes for organizational and structural change.

ii. Policy Making and Analytic Capacity

3.012 Part of the study examined policy making and the existing analytic capacity to support this important function of government.

3.013 Combining survey research with investigation of files, the research conducted for this Study profiled the policy making process and examined government's present capacity to analyze policy areas and to develop and analyze data in support of this process.

3.014 The profile indicated several key sets of participants in the policy process, namely, the parliament; the political executive (the prime minister, cabinet and ministers); the permanent executive (secretariat, ministries and divisions); policy staff within government; service associations, trade unions and professional bodies; advisory boards; and clientele groups.

3.015 The first four sets are fundamental government components while the last three may be categorized as a mixture of government sponsored, quasi-governmental, or autonomous bodies.

a. **Parliament**

3.016 The parliament's (or Jatiya Sangsad's)¹ most important

function is its legislative or law making function. In enacting laws, it is ratifying the results of policy making and providing the means through which policy may be implemented.

3.017 On average, in every session, between 10 to 12 bills are passed. At present, most are bills either to amend existing legislation or to regularize previously promulgated ordinances.

3.018 In support of its legislative function, the Jatiya Sangsad has the power to appropriate funds, censure, and investigate.

3.019 Its censuring function (defined as criticizing the government on issues of importance) is central to public management and is accomplished through legislative debates, question time, questions without notice, censure motions, etc.

3.020 Its investigating function is also critical to public management since governmental actions are often the subjects of parliamentary inquiry through standing committees constituted to deal with specific ministries or other public organizations.

3.021 A major achievement of the fifth parliament has been to activate its committee structure.

3.022 There are both standing and select committees. Standing committees are constituted at the commencement of the life of each parliament. Select committees are appointed by resolution to examine draft bills and other legislative proposals, review the enforcement of laws and propose measures for such enforcement, or investigate or inquire into the operations of a ministry.²

3.023 There are approximately 50 committees including the ministerial committees.

3.024 Two important standing committees of the fifth parliament are the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Public Undertaking Committee (PUC) both chaired by non-ministers.

3.025 Important inputs into policy making and policy making revision are derived from performance of the investigating function and, to the credit of the fifth parliament, both the PAC and the PUC sat over forty times and released three reports (two from PAC and one from PUC) which touched upon irregularities in 13 ministries and 19 autonomous bodies.

3.026 The responses of 241 (out of 250 surveyed)³ government officials, journalists, and citizens revealed their assessment of the effectiveness of parliament in law making, policy formulation and control of government management are shown in Table 3.1.

3.027 Their responses to the question of how parliament could be more effective in law making, policy formulation and control of management are shown in Table 3.2.

3.028 There are several ways to improve the effectiveness of the parliament. These include professionalization of legislative staff, improved information management, skills development among members and staff development. Increasing the parliament's capability to provide information to its members and inculcating skills among its members and staff to effectively use information is a very important way of improving the effectiveness of the parliament. This may be done by improving the services offered

Table 3.1
Effectiveness of Parliament

RESPONSES	Top Level Officials (TO)	Mid Level (MO)	Journalists (JO)	Office Assistants (OA)	Non- Officials [includes teachers] (NO)	TOTAL
Highly Effective	2	10	7	1	6	26 (10.7%)
Effective on the Whole	47	57	13	15	40	172 (71.3%)
Not Effective	9	10	3	8	5	35 (14.5%)
Undecided	1	2	4	-	1	8 (3.3%)
TOTAL	59	79	27	24	52	241

Source: M. Safiur Rahman, "Attitudinal Survey" Research Study on Administrative Culture and Norms. July 1993

Note: Top Level Officials (TO) include Additional Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and heads of departments; Mid Level Officials (MO) include Deputy Secretaries, senior field officials and equivalent ; Office Assistants (OA) include Class II and Class III officials; Journalists (JO) include journalists writing for Dhaka dailies and weeklies; and Non-Officials (NIT) include teachers and other non-civil servants.

Table 3.2
Means of Making Parliament More Effective

Responses	Top Level Officials (TO)	Mid-Level Officials (MO)	Journalists (JO)	Office Assistants (Class II)	Non-Officials	TOTAL
Repealing Article 70 of the Constitution	13	21	14	9	11	68 (27.8%)
Activating Parliamentary Committees	30	38	9	9	10	96 (39.2%)
Less Legislative Activities in Promulgation of Ordinances	-	4	-	2	3	9 (3.7%)
Giving M.P.s More Facilities	1	1	-	1	1	4 (1.6%)
Training M.P.s	18	20	4	5	11	58 (23.7%)
Others	1	3	1	-	-	5 (2.0%)
Undecided	1	-	2	-	2	5 (2.0%)
TOTAL	64	87	30	26	38	245 (100%)

Source: M. Safiur Rahman, "Attitudinal Survey" Research Study on Administrative Culture and Norms. July 1993

Note: Top Level Officials (TO) include Additional Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and heads of departments; Mid Level Officials (MO) include Deputy Secretaries, senior field officials and equivalent;; Office Assistants (OA) include Class II and Class III officials; Journalists (JO) include journalists writing for Dhaka dailies and weeklies; and Non-Officials (NIT) include teachers and other non-civil servants.

to members by the Parliament Secretariat and improving the knowledge and skills of both Members of Parliament and parliamentary staff.⁴ Improved services may also include the establishment or further development of a library located in the parliament with both documents and materials as well as reference services to provide ad hoc information or analyses of data. These library services should be viewed as independent of data analysis conducted by the government ministries/divisions. The Asia Foundation utilizing funds from USAID is working with the Parliament Secretariat to improve the legislative support services available to Members of Parliament. These support services include legislative drafting of bills, research in support of legislative activities and information programmes for Members of Parliament on both procedural and substantive issues. Another way to improve the effectiveness of the parliament is by improving the knowledge base and skills of its Members. Through its international visitors's programme, USIS arranged visits by nine Members of Parliament to the United States to observe the functioning of democratic institutions. USIS plans to send an additional four MPs over the next several months. USAID plans to sponsor two seminars for Members of Parliament on the topic of effective and efficient parliamentary operations. The seminars will be conducted by the National Democratic Institute (an non-profit organization based in the U.S.). Both Member and staff development are important in improving the Parliament's capability to meet its constitutional responsibilities.

3.029 The above activities are largely designed to sensitize parliamentarians to the issues involved in developing a professional legislature. The next step would involve the development of a comprehensive, institutionalized parliamentary development programme which would provide each Member of Parliament with factual data readily available, and skills in such areas as policy formulation and analysis, legislative oversight operations, budgeting and taxation. Included would be familiarization with existing rules and regulations regarding the operation of the legislature and the permanent executive.

b. **The Political Executive: The Prime Minister, Cabinet and Ministers**

3.030 The Haldane Committee of 1914 in the United Kingdom summarized the functions of a cabinet under a parliamentary system as follows:

- (a) Final determination of policies to be laid before the parliament;
- (b) Supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the laws passed by the parliament; and
- (c) Continuous coordination and delimitation of the various governmental departments.

3.031 The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh [As modified up to 10th October, 1991] follows the prescriptions of the Haldane Committee by clearly establishing the constitutional position of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as the head of the Executive.

3.032 Part IV, Chapter II, of the Constitution states that "The executive power of the Republic shall, in accordance with

this Constitution, be exercised by or on the authority of the Prime Minister. . ." and indicates that the Prime Minister will head the Cabinet. (Section 55)

3.033 The same Section states that: "The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to Parliament."

3.034 Rule 159 of the parliament provides for a no-confidence motion against a minister.

3.035 All discussions in the cabinet are categorized as highly classified and minutes of cabinet meetings are not to be read by anyone below the levels of Secretary or Additional Secretary-in-Charge. The cabinet discusses all important policy matters.

3.036 The responses to the question of whether or not the ministers play a proper role in policy making by the 241 respondents cited above are contained in Table 3.3.

3.037 As shown in Table 3.3, it is interesting to note that over 60 percent indicated that ministers play only a partially proper role in policy formulation, which indicates that although ministers may be responsible for policy formulation, they are not effective in meeting their responsibilities for policy making. The seriousness of the problems with policy making are underscored by the fact that only 14 percent of those officials who are in frequent contact with the ministers believe that ministers play a proper role in policy making. If this perception is accurate, the ministers are not fulfilling their policy responsibilities.

Table 3.3
Policy Formulation Role of the Ministers

RESPONSES	TO	MO	JO	OA	NIT	TOTAL
Play a proper Role	8	7	1	3	6	25 (11.0%)
Don't Play a Proper Role	6	23	12	9	12	62 (27.3%)
Partially...	42	51	13	13	18	137 (60.4%)
Doesn't Know	1	-	1	-	1	3 (1.3%)
TOTAL	57	81	27	25	37	227

Source: M. Safiur Rahman, "Attitudinal Survey" Research Study on Administrative Culture and Norms. July 1993

Note: Top Level Officials (TO) include Additional Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and heads of departments; Mid Level Officials (MO) include Deputy Secretaries, senior field officials and equivalent ; Office Assistants (OA) include Class II and Class III officials; Journalists (JO) include journalists writing for Dhaka dailies and weeklies; and Non-Officials (NIT) include teachers and other non-civil servants.

c. **The Permanent Executive: The Secretariat,
Ministries and Divisions**

3.038 Since the British colonial days, the Secretariat has been the pivot around which the entire public management process works. It may be described as the nerve centre of all government activities, where policies are conceived, designed, initiated and apportioned to field agencies for implementation. In more simple terms, the Secretariat refers to a conglomerate of all ministries/divisions.

3.039 The principal purpose of the Secretariat is to establish among discrete self-contained hierarchical units a formal network of authority relationships, control, command and communication to maximize coordination and to achieve an integrative approach to governance.

3.040 Specifically, its role may be summarized as follows:

- (1) formulation of public policy;
- (2) policy and administrative planning;
- (3) framing legislation, rules and regulations;
- (4) budgeting and control of expenditures relating to its activities;
- (5) policy coordination;
- (6) interpreting policies;
- (7) supervising personnel management of cadre personnel in ministries/divisions and higher level personnel in statutory bodies, attached departments and subordinate offices; and
- (8) advising and assisting ministers in their administrative duties/responsibilities vis-a-vis Parliament.

3.041 In shaping public policies, the Secretariat collects, collates, analyzes, evaluates and synthesizes data, facts, figures and other information/evidence.

3.042 While Schedule I of the Rules of Business allocates the

functions of the ministries and divisions, Chapter IV provides for compulsory inter-ministerial consultations.

3.043 Empirically, however, it has been observed that the ministries in the Secretariat are often busy with administrative and regulatory issues--the issuance of a license or the posting and transfer of a clerk or peon. As a result, relatively less time is spent on policy formulation and planning.

3.044 The major questions are who formulates policies and how are policies formulated? Ministers have only a partial role, and if ministries are bogged down with administrative /legislative issues, then who prepares policy? Is government only reacting to events? If the government wishes to control its own future, it must develop its policy analytic capability.

3.045 Policy coordination, a major role of the Secretariat, is not always carried out as illustrated in the following case.

The Amnesty for Sarbaharas Case

3.046 In February 1992, the government declared amnesty to the Sarbaharas and promised that those who would surrender to the police (along with their arms), would be provided financial assistance and social rehabilitation services. A number of Sarbaharas accepted the government's offer only to be disappointed. The government failed to make the necessary arrangements for their rehabilitation. As a result, they became targets of other Sarbaharas who did not surrender. The reason that this policy failed was: (1) absence of a follow up operation against those who did not surrender; (2) no arrangements were

made to provide the promised financial assistance; and (3), absence of protection for those who surrendered. Rehabilitation had to be coordinated with several ministries, including Relief, Social Welfare, Education and Land, among others. This coordination was not accomplished.

3.047 Another case of a policy which failed involves food policy and is provided below.

The Sugar Policy Case

3.048 The sugar requirement for Bangladesh is 350 thousand metric tons per year. The 16 sugar mills in the country produce only 150 thousand metric tons. Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce decided to import sugar based on pressure from sugar importers. However, due to political pressure from the sugar producers, this decision was cancelled. As a result, scarcity resulted in an increase in the price of sugar and stimulated illegal, importation and black market operations.

3.049 Failure of this policy was not from lack of coordination but from not calculating the costs of submitting to political pressure. The costs of failure were borne by the population as a whole.

3.050 Before examining the survey research conducted with regard to perceived reasons for weakness in policy and decision making and how the process might be improved, let us examine a case where decision making in support of policy was successful.

Decision to Create the Department of Jute

3.051 There were two Directorates, the Jute Directorate and the Jute Goods Inspection Directorate under the Ministry of Jute. The Jute Directorate dealt with the license of the jute traders and supervised the raw jute market and supply throughout the country. The Jute Goods Inspection Directorate dealt with inspection and certification of all jute products before they were

exported. Both performed regulatory functions. In the Budget Forecasting meeting of the Ministry of Finance held on 13 March 1992, the issues of excessive manpower and need to increase the efficiency of government operations were broached and discussed widely. In this meeting, the decision of streamlining of excess manpower was taken with a view to reduce the manpower of the two Directorates. The Ministry of Finance advised the Ministry of Jute to amalgamate the two Directorates to avoid considerable amount of financial involvement. Accordingly, this decision was approved by the Cabinet. To follow up the Cabinet decision, a committee was formed with representation from the Ministry of Establishment, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Jute with the latter ministry's representative as chair. The committee made a recommendation for a new organogram for a Department of Jute and submitted this recommendation to the Cabinet. The Cabinet approved the new organogram on 13 August 1992, and asked the Ministry of Jute to finalise the organogram in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Establishment. The committee recommended the post of Director General for the new department and the Department of Jute was created on 7 January 1993. It took only five months from the time the issues were first raised in the Budget Forecasting meeting until Cabinet approval was given.

3.052 Tables 3.4 and 3.5 provide the responses from the 241 respondents regarding (a) their perceptions of the weaknesses of policy decisions and (b) how the policy making capabilities of ministers, ministries and the civil service might be improved.

Table 3.4
Reasons for Weaknesses in Policy Decisions

REASONS	TO	MO	JO	OA	NIT	TOTAL
Risk Aversion	37	46	9	14	14	120 (44.9%)
Interference of Politicians	17	24	14	4	10	69 (25.8%)
Interference of High Officials	3	13	6	4	6	32 (11.9%)
Interference of Service Associations and/or Trade Unions	1	4	1	-	2	8 (2.9%)
Absence of Data	-	16	6	3	2	27 (10.1%)
Other	1	3	3	-	1	8 (2.9%)
Don't Know	-	-	1	-	2	3 (1.1%)
TOTAL	59	106	40	25	37	267

Source: M. Safiur Rahman, "Attitudinal Survey" Research Study on Administrative Culture and Norms. July 1993

Note: Top Level Officials (TO) include Additional Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and heads of departments; Mid Level Officials (MO) include Deputy Secretaries, senior field officials and equivalent ; Office Assistants (OA) include Class II and Class III officials; Journalists (JO) include journalists writing for Dhaka dailies and weeklies; and Non-Officials (NIT) include teachers and other non-civil servants.

Table 3.5
How the Policy Making Capabilities of Ministers, Ministries
and the Civil Service Might be Improved

RESPONSES	TO	MO	JO	OA	NIT	TOTAL
With Proper Data	13	29	10	11	21	84 (37.7%)
By more Interaction with Ministers	37	35	4	8	10	94 (38.8%)
Parliamentary Committees should be Chaired by Non Ministers	3	5	5	-	2	15 (6.2%)
By Special Training for the Ministers	10	16	5	5	4	40 (16.5%)
Other	1	1	-	-	-	2 (0.8%)
Undecided	-	2	3	1	1	7 (2.9%)
TOTAL	64	88	27	25	38	242

Source: M. Saifur Rahman, "Attitudinal Survey" Research Study on Administrative Culture and Norms. July 1993

Note: Top Level Officials (TO) include Additional Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and heads of departments; Mid Level Officials (MO) include Deputy Secretaries, senior field officials and equivalent ; Office Assistants (OA) include Class II and Class III officials; Journalists (JO) include journalists writing for Dhaka dailies and weeklies; and Non-Officials (NIT) include teachers and other non-civil servants.

3.053 The responses shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that there is a lack of clarity of responsibility, and a consequent aversion to taking minimal steps in fulfilling those responsibilities and linking policy making with implementation.

d. Policy Staff Within Government

3.054 The research conducted on policy making and analytic capacity revealed an absence of units within government with individuals skilled in policy analysis and responsible for developing and analyzing specific information bases in support of policy making. The Planning Commission is a policy analysis/research unit but concentrates on development projects. Other units such as the O & M unit of the Ministry of Establishment could be involved in policy analysis but this unit seems to concentrate more on routine matters. Policy analysis units are often referred to as internal (to government) "think tanks." In public organizations, these units are part of the staff of the executive in charge of the organization and report directly to the executive.

3.055 When the 241 respondents mentioned above were asked whether or not policy staff should be incorporated into government organizations who have policy making responsibilities, 75.9 percent answered "yes," 15.2 percent answered "no" and 8.8 percent were undecided.

3.056 Government must have the capacity to develop policy based on fact and not conjecture. This requires improving the policy analytic capacity of government through incorporation

within the Secretariat, the Cabinet and the parliament of policy analytic units staffed by individuals trained in policy analysis.

e. Service Associations, Trade Unions and Professional Bodies

3.057 Service associations are permitted under civil service conduct rules but political activity by these associations is prohibited. .

3.058 All civil service cadres have their associations. The clerical staff has its association. The peons (MLSS) have their own association.

3.059 Trade Unions are permitted under labour law and are very active in pressing the demands of their membership.

3.060 Both service associations and trade unions have exerted influence on such government policies as pay scales, civil service management and the privatization of the public enterprise sector.

3.061 There are a few professional bodies in Bangladesh such as the Economics Association, the Political Science Association and the Institute of Engineers. Through seminars and symposia, they provide forums for analysis and discussion of public policy and these activities influence policy making in government. For example, the views (based on fact) by members of the Economics Association were considered in the preparation of the Fourth Five Year Plan.

f. Advisory Boards

3.062 From time to time, government creates advisory boards to consider issues involved in policy making. The Study was

unable to determine the contributions that these boards make to the policy making process with any degree of precision. However, one of the most successful advisory boards was the Martial Law Committee on Organization Set-up whose recommendations were examined by a Review Committee and submitted to and approved by the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The Chief Martial Law Administrator ordered the implementation of the Committee's findings and recommendations on 26 December 1982. The work of this Committee led to the development and maintenance of organograms and manning tables for all government organizations. In part, the success of this advisory board was due to its direct access to the chief executive.

g. Clientele Groups

3.063 In the past, public policy was formulated by government at the highest level without consultation with those who would be most directly affected by the policies.

3.064 There has been some change in this situation with the establishment of a democratically-based government.

3.065 Commercial and industrial policies have been discussed with organizations such as the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries. However, the extent and frequency of these discussions caused one business leader to remark:

No real business consultation has been done. There is a media for consultation. These are [the] Consultative Committees for various Ministries (Commerce, Industry, Finance). These Committees meet once in a year where 100 to 200 persons get together for a whole day and discuss [an] equal number of items. Interaction and consultation should be across the table on a regular and continual basis. Every month there should be a meeting, as in Malaysia. In Sri

Lanka, the Federation meets with Ministers every week and with the President once a month. (Interview with a business executive, March 1993.)

3.066 Consumers have only begun to organize. In 1992, a consumers association was formed but its effectiveness is yet to be seen.

3.067 In some areas where clientele have been involved in government operations, there have been positive results. The outstanding example of interaction between government and clientele groups involves government efforts to expand the availability of electrical power. The societies under the Rural Electrification Board, the Biddutayan Samitees, have been formed in different areas of the country and each society decides where to provide electrical connections. Similarly, in the field of agriculture, Deep Tube-Well (DTW) management committees have been formed and they decide on channels and connections.

3.068 When the 241 respondents were asked whether or not clientele groups should be involved in the planning process (which has implications for policy making), 91.4 percent responded in the affirmative, 6.3 percent in the negative and 2.3 percent were undecided.

3.069 One final comment on policy making and analytic capacity. In some countries, policy analysis is conducted by such organizations as universities and private or non-profit "think tanks." There appears to be some activity in this area in the universities in Bangladesh and some private or non-profit "think tanks" are or have been established. Given government's

needs in this area, encouragement of universities and non-government organizations to develop capabilities and increased capacity in policy analysis could have a very positive impact on policy making.

ii. Structural and Functional Characteristics

3.070 At present, there are 34 ministries and 21 divisions in the government of Bangladesh. This number of ministries is large in comparison to other countries such as Sweden (13), Japan and Thailand (14), United Kingdom (16), Germany (17), France (21), Malaysia (24) and South Korea (25). While the numbers of ministries are lower than Bangladesh, some of the countries, especially Japan, has three commissions and nine agencies under the office of the prime minister.⁵ There are approximately 220 departments, directorates or equivalent operating units, most of which are located in the divisions.

3.071 The major organizational units in the central government may be defined as follows:

ministry: a unit of government to which a specific task or tasks are assigned according to the Allocation of Business; it is headed by a minister or minister of state;

division: a unit of government under a ministry headed by a secretary or additional secretary in-charge or joint secretary in-charge (the last two officers serve as principal accounting officers);

department: a unit of government that has operational or implementing responsibilities and headed a head of the department who has specific financial and administrative responsibilities; and

directorates: a unit of government smaller in size than a department headed by a director or director-general.

3.072 The organization of government is dynamic and not

static. Since the Martial Law Committee on Organizational Set-up (chaired by the late Brigadier Enamul Huq Khan) completed its work in the early 1980s, the number of departments and directorates have increased by about 20 percent.

3.073 Likewise, when new ministries or divisions have been established, departments have been shifted from one ministry or division to new organizational homes and new departments and divisions were created. For example, when the Ministry of Environment and Forest was established, a new Department of Environment was created and the Forest Department was moved from the Agriculture and Forest Division (under the Ministry of Agriculture) to the new Ministry of Environment and Forest.

3.074 This shows is that government at times does respond to new challenges and adds new responsibilities. It also shifts responsibilities and abolishes governmental units as it periodically redefines its role.

3.075 No established principles are followed in specifying the role of a ministry/division. Functions are allocated largely on the basis of the broad goals of a ministry and as a result, two ministries may duplicate one another's functions.

3.076 Differences among ministries are perceptible insofar as the volume and complexity of their work determine their size, nature of personnel and the extent of functional decentralization.

3.077 Although the early scholars and practitioners of the "science of management" developed "scientific principles of

management" including the "scientific classification of organizations,"⁶ it may be more useful to categorize ministries/divisions into the following functional clusters:

- (1) executive: these organizations are entrusted with the responsibility of directing, controlling and monitoring whole or parts of the governmental machinery;
- (2) regulatory: they are empowered to make rules and regulations and oversee their enforcement;
- (3) service-oriented/welfare: they offer direct services of various kinds to either the general population or special target groups;
- (4) developmental: they are involved in nation building tasks, social and economic uplift and infrastructure development;
- (5) promotional: they serve to promote a particular field of activity in which the country made little progress in the past or which needs further governmental entrepreneurship;
- (6) staff/advisory: they are involved in activities which are auxiliary to the main purposes of government. They also investigate and/or review policy and proposals for the purposes of advising the government on the implications of policy making;
- (7) research: they undertake detailed studies and examinations to provide input into the policy making process and governance; and
- 8) international: these organizations liaise and maintain contacts with foreign countries and international organizations on various aspect of social, political and economic affairs.

3.078 Based on this broad classification, the government's several ministries/divisions may be roughly grouped in the following fashion:

EXECUTIVE

President's Office
Prime Minister's Office
Cabinet Division

REGULATORY

Ministry of Establishment
Finance Division
Internal Resources Division
Local Government, Division
Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Home Affairs
Ministry of Jute
Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism
Ministry of Shipping
Ministry of Lands
Bangladesh Public Service Commission Secretariat
Bangladesh Election Commission Secretariat

SERVICE-ORIENTED/WELFARE

Ministry of Relief
Special Affairs Division
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
Railways Division
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
Ministry of Social Welfare
Ministry of Women's Affairs
Ministry of Food
Ministry of Labour and Manpower

PROMOTIONAL

Ministry of Environment and Forest
Primary Mass Education Division
Education Division
Science and Technology
Ministry of Information
Ministry of Cultural Affairs
Ministry of Youth and Sports
Ministry of Religious Affairs

DEVELOPMENTAL

Ministry of Agriculture
Rural Development and Cooperatives Division
Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control
Roads and Road Transport
Ministry of Industries
Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources
Ministry of Works
Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock
Ministry of Jute
Ministry of Textiles

STAFF/ADVISORY FUNCTIONS

Armed Forces Division
Planning Division
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs
Parliament Secretariat

RESEARCH

Statistical Division
Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Division

INTERNATIONAL

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Economic Relations Division

3.079 Although this functional classification is not a program classification of ministries and divisions, it provides a more precise indication of what the central government does. There can be other ways of classifying ministries by functional categories and the purpose here is to have a total picture of all activities carried out by the central government.

iii. Allocation of Governmental Activities

3.080 The basis of creating an organization is to collectively pursue a set of goals and objectives. Each ministry/division or department/directorate is provided with a set of functions it is supposed to undertake. The several ministries/divisions have been allocated such functions keeping in view their actual role in government. These functions have been allocated among the several ministries/divisions often not according to the criteria of efficiency and economy but on the basis of political expediency. Thus, different dimensions of a single area have been placed under the purview of two or more ministries/divisions. For example, in the Ministry of Jute there

a Department of Jute. However, in the Ministry of Agriculture, there is an autonomous body called the Jute Research Institution, Dhaka. The result has been duplication and overlapping with consequent burden on public expenditure, in the case of jute at least duplicate overhead in terms of administrative costs. More important, this method of allocating functions deemphasizes effectiveness and efficiency, leads to mal-coordination and ultimately to organizational dysfunctions.

3.081 One area which deserves particular consideration in this respect is the management of officers of several civil service cadres. Most ministries/divisions have been given the responsibility to look after personnel belonging to so-called related cadres. The Ministry of Establishment could have been entrusted with the responsibility of managing the careers of all cadres. This not only would have provided coherence to civil service management but would also serve a significant purpose in avoiding inter-cadre rivalry--a phenomenon which is increasingly becoming so ominous today. Another alternative is to reduce the number of ministries, for example from 34 to 20 or grouping them for the purpose of cadre management.

iv. Missions, Goals and Objectives

3.082 The analyses of the Allocation of Business among the different ministries and divisions show that in several ways the allocations were made without considering in detail the probable impact of the allocation of functions on the problems to be addressed. Functions, however, are not the same as goals and

objectives. Functions are areas of operations. The allocated functions must be related to the expected outcomes of the activities of the organization. Goals that are ambiguous and conflicting should be avoided; rather, they should be placed in the appropriate organization.

3.083 The goals and objectives as set out in government documents are not clearly spelled out. Each ministry/division has been allocated a number of items which it is supposed to manage. Some items are so broadly or vaguely listed that it is not possible for anyone to discern what it is supposed to mean. For example, an examination of the functions allocated to the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism is illustrative of this problem (see Table 3.6 below).

Table 3.6
Functions Allocated to the Ministry of Civil Aviation
and Tourism

Function	Description
Civil Aviation	All matters relating to air space control, flight safety, aeronautical inspection, licensing of aircraft and air crew, administration of airports and aerodromes, etc.
Airways and Air Services	
Coordination and Research Relating to this Ministry	
Legislation	relating to civil aviation and tourism
Air Priority	
Registration	of travel agencies
Classification	of hotels
Secretariat Administration	including financial matters
Administration and Control	of subordinate offices and organizations under this Ministry
Liaison	with international organizations and matters relating to treaties and agreements with other countries and world bodies relating to subjects allotted to this Ministry
Laws	on subjects allotted to this Ministry
Inquiries and Statistics	on any of the subjects allotted to this Ministry
Fees	in respect of any of the subjects allotted to this Ministry except fees taken in courts.

Source: Allocation of Business, p. 11.

3.084 There is no relevance of one item to another nor is there any degree of specificity. Simply, some items are mentioned but how each is to be handled has not been clearly

specified. This sort of disjointed itemizing of organizational tasks serves no purpose.

3.085 It may be argued that the objectives of a ministry/division should be developed in a methodical and logical manner and specified to particular hierarchical levels and functional units within it so that these may indicate the desired performance of each part or activity of the organization. In this fashion, it may be possible to efficiently achieve the overall goals of a ministry/division or department/directorate.

3.086 What is required in each ministry, division, department/directorate is the development of specific goals, factored into objectives, and linked to activities. Expected outputs of activities should be specified. Expected outcomes or impacts of the activities of these organizational units should also be specified.

3.087 The nearest example of goal setting which still falls short of the kind of organizational analysis suggested above may be found in public enterprise sector. (See: Autonomous Bodies Budgets produced by the Monitoring Cell.)

3.088 Once systematic organizational analysis is complete, government would then be in a position to shift organizational units from one ministry/division to another to locate the organizational "home" most appropriate for the department/directorate. Once all the shifting of organizations is complete, each ministry would have its new organogram and detailed descriptions of the role and the objectives that each of

its component units is supposed to perform and achieve.

v. Discontinuation of Structures or Units

3.089 Bangladesh does not have a history of abolishing public organizations. But there have been mergers and bifurcations of ministries/divisions and departments/directorates.

3.090 During the Mujibur Rahman period (1972-75), several ministries/divisions were reorganized. This reorganization was dictated by political considerations.

3.091 During the Ziaur Rahman period (1975-82), a thorough reorganization of public sector organizations was undertaken to effect economy in management and to promote effective performance. Mergers, amalgamations and bifurcations of several public corporations took place.

3.092 Some rearrangements have been made by the present democratically-elected government. This rearrangement was necessitated by the political reforms of 1991 that saw the replacement of a presidential system with a parliamentary form of government.

3.093 Some ministries/divisions lost their significance in the new scheme of things while others have become more important. The President's Secretariat which was the centre of political power between 1975 and 1991, has now become an office undertaking housekeeping functions in line with the symbolic role that the President now plays. Five of its seven divisions have been relocated in other ministries or have become separate entities in their own right while the remaining two have been merged to form

one division albeit by reducing some of its functions.

3.094 The Supreme Command Headquarters Division has been renamed the Armed Forces Division. A new Special Affairs Division has been created to look after sensitive issues (Chittagong Hill Tracts, for example).

3.095 The Cabinet Division, Election Commission Secretariat (now Office) and the Parliament Secretariat have all been accorded separate status while the Public Service Commission has been attached to the Ministry of Establishment.

3.096 The Prime Minister's Secretariat, on the other hand, has been accorded a more prominent status and role. Many key departments, hitherto under the jurisdiction of the President, have been placed under its control. Mass primary education has been taken away from the Education Division and made into a Division under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister.

3.097 The External Resources Division, hitherto under the Ministry of Planning, has been placed under the Ministry of Finance and renamed Economic Relations Division. The Ministry of Health and Family Planning has been renamed as Ministry of Health and Family Welfare while Parliamentary Affairs has been added to the Ministry of Law and Justice.

3.098 The reorganization that has been accomplished during past two years was undertaken as (1) part of the transition from a presidential to a parliamentary system and (2) to bring about some changes in government priorities.

3.099 The reorganization that is required now should be

designed to promote clearly, results-oriented performance, transparency and accountability.

vi. Coordination

3.100 Over the past several years, there has been a substantial expansion of government activities. New development enterprises have been launched.

3.101 Although each ministry/division or department/directorate performs more or less self-contained tasks, they cannot work in isolation from one another. Coordination becomes necessary if only because many activities cross organizational boundaries.

3.102 It should be emphasized here the significantly large number of ministries that exist in Bangladesh. The larger the number of ministries, the greater the problem of coordinating these organizational units to accomplish tasks that cut across ministerial boundaries.

3.103 Although inter-ministerial consultations have been prescribed by rules, there is a tendency to by-pass them or to ignore them altogether. Those who represent different ministries do not always come prepared and therefore the consultation meeting fails to produce any positive results. (Interview with government official, April 1993, in Dhaka.)

3.104 Certain ministries/divisions or bodies can be identified as coordinating agencies. Some have been created to achieve that purpose while others have acquired the responsibility over time. The most effective coordinating

mechanism at the highest level is, of course, the Cabinet.

3.105 The Cabinet can play a significant role in removing misunderstandings, resolving conflicts and helping to reach consensus on vital issues. However, because of a number of reasons such as preparations for cabinet meetings, technical knowledge, the ability to express complex problem areas, and level of participation, the Cabinet is unable to play its role effectively.

3.106 Cabinet committees, on the other hand, may be able to facilitate coordination to a large measure. These committees, being smaller in size and more focused than the full Cabinet, can concentrate on the details of a case and come up with concrete proposals.

3.107 However, the problem with committee meetings without the Prime Minister is that often no consensus can be reached because of personality clashes between Ministers. At the same time, the presence of the Prime Minister may inhibit frank discussion among Ministers. The Prime Minister may wish to designate one or two deputy prime ministers to take charge of key cabinet committees. If that is not feasible, he/she may designate senior members of the cabinet to act as committee chairpersons.

3.108 This report does not have a recommendation for strengthening of the role of Cabinet committees as coordinating agencies but it is mentioned to draw attention to a potentially useful coordinating device.

3.109 There are other central coordinating agencies. These include the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Establishment, the Cabinet Division and the Public Service Commission. Each of these agencies are responsible for the coordination of specific functions but an examination and evaluation of their roles was not undertaken.

vii. Redefinition of the Role of the Central Government Through Deregulation and Privatization

3.110 Government is in the process of redefining its role both centrally and locally. At times, this redefinition process appears vague and ambiguous.

3.111 There is public discussion of streamlining government through a "golden handshake" process which will be discussed in Part 5 ("The Management of Human Resources") of this report.

3.112 The initial efforts at privatization received support from the donor community. However, the rate of privatization has slowed resulting in criticism by members of the donor community.

3.113 In the course of the research conducted for this Study, many individuals interviewed asked the researchers if they had uncovered a comprehensive "vision" that has been developed by government leadership regarding what government in Bangladesh should look like in five, ten or fifteen years. The response of the researchers has been a simple "no."

3.114 It may be hoped that the results of this Study may contribute in some way to the creation of a "vision."

viii. Service/Development Bureaucracies

3.115 In theory, a development or service bureaucracy differs from a traditional bureaucracy. The latter performs functions that are regulatory in nature. The former provides services that relate to the social and economic development of the nation.

3.116 In Bangladesh, the two varieties of bureaucracy have been lumped together. Government officer recruits enter the civil service by taking the same examination, undergo the same type of foundation training, have their careers managed in the same way, and even though belonging to different cadres, may find themselves in the same ministry/division. (For example, while there are several officers belonging to the BCS (Economic) cadre in the ministries of Relief, Shipping, Civil Aviation and Tourism, Jute and Cultural Affairs, using their area of specialization in the Ministry of Planning or Ministry of Finance might be a better utilization of scarce human resources.)

3.117 It would therefore be more effective to have different career management for the two types of bureaucracy.

ix. Institutions and Processes for Organizational and Structural Change

3.118 Although each ministry has an Assistant Secretary, Administration, responsible for the ministry's organogram and staffing tables, the principle government agency responsible for vetting reorganization plans is the O & M Wing of the Ministry of Establishment. What this unit does is to review proposed organizational changes in ministries/divisions and departments/directorates. It does not conduct research on

organization and structure of government nor does it provide consulting services on organizational issues for other government units.

3.119 Other national governments have perceived the need for not only vetting proposed organizational changes but to develop the capacity within their governments to conduct applied research on organization, structure and functioning of its government units as well as to provide consulting services for those government organizations wishing to improve their effectiveness and efficiency through reorganization. Other countries in South Asia have increased the skills level and human resource size of their O & M Wings and established them as management services divisions. Singapore has gone even further and privatized this service area as a wholly owned by government but entirely self-financing organization.

x. Decentralization/Deconcentration/Devolution of Power to the Local Level

3.120 Bangladesh has a unitary system of government. In the past, there have been many attempts to decentralize the administrative process and vest greater authority and responsibility in the local level.

3.121 The system largely remains centralized with little scope for deconcentration or devolution of authority.

3.122 Although there are multiple decision making layers in every ministry/division, there is a tendency among the officers below the Secretary level to "pass the buck." When a case is placed before an officer for his/her decision, the most usual

response is to provide a guarded opinion and forward the file to the next higher officer. Each higher officer follows the same pattern until the matter reaches the top. Few officers take risks that are involved in making a decision even if the position he/she is occupying authorizes him/her to do so. One study pointed out:

This tendency to push up things is due to many reasons. One main reason is the lack of experience and knowledge of the working of the Secretariat by Assistant Secretaries and the consequent lack of confidence to take decisions at their level. This situation is further aggravated by a lack of trust in their ability by the superiors and the tendency towards centralization.⁷

3.123 This is not only true for Assistant Secretaries. In the interview data collected for this Study [see Section 4 "Effectiveness and Efficiency in Government Operations"], it was found that some Secretaries refrain from taking action and forward even routine decisions to the Minister. In fact, according to the same interview data, some ministers prefer and appreciate this practice.

3.124 The Secretariat Instructions clearly spells out that "not more than two officers (excluding the Secretary) will note upon a case before its final disposal." (GOB, 1976, p. 26.) The Instructions also specify the jurisdictions of each officer insofar as decision making is concerned. (GOB, 1976, pp. 4-5, 40.)

3.125 In the Huda and Rahman study cited above, documented decision making in the Secretariat. They found the following:

- (1) Only 25 percent of the cases were disposed on file within a week's time of which only one-third were

communicated to the concerned quarters;

- (2) More than half of the correspondence (53.9 percent) were disposed in a month's time of which about two-thirds (63.7 percent) were communicated;
- (3) Over a period of three months or more, 78.1 percent of the cases were cleared on file of which only 68.8 percent were communicated;
- (4) About 10 percent of the disposed cases took more than three months for their disposal;
- (5) A large percentage of the cases (21.9) remained undisposed of in the Ministries of which 67 percent were pending for more than three months;
- (6) One-third (374 cases) of the undisposed cases belonged to ministerial business. Cases in personnel management (215 cases) constituted the second largest category of the undisposed cases.
- (7) Out of 5,125 cases, only 207 belonged to the policy category. Of these, only 126 were disposed during the year. Except in the Ministry of Commerce, very few policy-related cases were dealt with in the other Ministries.

3.126 One reason why dispersion of authority has not occurred in the administrative process is the absence of clear definitions of positions. As there are no job descriptions in the real sense of the term, officers holding important positions are not absolutely certain of the extent of their authority. As it is not always practicable or even desirable to delegate all authority down the line, a distinction must be made between policy interpreting authority and operating authority. The latter involving routine matters and repetitive decisions should be delegated while more important decision making exercises should be retained for top level management.

3.127 Another more democratic form of decision making could

be achieved through collegiality or collective decision making. Because officers are reluctant to make decisions on their own, a more participatory decision system could be introduced. One way of doing it would be through regular (once or twice a week) meetings of officers to decide on cases which cannot be categorized as routine.

3.128 There is ample scope for administrative decentralization. Operating agencies such as departments/directorates are precluded from taking action because of procedural bottlenecks imposed by formal rules. The Public Administration Efficiency Study (1989) identified "a lack of adequate delegation of authority over personnel and financial matters" as "the key constraint on effective Departmental operations and the major cause of delays" (PAES, 1989b, p. 6).

3.129 The heads of attached departments have not been empowered to implement personnel practices. The Ministry of Establishment and the controlling ministries/divisions are entrusted with the responsibility of making appointments, deciding on promotions, transfers, conduct and discipline, etc. A similar pattern is discernible in financial matters. The Departmental purse is "prudently" controlled by the ministries. (PAES, 1989b, pp. 7-8, 12.)

B. Local Government

i. Introduction

3.130 Local government in Bangladesh has a history dating back to the pre-British period.⁸

3.131 A statement from the District Administration Committee Report of 1913-1914 summarized the administration of rural East Bengal during the British colonial period in the following fashion:

. . .The old Bengal, Bihar and Orissa Province was an impossible charge and the Eastern Districts [Bangladesh] were the least favoured portion thereof. . .altogether this difficult country, the most thickly populated rural part of India was administratively starved.⁹

3.132 Virtually all of the revenue to provide services at the local level comes from the central government.

3.133 All the government officials serving outside the Secretariat in Dhaka are assigned, transferred, promoted, disciplined and evaluated by the central government and not local governments.

3.134 Likewise, officials working in local government are responsible and responsive to the central government (their home ministries/divisions) and not to elected local officials. The administrative relationships at the local level are vertical and not horizontal.

3.135 The central government through its locally based officials do not reach the basic organizations at the local level (the villages)--as in the case during the British period, to paraphrase the District Administration Committee Report of 1913-1914, the most thickly populated rural part of Bangladesh is administratively starved.

3.136 The extent to which the needs of Bangladesh's 116 million people for government provided services are being met is not known with any precision and collection of data in this area

was not a requirement in the Study's terms of reference as the local government restructuring was underway at the time the Study was planned.

3.137 However, based on a reading of secondary sources, it is fairly safe to say that these requirements are not being met by government. In part, it is due to the (1) size of population to be served, (2) the limited resources available to government, (3) the manner in which government operations are organized and structured at the local level and, last but not least (4) the lack of information about conditions at the local level.¹⁰ One measure of unmet needs is the attitude of rural people towards government and civil servants. In a survey of 95 farmers regarding their characterization of civil servants, 47.3 percent indicated that civil servants were either "lords" or "separated from the people." (See Table 5.3 in "Civil Service Management.")

ii. Structural and Functional Characteristics

3.138 Table 3.7 reveals the number of government units and villages.

3.139 ~~///~~ The division is the first major layer of government below the central government. Headed by a commissioner, the division played a coordinating role with regard to government activities in the districts. This coordinating role was never as strong as the role played by divisions in West Pakistan in the old United Pakistan days. Further, this role diminished substantially as a result of practices in successive regimes since 1971. Consequently, the division has been described by

Table 3.7
Local Government Structure

Type of Unit	Number*
Divisions	5 Average Population 23 million
Districts	64 Average Population 1.8 million
Thanas	487 Average Population 236,140
Unions	4,451 Average Population 25,837
Villages	86,650 Average Population 1,343

*Discussions are underway regarding making Sylhet a division. If this takes place, the number of divisions would increase to six.
 Source: "Local Government in Bangladesh: Retrospect and Prospect (Chapter VI)," in United Nations Development Programme, Human Development in Bangladesh: Decentralization for Local Action, Dhaka: UNDP, March 1993, p 68.

some as playing no more than a "post office box" role in district administration.

3.140 The role of the district and the deputy commissioner at its head has also gone through a change from the pre-independence period. As the critical unit of the vice regal system during the British period, the district in Bangladesh and the role of the deputy commissioner has been reduced. Line agency officials no longer report to the deputy commissioner. However, the deputy commissioner indirectly controls activities at the thana level through his/her thana nirbahi (executive) officers (TNOs).

3.141 The role of the thana and the thana nirbahi officer or TNO in local government remains strong. The TNO performs the role of financial controller for all funds channelled down to the

thana level and below. This means that line agency officials operating at the thana and below levels must secure permission from the TNO before funds can be released for government projects. The TNOs report vertically to the deputy commissioner in each district. (See Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Manual on Thana Administration, Volume I, Dacca: February 1983, for the listing of duties of the TNO.)

3.142 The farthest down the organizational pyramid that government assigns personnel is the union level. Some programmes and services do reach the village level but not all villages are part of programme or service delivery networks.

3.143 Rural Bangladesh has witnessed a number of government-sponsored rural development schemes reaching back to Village AID in the 1950s through the Rural Works Programme in the 1960s to the present Food for Works and other poverty alleviation schemes. Some of these rural development schemes are directly administered by government agencies while others are part of the efforts of over 500 Non-Government organizations operating in Bangladesh (see section 1.B.ii, "The Case of Poverty Alleviation").

3.144 In the case of poverty alleviation programmes, what exists in Bangladesh today are two parallel service delivery systems, one that government is responsible for with the line ministries/divisions and departments/directorates involved and the other being administered and management by Non-Government Organizations. In some cases there are cooperative efforts between the government organizations and NGOs. In other cases

the government unit runs its programme and the NGO runs its programme, with relatively little interaction. Rough calculations were made of the expenditures of government on poverty alleviation programmes compared to what NGOs spend. The government-NGO ratio was approximately 7:1.

iii. Decision-Making and Coordination of Government Services

3.145 Programmatic and financial decision making regarding government sponsored development projects and service delivery do not take place at the village or thana level. Rather, each line agency makes the decisions to extend services or initiate new projects in Dhaka. Coordination of service delivery takes place in Dhaka and not in the field. Decision-making and coordination at the central government level effectively eliminates the autonomy of local government bodies.

iv. Redefinition of the Role of Local Government Resulting from Central Government Decisions

3.146 The question of what is the optimal local government political and administrative system has been a perennial one in Bangladesh since independence in 1971. Several attempts to make changes in the inherited vice regal system have been made by previous regimes.

3.147 Current restructuring efforts have been initiated by the Government of Bangladesh with assistance from the donor community. The central government agency involved is the Local Government Division.

3.148 After the elections in 1991, the new government began

the process of making changes in the local government system it inherited from the Ershad regime:

In late 1991, the government dissolved all Upazila Parishads and later the name upazila was also changed to thana. On 25 November 1991, a Local Government Structure Review Commission was created under the chairmanship of the Minister of Information to recommend a new local government structure. The Commission in its work kept in view the constitutional provision that the state will encourage the establishment of representative local governments at various levels in which farmers, workers and women will be represented as adequately as possible. The 12th Amendment of the Constitution provided that local self-governments be constituted by elected representatives. (Human Development in Bangladesh: Decentralization for Local Action, p. 61.)

3.149 Rather than pursue decentralization,¹¹ the Commission sought to devolve power.¹² For rural areas, a two-tier local government system

consisting of the Union Parishad and the Zila Parishad was recommended and for urban areas, [it] also recommends Pourashavas. . . and City Corporations for the larger cities, as is already the case. At the thana level, a Thana Development and Coordination Committee, not a local government tier is recommended. Further, the Commission recommends on Gram Shava (village assembly), again not a local government tier, to be constituted by representatives of all villages within a union, to serve as the conduit for involving village residents effectively in the local self-government process. (Human Development in Bangladesh: Decentralization for Local Action, p. 62.)

3.150 On the tax issue, the Commission recommended relocation of ". . . a substantial number of tax sources from the thana to the union level. . . [and] . . . emphasizes the need for efficiency in tax collection." (Human Development in Bangladesh: Decentralization for Local Action, p. 62.)

3.151 While new structures are anticipated, during the transitional period the operational system still remains under the control of the TNO.

3.152 These efforts lead in the direction of increased local decision-making. However, as long limited financial resources characterize local government, autonomy¹³ of local government organizations in the exact meaning of the term will not exist.

3.153 As evident from our interviews, the real challenges in establishing an appropriate local government system in Bangladesh, as envisaged in the Constitution (Articles 59+60) arises from lack of adequate pressures from the local people and their institution and delay from administrative and political leadership to encourage the development of a locally based political process by sharing power, responsibility and authority with elected local government bodies. People and institutions at the local level are not well organized for local level actions due to various reasons. Development Programmes in various socio-economic areas including activities of non-governmental organizations have generated some interest, but not adequate for building an effective pressure group. In the past, efforts by authoritarian regimes in creating local bodies were tainted by their primary need to obtain political support. This did not facilitate the development of an autonomous political process at these levels. Recently, the process of democratization has started in the country, but as yet the culture of sharing power with people and their institutions at the grassroots level has not yet developed. This concern, it must be noted, is evident in many developing countries struggling to establish a viable local government system.

3.154 A viable local government system is needed for developing both political process and political leadership at the local level to complement political process and leadership at the national level. It is also needed to devolve and decentralize government services nearer to the people and develop an accountable administrative process at the local level to complement the accountable administrative system at the national level. The development of such a viable local government, as shown in experiences from other countries, require an act of faith, trust and commitment and a non-partisan consensus among the elected members of national parliament - a consensus similar to the one they formed in transforming the Constitution for Parliamentary Government in 1991.

End Notes

1. The parliament (Jatiya Sangsad) is a one-chamber house with 300 directly elected members and 30 (reserved seats for women) members elected by the directly elected members. Each of the directly elected members represent a single member constituency demarcated on the basis of population.

2. This power was used recently by Shaikh Razzak Ali, Speaker of the Jatiyo Sangsad, to establish "a parliamentary committee to investigate allegations of corruption brought against [the] Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control Minister. . ."

See: The Daily Star, June 28, 1993. This committee was established by an unanimous vote on July 13, 1993. In the press coverage of this event, it was stated:

This is for the first time in the country's parliamentary history that the JS [Jatiya Sangsad] has constituted a House probe to scrutinise the activities of a particular ministry.

See: "Parliamentary probe body formed at last," The Daily Star, Wednesday, July 14, 1993.

3. The breakdown of the respondents were as follows: 60 high ranking civil servants (Additional Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and heads of departments); 80 mid-level civil servants (Deputy Secretaries, senior field officials and equivalent); 25 Class II and Class III officials; 29 journalists writing for Dhaka dailies and weeklies); and 38 teachers and other non-civil servants.

4. The following information is taken from "Bangladesh: Assistance for Democracy and Good Government," a report produced by the British High Commission, Dhaka, June 22, 1993.

5. See: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development, "Administrative Structure and Civil Service Systems in Asian Countries," 1993, draft; and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development, "Administrative Structure and Civil Service Systems in France, Germany, Sweden, and United Kingdom," 1993, draft.

6. See the classic Principles of Scientific Management edited by Luther Gulick, et. al., published in 1937. In addition to the broad categories of "line" and "staff," the classification criteria Gulick suggested included task, process, clientele and geographic location or area encompassed.

7. A. T. M. S. Huda and M. A. Rahman. (1989) Delay in the Disposal of Cases: A Structural Analysis of the Bangladesh Secretariat. Dhaka: Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre.

8. For a brief history of local government in what is now Bangladesh, see: "Local Government in Bangladesh: Retrospect and Prospect (Chapter VI)," in United Nations Development Programme, Human Development in Bangladesh: Decentralization for Local Action, Dhaka: UNDP, March 1993, pp. 56-61.

9. Government of Bengal. (1915) District Administration Committee Report, 1913-1914, Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press, p. 16. Cited in Badiur Rahman, "Local Level Planning in Bangladesh: Problems, Prospect and Dilemmas," A Background Concept Paper prepared for presentation in the discussion forum organised and sponsored jointly by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) and presented in August 1991 in Dhaka. The parenthesis around "Bangladesh" in the quotation were Badiur Rahman's.

10. As recently as 1986, the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics stated:

Government agencies carrying out censuses and surveys on several subjects also collect statistics as by-products of administration. Very rarely these statistics become available to the people or even to government agencies at local levels. Moreover, all the statistics that are required at the Mauza/Union/Upazila for planning and preparing development projects are never fully covered by Government organizations. A great portion of Government socio-economic statistics are collected through sample surveys and these cannot be desegregated at the Mauza/Union/Upazilla level.

(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, "Background Note for the Steering Committee on Community Level Statistics," 1986, p. 1 as cited in Badiur Rahman, "Local Level Planning in Bangladesh: Problems, Prospect and Dilemmas." A Background Concept Paper prepared for presentation in the discussion forum sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme and the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB). Dhaka: August 1991, p. 10.)

11. Decentralization ". . . essentially means that the central government retains all powers but transfers some of those . . . to local government for execution. . . under this disposition, local governments are extensions of the central government, and remain responsible to the central government and not to the local people." (Human Development in Bangladesh: Decentralization for Local Action, p. 61.

12. Devolution of power means that ". . . through constitutional provisions, representative local self-governments are created, which are responsible to the local people and not to the central government. . . Under [devolution of power]. . . autonomy of local self-government is ensured." (Human Development in Bangladesh: Decentralization for Local Action, p. 61.)

13. The words associated with the definition of autonomy are:
"independence," "sovereignty," "freedom," and "home rule."

4. DECISION-MAKING

4.01 Decision-making may be divided into five parts:

- (1) the process of using information in decision making as well as keeping track of decisions and cases;
- (2) where the decision making authority resides and how decisions are taken;
- (3) the delegation of authority and responsibility;
- (4) aberrations in decision-making; and
- (5) the use of technology in management.

4.02 Internal management is very much involved in the making of decisions and the implementation of these decisions.

Control in organizations is normally accomplished by delineating areas of decision making and allocating to those areas individuals who possess both authority to make decisions and who have the responsibility to see that those decisions are, in fact, implemented.

4.03 The process of decision-making was inherited from the British colonial system. It is characterized by the movement of paper (files) from one level to another in the hierarchy. A noting system is prescribed and officers are assigned the responsibility of ensuring that each case (file) within his/her area is disposed of, either by taking the final decision on the case or moving it upward or downward for vetting. At one time, the measure of the efficiency of a civil servant was how quickly he/she disposed of a file.

A. **The "Paper Chase"--Vetting and Noting**

4.04 It is alleged that Lord Curzon, serving as Viceroy of India, once remarked that as long as Indians retained their love for the file, remained accustomed to pushing up the file,

maintained their clerical attitude, ". . .surely we [the British] have the right to rule over them and India rightly deserve[s] to be administered as a colony."¹

4.05 The vetting and noting system which presently exists in the Government of Bangladesh was described for the researchers

There are major factors within the Government that lead to slow implementation. The main factor is that the process of decision making is very slow. Files move up and down, back and forth. On minor matters, files go up for decision. The system is so fraught with delays that even if all officials involved are well-meaning, still it takes time. According to the Country Economic Memorandum prepared by the World Bank for the Paris Aid Group Meeting, the time to decide on a contract in the power sector is twenty-four months. The question is what changes can be made in the decision making process to avoid delays. [The answers relate] to delegation of authority. (Interview with official of the donor community, May 16, 1993, in Dhaka.)

4.06 At present, too many layers are involved in the Secretariat procedures starting from Section Assistant and going upwards to the Secretary of the Government.

4.07 Not only are there vertical layers but there also exists multiple horizontal layers contributing to the paper chase. Often times these layers are not involved in the decision making process.

4.08 Although the layers within the government have been significantly reduced since independence in 1971, the rules of file management, i.e., "putting up a file," remain the same.

4.09 Consultation and coordination and inter-ministerial committees are often seen playing informational roles in the decision making process. However, only after the decisions are taken are responses from related agencies advanced causing further delays in the process.

4.10 Multi-layered decision making also requires clients to

follow their cases personally and therefore wastes valuable time.

4.11 This system contributes to the paper chase.

B. The Decision-Making Loci

4.12 At the apex of the decision making process in the political executive is the Prime Minister. Moving down the hierarchy is the Cabinet followed by individual Ministers.

4.13 In the permanent executive, each Secretary is the chief executive and accounting officer in the ministry/division. Moving down the hierarchy, is the Joint Secretary followed by the Deputy Secretary. Senior Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries do not have major decision making responsibilities.

4.14 However, in this period of transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic one where the political executive dominates the permanent executive, it is not clear where decision lines are drawn in certain ministries/divisions. The Formulation Mission commented on decision delays in the following fashion:

Apparently, decisions are actually moved upward, to the highest level, especially when decisions involve personnel (posting, transfer, promotion and discipline) and finances (purchase of supplies and equipment) and even programmatic (approval of loan applications and dispersals by various levels). This shift of responsibility upward has resulted in serious consequences (especially delays) in performance of all key functions. For example, policy making, policy detailing and policy communications are the major functions of the Minister and senior ministry officials, but they are usually busy doing housekeeping and personnel functions. Similarly, policy and programme detailing and implementing through the handling of specific cases are the responsibility of lower level officials, but cases are pushed up to higher levels, leaving lower level officials redundant. One interviewee stated that structure had broken down, discipline has

broken down and there is complete demoralisation of staff. Officials with responsibility to take decisions are behaving like clerks.²

There was one reported case of a Secretary who passed all decisions up to the Minister, both major and minor ones.

4.15 Prolonged and delayed decisions appear to be the norm as opposed to the exception. A few cases will illustrate this point.

The Case of the Bangladesh Education Equipment Board:
Centralization, Decision Delay and Waste

4.16 The Bangladesh Educational Equipment Board was established in 1981, and construction of the building to house the BEEB was initiated and the Board began to purchase equipment shortly after its establishment. However, the technical, administrative and financial sanctions took a long time. A commercial feasibility study of the BEEB was undertaken nine years after it was established (in 1990). The study revealed an outlay of Tk. 178.6 million against tangible assets of Tk. 76.9 million. Tk. 101.7 million was spent on pay and allowances, remuneration, consulting fees. In May 1991, the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council decided to liquidate government's investment and privatize the BEEB.

4.17 The fact that government proceeded to establish BEEB without conducting a feasibility study reveals decision making without adherence to the basics of accountability, a fundamental lack of knowledge in this area and inadequate decision making capacity.

The Case of Family Planning:
Multi Layered Decision Making

4.18 The case involved creating incremental posts in development project and began in 1987. The first step involved the Director General of Family Planning (DGFP) preparing the description [of the incremental posts]. Step 2, the DGFP submitted the description to Ministry of Health. Step 3, Ministry of Health cleared and submitted it to the Ministry of Establishment. Step 4, the Ministry of Establishment approved it and submitted it to the Ministry of Finance for their comment on approval of funds (sometimes Ministry of Finance comments more on the human resources issue than on the financial aspect). Step 5, the Ministry of Finance approved it and sent it back to the Ministry of Health. Step 6, the Ministry of Health checked with the Surplus Branch in the Ministry of Establishment to see if there were any candidates on the Surplus List (who have priority to the posts). Step 7, once this is completed, the Ministry of Health advertized, interviewed and hired.

4.19 There have been improvements since 1987. In the case of approved projects, the Ministry concerned directly issues G.O. creating the posts. After the posts are created, the Project Director or Heads of Departments can recruit Class II and IV staff, while the rest require approval of the Ministry. As a measure to obtain quick approval by the Ministry no clearance is needed from any other Ministry.

4.20 However, since all posts under the development budget are to be filled up on the basis of recruitment rules which are approved by the Establishment Division after a very

complicated and dilatory system of scrutiny by a number of ministries and organizations, delays can occur. In view of the length of time required for framing such rules, ministries have been recruiting personnel on self approved rules which are generally based on those pertaining to revenue posts.

4.21 Despite improvements in the processes and procedures of appointment of personnel in development projects since 1987, the practice of multi-layered decision making in the development area is compounded by the inadequate delegation of financial authority to Project Directors or Heads of Departments and the absence of clearly defined guidelines regarding the level of authority empowered to decide on project programmes.

C. Delegation of Authority and Responsibility

4.22 A case of delegation of authority and responsibility will illustrate some of the problems in this area. This case examines delegated powers and actual practice.

The Case of Delegation of Financial Powers

4.23 Delegation of Financial Powers under Government Order (G.O) of August 1982, August 1983 and June 1985 still guide decision making in the management and implementation of development projects. As the following analysis reveals, the existing arrangements in terms of delegation of powers are inadequate to support and sustain development exercises of large magnitude.

4.24 The booklet published by the Economic Relations Division (ERD) on the present arrangement for the purchase of goods and the appointment of consultants, which includes reference to

the financial powers of project directors for implementation of projects, refers mainly to the Government Order of 1985 wherein the powers of the different layers of authority have been specified. A brief classification of the authorities with their powers are given below:

1. Boards of Directors/Heads of Agencies--(a) Taka 1 crore (ten million) for consultancy. Other purchases--Taka 5 crores (50 million). Smaller corporations and smaller executing agencies have authority for purchases of 2.5 crores (25 million).
2. Ministers (a) Consultancy--3 crores (30 million)
(b) Other Purchases--2.5 crores (25 million)
3. Council Committee--amounts exceeding those of the Ministerial level.

4.25 However, while the delegation of powers to the project directors for project implementation is commendable, the Ministry of Finance is not willing to apply the provisions, thus negating chances of successful delegation of powers. The order itself suffers from another anomaly in the sense that while heads of autonomous corporations can effect purchases up to Tk. 5 crores (50 million), Secretaries of ministries have no such authority. Purchases above the limit indicated for corporate heads have to be put up to the Ministry for approval.

Written and Unwritten Delegation of Authority

4.26 At times authority is delegated but written and unwritten directives are there that require consultation with the high ups before implementation of a decision. In compliance with these invisible requirements, the files have to travel the whole length of the hierarchy.

4.27 The process generates more queries and marginal issues

which sidetracks the process. A case in point is provided below.

The Case of the Manhole Covers

4.28 During the early 1980s, Dhaka WASA invited tenders for supplying manhole covers and the Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory, Gazipur, was successful in competition in the bidding. The quotation of the factory was the lowest and the tender was accepted. Dice were designed and samples were manufactured and supplied following the approval of which a Work/Supply order was issued by Dhaka WASA. Production was started to meet the deadline for supplying the manhole covers. However, when the Ministry of Industries (which was the controlling ministry for Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory, Gazipur, was asked to approve the contract, a query was raised as to the validity of the quoted price. Why was the quoted price so low and not high enough to help the BMTF earn more profit? The file moved up and down. Eventually, the production of manhole covers had to be stopped and the contract was terminated by the WASA. In this abortive arrangement, the Machine Tools Factory sustained a substantial loss although in their estimates, they expected to earn a profit of several million taka.

4.29 The present delegation of power is insignificant and incapable of supporting and sustaining complex development efforts of major dimensions. Nearly all matters have to be referred to the controlling ministry for a decision. For example, even the purchase of tires worth Tk. 10,000 and stationery worth Tk. 5,000 require the sanction of the

ministry. Project directors cannot sanction such purchases.

4.30 At the same time that control is exercised over very small expenditures of funds, large scale leakage of funds takes place. The rules and regulations regarding delegation of authority and the assignment of responsibility have to be examined and revised to promote transparency and accountability in the government.

D. Some Aberrations in Decision-making

4.31 It is a common belief that decisions in government are often influenced by subjective reasons and do not serve public interests. Public power and authority are abused for private individual or group gains that may have far reaching implications and may be highly demoralizing. Applied to economic activities such aberrations can be highly detrimental to development and may weaken the trust of the people in their government. Recently a Report of the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), a joint service of the IFC, MIGA and the World Bank on "Policy, Regulatory and Incentive Regimes Affecting Private Foreign and Domestic Investment in Bangladesh" caused a great furore in the media. Quoting the said Report, the Daily Star came out with a headline on May 20, 1993 stating "INVESTMENT IN BANGLADESH - MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS NEEDED". This article stated that lack of accountability and complex administrative procedures, coupled with "gross abuses" and bureaucratic interference, were the primary impediments to investment in the country. The FIAS Report noted that "The lack of public accountability is reinforced by the fact that typically no reports are made

of the time taken to process applications for various types of commercial transactions. Those who know to navigate through the administrative maze are able to proceed, while others have to wait for extended periods." Administrative review is difficult, time consuming and generally unrewarding and judicial oversight is hard to obtain". The report goes on to say that "Government intervention and rent-seeking have corroded the judicial, administrative and commercial machinery of country. Access can, and frequently does, have its price. Officials simply do not take action or refuse to take action without sufficient "encouragement." When decisions are finally taken, they can often be arbitrary, and moreover, there is little effective recourse to administrative or judicial appeal. .

4.32 Bureaucratic or political corruption was not a subject or enquiry of this Study Team. However, some of the consultants to the Study Team were confronted in many ways with matters relating to corruptions that the Study Team thought it relevant to underscore some pertinent issues, consideration of which cannot be bypassed in studying the prevailing administrative behaviour. One should, of course, hasten to mention that corruption is neither a new phenomenon nor is it unique to Bangladesh. It is interesting to note that as far back as in 1893, Carl Schurz mentioned that while one aim of civil service reform (related to America) was "an improved conduct of the public business," there were more important issues also to reckon. .

But the ultimate end of Civil service reform is something far more important than a mere improvement

in the machinery of administration. It is to elevate the character of our political life by eliminating from it as much as possible the demoralizing elements of favouritism and of mercenary motives which under the spoils system have become the moving powers in our politics. It is to rescue our political parties, and in a great measure our public affairs, from the control of men whose whole statesmanship consists in the low arts of office-mongering, and many of whom would never have risen to power had not the spoils system furnished them the means and opportunities for organizing gangs of political followers as mercenary as themselves. It is to restore ability, high character, and true public spirit once more to their legitimate spheres in our public life, and to make active politics once more attractive to men of self-respect and patriotic aspirations. (Harper's Weekly, July 01, 1893).

What was said about the polity of America a hundred years ago would seem to be relevant to Bangladesh as she is struggling to give the country a transparent and accountable democratic government.

4.33 The Interregional Seminar on "Corruption in Government" organized by the United Nations in The Hague, the Netherlands on 11-15 December, 1989, (Ref TCD/SEM. 90/2, INT-89-R56, published in 1990) came to certain conclusions much of which are also relevant to Bangladesh conditions. The seminar found that:

Corruption takes place as a result of inadequacies in existing public management systems, as well as social, cultural, political and economic factors. Causes of corruption include the persistence of traditional values and cultural approaches, poverty, ignorance and lack of knowledge about individual entitlements, greed and patronage.

The seminar identified many other causes of corrupt practices and misconduct in government, among them are:

. . . extension of the public sector to the point where management of the economy and provision of services become inefficient; the asymmetry of relationships favouring those in control of state power; stifling

entrepreneurship and competition; economic shortages in which public officials assume extraordinary control over scarce goods and services; weakening of supervision and effective public control over the administration; and erosion of the civic spirit in modern political systems.

The seminar also observed that "the absence of administrative/legal regulations and a morass of rules open to manipulation can provide opportunities for corruption".

4.34 At one time there were popular notions about corruption being rooted only in few branches of the government having powers to impose taxes and levies, take punitive actions or bestow favours, and that these instances were confined mainly to lower hierarchies of those departments. The notions have now changed, and corruption is now considered to be all pervasive, creeping upwards even to very high echelons which may tend to affect policy formulation and make obtaining redresses more difficult. In theory, there could be three major remedies for corruption; namely, penal action (necessary but effective only for major crimes), appeal to moral sense (desirable but ineffective), and removal of temptations which calls for civil service reform. No wonder the FIAS report stated emphatically that "the entire administrative apparatus of the government needs to be made transparent and accountable," and also suggested that:

the most pressing needs in the field of Bangladeshi law to day are: (1) strengthening of the general legal framework; (2) establishing public confidence in the reliability of regular law enforcement; (3) speedy, competent, independent and impartial administration of justice; and (4) transparency of legal rules as well as proceedings. Necessary reforms in more specific technicalities of commercial law can only bear fruit in correction with fundamental, long-term reforms.

4.35 As regards the institutional devices useful in dealing

with corruption in government, particularly, institutionalized corruption, the UN Seminar had noted the following issues to be of relevance:

- o Supervision and control of administrative procedure.
- o Political responsibility/parliamentary control.
- o Administrative law and judicial control.
- o Administrative courts.
- o Administrative tribunals.
- o Administrative law reforms.
- o The Ombudsman system.

4.36 For the nascent democracy in Bangladesh, among others, the following would appear important in minimizing corruption and strengthening the confidence of the public in its government. The following ideas from these previous reports are mutually reinforcing with the recommendations of the Study Team: (1) separate the judiciary from the executive and establish meaningfully the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary; (2) introduce as much transparency to government actions as feasible and permit easy access to information for the public; (3) remove regulations and controls of the government in public affairs to the maximum possible extent, but strengthen monitoring capability to watch and protect public interests; (4) institutional democracy, ensure freedom of the press and allow people and the public representatives to question and scrutinize public actions; and (5) appoint the Ombudsman.

E. The Use of Technology

4.37 There are many ministries and organizations which have

already equipped themselves with computers or are in the process of doing so. But to what extent this new technology is helping to improve management remains a moot question.

4.38 One of the best equipped is the Public Administration Computer Centre (PACC) of the Establishment Division which has a Honeywell Super-Mini computer which was installed in 1986 with USAID assistance. The Honeywell has 25 terminals of which 12 are used by the operators and 12 are distributed among various high officials in the Ministry of Establishment, including the Minister, Establishment Secretary, Additional Secretary, all Joint Secretaries, four Deputy Secretaries, the Cabinet Secretary and also the Prime Minister's office through a modem.

4.39 The PACC also has two Apple p.c.'s and four IBM p.c.'s. Combined, the system maintains information on about 4,200 officers. The PACC also maintains all foreign training records of officers of all cadres. The security system has not been fully tested.

4.40 One of the important assignments of the PACC has recently been started--provision of computer training to different grades of officers. The scheme is to provide 15 days of two hour per day hands on training to officers in batches of 10 each. So far, two batches have been trained.

4.41 PACC management maintains that their training system for officers is more effective than the short training on word processing that is being imparted to officers undergoing Foundation Training at the Public Administration Training Centre (PATC).

4.42 Although PACC is investigating the use of computers for general management improvement, simplifying filing and noting systems, recording, keeping records of decisions and following up the status of their implementation, establishing accountability of officers and so on, considerable research and development is required in these areas.

4.43 The computer system installed in the Prime Minister's Secretariat is comprised of an IBM PC/2-Model 30 with 20-25 units arranged on LAN. The system is supposed to record and follow up Cabinet decisions but is unable to do so as of yet. One problem is that the main server is too slow for this purpose. The system here is not linked with the various ministries who are concerned with the implementation of decisions of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

4.44 The computer installed at the ERD for maintaining aid accounts or at the IMED for imputing and processing limited amounts of information regarding project implementation seem to be carrying out these limited functions as planned. However, no serious efforts have yet been made to expand the scope of their utilization or to use them for personnel management.

4.45 Most government departments are now equipped with some sort of computers but many of them are believed to be heavily underutilized.

4.46 The use of the computer for improving the basic functions of government organizations has not been attempted seriously. Some examples will illustrate this last statement.

4.47 The Public Service Commission started experimenting with

the computerization of its examination system by using the IBM mainframe computer available at the Bangladesh University of Engineering Technology. Encouraged with the results, PSC secured technical assistance from the World Bank to install their own computer system using advanced model p.c.'s. The system is still underutilized and no attempt as yet has been made to use the computers for simple functions such as budgeting, maintenance of accounts and personnel management.

4.48 Another example is the Parliament Secretariat and The Asia Foundation's attempt to introduce computers to speed up the publication of records of parliamentary debates and to perform other informational tasks. However, this project has not progressed very far.

4.49 Not much progress has been made in Bangladesh in the use of modern technologies for the improvement of management efficiency. However, this does not mean that modern technology cannot be used to improve internal management and control.

End Notes

1. A. Z. M. Shamsul Alam, "File Pusher Officers," Bangladesh Observer, July 5, 1993.
2. A. T. R. Rahman and Jeanne-Marie Col, Public Administration Sector Study in Bangladesh, Formulation Mission Report, New York: Public Administration Branch, UNDES, 8-29 October 1992, p. 13.

5. CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT

5.001 In the section which follows, several critical issues in the management of the civil service of the Government of Bangladesh are examined and analyzed. They include: (A) perceived status of the civil service in Bangladesh; (B) inter-service tensions; (C) evaluation of current government personnel practices; (D) quantity of human resources; and (E) the role and status of women in government service.

A. Perceived Status of the Civil Service in Bangladesh

5.002 In the years immediately following the partition of British India and the establishment of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, several retired Indian Civil Service officers began to provide their histories of colonial administration in the Indian Sub-Continent.¹

5.003 Among the themes that the authors stressed included the fair and impartial rule of law, the prestige of the Central Superior Services, and the attempt to administer a vast, heavily populated area with a handful of Plato's "philosopher kings."

5.004 For the first two decades of independence (the 1950s and 1960s), the status and role of the civil services of both India and Pakistan were substantial. Families encouraged their children to prepare for, take and pass the competitive examination to enter the civil service academy and selection as an IAS or CSP officer was an honor and a privilege.

5.005 In the 1970s, the status of the civil service began to change in the newly independent People's Republic of Bangladesh

and the part of the original Pakistan which retained the title of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

5.006 Both the regimes of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought to remove the elite status of their civil services and to open up the civil service to the middle classes of their countries.

5.007 The desirability of a civil service career for the "best and the brightest" in both Bangladesh and Pakistan began to diminish.

5.008 This is not to say that the Civil Service of Bangladesh does not have extremely intelligent and dedicated officers. Rather, the career alternatives in business and the professions were pursued more diligently by the sons and daughters of those families who could afford university educations for their offspring.

5.009 Given the employment situation in Bangladesh, a government position is still a very desirable job. But the question is, "Is government service attracting its fair share of high quality individuals?"

5.010 One source of information on the perceived status of the civil service comes from the content analysis of open ended responses from 34 "elite" respondents to a semi-structured questionnaire. The findings of the researchers/interviewers are as follows:

If there has been any unanimity in the responses of the interviewees it has been in their assessment of the quality level of civil servants. They have all expressed their dismay at the deterioration in the quality level and

efficiency of officials.' Quality has deteriorated over the years because of various reasons [cited by the respondents], including the following:

- (1) low level quality of education has led to deterioration in the quality of people entering the civil service;
- (2) low level of salary, erosion of prestige, status and job satisfaction has made the civil service less attractive to the brighter candidates; and
- (3) the first recruitment into the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) after independence in 1971 occurred in 1973 without proper examination--this recruitment of a large number of officers was undertaken because of shortages of personnel at the district and subdivision levels.

Additional interview data suggest another reason for the perceived deterioration of the quality of the civil service, namely, induction² of East Pakistan Provincial Civil Service officers into the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre shortly after 1971-without providing these officers with the training necessary to undertake new and quite different duties and responsibilities.

5.011 A survey of civil servants appointed during the last decade (1980s) was conducted by 91 specialists selected by the Public Service Commission. The results of the survey were published in the Dainik Bangla on May 22, 1993. None of the 91 specialists felt that the best students were joining the civil service; 74 percent of the specialists felt that most of those appointed to the civil service had been "average" students while 26 percent of the specialists felt that those appointed had been "lower standard" or less than average students.

5.012 But are the above assessments* only those of an older

generation alleging that more recent generations do not have the same kinds of values as themselves or that their education was superior? Answers to these questions may be revealed, in part, in survey research undertaken for this Study. Two surveys containing structured questions were conducted for this Study involving recent graduates (58) from the University of Dhaka and recent technical/scientific graduates (21) from technical universities and colleges on their perceptions of the civil service.³ The results are shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2.

5.013 The responses from the University of Dhaka graduates indicate:

- (1) 52 out of 58 felt that all civil servants (encadred and nonencadred) were well respected by people-at-large;
- (2) almost two-thirds felt that encadred civil servants were neither dedicated to nor conscientious about their jobs;
- (3) 35 out of 58 (sixty percent) of the respondents thought that encadred civil servants were involved in corruption;
- (4) slightly more than one-half felt that encadred civil servants were as qualified as their counterparts in business;
- (5) more than two-thirds felt that encadred civil servants had more opportunities for career advancement than other members of the civil service;
- (6) almost three-fourths believed that encadred civil servants held interesting jobs;
- (7) slightly more than one-third believed that encadred civil servants performed their jobs effectively and efficiently;

Table 5.1
Perceptions of the Status of Civil Servants by 58 Recent
Graduates of the University of Dhaka

Do you believe that civil servants:	Yes (%)	No (%)
(in general and encadred civil servants in particular) are well respected by people at large?	52 (89.6)	6 (10.3)
(encadred) are dedicated and conscientious to their work?	21 (36.2)	37 (63.7)
are corrupt?	35 (60.3)	23 (39.6)
(encadred) are as well qualified as their private sector counterparts?	32 (55.1)	26 (44.8)
(encadred) have more opportunities for career advancement than other branches of the civil service?	39 (67.2)	19 (32.7)
(encadred) perform interesting jobs?	43 (74.1)	15 (25.8)
(in general and encadred civil servants in particular) are performing their jobs in effective and efficient manners?	20 (34.4)	38 (65.5)
(encadred) enjoy greater tenure of service compared to their counterparts in the private sector?	46 (79.3)	12 (20.6)
<u>Would you like to make a career as a encadred civil servant even if you have other career options in the private sector?</u>	<u>36 (62.0)</u>	<u>22 (37.9)</u>

Source: M. Mohabbat Khan, Research on Civil Service Management, June 1993.

Table 5.2
Perceptions of the status of Civil Servants 21 Recent
Graduates of Technical Universities and Colleges

Do you believe that civil servants:	Yes (%)	No (%)
(in general and encadred civil servants in particular) are well respected by people at large?	0	21
(encadred) are dedicated and conscientious to their work?	0	21
are corrupt?	21	0
(encadred) are as well qualified as their private sector counterparts?	18 (85.7)	3 (14.2)
(encadred) have more opportunities for career advancement than other branches of the civil service?	15 (71.4)	6 (28.5)
(encadred) perform interesting jobs?	2 (9.5)	19 (90.4)
(in general and encadred civil servants in particular) are performing their jobs in effective and efficient manners?	0	21
(encadred) enjoy greater tenure of service compared to their counterparts in the private sector?	8 (38.0)	13 (61.9)
<u>Would you like to make a career as a encadred civil servant even if you have other career options in the private sector?</u>	<u>7 (33.3)</u>	<u>14 (66.6)</u>

Source: M. Mohabbat Khan, Research Study on Civil Service Management, July 1993.

- (8) more than two-thirds believed that encadred civil servants enjoyed greater tenure of service compared to their counterparts in the private sector; and
- (9) not quite two-thirds indicated that they would make a career as a encadred civil servant even if they had other career options in the private sector.

5.014 The graduates of technical universities and colleges

had different opinions than the liberal arts graduates. Their responses were as follows:

- (1) none felt that all civil servants (encadred and nonencadred) were well respected by people-at-large;
- (2) none felt that encadred civil servants were dedicated to nor conscientious about their jobs;
- (3) all of the respondents thought that encadred civil servants were involved in corruption;
- (4) more than eighty (86.0) percent felt that encadred civil servants were as qualified as their counterparts in business;
- (5) almost three-fourths felt that encadred civil servants had more opportunities for career advancement than other members of the civil service;
- (6) only two (less than ten percent) thought that encadred civil servants held interesting jobs;
- (7) none believed that civil servants (in general and encadred civil servants in particular) performed effectively and efficiently in their work;
- (8) slightly more than one-third believed that encadred civil servants enjoyed greater tenure of service compared to their counterparts in the private sector; and
- (9) one-third indicated that they would make a career as a encadred civil servant even if they had other career options in the private sector.

5.015 Some of the responses appear to be contradictory. For example, although 60 percent of the University of Dhaka graduates believed that civil servants were corrupt and 65 percent believed that civil servants were not effective or efficient, 62 percent indicated that they would make a career as an encadred civil servant even if they had other career options in the private sector. This may reveal something about job prospects for graduates. The data is not complete enough to render other than

these conjectures.

5.016 The fact that only one-third of the technical graduates indicated that they would make a career as an encadred civil servant even if they had other career options in the private sector may indicate that their perception is that the status of technical personnel in the civil service is low.

5.017 The data from the surveys of recent graduates reveals basically a current snap shot. No longitudinal data were discovered in the research conducted for this Study.

5.018 No public opinion survey research was done for this Study on the general public's perception of the civil service and civil servants. But as recently as 1990, the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Center conducted a sample survey of 500 "farmers, labourers, service holders, businessmen, [and] others" on the issue of how the people viewed civil servants.⁴ Table 5.3 reveals the results of this survey.

5.019 What may be suggested from the data collected in 1990 and 1993 is that the status of encadred civil servants is not high in the eyes of the respondents and the civil service as a career is not that attractive to those who graduated from technical universities and colleges. Among these recent graduates, the civil service has a serious image problem.

B. Inter-Service Tensions

5.020 Inter-service tensions are not recent phenomena in Bangladesh or in many other countries of the world.

5.021 Although the generalist-specialist debate is probably

Table 5.3
Civil Servants as Seen by the Public

Do you think that Civil Servants are best described as:	Farmers	Laborers	Service Holders	Business men	Others	Total
Servants of the people	36	2	49	18	7	112 (22.4%)
Friends of the people	12	9	15	30	10	76 (15.2%)
Separated from the people	27	31	61	63	31	213 (42.6%)
Lords of the people	18	1	11	18	18	66 (13.2%)
no opinion	2	1	14	16	0	33 (6.6%)
Total	95	44	150	145	66	500

Source: M. Saifur Rahman, "Survey of Opinions about Public Servants" in Research on Administrative Culture and Norms, July 1993.

as old as independence in the Sub-Continent, respondents to the Formulation Mission team indicated that the tensions have increased over time.

5.022 Basically, these tensions can be divided into three categories; (1) the tensions between the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) Administration cadre and the other 29 cadres; (2) tensions between different batches of the civil service; and (3) tensions between Class I officers and Class II, III, and IV officers and staff.

5.023 It should also be noted that there is another set of tensions that have emerged in recent years with the increase in the induction of women in the civil service. These gender-related tensions will be discussed and analyzed in section G ("Role and Status of Women in Government Service").

i. The "Cadre" Problem

5.024 An encadred civil servant is a civil officer (Class I) who belongs to a specific cadre. Encadrement occurs during the Bangladesh Public Service Commission's (BPSC) recruitment process. Advertisements issued by the BPSC specify vacancies in different cadres. Individuals, when applying for public employment, indicate ten (10) preferences in prioritized order.

5.025 The examination process involves three parts: (1) a written examination; (2) a psychological test; and (3) an interview (viva voce). The combined marks (scores) on these three parts determine which cadre an individual will be permitted to join. Usually, those who have the highest total marks get

their preference of cadres.

5.026 It is asserted that once assignments are made to the various cadres, the tensions between members of different cadres begin.

5.027 The tensions revolve around how many posts, in which ministries/divisions and at what levels are reserved for members of certain cadres.

5.028 Tensions also exist between encadred and nonencadred officers. It is possible to join the service as a Class I officer without being encadred. This has occurred at least twice in Bangladesh's history since 1971: the first involved the induction of the 1973 batch when these individuals did not go through the examination process. The second was in 1982 when individuals were inducted into the civil service without going through the normal examination process.

5.029 A questionnaire was developed by a national consultant and distributed to 30 encadred civil servants of the Ministry of Establishment (primarily BCS Administration) and 25 civil servants, both encadred and nonencadred (primarily BCS from cadres other than Administration--referred to as "technical-functional"), in other ministries. All 55 were asked to comment on the cadre system and changes that might be made in the government personnel system. The responses are presented in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4
Perceptions of Civil Servants of the Cadre System

Do you think that:	BCS (Admin)		Tech.-Funct. Officials	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
civil servants are presently organized in the most efficient personnel arrangement within the secretariat?	5	25	0	25
all posts in the secretariat have been encadred?	4	26	1	23
(if yes to the previous question) the encadred posts include those of the secretaries, additional secretaries, deputy secretaries and assistant secretaries?	4	0	0	1
the cadre system has contributed to inter-service rivalries, jealousies and bickering?	25	5	8	17
the cadre system should be abolished altogether?	0	30	7	18
the cadre system should be continued as it is?	3	27	1	24
the cadre system should be modified?	30	0	25	0
civil servants can be grouped into broader categories to provide in-depth sectoral experience (i.e., economic, social, health, education, etc.)	19	11	8	17
rank classification should be replaced by position classification?	21	9	21	4

Source: M. Mohabbat Khan, Research on Civil Service Management, July 1993.

5.030 Several findings from this survey with regard to the cadre system are as follows:

- (1) one-fifth of the BCS Administration officers and none of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that civil servants were presently organized in the most efficient personnel arrangement within the secretariat
- (2) four-fifths of the BCS Administration officers thought that the cadre system has contributed to inter-service rivalries, jealousies and bickering, while one-third of the BCS technical-function officers thought this was the case;
- (3) none of the BCS Administration officers and 7 out of 2 (slightly more than one-fourth) of the BCS technical-functional officers wanted its abolition;
- (4) however, both the BCS Administration cadre (27 out of 30) and BCS other cadres (24 out of 25) were against continuation of the cadre system as it exists presently;
- (5) all of the BCS Administration cadre officers and all of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that the cadre system should be modified;
- (6) almost two-thirds of the BCS Administration officers and almost one-third of the BCS other cadres officers thought that civil servants could be grouped into broader categories to provide in depth sectoral experience to their organizations; and
- (7) both the BCS Administration cadre officers (21 out of 30) and the BCS other cadres (21 out of 25) were in favor of changes in the basic structure of the civil service by eliminating classification, by rank and adopting position classification;

5.031 Other evidence indicates that change in the cadre system is greatly desired. For example, the Bangladesh Civil Service Coordination Committee of Doctors, Engineers and Agriculturalists (DEA) Combine, a conglomerate of twenty-six⁵ technical and functional cadres within the BCS and three professional groups have presented demands to the government in the following areas:..⁶

- (1) control of development activities and geographical administrative tiers by elected officials;

- (2) creation of new cadres;
- (3) elimination of the practice of reserving posts for officers of one cadre;
- (4) pay scales should be designated as grades;
- (5) delegation of responsibility and authority;
- (6) equal opportunity for promotion for all encadred officers; and
- (7) separation of judiciary from the executive.

5.032 What seems to be happening is an increasing dissatisfaction among encadred and noncadred civil servants with the continuation of the classic rank-in-person system inherited from British colonial administration. Some kind of movement towards a rank-in-position system seems to be what is desired by a majority of civil servants.

5.033 It also seems that no clear consensus has developed regarding a precise model personnel system. The BCS technical, professional, and specialist cadres want to erode the power of the BCS Administration cadre and dominance over key positions in the civil service structure while the BCS Administration wants to continue its position.

ii. The "Batch" Problem

5.034 The "batch" problem is an inner-service problem. It pits different batches (years of entry into the service) against each other.

5.035 Most of the attention in this problem area focuses on the so-called "batch of 1973"--the induction into the BCS of individuals whose service in the fight for freedom gave them sort

of a "veteran's preference."

5.036 Officers inducted before this batch and those inducted after maintain that the batch of 1973 is inferior because they were not required to compete for entry based on the competitive, rigorous civil service examination. Rather, because they were "freedom fighters," they gained government employment.

5.037 No empirical data were generated from this Study to either prove or disprove the contention that this batch is inferior.

5.038 However, what is known is that there were irregularities in the examination and selection processes.

5.039 Another "batch" problem relates to the batch of 1982. In essence, two batches were inducted during this year. One took a modified examination and the age bar was suspended while the other took the normal competitive examination. The former officially was inducted earlier than the later but was not encadred. This has led to conflict between the two batches regarding seniority rights which affect promotional, posting and training opportunities.

5.040 There were also irregularities in the inductions of the 1977 and 1979 batches. These irregularities also relate to examination and selection.

iii. The "Class" Problem

5.041 With the continuation of the four class system, those in classes below class I find their promotional possibilities blocked by the "class line." Movement from class II to class I,

although not impossible, is extremely difficult.

5.042 Movement towards a modified rank-in-person system or transformation to a rank-in-position system may ease the tensions that exist in the present class arrangement.

C. Evaluation of Current Government Personnel Practices

i. Recruitment

5.043 According to an earlier administrative report (CARR), the public services lacked appropriate, consistent and uniform personnel policies with regard to recruitment.

ii. Examination

5.044 In the examination and interview processes, there has been grade inflation which has reduced the quality of the intake.

iii. Career Development

5.045 When the officers were asked if they had career plans developed for them or in collaboration with them, 80 percent replied in the negative. Of the remaining 20 percent who said that they had career plans, 70 percent indicated that their plans had been determined by their ministry/organization and 10 percent said that they were determined by training institutions.

However, when asked if they were consulted in preparing their career plans only 20 percent said "yes". When they were further asked if they were satisfied with the career plan as prepared, only 5 percent said "yes".

5.046 These results show the general absence of career plans for Bangladeshi senior officers and the highly unsatisfactory nature of these career plans when they exist.

iv. Performance Evaluation

5.047 Seventy-two (72) percent of the officers surveyed indicated that the Annual Confidential Report process has lost its validity.

v. Promotion

5.048 Drawing again from the data collected from the survey conducted of the 30 BCS Administration officers and the 25 BCS technical-functional officers, Table 5.5 reveals their perceptions regarding promotion policy and, in particular, how it is administered.

5.049 The responses reveal the following:

- (1) not quite one-third of the BCS Administration officers and none of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that the promotion system was premised on the merit principle;
- (2) almost all (20 out of 21) of the BCS Administration officers and almost all (24 out of 25) of the BCS Administration technical-functional officers who did not believe that the promotion system was premised on the merit principle though that it should be;
- (3) one-third of the BCS Administration officers and all of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that promotion depended on factors other than merit; and
- (4) three-fourths of the BCS Administration officers and almost three-fourths of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that promotion was a reward for a job well done.

Table 5.5
Perceptions of Civil Servants Regarding
Promotion Policy and Administration

Do you think that:	BCS (Admin)		Tech.-Funct. Officials	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
the promotion system of encadred civil servants is premised on the merit principle?	9	21	0	25
(if no to the previous question) would you like the promotion system to be based on the merit system?	20	1	24	1
a encadred civil servant's promotion depends on factors other than merit?	20	10	25	0
promotion is a reward for a job well done?	23	7	18	7

Source: M. Mohabbat Khan, Research on Civil Service Management, July 1993.

5.050 When the over 100 civil servants surveyed for the human resource development and training portion of this study were asked if promotion is linked to training, 52 percent of those officers survey answered in affirmative.

5.051 The officers were asked if they thought that the existing system of promotion was fair. Of the eighty-three (83) percent replied in the negative, 47 percent said that it was not just because of the absence of scientific criteria in the evaluation of performance. Nineteen (19) percent said that it was mainly due to patronage and 5 percent said that it was due to corruption while another 7 percent said that it was due to all the three reasons (absence of criteria, patronage and corruption). The remaining officers attributed it to other reasons including

various combination of the factors mentioned above.

5.052 There was support for a comprehensive examination for promotion at all levels.

5.053 According to the Government's Personnel Manual'

- (1) when promotion from a lower class to a higher class (i.e., from Class II to Class I) occurs, the decision is made on the basis of merit with due consideration to seniority;
- (2) for promotions within the same class, the departments are required to draw distinctions between promotion posts and selection posts;
- (3) for promotion posts, the decision is based on seniority-cum-fitness while the criteria for promotions to selection posts are merit with due regard to seniority;
- (4) the criterion for promotion to selection grade posts in any cadre is seniority-cum-merit;
- (5) promotion cases that are outside the purview of the Public Service Commission are processed by the following committees/boards:
 - (a) the Council Committee on Senior Appointment, Promotion and Service Structure considers cases of promotion of officers to posts of Joint Secretary and above and heads of departments and autonomous bodies/corporations after they have been processed through the Superior Selection Board;
 - (b) the Superior Selection Board considers cases of promotions of civil servants and direct appointments of persons not in the government service to joint secretary and above in the secretariat, to deputy secretary, to heads, directors, and members of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, and all other government posts whose initial pay is Taka 3,700 and above;
 - (c) the Special Promotion Committees of the ministries/divisions consider cases of promotion to modified new scales of pay between Taka 2,800 to 4,425 for civil servants belonging to the BCS cadres; and
 - (d) Departmental Promotion Committees in each

ministry/division are responsible for recommending promotions with Class II or from Class II to Class I posts.

5.054 In an interview with a high ranking officer in the Ministry of Establishment, the following information was provided:

- (1) in promotions to deputy secretary, joint secretary, additional secretary, the following formula is followed:
 - (a) sixty (60) percent weight is assigned for any 10 years of a candidates Annual Confidential Report (ACR); and
 - (b) forty (40) percent weight is placed on the interview.
- (2) during the interview, both seniority and performance are considered.

5.055 However, there are serious doubts about the validity of the ACR in terms of its ability to measure a candidate's potential and suitability for promotion and there are doubts regarding the priority that superiors attached to the ACR process. Many civil servants do not complete ACRs for the subordinates on a timely and regular basis.⁸

5.056 Promotion is an area of civil service management where a clash of interests occurs between the generalists (BCS Administration cadre) and the specialists (BCS other cadres). In part, government has not developed a clear-cut promotion policy which applies to all officers. For example, five cadres (health, general education, technical education, judicial, and statistical) are exempted from taking examinations for promotion.

5.057 Promotion has been a priority area for the present

government. Because of a freeze on promotions since 1985, there was a recent promotion of 657 officers.

5.058 However, this relatively large promotion exercise satisfied few. The members of the technical-functional cadres and professional groups made their displeasure known publicly by alleging that the promotions were biased towards members of the BCS Administration cadre. Some encadred civil servants took legal action to challenge the entire promotion exercise. On the other hand, some members of the BCS Administration cadre were frustrated because they did not get promoted.

5.059 There appears to be little relation between promotion and posting. Officers recently promoted may wait months as Officers on Special Duty (OSDs) before being posted. In some cases, posts had to be upgraded to accommodate those promoted.

vi. Transfer/Reassignment

5.060 The responses from the interviews of 30 BCS Administration officers and 25 BCS other cadres officers on transfer policy and practice is shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6
Perceptions of Civil Servants Regarding
Transfer Policy and Administration

Do you think that:	BCS (Admin)		Tech.-Funct. Officials	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
the present system of transfers of encadred civil servants is based on any sound rationale?	6	24	0	25
the present system of transfers of encadred civil servants reflects the need for balance between the concepts of mobility and training of civil servants and continuity of policy?	17	13	0	25
encadred civil servants are transferred too frequently?	18	12	21	4
(if yes to the previous question) such transfers adversely impact on morale and efficiency of encadred civil servants?	18	0	21	0

Source: M. Mohabbat Khan, Research on Civil Service Management, July 1993.

5.061 The results this survey are as follows:

- (1) one-fourth of the BCS Administration officers and none of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that the transfer process was based on any sound rationale;
- (2) slightly more than half of the BCS Administration officers and none of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that the present system of transfers reflected the need for balance between the concept of mobility on the one hand, and the concepts of utilizing training and continuity in policy;
- (3) slightly less than two-thirds of the BCS Administration officers and slightly less than three-fourths of the BCS technical-functional officers thought that encadred civil servants were transferred too frequently; and
- (4) of those that answered "yes" to the question regarding frequency of transfers, all of both the BCS Administration officers and the BCS technical-functional officers thought that frequency of transfer

adversely impacted on the morale and efficiency of encadred civil servants.

5.062 The transfer of civil servants from one post (position) to another is governed by the Personnel Manual.⁹ Two of the more salient rules are as follows:

- (1) all Class I and Class II officials are required to serve in any part of the country; and
- (2) the period of posting should not normally exceed three years.

5.063 It seems clear from the interviews conducted and the findings of the structured questionnaires distributed and completed that government has not adhered to its transfer policy. When the statistics on transfers of civil servants posted in the secretariat, government's failure to follow its transfer policy guidelines is clear:

- (1) only 10 percent of deputy secretaries, joint secretaries and additional secretaries complete two years in one post;
- (2) eighty (80) percent of deputy secretaries, joint secretaries and additional secretaries stayed in one post for a year or less;
- (3) ten percent of deputy secretaries, joint secretaries and additional secretaries who remain as officers on special duty are subjected to still more frequent transfers;
- (4) fifty (50) percent of the secretaries have been transferred within one year or less than two years after assuming charge of a ministry or division; and
- (5) aptitude, training and experience of an encadred civil servant is not usually taken into consideration in deciding on his/her transfer. (Interview with senior a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Establishment, February 1993.)

Data Analysis of the Movement of Civil Servants

5.064 A random sample of the movement of civil servants through transfers was collected for Secretaries, Additional and Joint Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries. Different approaches were used to analyze and present the data. In the case of Secretaries, for example, movement between ministries was examined. With Additional and Joint Secretaries, movement was traced between ministries, departments/directorates, corporations and autonomous bodies and field administration. Deputy Secretaries' movements were examined by position and specific dates of transfers. Data for the analysis were collected from the Personnel Data Sheet from the Public Administration Computer Center of the Ministry of Establishment, Government of Bangladesh, in June and July 1993.

Analysis of the Movement of Secretaries

5.065 Analysis of 10 cases reveals that after being promoted as Secretary of government, on average each Secretary has held 6.1 positions and has served 8.2 years. This means that on average a Secretary serves in a post approximately one year. Three cases further illustrate the frequency of transfer problem:

Case of Secretary A

- Step 1. Civil servant "A" was appointed Secretary in May 1988.
- Step 2. In January 1990, he was transferred to a new ministry.
- Step 3. In December 1990, he was transferred to still another ministry.
- Step 4. In April 1991, he was transferred to the ministry

that he was posted to in May 1988.

Totals: Four transfers in three years to three different ministries.

Case of Secretary B

Step 1. Civil servant "B" was appointed Secretary in January 1991.

Step 2. In October 1991, he was transferred to a new ministry.

Step 3. In October 1992, he was transferred to still another ministry.

Totals: Three transfers in one year and ten months to three different ministries.

Case of Secretary C

Step 1. Civil servant "C" was appointed Secretary in August 1987.

Step 2. In August 1988, he was transferred to a new ministry.

Step 3. In July 1989, he was transferred to still another ministry.

Step 4. In November 1989, he was transferred once again to still another ministry.

Step 5. In January 1990, he was posted to still another ministry.

Step 6. In October 1991, he was transferred once more to still another ministry.

Total: Six transfers four years and two months to six different ministries.

Analysis of the Movement of Additional and Joint Secretaries

5,114 The following cases illustrate the transfer problem at this level of government.

Case of Joint Secretary 1

Positions Held	Number	Years of Service	Average # of Yrs/Position
Ministries	03		
Dept/Direct.	05		
Corp/Auton Bd	01		
Fld Admin	07		
Total	16	33	2.06

Case of Additional Secretary 1

Positions Held	Number	Years of Service	Average # of Yrs/Position
Ministries	07		
Dept/Direct.	02		
Corp/Auton Bd	04		
Fld Admin	04		
Total	17	23	1.44

Case of Joint Secretary 2

Positions Held	Number	Years of Service	Average # of Yrs/Position
Ministries	03		
Dept/Direct.	04		
Corp/Auton Bd	01		
Fld Admin	10		
Total	18	37	2.05

5.066 The analysis of five randomly selected cases shows that Additional and Joint Secretaries on average have 30.4 years of service and have held 16.6 posts over their careers. This means on average a Additional or Joint Secretary spend 1.8 years per post.

Analysis of the Movement of Deputy Secretaries

5.067 The transfer of Deputy Secretaries share many of the same characteristics of the transfer of Secretaries and Additional and Joint Secretaries. Two cases will illustrate the problem.

Case of Deputy Secretary 1 (Admin)

Positions Held	Date
Dy Mag & Dy Col Mym	12/73 - 03/75
Dy Mag & Dy Col Kish	03/75 - 10/77
Dy Mag & Dy Col Synam	10/77 - 08/80
Mag Hatiya	08/80 - 03/82
Addl SDO Lakshipur	03/82 - 08/82
Adgl Bandarean	08/82 - 12/82
UNO Monohordi	12/82 - 09/85
ADC Naogoan	08/85 - 04/86
ADM & ADC Naogoan	04/86 - 08/88
SAS M/o Works	08/88 - 01/90
ADC Shylet	01/90 - 02/92
OSD Estab	02/92 -
Director, Narcotics	06/93 -

Case of Deputy Secretary 2 (Econ)

Positions Held	Date
Ag.Econ M/o Lands	10/77 - 05/86
Dy Chief M/o Lands	05/86 - 02/92
Dy Chief (DS) M/o Lands	02/92 - 04/92
PD Swanirvar Adarsha Prj	04/92 -

5.068 Officers in the BCS (Administration) cadre are transferred more often than officers in other cadres as is revealed when the case of Deputy Secretary 1 is compared to Deputy Secretary 2. The Deputy Secretary (Admin) stayed 1.46 years per post while the Deputy Secretary (Econ) averaged 3.75 years per post.

5.069 From the cases and the empirical analysis indicated above, it can be concluded that transfers of BCS officers are too

frequent to encourage efficient performance on the job.

5.070 Frequency of transfer has its costs. First, there is always a "learning curve" for the individual who has been transferred. Although management has some common characteristics cutting across various sectors, a significant part of management relates to knowledge and understanding of substantive issues. The blend of both generic management and specific knowledge based capacities make management more effective by providing specialization necessary in dealing with broad sectors of public management. In addition to the subject matter, each organization has a "history" and a "culture" that can only be learned on the job. Second, administration and management are people centered subjects. Acquiring an understanding of who you are supervising and working with requires time on the job. In addition, subordinate staff have to adjust to different leadership styles. Frequent transfers in middle and upper management mean frequent adjustments (and mistakes in adjustment) to differing leadership styles. Third, each public organization has its own "shareholders" and/or client groups. Effective administrators and managers must know their "territory" to avoid making major mistakes in decision making and the implementation of decisions. Fourth, performance and accountability require that an official especially in non-routine management/administrative leadership jobs stays for a reasonable period of time to be able to offer his/her full interest and commitment to the job.

5.071 Few if any public management systems have been

effective and efficient when frequent transfers of key personnel across ministries are characteristics of their public organizations. A study of several countries shows that officials, even at the top level, usually stay in the same ministry, thereby providing specialized management and close familiarity of policies and programmes in their respective sectors even if transfers are frequent. Japan, for example, does not usually permit its public executives to transfer out of a ministry. Thailand, as another example, not only prohibits inter-ministerial transfers, it requires its permanent secretaries to keep the same post for a minimum of four years. South Korea experimented with inter-ministerial transfers of personnel but abandoned this practice because it was found to be inefficient.

5.072 There is no doubt that the current practice of frequent transfers is financially burdensome and in the interest of neither efficient nor democratic management. It is also not in the interest of transferees whose lives are dislocated by such transfers. A closer examination of factors and reasons for such transfers and practices and who benefits from these is urgently needed. The human factor in the policy management process is as vital as other resources such as finance and the continuity of leadership in key posts, especially in non-routine jobs, is critical to effective public policy management.

5.073 The transfer policy of every three years or more is not followed in most cases. In fact, data reveal that the frequency

of transfers is much greater than would be predicted by the transfer policy. Be that as it may, it is also necessary to question the rationale of transfer and that of a uniform transfer policy for all government officers irrespective of existing cadres. Are the reasons which require transfer of officers in regulatory activities the same as the transfers of officers in promotional and developmental activities? For example, the question should be asked why a thana fisheries officer has to be transferred every three years in the same way as the Thana Nirbhai Officer? What specific goals is the transfer expected to achieve in each case? Are these goals relevant to the objectives and goals of the organization in which the officer is located? A larger question in the context of transfer is also the need for diversity of experience for an official as he/she moves up increasing levels of responsibilities and authorities. How relevant and important are these diversities in the context of the homogeneity and similarity in the socio-economic conditions of Bangladesh? Also the question should be posed about the linkage of transfer and promotion. Is transfer absolutely necessary for promotion to a higher level or can promotion be effected at the same place by creating higher level posts so that an officer can stay a reasonable number of years to bring about changes, improvements and consistent management. Transfer is a key issue and its objectives and frequency must be related to the objectives, goals and management needs of the organization. A satisfactory resolution of the transfer issue will play a vital

role in administrative consolidation and improved public management performance.

vii. Compensation: Salaries and Benefits

5.074 The relative buying power of civil service salaries was examined in this Study.

5.075 A questionnaire was distributed to 12 officers (Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries) to elicit information about their income and expenditure patterns.

5.076 With the exception of one, all asserted that their salaries were far from adequate for their family requirements.

5.077 As to how they coped with this situation, four officers indicated that their wives were also working; three officers mentioned that they secured supplies of staples such as rice and lentils from their parental homes; one stated that the odd assignments he received for working on different committees, writing reports and other activities outside his normal tour of duty helped him to supplement his government salary; and four officers avoided discussions regarding family income, household expenditure or the standard of living they maintained. All officers without exception mentioned that they were worse off materially despite of their promotions and pay raises.

5.078 Table 5.7 shows the relative changes of the nominal and real basic salaries (taking only the commencement of scale if it is not a fixed salary) for the top three grades of the civil service.

Table 5.7
Relative Changes of the Nominal and Real Basic
Salaries of Secretary, Additional Secretary
and Joint Secretary Levels
(Taka Per Month)

<u>Year</u>	<u>CPI</u> 1969/70 = 100	<u>Secretary</u>		<u>Addt. Sec</u>		<u>Jt. Sec</u>	
		Nominal	Real	Nominal	Real	Nominal	Real
1972	182	3000	3000	2750	2750	2300	2300
1977	441	3000	1238	2850	1176	2350	970
1985	1014	6000	1077	5700	1023	4750	853
1991	1671	10000	1089	8600	936	7800	850
1993*	1740	10000	1046	8600	900	7800	816

*March of 1993.

Source: S. M. Al-Husainy, Report on Civil Service Management, July 1993.

- Note:
- (a) Weights assumed by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) for calculating the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for government employees stationed in Dhaka are: food, 52.7 percent; fuel and lighting, 5.32 percent; housing, 11.98 percent, clothing and footwear, 8.03 percent, miscellaneous, 21.54 percent. The actual consumption baskets for the classes of officers under consideration might have had somewhat different weightages.
 - (b) Middle class government officials were assumed to be within the monthly salary bracket of Rs 100 and 400 in 1969/70.
 - (c) In the absence of any other more appropriate deflators, the CPI for middle class government employees in Dhaka as published by the BBS was used to calculate the real wages of selected categories of civil servants.

5.079 The findings from this examination are as follows:

- (1) the pre-independence salaries continued to hold good for the top grades also at the time of the introduction of the ten scales of pay in 1973;
- (2) when the New National Scale with 20 scales was introduced on July 1, 1977, the Secretary level pay was

not changed from the old Tk 3000 while the Additional Secretary and Joint Secretary level pay rates were given only a Tk 50 increase; and

- (3) despite of the significant nominal increases provided with the Modified New Scales (introduced on June 6, 1985) and the National Pay Scales (introduced on July 1, 1991), the salaries of civil servants continued to decline in real terms.

5.080 Ignoring the slight errors involved in using the available CPIs for the calculations, the order of magnitude indicates quite clearly that despite a more than 333 percent nominal increase in salaries, the real basic salaries of the top civil servants in 1993 were about one third of what they were receiving immediately after independence in 1971.

5.081 For comparison, it may be seen in Table 5.8 how the real wages of some other senior grades of officers suffered erosion from the time of the introduction of the New National Scale in 1977 until March 1993 after two further revisions:

Table 5.8
Relative Changes of the Nominal and Real Basic
Salaries of Deputy Secretary, Senior-Assistant
Secretary and Junior Class I Levels
(Taka Per Month)

<u>Level/Grade</u>	<u>1977</u>		<u>1993</u>	
	<u>Nominal</u>	<u>Real</u>	<u>Nominal</u>	<u>Real</u>
Deputy Secretary	1850	1850	6300	1597
Senior Asst. Sec.	1400	1400	4800	1217
Junior Class I	750	750	2850	722

Source: S. M. Al-Husainy, Report on Civil Service Management, July 1993 .

5.082 Based on discussions with several officers, an indicative average monthly requirement of funds for an officer of the level of a Senior Deputy Secretary with a family of five is

shown in Table 5.9. This list of items assumes he/she has no transport, did not have a telephone at his/her residence provided by the government and had to rent a house privately (if provided a government accommodation, an officer has to pay only 7.5 percent of his/her salary as house rent, otherwise, he/she receives a house rent support at 40 percent of his/her salary.

Table 5.9
Average Monthly Requirement of Funds

<u>Item</u>	<u>Tk Per Month</u>
Rent	4500
Electricity	350
Gas	215
Water	100
Telephone	500
Medical Care	1000
Clothing	1000
Education (of children)	600
Food	5000
Guests and Gifts	750
Travel/Transport	1200
Books/Journals/Misc.	750
Total	15,965

Source: S. M. Al-Husainy, Report on Civil Service Management, July 1993.

5.083 The estimates in Table 5.9 are highly variable according to the stations, size of family and the needs of the family. Also, these figures would vary according to what benefits government provides.

D. Quantity of Human Resources

i. Size of Existing Classes of Personnel

5.084 Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the class distribution of public employees. These data are drawn from the data base maintained by the Ministry of Establishment Computer Center.

5.085 The total sanctioned strength of the civil service of Bangladesh is 1,055,508. The actual strength is 946,749. There are 78,685 Class I officers, 36,858 Class II officers, 579,842

Class three employees and 251,364 class four employees. All services are not at their sanctioned strength. Class I and Class II officers are operating at 14.41 percent and 13.31 percent below strength respectively. Class III (9.99 percent), and Class IV (8.51 percent) employees also operate below sanctioned strength though as shown they are in a better position than the two higher classes.

5.086 Nearly 69 percent of the employees work in departments and directorates while another 31 percent work for public corporations.

5.087 After the promulgation of martial law in 1982, the Martial Law regime felt that the government was overstaffed. It established the Martial Law Committee on Organisational Set-up chaired by Brigadier Enamul Huq Khan to examine staffing and to propose measures to reduce the human resource component of government.

5.088 Before the Enam Committee's activities, there were no

Table 5.10
Percent of Sanctioned and Positions Filled of Total Class Positions

	Ministries Divisions		Departments Directorates		Autonomous Corporations	
	Sanctioned	Actual	Sanctioned	Actual	Sanctioned	Actual
Class I	2.26	2.38	44.57	41.84	53.17	55.78
Class II	0.16	0.14	29.80	29.14	70.04	70.72
Class III	0.17	0.17	74.89	76.38	24.40	22.91
Class IV	0.88	0.93	63.84	64.77	35.28	34.29

Table 5.11
Class Distribution by Actual Numbers

Class I	2128	1875	41951	32922	50052	43888
Class II	67	51	12670	10741	29779	26066
Class III	4548	4132	482413	442859	157169	132851
Class IV	2426	2343	175378	162819	96927	86202
Total	9169	8401	712412	649341	333927	289007
% Total Strength	0.87	0.89	67.49	68.58	31.64	30.53
Total Strength for all Classes Sanctioned and Actual						
	Sanctioned		Actual			
	1055508		946749			

compiled statistics regarding the number of officers and employees and no organization charts (organograms). The Committee established the manpower strength of each unit of government based on their calculation of workload.

5.089 According to a civil servant who has been involved in several government and donor-sponsored studies of government operations, the Enam Committee Report (three volumes) still remains the basis of approved manpower strength of the various units in government. Development projects were excluded from the purview of the Enam Committee's activities.

5.090 To reallocate the personnel declared surplus by the Enam Committee, a "Surplus Cell" was created in the Ministry of Establishment. This Cell then circulated lists of surplus personnel to all government unit and each unit was asked to select from the lists to fill existing vacancies. In this fashion, all surplus personnel were relocated and none were retrenched.

5.091 It has been a common practice of government units to leave about 10 percent of their allocated positions vacant.

5.092 In March 1989, another committee (a five member Committee Constituted for Re-examining Organizational Set-up of Department/Directorates--the so-called Muyeed Committee) was established. The task of this committee was to examine the justification for the existence of various departments, directorates, bureaux and attached offices and also review the Enam Committee Report. Ministries/divisions were excluded from

this review. The committee submitted its Report in July 1989. The committee examined 41 departments, directorates, bureaus and attached offices under 18 ministries and one Cell under the President's Secretariat. Out of the 42 units examined, the committee recommended the abolition of 27 and the amalgamation of 10 others with allied units. A few amalgamations were implemented and some reduction in manpower occurred but by and large the recommendations of this Report were not implemented. (Interview with senior civil servant, June 23, 1993, in Dhaka.)

5.093 Recently (June 1993), the Minister of Finance commissioned a six member Administrative Reorganization Committee to examine work load in government.

5.094 Is the Government of Bangladesh overstaffed? Is the balance between different classes appropriate to the broad category of tasks and needs of career development? Without a substantial research effort to examine work load in the ministries/divisions, departments/directorates, bureaus and other government units, and their broad distribution among classes of employees it is impossible to determine with any accuracy answers to these questions. A rational, work load analysis would also require a systematic look at the total structure of the government to understand the rationality of reorganizing government affairs and avoid duplication among various ministries, divisions and departments.

5.095 Work loads and the degree of overstaffing and understaffing can be objectively determined if enough time and

staff is assigned these tasks. The status of each organization has to be determined separately and the task would involve finding out through methodical surveys how much work each individual performed and the time taken for the same, weighing it against the optimum quantum of work that ought to be performed under the prevailing system.

5.096 Of the total sanctioned posts, approximately 90 percent are filled. There are a number of officers who are on "special duty" (Officers on Special Duty or OSD) awaiting posting but the precise figure has not been ascertained.

ii. Retrenchment Efforts to Date

5.097 A 10 member committee convened by M. Mustafizur Rahman with 9 other Secretaries were assigned the task of recommending terms for superannuation of surplus manpower for the government and the autonomous bodies in June 1992. Their recommendations are summarized as follows:

- (1) a separate commission may be constituted to determine the surplus manpower in all government organizations and semi-autonomous bodies;
- (2) the government should assist those organizations which have already determined their surplus manpower and decided upon a reorganized structure. The surplus manpower should be given the following:
 - (a) payment of gratuity at the normal rules over 50 percent of the grace pension;
 - (b) upon surrender of the balance of 50 percent of the pension and medical allowances, the following one-time payment may be made for each Taka of surrender:

Service Period	Payment Per Taka Surrendered
----------------	------------------------------

25 years and above	117
20-25 years	121
15-20 years	125
10-15 years	130

- (c) everyone would be entitled to the above rate but those who served for less than 10 years or who are above age 52 years would not get the additional benefit as indicated above but would be entitled to normal pension benefits.

5.098 Those governed by the Gratuity Rules or the Factories Act were to receive pay gratuity and provident fund benefits according to the normal rules.

5.099 Those entitled to only gratuity received the following privileges:

Service Period	Additional Payment Over Normal Gratuity
25 years and above	10.0 percent
20-25 years	14.0 percent
15-20 years	17.5 percent
10-15 years	22.0 percent

5.100 No assurances would be given for alternative employment for the discharged employees and no programs in this regard would be provided.

5.101 Industrial workers would get the above benefits in addition to the normal gratuity. But this would not be applicable to the for employees with less than 10 years service and over the age of 52 years. Those already in retirement would also be entitled to the additional benefits.

5.102 The Ministry of Finance prepared a summary which shows the indicative requirement of funds for separation allowances for seven organizations. The summary appears in Table 5.12.

5.103 Bangladesh Railways being a full fledged government department and aiming to retrench 10,000 or 17.9 percent of its 56,000 employees has about the largest program for separation. It also requires the largest amount of funds for this purpose. The total requirement for Bangladesh Railways was estimated at Taka 250 crores. Taking into consideration total government work force, budget constraints and retraining possibilities, has the government chosen the most cost effective means of streamlining government operations?

5.104 The largest program of retrenchment in numerical terms (number of employees to be retrenched) was Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation who proposed to layoff 20,000 workers followed by Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation. Bangladesh Jute Corporation which is being totally liquidated requires Taka 39 crores for its 3,128 employees.

5.105 The Ministry of Finance initially budgeted Taka 238 crores for the Fiscal Year 1992-93. This figure included a provision of Taka 150 crores for Bangladesh Railways who had been the most advanced of all Bangladesh organizations in implementing their layoff program. Having already spent or committed Taka 150 crores, Bangladesh Railways now require an additional Taka 100 crores for which the Ministry of Finance has been requested to supply.

Table 5.12
Separation Schemes in Departments and State-Owned Enterprises

Organization	Existing Strength	Number to be Separated	Number Already Separated/ Amount Released (in crores)	Number Being Processed/ Amount Required (in crores)	Comments
BD Railways	56,000	10,000	6,000/Tk. 150	4,000/ Tk. 100	
Food Directorate	13,719	5,000	1,000/Tk. 14	- - -	25 crores allocated
BRTC	4,922	1,250	421/Tk. 5	823/Tk. 10	
BJMC	134,655	27,000	4,488/ Tk 25	3,512/Tk. 25*	[See **]
BTMC	46,000	1,648	- - -	- - -	Funds will be allocated soon
BJC	3,128	3,128	541/Tk. 14	2,587/Tk. 21	Being liquidated
BADC	20,010	10,000	4,715/Tk. 30	- - -	Total number to be severed has not be fixed
Total	278,434	58,026	17,165/Tk. 238	10,922/Tk. 156	

BRTC = Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation; BJMC = Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation; BTMC = Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation; BJC = Bangladesh Jute Corporation; BADC = Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation.

*To be borrowed from bank. **Sixty (60) crores were spent during FY 90-91-92 from bank loan to retire 14,198. Bank loans will be repaid on receipt of jute sector credit.

Note: The Committee for restructuring BADC has not yet submitted its report. BSFIC (Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation), BSEC (Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation), BCIC (Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation), and TCB (Trading Corporation of Bangladesh) have already undertaken steps to identify and separate surplus employees. Exact figures and amounts required for separation schemes for these organizations are yet to be ascertained. Source: S. M. Al-Husainy, Report on Civil Service Management, July 1993.

5.105 Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) wanted to retrench 4,654 or about 10 percent of its office employees but this figure was revised downwards to 1,648. There had been some resistance from the employees of BTMC, but since the Corporation has closed down certain mills, the employees are finding it more prudent to take the separation with normal benefits according to their service rules without waiting for a very uncertain and insecure future.

5.106 The Telephone Shilpa Sangstha (TSS) similarly proposed to allow 97 or about 10 percent of its employees to take voluntary retirement but this program has been halted because there may be additional, new positions in the organization so that retrenchment may not be needed.

5.107 It appears that none of the organizations who have surplus staff have their own funds to provide the "golden handshakes" required in the government's effort to trim surplus personnel. The government has supplied the funds using an eight (8) percent discount rate to determine the Net Present Value of the potential pension funds surrendered by the employees. However, the financial benefits that will accrue to the respective organizations by the reduction in staff have not been calculated as of now. Nor have many organizations completed reforms in their organizational structures. The retrenchments proposed by these organizations have been worked out on an ad hoc basis.

5.108 Bangladesh Railways is about the only organization that

reported a completing a thorough study of restructuring and terminating its surplus personnel department by department. According to its formal report for restructuring, their employment status is as follows:

o	sanctioned strength	70,205
o	revised sanction (excluding officers)	51,337
o	on roll	58,418
o	proposed strength after reorganization	41,019

5.109 Bangladesh Railways complained that the overstaffing problem has been with the organization since 1947 but it was unable to do anything about this condition because of resistance from the union. Only through job freezes and no new recruitment has the position improved somewhat over the years.

5.110 While the Bangladesh Railways study describes the functions of its 12 departments, the analysis behind the determination of surplus personnel was not readily available. The Bangladesh Railways has continued both its job freeze and the vacancies created through normal attrition (retirement, death, etc.) have not been filled. This approach has been quite effective in dealing gradually with overstaffing. However, management complains that the railways is losing many skilled and experienced middle aged employees.

5.111 All the organizations who have proposed "golden handshake" programs have been running at losses. Therefore, these organizations will benefit through the process.

5.112 In the reports of the organizations, there are no mentions of "ghost workers," although one study by the World Bank

suggested that BJMC had about 10,000 "ghost workers" and that the extend of overstaffing in BADC and Bangladesh Railways was more than 50 percent.

5.113 In this context, it may be useful to note the World Bank's review of 76 civil service reform efforts they supported in developing countries as part of Structural Adjustment and Technical Assistance loans. Three-fourths of these efforts were in Africa. The reform measures included retrenchment to reduce the wage bills (e.g., census of employees, recruitment freeze, voluntary departures and early retirement, retrenchment and mandatory termination, redeployment and training) and the reform of pay and employment policy as incentives to greater efficiency and productivity in the civil service. The Position Paper for Improving Civil Service Efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa reviews these efforts:

For both the quantitative and qualitative objectives, the overall results are at most mixed. On the quantitative side, the gross figures suggest a sizable downsizing impact. . . On the qualitative side, both the fiscal and efficiency impacts were substantially less than expected. Severance payments generally represented a substantial drain on the budget, often exceeding or equalling the short-term savings from downsizing. [DeMerode, "Civil Service Pay and Employment Reform in Africa: Selected Implementation Experiences," para 94.] . . . Regarding improved productivity/efficiency, none of the cases reviewed so far revealed any empirical evidence that the CSR [civil service reform] and related TALs [Technical Assistance Loans] have succeeded in fostering the needed change in work attitudes, ethics and organization culture that could lead to greater efficiency/productivity in the civil service.¹⁰

The Position Paper argues for linking civil service reform in a larger framework involving three levels of change: institutional adjustment, economic management and linking pay/incentives and

performance.

E. Role and Status of Women in Government Service

5.114 Although women have been in government service in Bangladesh even before independence in 1971, the percentage has not been great certainly in comparison with the percentage of females in the total population of the country. Until the 1980s, women tended to join government service either in the education or health areas. It was not until the last decade that women began to join the other cadres in the Bangladesh Civil Service. Tables 5.13 and 5.14 show the gender disaggregated of those involved in the examination process and those selected as a result of successfully completing the examination process. ,

Table 5.13
Gender of Participants in Examination
Process for the Bangladesh Civil Service

<u>Year of Exam.</u>	<u>Total Number Who Took Exam</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Percentage Male</u>	<u>Percentage Female</u>
1986	33,504	29,795	3,709	88.93	11.07
1988	37,348	31,799	5,549	85.14	14.86
1989	28,419	23,844	4,575	83.90	16.10
1990	30,677	25,462	5,215	83.00	17.00
1991	37,593	31,170	6,423	82.91	17.09
Total	167,541	142,070	25,471	84.90	15.20

Source: Ministry of Establishment.

Table 5.14
Gender of Participants Selected for the
Bangladesh Civil Service

<u>Year of Exam.</u>	<u>Total Number Selected</u>	<u>Number Male</u>	<u>Number Female</u>	<u>Percentage Male</u>	<u>Percentage Female</u>
1986	2,117	1,809	308	85.45	14.55
1988	1,166	976	190	83.70	16.30
1989	1,022	906	116	88.65	11.35
1990	995	602	93	86.62	13.38
1991	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total	5,000	4,293	707	85.86	14.14

Source: Ministry of Establishment.

5.115 Among all of the 30 cadres which constitute the BCS, the Administration cadre was targeted for this research. There were several reasons for this:

- (1) the Administration cadre consists of a large number of women officers, relatively speaking;
- (2) a number of women have joined this cadre in recent years (it was only open to women in the early 1980s) in contrast to the education and health and family cadres-cadres which women normally joined in years past; and
- (3) women in the Administrative cadre have a wide variety of working experiences since they have held various positions in the ministries/divisions and field offices in different parts of the country.

5.116 Table 5.15 shows the gender composition of the BCS Administration and Table 5.16 shows the rank/level distribution of women officers in the BCS Administration cadre.

Table 5.15
Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Cadre
by Gender

Gender	Number	Percentage
Male	3,955	93.5
Female	276	6.5
Total	4,231	

Source: Ministry of Establishment.

Table 5.16
Rank/Level Distribution of Women Officers in the
Bangladesh Civil Service Administration Cadre

Rank/Level	Number	Percentage
Secretary	- -	- -
Additional Secretary	- -	- -
Joint Secretary	- -	- -
Deputy Secretary	3	1.1
Senior Asst. Sec.	43	15.6
Assistant Secretary	230	83.3
Total	276	

Source: Ministry of Establishment.

5.117 To examine the role and status of women in public service, a case study approach was utilized. The subjects of the case were twenty-five women BCS (Administration) officers. Four sets of semi-structured questionnaires were designed. One was administered to the 25 women; one to 24 male officers (their controlling officers) to whom they reported; one to 25 male officer colleagues with whom the women worked; and one to 21 subordinate officers/staff (all male) who were supervised by the women. All four questionnaires were self-administered. The women were selected at random.

5.118 Four basic issues were

- (1) what barriers they had to overcome at the time of joining a cadre which was traditionally male dominated;
- (2) the kind of problems they have faced or are facing after joining the public service;
- (3) the changes (to themselves and their families) that have occurred as a result of being in public service; and
- (4) the changes that need to be brought about to make

public service more attractive for women.

i. Barriers/Problems Confronting Women in Government

5.119 Some demographic data on the women in the study will be helpful in understanding the barriers they confronted in joining the service and the problems they have encountered while in the service. These data are displayed in Tables 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20 and 5.21.

Table 5.17
Years in Service of the Women Officers in the Study

<u>Years</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Below 5 years	3	12.0
5 to 10 years	13	52.0
10 to 15 years	7	28.0
15 to 20 years	1	4.0
Total	25	

Source: Parag, Report on Women in Civil Service, June 1993.

Table 5.18
Age of the Women Officers in the Study

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Below 30 years	2	8.0
30 to 40 years	16	64.0
40 to 50 years	7	28.0
Total	25	

Source: Parag, Report on Women in Civil Service, June 1993.

Table 5.19
Marital Status of the Women Officers in the Study

<u>Marital Status</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Married	21	84.0
Unmarried	4	16.0
Total	25	

Source: Parag, Report on Women in Civil Service, June 1993.

Table 5.20
Occupation of Husbands of the Women Officers in the Study

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Service	14	66.74
Business	5	23.81
Education/Teaching	1	4.76
Journalism	1	4.76
Total	21	

Source: Parag, Report on Women in Civil Service, June 1993.

Table 5.21
Responsibility for Aged Parents of
the Women Officers in the Study

<u>Are You Responsible for Aged Parents?</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Yes	13	52.0
No	12	48.0

Source: Parag, Report on Women in Civil Service, June 1993.

5.120 Of among the 25 women, there was a total of 18 children below the age of ten years.

5.121 The women in this study came from families who stressed education for their female members. All of these women received higher education. However, five officers faced obstacles at the time of joining the service from their families or friends of the family. One of the four women's families was against her joining the service because she would be posted far from her family. Three women had opposition to their joining the service from either their husbands or their in-laws. Apparently, it was not acceptable for the wife of the house to work outside the home. Finally, one women had opposition to joining from outside the family from a male who could not accept the idea of a women

serving as a Magistrate.

5.122 Of the 25 women officers, eleven indicated that they have not and do not face any problems in their service. However, fourteen clearly and categorically mentioned different problems with which they have had to contend or are contending with in their government service. The problems they identified are listed below (not prioritized):

- (1) apprehension of getting posted in remote areas;
- (2) absence of a day care centre;
- (3) lack of separate rest room facilities;
- (4) unavailability of an individual room in which to work;
- (5) negative attitudes towards them by male colleagues;
- (6) doubts of superior officers about the capabilities (for work) of women officers;
- (7) superiority complexes of their male colleagues;
- (8) tendency to treat women officers in a gender-biased fashion;
- (9) comments that male officers are more efficient than women officers;
- (10) the absence of a congenial working environment;
- (11) having to perform the dual role as housewife and government officer without the required support system;
- (12) noncooperation of male colleagues and family members;
- (13) absence of security when having to work after hours in vacated offices; and
- (14) societal backwardness (women not accepted as government administrators/officers by the public).

5.123 In the civil service, the ratio of women to men is approximately 1:10 with the largest number of women in classes III and IV. This ratio means that on average one woman has to work everyday surrounded by more than ten males. There is a strong possibility that at the officer level, a woman officer would be surrounded by more than ten males. In fact, there are many offices in which there is only one woman officer and she has to work everyday surrounded by many more than 10 male officers and staff. Office work is conducted in a team work arrangement

or within a chain of command system. Therefore, understanding, co-operation, co-ordination and friendliness among the officers are prerequisites for any successful completion of the assignments.

5.124 Although there have been some efforts to provide overseas training in such issues as gender in management for women officers of the BCS,¹¹ and although networking among women officers has begun, the research findings in this area lead to the conclusion that more has to be done in the area of training of both women and men officers and staff regarding the new roles that women are assuming in government service. As well, the network that women have established, one can allege, does not yet match that of male officers. An agenda setting process must be put in place to integrate new groups, such as women, into the government work place.

ii. Working Conditions for Women

5.125 Based on the research conducted for this Study, the following recommendations to improve working conditions for women in government are as follows:

- (1) provide day care centers;
- (2) provide rest rooms for women;
- (3) provide hostel facilities for women;
- (4) provide transport facilities for women;
- (5) extend maternity leave;
- (6) post spouses together at the same station; and
- (7) change existing rules which discriminate against women, i.e., the pension rules.

iii. Working Relationships between Women and Men

5.126 The principal interventions that are recommended to improve working relationships between women and men include:

- (1) the establishment of a government policy to discourage the harassment of women (both sexual and other forms of harassment) and a process to permit redress for grievances in this area; and
- (2) mandatory training programs which would focus on such subjects as gender in management, awareness development (for both women and men), harassment. These training programs could be mobile in nature through the use of training videos and training teams.

End Notes

1. One of the most complete and readable histories is the one written by Philip Mason (under the pen name of Philip Woodruff) entitled The Men Who Ruled India published in two volumes in the early 1950s. Mason served as an ICS officer in India before World War II.
2. This was actually a merger of East Pakistan Provincial Civil Service (EPPCS) officers with those Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) officers who opted for Bangladesh after 1971.
3. The 58 recent graduates from the University of Dhaka included (by major area of study): biological sciences (10), science (10), social sciences (8), commerce (5), arts (5), business administration (5), nutrition and food science (5), education and research (5) and social welfare and research (5). The 21 recent graduates of technical universities and colleges included (by major area of study): medicine (8), agriculture (7) and engineering (6).
4. The survey results are reproduced from M. Safiur Rahman, Human Relations in Administration: Bangladesh Context, [in Bengali], Dhaka: BPATC, 1990.
5. The leaders of the BCS Coordination Committee and the DEA Combine claim that out of the 29 BCS cadres, they represent the interests of 26 cadres and that the other two cadres (BCS Foreign Affairs and BCS Judicial) are not against their demands.
6. These demands are called the "17 Point Demands of Professionals and 26 BCS [Bangladesh Civil Service] Cadres."
7. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Personnel Manual, Dhaka: O & M Wing (Development Branch), Ministry of Establishment, April 1989, pp. 75 and 16-17.
8. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Public Service Commission Report, 1992, Dhaka, 1992.
9. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Personnel Manual, Dhaka: O & M Wing (Development Branch), Ministry of Establishment, April 1989. The following two rules are indicated on p. 37.
10. Mamadou Dia, Position Paper for Improving Civil Service Efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, D.C.: Institutional Development and Management Division, Africa Technical Department, The World Bank, October 1992, pp. 5-6.

11. The assistance of the British Council with funding from British ODA is notable in this area. /

6. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING

6.001 The human resources of any government are important if only because government tends to be labor intensive. One of the areas of research for the Study was human resource development and training. This section examines: (A) the quality of human resources in the government of Bangladesh; (B) training as a vehicle for human resource development; and (C) the relationship, if any, between training and human resource utilization.

A. Quality of Human Resources

6.002 The overall quality of the civil service as determined from the level of education of those entering the civil service has deteriorated according to the survey cited in the previous section (as reported in the Dainik Bangla on May 22, 1993):

[in] analysing the results of the SSC and HSC exams of 1989 and 1990, it appears that in 1989 only 6.8 percent [of the] candidates passed [the] SSC in [the] 1st Division; in 1990, only 5.7 percent [of the] candidates passed in [the] 1st Division. In [the] 1989 HSC examination, only 2.83 percent [of the] candidates past in [the] 1st Division and in 1990, [only] 4.17 percent.

6.003 As well, the overall quality has deteriorated as determined by the ability of to spell correctly English or Bengali words. From the same survey cited above, it was reported that:

. . .in the 1980s in a particular cadre (which was not identified), [individuals who] entered [the] civil service. . .could not spell correctly a single word among six ordinary Bengali words and six ordinary English words.

B. Training

6.004 In the research conducted on human resource development and training for this Study, over 100 civil servants were

surveyed using a questionnaire containing both structured and semi-structured. The results of this survey indicated the following:

- (1) effectiveness of management training is hindered by lack of clarity of national goals and deterioration of moral values and a resultant increase in corruption;
- (2) training provided by government training institutions was considered useful but its utilization by those trained was limited because they did not return to their old positions, did not get necessary support from their organizations to apply what they learned and were not provided training in how to introduce changes in their organizations; and
- (3) foreign training opportunities were provided to those "who could manage it" and the civil service "elites" while domestic training opportunities went to "those who could not avoid" the training;

6.005 The survey also revealed training issues such as the preference for training in financial management (24.0 percent), policy planning (16.0 percent), public administration (12.0 percent) and economic development (9.0 percent). Subjects such as problem solving and computer techniques were given comparatively low priority.

6.006 The results of the survey also indicated that officers were not usually consulted in determining their training needs.

6.007 The survey showed that there were deficiencies in the adequate utilization of all types of training, including formal, foundation, in-service and on-the-job.

6.008 The survey revealed that the officers felt that they could not use their expertise and experience in Bangladesh adequately.

C. Utilization of Trained Human Resources

i. Staffing/Posting

6.009 According to the survey of over 100 civil servants, there is doubt about the linkage of posting to training completed. The opinions of the officers seemed to be almost equally divided with 48 percent answering in the affirmative and 52 percent answering in the negative.

6.010 The analysis conducted on randomly chosen Personal Data Sheets confirms the fact that trained civil servants are not utilized effectively and that overtraining is also a characteristic of public sector human resource development in Bangladesh. Four randomly selected cases provide empirical support for the statements indicated above.

ii. Case of Misutilization of Training

6.011 Below is the training profile of a BCS officer.

Type of Training	Positions Held
Health Service Administration, USA	SDO Jhalakati
Health Service Administration, GDR	SO M/o Industries
Health Service Administration, Neth	PS M/o State
	DS M/o Irrigation
	PS M/o Youth & Sports
	DS M/o Jute & Textiles
	Alt Dir World Bank
	Dir Pres Sect
	Addl Reg Coop Soc
	DS M/o Estab
	Dir Govt Accomo
	OSD Estab

No post which this officer has held utilized the training he received in health service administration training from three overseas institutions.

iii. A Case of Overtraining

6.012 Below is another training profile of a BCS officer.

Degree Obtained	Place	Date
MPPA	Univ. of Wisconsin	01/74 - 06/75
MPA	Harvard Univ.	07/83 - 06/84

Getting the basically same degree from two major U.S. institutions is a waste of valuable training opportunities. Government could have used one of these educational opportunities to train an additional officer. As well, this type monopoly of training opportunities contributes to inter-cadre tensions since BCS (Administration) tends to dominate degree education abroad.

iv. Another Case of Misutilization of Training

6.013 Below is still another training profile of a BCS officer.

Training Courses	Date
Foundation Tr	04/74-05/74
Treasury Tr	08/74-10/74
Thana Tr	08/83-09/83
Sur & Sett Tr	11/90-02/91
Land Adm & Ref	04/91-04/91

Positions Held	Date
Dy Mag & Dy Col Mym	12/73 - 03/75
Dy Mag & Dy Col Kish	03/75 - 10/77
Dy Mag & Dy Col Synam	10/77 - 08/80
Mag Hatiya	08/80 - 03/82
Addl SDO Lakshipur	03/82 - 08/82
Adgl Bandarean	08/82 - 12/82
UNO Monohordi	12/82 - 09/85
ADC Naogoan	08/85 - 04/86
ADM & ADC Naogoan	04/86 - 08/88
SAS M/o Works	08/88 - 01/90
ADC Shylet	01/90 - 02/92
OSD Estab	02/92 -
Director, Narcotics	06/93

The officer attended five training courses in-country and held 13

different posts over a time span of 19 years with an average of 1.46 years in each post. Utilization of training would be very difficult given the frequent movement of the officer from post to post. His last posting as Director, Narcotics, was not related at least directly to either his training or prior postings.

v. The Case of Unfocused Training

6.014 The training profile below reveals another form of misutilization of training.

Training Courses

Date

IASTT Course in Math	05/73-06/73
Japanese Language	04/76-03-77
MS & DR Mech Engg, Japan	04/77-03/82
Test Const	04/84-04/84
Ed Admin & Mgmt	06/88-07/88
Train of Trainers	10/89-11/89
Fin Mgmt	03/90-03-90

Positions Held

Date

Lect Govt Gir Coll DH	11/71-02/72
Lect Govt Coll Syl	02/72-03/76
Lect Dput Japan	04/76-03/82
Lect Sad Coll	03/82-10/82
Lect Nazrul Coll	10/82-02/83
Asst Prof Zahada Coll	11/80-04/83
Spec NAEN M/o Ed	04/84-09/91
Assoc Prof Jag Coll	10/91-02/92
OSD M/o Estab	02/92-
DS Sci & Tech	03-92

The training experiences of this officer were unfocused and the training has little connection with the posts this officer has held.

IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FINDINGS

A. Performance and Accountability

1.01 The team found widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of Government, both among senior government officials and among representatives of the private sector. Criticisms related particularly to the implementation of policy. A number of reasons were put forward for the poor performance which included apathy, narrow vision, a lack of commitment and inexperience in operating within a democratic system of government. It was suggested that the civil service, has been unwilling to give up powers to the democratically elected representatives, and that there are uncertainties and tensions about the respective roles of Ministers and the civil servants.

1.02 The shortcomings in the performance of government are seen to be related to the system of accountability. It was suggested that the select committee system for holding Ministries accountable to Parliament is not working effectively. There are weaknesses in the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General arising partly from the backlog of work. The evidence led the Team to conclude that government organizations are not being held properly accountable either financially or for programme performance.

1.03 As to the performance of individual civil servants, there appears to be no system for position description setting out the responsibilities and reporting lines for most posts in

Ministries and other government organizations. Nor is the Annual Confidential Report system being used properly. The Team concluded that individual performance is not being objectively evaluated and that individuals are not, therefore, being held properly accountable.

B. Control of and Accountability for Financial Expenditures

1.04 It was not part of this study to examine the government's budgeting and financial management systems. The Team did examine the relationship between its studies and the conclusions about control of and accountability for financial expenditures contained in two recent reports by International Management Consultant Limited; namely: International Management Consultants Limited, Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control, Final Report. Colchester, Essex, UK, June 1993; and International Management Consultants Limited, Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control, Final Report. Project Implementation Documentation. Colchester, Essex, UK, June 1993. These reveal serious inadequacies in present systems and make a series of important recommendations which are set out in paragraph 2.09 of this study's report. The Team consider that the recommended changes to the budgeting and financial management systems should be evaluated and implemented along with the recommendations of this study.

C. Organization, Structure and Functioning

1.05 The Team found, in the systems of Government, relics of the former authoritarian Presidential regime, which are evident for example in the relatively rigid bureaucratic

approach and in the frequent delays in transacting government business. But the processes of deregulation, disinvestment and privatization are beginning to change and loosen up the government systems. At the same time, the political and economic imperatives are requiring a redefinition of the rôle of government and a narrowing of its involvement in the economy.

D. Policy Making

1.06 The Team examined the process of policy making including the influence and effectiveness of the main policymakers.

1.07 In carrying out its functions particularly of holding the government accountable, the survey data showed that most respondents (over 80 percent) considered the Parliament to be "highly effective" or "effective" on the whole. The three methods of making Parliament more effective which commanded most support were the repeal of Article 70 of the Constitution, activating parliamentary committees and training Members of Parliament.

1.08 Of the responses to the survey on the rôle of Ministers in policy making, over 60 percent considered that Ministers played only "a partially proper rôle" and only 14 percent of officials with frequent contacts with Ministers believed that they played "a proper rôle". If these perceptions are correct, many Ministers seem not to be fulfilling their responsibilities in the decision-making process.

1.09 The Secretariat (defined as meaning the conglomerate of all Ministries and Divisions) was found to be heavily engaged in detailed administrative and regulatory functions which

allowed relatively little time for policy formulation and planning. Nor is policy coordination always being effectively carried out. The main weaknesses in the functioning of the Secretariat pinpointed in the survey work were risk aversion, interference of politicians and senior officials, and the absence of data. The surveys suggested that the cooperation of Ministers, Ministries and the civil service might be improved by making proper data available, by greater interaction between Ministers and civil servants, by special training of Ministers and by appointing as the Chairman of Parliamentary Committees MPs who are not Ministers. The responses to these surveys suggest that there is a lack of clarity about the allocation of responsibility and a consequent aversion to taking even minimal steps in exercising responsibility.

1.10 The Team found an absence of units in government with individuals skilled in policy analyses and 76 percent of the participants in the survey considered that staff with such skills should be integrated into the policy making areas of government.

1.11 The Team found an increasing tendency for government to consult outside interest and clientele groups in formulating policy and some policy analyses are being carried out in universities and private and non-profit "think tanks". However, further developments in these areas could make a positive contribution to better informed policy making.

1.12 It is important to the proper functioning of government that the organisation at central and local levels should be coherent and understandable to those in the public service and

by citizens generally. The Team found that Bangladesh has a larger Cabinet and more separate Ministries than most other countries. The size of the Cabinet and the number of separate Ministries is a matter of political decision. However, the study found wide differences in size, and in the volume and complexity of work between Ministries, and there was evidence of some lack of clarity in definition of functions and of consequent over-lapping responsibilities. The management of the civil service poses difficulties and inefficiencies because of the divisive influences created by the cadre system and the inter-cadre rivalries.

1.13 The lack of definition in the goals and objectives relating to individual policy areas is another cause of inefficiency. The Team sees a need to develop for each organisational unit objectives linked to activities and the expected outputs or impacts of those activities. This would provide the basis of creating a more coherent, compact and efficient structure of Ministries each with a clearer definition of its role. Some reorganization has been undertaken by the present government. Further reorganization should be designed to promote results-oriented performance, transparency and accountability.

1.14 There are problems concerning the coordination of policy between Ministries and Divisions. A reduction in the number of Ministries/Divisions would be beneficial from this point of view. Although the Team makes no recommendations about the functioning of Cabinet and Cabinet Committees, it suggests that consideration might be given to ways of making Cabinet

Committees more effective so as to reduce the number of matters that have to be decided by the full Cabinet.

1.15 The process of redefining the scope of government appears to be vague and ambiguous. There is a lack of clarity in the relationship between the traditional regulatory functions and the service functions of the civil service including the way these are managed.

1.16 The Team noted that other countries had found a need to develop in government a capability to undertake research on organization, structure and functioning of government and to provide consultancy services to government organizations. No such capability appears currently to exist in Bangladesh.

1.17 Research data indicate that officials are reluctant or unwilling to take decisions with the result that even routine issues often end up on the desks of Secretaries and Ministers. This problem is related to the lack of position descriptions. The Study reveals a need to separate policy decision making from more routine matters which involve implementation so that the latter can be delegated to appropriate levels in central and local government. The formal rules governing the scope for decentralizing/delegating decision-making need to be further reviewed. A more collegiate approach, for example through regular meetings between relevant officials, would facilitate speedy decision-making and reduce the need for passing of files.

E. Local Government

1.18 The continuing high degree of centralization in government is reflected in the fact that the career moves and

development of all staff serving outside the Secretariat are managed directly by central government. Officials working in local government are answerable to their parent Ministries or Divisions and not to local government. Local administration is generally organized vertically with little coordination horizontally. The evidence from secondary sources indicates that, in many cases, services are not getting through to meet the needs of the population. There are a number of reasons for this including a lack of information about conditions at the local level. Some programmes and services reach down to the village level but not all villages are part of programme or service delivery networks.

1.19 There are two parallel delivery systems for services under poverty alleviation programmes, one managed by central government and the other by non-governmental organizations. In some cases, there is cooperation between the two delivery systems. The decisions on government sponsored development projects, including those relating to coordination at local level, are taken in Dhaka, thus effectively cutting out any autonomy at local government level.

1.20 The proposals for restructuring local government made by the Local Government Structure Review Commission seem to be based more on systems of decentralization than on devolution. The evidence suggests that people and institutions at the local level are not well organized for local level actions and that there is inadequate pressure from them for change. A viable local government system is essential to develop the political process and leadership at local level to complement

these at national level. This would provide a basis for devolving and decentralizing the delivery of services and for local accountability.

F. Decision-Making

1.21 The decision making process is characterized by excessive passing to and fro of papers on individual issues in a bureaucratic system with a multitude of both vertical and horizontal layers of responsibility. Nor is responsibility always well defined which adds to the confusion and delays. Ministers and senior civil servants spend too much time on housekeeping, personnel questions and more routine matters that should be handled at lower levels. The management and implementation particularly of large-scale development projects appears inadequate because of an unwillingness by the Ministry of Finance to apply the relevant rules which provide for delegation to take place. Where delegation does take place, the effectiveness can be impeded by requirements to consult higher authority before actions are taken. The Team sees an urgent need to examine and revise the rules and regulations on delegation in order to increase transparency and accountability.

G. Aberrations in Decision-making

1.22 It was not part of the Study's remit to collect evidence about subjective, illegal or corrupt practices affecting decision-making and the delivery of services. The Team was, however, confronted with a good deal of information about such practices though the facts are hard to establish. It was concluded that the report could not ignore this issue because

of its evidently central importance in any consideration of the administrative processes and behaviour in Bangladesh. The information put to the Team suggests that corruption is not limited to the more obvious branches of government, but is now all pervasive, creeping up even into the higher levels affecting policy formulation and systems for redress. The Team has summarized the ideas which emerged from previous reports on corruption. The Team considers that previous proposals mutually reinforce the recommendations of this current study.

H. Use of Technology

1.23 Although there have been developments in the computerization of central government, it is not clear how effective this has been in improving the operations of government. The Team considers that there is scope for further use of modern technology to improve internal management and control.

I. Civil Service Management

1.24 Good Government in a democratic society is dependent on the competence and motivation of a non-political civil service. Since the 1970, the evidence suggests that the tradition of "the best and brightest" seeking a career in the civil service has diminished. This is, in part, because more attractive career opportunities in business and the professions have opened up. Although a career in government is still very desirable, particularly in view of the employment situation, the survey data indicates that the standing of encadred civil servants is not high in the eyes of

the respondents and that a civil service career is not seen to be attractive to graduates from technical universities and colleges. Among recent graduates, the civil service has a serious image problem.

1.25 Inter-service tensions, which are not a new phenomenon, are a feature of relations between cadres, between different batches recruited into the civil service and between Class 1 officers and others. Survey results showed widespread dissatisfaction among both encadred and non-encadred civil servants with the cadre system and with the system based on rank-in-person. A move towards a rank-in-position system seems to be favoured by a majority of civil servants. However, there is no consensus about the model for a personnel system.

1.26 The recruitment in 1973 of civil servants who were not required to compete under the normal rigorous examination system is a cause of resentment among those civil servants recruited before and since that date. Special procedures were also operated for some other intakes. The Team had no empirical evidence to support the contention that the 1973 intake and some other year intakes are inferior. The tensions which also exist between classes of officers could be eased by changes in the present rank-in-person system.

1.27 The results from the enquiries into career planning in the civil service suggest that such plans exist for only a minority of staff and are frequently drawn up without consulting the individual concerned. Among senior civil servants, career plans are generally non-existent and

unsatisfactory where they do exist.

1.28 The Team found general dissatisfaction with the Annual Confidential Report system. The majority of the BCS (Administration) and other BCS officers considered that promotion, in general, is not based on merit. Eighty-three percent of the survey group did not see the promotion system as fair and about half attributed this to factors other than the absence of objective criteria. Promotion is an area of civil service management where there is a clash of interest between the BCS Administration cadre and other groups. This was apparent from the feelings aroused by the recent promotion exercise. The Team felt that these problems appear to be, in part, the result of there being no common promotion policy applying to all groups of the civil service.

1.29 There is dissatisfaction, particularly among non BCS Administration staff, with the transfer system. The frequency with which staff at Secretary and other senior levels change jobs means that efficiency in performance must suffer, because of the learning curve on new work and because this makes it impossible to get to know properly subordinate staff and representatives from the outside interests concerned with the new area of work. There is an inevitable loss of commitment to the job when officers expect to be moved on rapidly. The present transfer systems are neither efficient nor satisfactory for functioning of the government system or for the individual civil servants. There may be good reasons for operating different transfer systems for different groups of staff but there is a need, in the Team's view, to examine

whether common rules should apply in different areas of government work. There seems a need to clarify the aims of transfer policy and its link with promotion. The Team concluded that a satisfactory resolution of the transfer issue will play a vital role in administrative consolidation and improved public management performance.

1.30 Government has taken to down-size the civil service at considerable cost in severance payments. The Team had no evidence as to whether or not the government has chosen the most effective means of streamlining government operations. The retrenchments proposed for most organizations appear to have been decided on an ad hoc basis and the financial benefits to the organizations have not been calculated. In the reports produced, no account has been taken of "ghost workers" who add to overstaffing levels. Based on studies of other countries, retrenchment alone does not guarantee increased efficiency and effectiveness.

1.31 The proportion of women in the Bangladesh civil service remains small in relation to the population generally, and concentrated in certain professional/technical cadres. Over the years 1986-91, women represented 15.20 percent, on average, of the number of participants in the examinations and 14.14 per cent of those who were successful. In the BCS Administration cadre, a survey showed 6.5 percent to be female, with the great majority as Assistant Secretary, and none above Deputy Secretary.

1.32 A case study was carried out to identify the problems confronting women in government. All the women in the study

came from families which stressed the importance of female education. Nevertheless, some faced obstacles from family and friends at the time of joining. More than half the women interviewed referred to various problems which they had to contend with in the service. The Team concluded that there is a need to do more to train men and women officers and staff about gender awareness, and a need to improve the working and service conditions for women.

J. Human Resources Development and Training

1.33 The research data suggested that respondents perceive that the level of education of recruits to the civil service has deteriorated.

1.34 The results from a survey of civil servants about their training experiences suggests that the effectiveness of management training is impeded by a lack of clarity on national goals and a deterioration in moral values linked with increased corruption. The benefits of training can be of limited value because officials do not return to their old positions. Officers are not generally consulted on their training needs. The survey showed up inadequacies in all types of training and many officers felt that they could not use their expertise and experience adequately in Bangladesh.

1.35 An analysis of personnel records suggested that trained personnel are not effectively used, and that in some cases, there is a problem about over-training. The frequent transfer of officers makes it difficult to match training experience to job needs.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

2.01 The recommendations are based on the findings of the Formulation Mission Report (8-29 October 1992), studies by local consultants, review by Team members of both primary and secondary data sources, and interviews carried out by Team members. They comprise proposals/ideas with varying degree of specificity indicating the need for detailing these recommendations in the form of Plan of Action for implementation. This is exactly what the Team will do in the form of a Programme Document after the Government reviews the Report. The Team is also expected to prepare a Programme Support Document for the UNDP funding of specific components and activities in the Programme Document.

2.02 The Team recognizes the existence of a wide gap between appearance and reality in the public management culture as reflected in ineffective implementation of policies and programmes. Narrowing this gap is critical to transparent management and can be brought about and sustained by the effective enforcement of existing laws and regulations and the implementation of reform measures recommended in the Report. The durability of reform measures needs to be based on the principles of openness, neutrality and fairness that can motivate and mobilize public officials to work for the goals of development and stability. The Team considers that reforms in the organizational and management systems require basic attitudinal changes among public servants. These changes need to address their service relationships to the public, their role as facilitators for the private sector and their

accountability to the elected representatives and Ministers. The Team equally considers that such attitudinal changes need to be brought about and sustained in a governance and management environment supported by laws and practices where public servants feel that decisions affecting them are fair, consistent and predictable.

2.03 The Team notes that the rights and aspirations of the people, broad goals of society and the ways of achieving these goals are embodied in the Constitution. The Team also notes that the current Government's perception about the role of the government is clearly stated in the recent budget speech, as being confined to "things that it should do best, that is, maintenance of law and order, development of social and physical infrastructure, formulating and implementing monetary, fiscal, trade and investment policies that explore all potential avenues of growth and are in harmony with the dynamics of society and genius of the people. The rest should be kept to private endeavours of individuals and organizations". The Team considers that the definition of a more limited role for the Government will require development of viable institutions in other sectors of society, and until this has happened, Government and its management system will need to continue its wider role.

2.04 The Team notes that the potential support for reform that a homogenous society like Bangladesh can offer has been seriously eroded by increased factionalism and an absence of national consensus on vital issues. Although it is not within the scope of the study, the Team suggests that broad societal

support will be necessary for enduring governance and management reform and that efforts need to be made to build consensus around a societal vision of change which can sustain the process of change and reform in the public management system.

2.05 The Team notes that, in pursuit of its objective of building a democratic and prosperous society, Bangladesh aims to organize an efficient and democratic administrative system, focusing upon performance, transparency and accountability. In doing so, certain concepts that are drawn from current reality but geared to achieve future goals are outlined below. These concepts also reflect the distilled experience of countries with similar size and socio-economic situations that have achieved significant development in the post-war decades.

- o A vision or framework of broad social values and goals will be required to bind and mobilize people and groups in the society in support of Government reforms. Socio-economic goals have to be articulated by political leadership; observed in making policies and laws; and focused on positive behavioural changes to achieve greater social cohesiveness.
- o The foundations for a democratic and efficient government can be reinforced. Bangladesh is a homogeneous society with an essentially single linguistic, ethnic and cultural tradition, yet characterized by diverse factions and interests. A strategy to extend consensus-building can reinforce and strengthen the homogeneous character of society.
- o A pro-active development policy balancing the interests of security, economic growth and human development is useful. The Government and the society need to establish clear priorities reflecting needs and resources. These priorities should provide a framework for the relationship with development partners.
- o National commitment, as inscribed in the Constitution, is to democratic and parliamentary government. This commitment involves providing an

accountable, transparent and performance-oriented administration. Such a challenging task requires active cooperation and support from key groups and institutions in the society. There is a need to widen this consensus process to support the necessary institutions, systems and practices of administration within a parliamentary democracy. There is need for Government actively to seek and promote greater understanding and agreement among all segments of society in its governance and management process.

Governance structures and management systems need to be rooted in constitutional and legal bases in order to provide a framework for actions of individual Government organizations and public officials.

All actions of Government organizations and their officials are ultimately the responsibility of Ministers who are accountable to Parliament.

Performance and accountability, rather than patronage and rent-seeking, should be the criteria for action by public officials in running the affairs of the State. All administrative, personnel and financial laws and regulations need to be designed to ensure that public officials do the job for which they are paid.

Efficient and democratic administration need appropriate structures and necessary resources to achieve policy goals.

Merit, equity and fairness should be guiding principles in the treatment of public servants. A balance of structural reforms and behavioural changes will guide public servants to perform their jobs with integrity and efficiency.

2.06 Although the recommendations are inter-related, they are noted under six topics; namely, (1) performance and accountability, (2) policy and decision-making, (3) organization and structure, (4) civil service management, (5) human resource development and training, and (6) technological infrastructure. These recommendations are further organized into two groups; namely, (a) consolidation proposals and (b) reform proposals. Consolidation measures build upon existing realities and perceptions and require immediate remedial

actions which will signal the changes necessary for reform. The reform measures are geared to developing a more responsive, transparent and accountable administrative system and a performance - oriented civil service to support parliamentary democracy as well as durable development. The linkage between the consolidation and reform measures is close and may be seen as an on-going process of change involving stages. The gains obtained from consolidation measures will not be sustained unless reform measures are introduced as soon as possible. Both the consolidation initiative and the reform initiative should go forward simultaneously. Should that not be feasible for any reasons, the Team recommends that the initiatives be implemented at least in quick sequence. While the proposed consolidation and reform measures are presented below under six topics, in a condensed format, some explanatory notes pertaining to these measures may be seen in the Appendix 2.

A. Performance and Accountability

i. Consolidation Proposals

1. Establish a unit in the Prime Minister's Office responsible for conducting assessments of performance of Ministries, with reports to be submitted to the Prime Minister
2. Require annual reports to be submitted to Parliament by each Ministry, on performance in relation to its goals, objectives, targets and programmes achieved during the previous fiscal year
3. Strengthen the independent advice and support for the ministerial review committees in Parliament in order to improve their effectiveness in scrutinizing and reporting on the performance of Ministries. These review committees should be chaired by a Member of Parliament who is not a Minister of the

Government

4. Strengthen the independence of Comptroller/Auditor General (CAG) by establishing its own Secretariat, and substantially strengthen its technical and logistical capacity and the resources to produce reports more rapidly
5. Implement the provision for the Ombudsman, as embodied in Article 77 of the Constitution

ii. Reform Proposals

6. Establish results oriented management systems through setting objectives and measures of outputs and impacts for units throughout the Government. Initiate this activity with selected Ministries, Divisions, Departments, Districts, and Thanas, progressively including additional units
7. Establish units in each Ministry and Division, responsible for developing and applying performance criteria and measures and developing internal performance audit capability. Initiate activity with selected Ministers and Divisions, eventually to add this capacity to all Government organizations
8. Require that audits produced by the CAG be completed no later than 12 months after the completion of the fiscal year for which the audit is conducted
9. Implement budget and expenditure control reforms, including budget rules, format, calendar, and accounting and auditing rules and practices, generally as recommended in Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control: Final Report. Initiate reforms progressively
10. Develop closer integration of budgetary system with planning system, including application of appropriate modern methods, with linkage to development programmes and a multi-year perspective

B. Policy and Decision Making

i. Consolidation Proposals

11. Initiate development of systematic data base

for all Government information, with initial focus on finance, personnel and performance data

12. Increase policy analysis capability in Government by developing the skills of the existing staff, and by introducing specialist posts and units in Ministries
 13. Establish and utilize advisory councils and committees consisting of representatives of interest groups and expert groups to advise on policy formulation, and involve as appropriate, client and beneficiary groups in the implementation of policy and delivery of services
 14. Strengthen the Parliamentary library by making it a depository of all relevant Government documents, as well as a reference and research service for all Members of Parliament
 15. Review existing rules and practices regarding decision making and develop measures to ensure that decision making authority is delegated to and exercised at appropriate levels
- ii. Reform Proposals
16. Develop networking of the data base so that Parliament, political executives and permanent executives can access the information, as mentioned in the related Consolidation Proposal (# 11)
 17. Strengthen collective decision making in the framework of corporate planning by teams within Ministries and operating units at appropriate levels
 18. Encourage development of autonomous policy think-tanks, capable of researching and preparing reports as input to the improvement and development of Government policies

C. Organization and Structure

i. Consolidation Proposals

19. Initiate systematic organizational review initially with selected Ministries, Divisions, Departments, wings, cells, and autonomous bodies, eventually extending exercise throughout Government, the results of which would define a reconfiguration of central Government structure, including the

establishment of some existing implementation units as self-accounting agencies where appropriate

20. Review and implement rational allocation of functions between central and local levels in order that local administrations and local Governments would be progressively strengthened

ii. Reform Proposals

21. Rationalize Government structure following examination of functions and based upon principles of compactness and coherence, taking into account the need to improve coordination and to reduce the number of Ministries and Divisions in order to make Government more manageable
22. Systematically review and streamline Government rules and regulations relating to allocation of business/work and financial powers so as to eliminate red tape and redundant functions, and thereafter update all relevant Government manuals
23. Ensure independence of the judiciary at all levels, including separation of judiciary from executive, as provided in Article 22 of the Constitution
24. Progressively place under control of elected Local Governments, the local administrations and locally-posted officers, as appropriate, and related to Articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution and the Report of the Local Government Structure Review Commission

D. Civil Service Management

i. Consolidation Proposals

25. Select and promote officials based on merit, determined in a transparent process and defined as: (1) demonstrated competency/expertise and educational attainment for selection; and (2) performance, examination and successful completion of mandatory training for promotion
26. Strengthen Public Service Commission through improvement of status and conditions of service of members, upgrading the secretariat, logistics and technical expertise, and ensure that it can operate effectively and independently in its assigned tasks of

recruitment, selection, promotional principles, terms and conditions of service, discipline, and making an annual report to Parliament, as embodied in Articles 137-141 of the Constitution

27. Develop, within the Ministry of Establishment, principles of personnel management for all levels of civil servants, including the development of frameworks for Ministries and units to manage their own staff, including revision and updating of personnel manual
28. Provide for the Ministry of Establishment to be responsible for managing directly officers at Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary levels. All other levels should be managed by their respective Ministries, Divisions and future self-accounting agencies
29. Revise existing conduct rules and integrate these into an updated Code of Conduct to reflect current socio-economic context
30. Progressively remove distinctions between cadres, specifically by combining similar cadres into a smaller number of cadres in order to open up more promotional opportunities based on merit especially at the top levels, and by harmonizing pay systems and conditions of service
31. Abolish the practice of reservation of posts in Ministries for particular cadres, and provide for open competition for Secretariat posts from all cadres, based on qualifications and experiences relevant to the post
32. Professionalize the civil service through development of an appropriate transfer policy in order to reduce the adverse impact of current frequent transfers on the efficiency of Government operations
33. Develop position descriptions for all posts in Government, beginning with Class 1 officer posts, in order to enable personnel to be matched to posts
34. Provide adequate infrastructure for women officers, including attention to issues of child care and transportation

ii. Reform Proposals

35. As envisioned in Article 133 of the

Constitution, enact appropriate civil service laws and rules to regulate appointment and conditions of service of persons in the service of the Republic

36. Decentralize implementation of personnel policies to Ministries and Divisions
37. Revise leave rules to accommodate special requirements of women
38. Replace cadre and class system with personnel management system based on position classification and grades, for transparent, fair and efficient management of officials in a democratically responsive civil service

E. Human Resources Development and Training

i. Consolidation Proposals

39. Revise the content of training programme to reflect the needs of a parliamentary democracy, private sector development, and a market economy. Training schedules should cover people-centred development and public service ethics
40. Professionalize the civil service through enforcing, and initiating where necessary, mandatory periodic training, including performance assessment and examination, directly linked to promotion to specific levels and types of posts
41. Develop special top-level seminars of short duration, based on participatory format, and using high level experts, for highest level civil servants and heads of industry and NGOs, so as to increase awareness of better management practices, wider global perspectives, and the need for consensus-building and greater trust within society
42. Design and initiate orientation programmes and policy seminars for Members of Parliament
43. Strengthen training institutions through computerization, training equipment and the acquisition and development of advanced materials

ii. Reform Proposals

44. Carry out on a regular and systematic basis

training needs assessments, in order to develop appropriate training and other measures to enhance technical and managerial skills among the civil servants

45. Provide professional development opportunities for individual officers, to be determined in the context of the Annual Confidential Report and career development needs
46. Design and offer special training programmes for collective teams within Governmental units at all levels, where these teams are developed
47. Expand and strengthen training programmes for local level leaders
48. Initiate mandatory inclusion in all training programmes of gender awareness for women and men officers and staff, and develop curricular modules on gender and management and special courses for women managers as appropriate

F. Technological Infrastructure

i. Consolidation Proposals

49. Computerize and/or upgrade major systems of information on finance, personnel and performance management, within Government units, to improve the quality of policy and decision making as noted under the section on policy and decision making
50. Develop linkage with international information networks for professional development, policy development and all aspects of enhancing global perspectives

ii. Reform Proposals

51. Develop decentralized and coordinated information systems, linking central Government units with local administration and local Governments, as noted in the section on organization and structure
52. Provide special infrastructure and computerized information systems to support collective decision making teams, as noted in the section on policy and decision making

3. IMPLEMENTATION

3.01 Observations were made in the recommendations section regarding some aspects of implementation. The UNDP expressed its readiness to prepare a Programme Document to develop, in consultation with the Government, specific proposals to implement the above recommendations included under consolidation and reform measures. In this section, suggestions for strategy and approaches and institutions for implementation of these recommendations will be made. It may be noted the suggestions for reform implementation in this section covers all the recommendations within both consolidation and reform categories.

3.01 Strategy and Approaches. The strategy proposed attempts to build on the on-going process of democratization which is taking place in Bangladesh today. The elements of the strategy for reform must include transparency, results-oriented performance, and accountability.

3.02 To ensure transparency, implementation of administrative reforms must specify clear-cut, precise goals and objectives that are made known to those that will be most affected by the reforms. In the past, several reform attempts were made during both the 1947 to 1971 period and the period since independence in 1971. Many of them failed because the reforms were not disclosed to the public.

3.03 The transparency element of the approach requires that the bureaucracy, the relevant segments of the population and the public as a whole be informed of the goals and objectives of the reform as well as the progress being made in

implementing the reforms. Given the press coverage of the topic of administrative reform including areas of government operations that should be reformed as well as suggestions for reforms, there appears to be adequate interest and support that can be mobilized for reform implementation.

3.04 The results-oriented element of the approach requires that specific reforms and their detailed elements be anchored to specific time frames. This matrixing of reforms to time provides a clear indication of what is to be expected and when.

3.05 The accountability element of the approach requires that the implementation of reforms is the responsibility of the chief executive of the country. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (as revised in 1991), vests this power in the Office of the Prime Minister. At the same time, the Prime Minister possesses the power to delegate this authority to whatever organization she/he wishes with the understanding that the reform implementation organization reports to the Prime Minister in a periodic, timely fashion.

3.06 Institutions. The institutions most directly affected by the reforms recommended in this report include: the parliament; the cabinet and individual cabinet members; the judiciary; the civil service; and the public. Therefore, all of these segments of Bangladesh society have to be involved either in the role of overseer, implementer or evaluator. This must also be a non-partisan effort since the reforms that are recommended, if implemented, will be beneficial to all political parties in Bangladesh.

3.07 In this context, it is recommended that the Prime Minister appoint a Reform Implementation Commission composed of members of parliament, the cabinet, the secretariat, representatives of the business community, labour groups, agricultural organizations, the mass media, civic organizations, academic and professional institutes and associations and non-government organizations. The Chairperson should be a prominent, well-respected member of the judiciary. A Secretariat for the Commission should be comprised of high level technical and managerial experts drawn in part from institutions represented in the Commission. The Secretariat should be located in the Office of the Prime Minister.

3.08 The terms of reference for the Reform Implementation Commission should include: (1) the development of detailed proposals specifying objectives, components, and operational strategy for each reform recommendation; (2) the development of specific results-oriented activities, and matching them to specific time tables; (3) the assignment of specific implementation responsibilities to specific government officers and organizations; (4) the suggestion to the Prime Minister of any issue or areas of work that need to be studied to improve government performance; and (5) the presentation of quarterly and annual reports to the Prime Minister on the accomplishments of the implementation, as well as analysis of obstacles that the Commission is trying to overcome to stay on target.

Appendix 1

Commissions and Committees for the Study of Public Administration in Bangladesh 1972-1993

	<u>Title</u>	<u>Main Focus</u>
1.	Administrative and Services Structure and Reorganisation Committee, March 15, 1972	Personnel Management
2.	National Pay Commission I, July 21, 1972	Pay
3.	Pay and Services Commission, February 20, 1976	Personnel Aspects Including Pay
4.	Martial Law Committee for Examining Organisational set-up of Ministries/ Divisions, Department, Directorate, and other organisations under them, April 18, 1982	Organisation Staff
5.	Committee for Administrative Reform and Reorganization, April 28, 1982	Structure and Organisation
6.	National Pay Commission II May 31, 1984	Pay
7.	Secretaries Committee on Administrative Development, April 20, 1985	Promotion Aspects
8.	Special Committee to Review the Structure of Senior Services Pool (SSP) December 23, 1985	Structure of SSP
9.	Cabinet Sub-Committee June 3, 1987	Review SSP and Promotion Aspects
10.	Public Administration Efficiency Study May 1989	Secretariat Operations, Relationships Between Ministries, Departments, and Public Corporations. Project Cycle
11.	National Pay Commission III August 1989	Pay

Explanatory Notes on Recommendations

PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Consolidation Proposals	Reform Proposals
1. Establish a unit in the Prime Minister's Office responsible for conducting assessments of performance of Ministries, with reports to be submitted to the Prime Minister 2. Require annual reports to be submitted to Parliament by each Ministry, on performance in relation to its goals, objectives, targets and programmes achieved during the previous fiscal year 3. Strengthen the independent advice and support for the Ministerial review committees in Parliament in order to improve their effectiveness in scrutinizing and reporting on the performance of Ministries. These review committees should be chaired by a Member of Parliament who is not a Minister of the Government 4. Strengthen the independence of Comptroller/Auditor General (CAG) by establishing its own Secretariat, and substantially strengthen its technical and logistical capacity and the resources to produce reports more rapidly 5. Implement the provision for the Ombudsman, as embodied in Article 77 of the <u>Constitution</u>	6. Establish results oriented management systems through setting objectives and measures of outputs and impacts for units throughout the Government. Initiate this activity with selected Ministries, Divisions, Departments, Districts, and Thanas, progressively including additional units 7. Establish units in each Ministry and Division, responsible for developing and applying performance criteria and measures and developing internal performance audit capability. Initiate activity with selected Ministries and Divisions, eventually to add this capacity to all Government organizations 8. Require that audits produced by the CAG be completed no later than 12 months after the completion of the fiscal year for which the audit is conducted 9. Implement budget and expenditure control reforms, including budget rules, format, calendar, and accounting and auditing rules and practices, generally as indicated in <u>Bangladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control, Final Report</u>. Initiate reforms progressively. 10. Develop closer integration of budgetary system with planning system, including application of appropriate modern methods, with linkage to development programmes and a multi-year perspective.

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

1. Establish a unit in the Prime Minister's Office responsible for conducting assessments of performance of Ministries, with reports to be submitted to the Prime Minister

The Prime Minister, as head of the Government, is responsible for the performance of the machinery of Government, including its outputs and its impact on society. A professionally competent unit within the Office with expertise, experience and information would assist the Prime Minister in knowing whether there is a need for improvement in the implementation of Governmental programmes. The task of this unit will be staff work, quite distinct from the Prime Minister's Secretariat, IMED or other organizations performing main line functions.

2. Require annual reports to be submitted to Parliament by each Ministry, on performance in relation to its goals, objectives, targets and programmes achieved during the previous fiscal year

This proposal reflects the demands of a Parliamentary democracy in which Parliament must have adequate information to review the actions of the executive. Specifically, according to this proposal, each Ministry will develop goals, objectives, targets and programmes and a mechanism for collecting data on the accomplishment of the above, the results of which will then be reported annually to Parliament.

3. Strengthen the independent advice and support for the Ministerial review committees in Parliament in order to improve their effectiveness in scrutinizing and reporting on the performance of Ministries. These review committees should be chaired by a Member of Parliament who is not a Minister of the Government

Ministerial review committees can be strengthened to be able to analyze the performance of Ministries. Staff can be trained in the use of performance indicators and the analysis of reports and statistics. The appearance of conflict of interest whereby a Minister chairs the committee that oversees his/her Ministry can be overcome by the committee being chaired by Members of Parliament who are not Ministers. Some of these committees, as well as the Public Accounts Committee, might be chaired by Members of the Opposition.

4. Strengthen the independence of Comptroller/Auditor General (CAG) by establishing its own Secretariat, and substantially strengthen its technical and logistical capacity and the resources to produce reports more rapidly

The Comptroller/Auditor General plays a key role in public accountability. This office needs to have the trained staff, logistics and information to ensure the timely release of reports on the use of financial resources by the

Government. Although this office could, with additional financial audits, this office could, with additional training, perform selected performance audits, as requested by the Parliament.

5. Implement the provision for the Ombudsman, as embodied in Article 77 of the Constitution

Although the concept of Ombudsman is mentioned in the Constitution, it has not yet been implemented. In a democracy, it is important for citizens to have some ready mechanism that can receive and consider their grievances. In some cases, the Ombudsman can direct their grievances so that redress can be made; in other cases, even though redress is not forthcoming, the citizen will feel that he/she has been listened to with respect and fairness.

REFORM PROPOSALS

6. Establish results oriented management systems through setting objectives and measures of outputs and impacts for units throughout the Government. Initiate this activity with selected Ministries, Divisions, Departments, Districts, and Thanas, progressively including additional units .

Related to the issue of accountability is the concept of expecting Government policies, programmes and actions to produce some measurable results in the lives of the citizens. To achieve results, the Ministries and various operational units must clarify goals through setting specific objectives and targets for achievement for specific periods of time. The units must develop means of measuring the achievement of the targets, indicating the outputs of Government activity and the measured impact for society. This methodology can be employed in any unit and at any level, with a team of top officials who are responsible for using financial, personnel and logistical resources for the achievement of specified results. Units should be interested in reporting their results to Parliament, but more importantly, each unit should be interested in monitoring and improving its own performance.

7. Establish units in each Ministry and Division, responsible for developing and applying performance criteria and measures and developing internal performance audit capability. Initiate activity with selected Ministries and Divisions, eventually to add this capacity to all Government organizations

To accomplish results oriented management, it is necessary to establish a unit in each Ministry and division which would develop and apply criteria and measures for performance. This unit would assist and monitor operational units as they establish results oriented management systems.

8. Require that audits produced by the CAG be completed no later than 12 months after the completion of the fiscal year for which the audit is conducted

A major dimension of accountability is timeliness. Reports on the use of money and other resources which appear several years after the fact are useless for managerial purposes. It is too late to take corrective action, as too many contextual factors have changed. As the CAG increases its capability, it is reasonable to require that audit reports be completed within 12 months after the completion of the fiscal year.

9. Implement budget and expenditure control reforms, including budget rules, format, calendar, and accounting and auditing rules and practices, generally as recommended in Banqladesh: Reforms in Budgeting and Expenditure Control: Final Report. Initiate reforms progressively.

Several reports have indicated necessary reforms in the area of budget and expenditure control. The Study Team believes generally that these reforms should be implemented as soon as practicable, and that necessary training and equipment should be provided, as well as required changes in Government procedures should be made.

10. Develop closer integration of budgetary system with planning system, including application of appropriate modern methods, with linkage to development programmes and a multi-year perspective

As the budgetary system represents the allocation of financial resources and a planning system generally reflects the goals of the society, there should be considerable integration of the two processes. This integration can be facilitated by, among other things, coordination in information systems, especially through computerization and sharing of data between the two systems. The multi-year perspective and commitments to development programmes, including those that are donor funded and likely to be shifted to national budget, must be reflected in the budget and planning processes and documents. The current practice of using three-year rolling investment programme ought to be related to socio-economic development goals rather than a simple exercise of pruning investment proposals.

POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING

Consolidation Proposals	Reform Proposals
11. Initiate development of systematic data base for all Government information, with initial focus on finance, personnel and performance data 12. Increase policy analysis capability in Government by developing the skills of existing staff, and by introducing specialist <u>posts</u> <u>units</u> in Ministries 13. Establish and utilize advisory councils and committees consisting of <u>representatives of interest groups</u> and <u>expert groups</u> to <u>advise on policy formulation</u>, and <u>involve</u> as appropriate client and beneficiary groups in the implementation of policy and delivery of services 14. Strengthen the Parliamentary library by making it a depository of all relevant Government documents, as well as a reference and research service for all Members of Parliament 15. Review existing rules and practices regarding decision making and develop measures to ensure that decision making authority is delegated to and exercised at appropriate levels	16. Develop networking of the data base so that <u>Parliament</u>, political executives and permanent executives can access the information, as mentioned in the related Consolidation Proposal (#11) 17. Strengthen collective decision making in the framework of corporate planning by teams within Ministries and operating units at appropriate levels 18. Encourage development of autonomous policy think-tanks, capable of researching and preparing reports as input to the improvement and development of Government policies <i>enhance this</i>

ELABORATED RECOMMENDATIONS

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

11. Initiate development of systematic data base for all Government information, with initial focus on finance, personnel and performance data

Sound policy decisions and operational decisions require knowledge of current and past data and performance. Policy and decision making must be informed by accurate pictures of the financial, personnel and logistical resources, as well as clear information on the objectives to be achieved and the past performance of Government units. In a Parliamentary democracy, these data are organized into a useable format, which is readily available to all units and levels of Government, and especially Parliament. The easiest and most open manner for sharing information is through computerized systems, which are relatively inexpensive as of the 1990s.

12. Increase policy analysis capability in Government by developing the skills of existing staff, and by introducing specialist posts and units in Ministries

Sound policy decisions and operational decisions also require staff that can collect, organize, analyze and interpret data, in order to provide policy and decision options. As much as possible, policy and decision makers should have or develop analytical and interpretation skills, but it is likely that special staff will need to be specifically skilled in policy analysis. These staff may occupy policy analyst positions and may be organized into policy analysis units in the Ministries.

13. Establish and utilize advisory councils and committees consisting of representatives of interest groups and expert groups to advise on policy formulation, and involve as appropriate, client and beneficiary groups in the implementation of policy and delivery of services

In a democracy, the bureaucracy is open to input from citizens. Such input is often organized through advisory councils and committees, composed of representatives of interest groups and expert groups. These groups can study issues and make recommendations. In a democracy, the Government receives citizen input, makes policy decisions, and has to justify to the Parliament and the public the reasons for their decisions. This is open and transparent governance. Also, the implementation of policy and delivery of services can be either contracted out to interest or expert groups or allocated to community groups on a self-help basis.

14. Strengthen the Parliamentary library by making it a depository of all relevant Government documents, as well as a reference and research service for all Members of Parliament

Members of Parliament can better make policy decisions if they have maximum information readily available. To assist in the analysis of this information, the library may need specialized staff and adequate modern technological support to research topics as requested by Members.

15. Review existing rules and practices regarding decision making and develop measures to ensure that decision making authority is delegated to and exercised at appropriate levels

In order to ensure that policy level officials, such as Ministers, Secretaries, Additional Secretaries and Joint Secretaries, etc., concentrate on policy and the larger issues of performance and accountability, it is essential that operational decisions be taken at operational levels. A study can reveal what decisions should be taken at each level. New rules and regulations concerning policy and decision making should be enforced.

REFORM PROPOSALS

16. Develop networking of the data base so that Parliament, political executives and permanent executives can access the information, as mentioned in the related Consolidation Proposal (#11)

As data is collected in all units and Ministries, this information can be computerized, using not only data bases but also CD-ROM facilities, in order to fully share all available information widely among the Government machinery, the Parliament and even citizens' groups. Of course, information and data bases involved in national security would be secret, but in a democratic society, there is relatively little, and certainly nothing in domestic policy, that must be kept secret. The sharing of information among elements of the Government machinery can contribute to greater speed and accuracy in decision making, especially concerning budgets and personnel. The openness of information and information systems is a symbol to the public that "there is nothing to hide".

17. Strengthen collective decision making in the framework of corporate planning by teams within Ministries and operating units at appropriate levels

One contribution to good management, as well as to transparency and accountability, is to facilitate the taking of decisions by an appropriate group of top level officials in the unit or Ministry. This type of collective responsibility by the top team would allow collegial debate, consensus-building and joint responsibility for the use of financial, personnel and logistical resources. When such a team develops a corporate plan for their unit, they can use the plan as a basis for measuring performance. This concept is related to results oriented management systems, mentioned above.

18. Encourage development of autonomous policy think-tanks, capable of researching and preparing reports as input to the improvement and development of Government policies

Democratic governance requires the consideration of many and diverse opinions, based on a wide variety of analytic frameworks. To ensure the availability of a diversity of citizen inputs to improve the quality of policy and decision making, the Government may encourage the development of autonomous policy institutes or think-tanks, whether Government, private or jointly funded. These institutes would be entirely autonomous, but encouraged to research policy issues and prepare reports to encourage Parliament and the Government to consider additional viewpoints, with sophisticated research and gathering of evidence.

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Consolidation Proposals	Reform Proposals
19. Initiate systematic organizational review initially with selected Ministries, Divisions, Departments, wings, cells, and autonomous bodies, eventually extending exercise throughout Government, the results of which would define a reconfiguration of central Government structure, including the establishment of some existing implementation units as self-accounting agencies where appropriate 20. Review and implement rational allocation of functions between central and local levels in order that local administrations and local Governments would be progressively strengthened	21. Rationalize Government structure following examination of functions and based on principles of compactness and coherence, taking into account the need to improve coordination and to reduce the number of Ministries and Divisions in order to make Government more manageable 22. Systematically review and streamline Government rules and regulations relating to allocation of business/work and financial powers so as to eliminate red tape and redundant functions, and thereafter update all relevant Government manuals 23. Ensure independence of the judiciary at all levels, including separation of judiciary from executive, as provided in Article 22 of the <u>Constitution</u> 24. Progressively place under control of elected Local Governments, the local administrations and locally-posted officers, as appropriate, and related to Articles 59 and 60 of the <u>Constitution</u> and the <u>Report of the Local Government Structure Review Commission</u>

ELABORATED RECOMMENDATIONS

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

19. Initiate systematic organizational review initially with selected Ministries, Divisions, Departments, wings, cells, and autonomous bodies, eventually extending exercise throughout Government, the results of which would define a reconfiguration of central Government structure, including the establishment of some existing implementation units as self-accounting agencies where appropriate

The goal of this section is to encourage systematic review of allocation of business, in order to reconfigure the machinery of government. It is envisioned that the machinery can be streamlined; that is, some units can be consolidated, some neglected areas could be established, and some obsolete functions could be abandoned. Also, some existing implementation units could be granted more operational autonomy, while being held accountable for results. This autonomy could only be granted if appropriate measures are developed for measuring performance and holding the units accountable. Generally, these units are referred to as "self-accounting" agencies.

20. Review and implement rational allocation of functions between central and local levels in order that local administrations and local Governments would be progressively strengthened

The Study Team also saw the need to clearly delineate the roles of central and local governments in a democratic society. A review should consider what functions the local governments can be responsible for and those local governments should be given financial, personnel and logistical resources to carry out those functions. In a democratic society, some key service delivery functions should be performed as closely as possible to the recipients. And those recipients, gathered together into local level representative democratic institutions, should have considerable influence over the service delivery system, ultimately making the this service delivery system directly accountable to the clients, as represented in their local governments.

REFORM PROPOSALS

21. Rationalize Government structure following examination of functions and based on principles of compactness and coherence, taking into account the need to improve coordination and to reduce the number of Ministries and Divisions in order to make Government more manageable

This rationalized Government structure would arise from the examination of allocation of business during the Ministerial review, as indicated above in the CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS. For example, compact and more self-contained Ministries can be created by combining all industry-related Ministries (e.g., industry, textile and jute) into one Ministry. If the Government prefers to emphasize export

orientation, it may also combine Trade and Commerce into one Ministry. Similarly, in the area of agriculture, Ministries of agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and rural development and cooperatives (divisions) can be consolidated into one compact Ministry. The Ministries of Finance, Planning, External Relations Divisions also can be combined into one Ministry. These are only tentative suggestions, based on experiences of how other countries have re-organized their government machineries. The basic idea is to organize a Ministry for policy development and coordination and performance standard setting and monitoring, leaving policy implementation with appropriate organizations: departments, agencies and public corporations as appropriate.

22. Systematically review and streamline Government rules and regulations relating to allocation of business/work and financial powers so as to eliminate red tape and redundant functions, and thereafter update all relevant Government manuals

Along with the review of allocation of business, should come a review of the rules of business, in order to eliminate delays, bottlenecks and other problems which might be identified. All changes should be reflected in revised Government manuals. It may be advisable to set up a permanent standing committee for this purpose.

23. Ensure independence of the judiciary at all levels, including separation of judiciary from executive, as provided in Article 22 of the Constitution

The appearance and actuality of fairness, equity and justice depend upon the judiciary being entirely independent from possible influences from the executives and politicians. An independent judiciary is a major symbol of democratic society and an assurance to the public

24. Progressively place under control of elected Local Governments, the local administrations and locally-posted officers, as appropriate, and related to Articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution and the Report of the Local Government Structure Review Commission

As an extension of the review of allocation of responsibilities between central and local governments, and in order to strengthen popularly elected local government, as the level of government most close to the people who are the recipients of Government services, the local governments require control over the financial, personnel and logistical resources in order to be accountable to their people for the delivery of government services. For maximum transparency and accountability, people in their localities can control the institutions which are responsible for local service delivery.

CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT

Consolidation Proposals	Reform Proposals
25. Select and promote officials based on merit, determined in a transparent process and defined as: (1) demonstrated competency/expertise and educational attainment for selection; and (2) performance, examination and successful completion of mandatory training for promotion 26. Strengthen Public Service Commission through improvement of status and conditions of service of members, upgrading the secretariat, logistics and technical expertise, and ensure that it can operate effectively and independently in its assigned tasks of recruitment, selection, promotional principles, terms and conditions of service, discipline, and making an annual report to Parliament, as embodied in Article 137-141 of the <u>Constitution</u> 27. Develop, within the Ministry of Establishment, principles of personnel management for all levels of civil servants, including the development of frameworks for Ministries and units to manage their own staff, including revision and updating of personnel manual 28. Provide for the Ministry of Establishment to be responsible for managing directly officers at Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary levels. All other levels should be managed by their respective Ministries, Divisions and future self-accounting agencies	35. As envisioned in Article 33 of the <u>Constitution</u>, enact appropriate civil service laws and rules to regulate appointment and conditions of service of persons in the service of the Republic 36. Decentralize implementation of personnel policies to Ministries and divisions 37. Revise leave rules to accommodate special requirements of women 38. Replace cadre and class system with personnel management system based on position classification and grades, for transparent and efficient management of officials in a democratically responsive civil service

ELABORATED RECOMMENDATIONS

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

25. Select and promote officials based on merit, determined in a transparent process and defined as: (1) demonstrated competency/expertise and educational attainment for selection; and (2) performance, examination and successful completion of mandatory training for promotion

In a democratic society, the civil service is organized to serve society through managing government to deliver services and appropriate policies in as effective and as efficient a manner as possible. In order to be most productive, the officials should be recruited on the basis of competition, with only the best being recruited without quota reservations. The orientation toward performance and accountability for performance can be emphasized through basing promotion on performance, advanced examination, successful completion of mandatory training, with those achieving the highest score earning the promotions. This recommendation depends upon strong systems of examinations, performance evaluation, and proper posting of officials to best utilize training and experience. This recommendation also presupposes that the public at large, politicians inside and outside of Parliament and local Governments, and civil servants at all levels will restrain themselves from attempting to influence selection and promotion decisions.

26. Strengthen Public Service Commission through improvement of status and conditions of service of members, upgrading the secretariat, logistics and technical expertise, and ensure that it can operate effectively and independently in its assigned tasks of recruitment, selection, promotional principles, terms and conditions of service, discipline, and making an annual report to Parliament, as embodied in Article 137-141 of the Constitution

The PSC plays a critical role in the recruitment and selection of civil servants, as well as in determining promotional principles, terms and conditions of service and discipline. Its annual report to Parliament informs politicians concerning current situations in civil service management. It is important that the members and staff be of the highest calibre, be thoroughly trained and/or experienced in personnel management, and be entirely free of political or administrative influence. Their operations must be transparent, in order to enjoy the trust of the civil servants and the public at large.

27. Develop, within the Ministry of Establishment, principles of personnel management for all levels of civil servants, including the development of frameworks for Ministries and units to manage their own staff, including revision and updating of personnel manual

The Ministry of Establishment must focus on policy issues of personnel management. In line with decentralization of implementation of personnel policies to the individual

frameworks, developing reporting arrangements, and establishing monitoring mechanisms. While the Study Team believes that actual management of personnel should be accomplished by the individual Ministries, the MOE must oversee the implementation of its policies. The new arrangements should be reflected in a revised personnel manual.

28. Provide for the Ministry of Establishment to be responsible for managing directly officers at Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary levels. All other levels should be managed by their respective Ministries, Divisions and future self-accounting agencies

Officers at the highest policy levels in Government must be centrally managed, and by the MOE. Officers at lower levels are more appropriately managed by their own Ministry, in which their superiors best know their performance and the needs of the positions to be filled.

29. Revise existing conduct rules and integrate these into an updated Code of Conduct to reflect current socio-economic context

The appearance and possible reality of corruption in Government operations demands the development and publication, as well as enforcement, of a strong Code of Conduct for Government officials. This revision of existing provisions should take into account current socio-economic context.

30. Progressively remove distinctions between cadres, specifically by combining similar cadres into a smaller number of cadres in order to open up more promotional opportunities based on merit especially at the top levels, and by harmonizing pay systems and conditions of service

A career and professional civil service means that the best people are placed in the right positions, and promoted according to their performance. By widening the definition of cadres to include several specialties which are somewhat similar in training and general competence, it is possible to organize more promotional opportunities for the best candidates. Although this system does not guarantee certain positions for a narrowly defined profession, it provides wider opportunities for the best performers, especially at the highest levels. It is only fair and equitable to harmonize pay systems and conditions of service. Potential for combining cadres with similar specialties include, for example, joining Health, Public Health and Family Planning into one group, joining economics and statistics into one group, and similar groupings.

31. Abolish the practice of reservation of posts in Ministries for particular cadres, and provide for open competition for Secretariat posts from all cadres, based on qualifications and experiences relevant to the post

in light of the need for superior performance, it is necessary to emphasize specific suitability and past performance for placement in Secretariat posts. The exact cadre of a candidate should neither penalize nor advantage in open competition. Both excellent managers and renowned specialists are needed for policy positions in the Secretariat. The Secretariat needs the best candidates from career tracks.

32. Professionalize the civil service through development of an appropriate transfer policy in order to reduce the adverse impact of current frequent transfers on the efficiency of Government operations

Current transfer policy does not seem to be enforced to the fullest length of stay possible; transfers take place usually within 12 to 18 months after appointment, sometimes much less. The policy seems to stipulate an optimal three year tenure in position before transfer. The three year period is designed to allow sufficient time to learn the work, receive and utilize appropriate training, and play a major role in policy development and/or implementation. There is a problem of continuity when officers are transferred too frequently. In fact, three years may be too short a time in some cases, but the best duration of tenure for types of positions should wait for the REFORM PROPOSALS. To achieve the most immediate goals of performance improvement and consolidation, an appropriate transfer policy should be developed.

33. Develop position descriptions for all posts in Government, beginning with Class 1 officer posts, in order to enable personnel to be matched to posts

Position descriptions are important for two reasons. (1) Matching candidates with positions depends upon a clear idea of what the position entails, so that the qualifications and experiences of several candidates can be evaluated to the position description. (2) Performance appraisal cannot be adequately accomplished unless there is a position description against which performance can be evaluated. Position descriptions must be developed within the context of organizational goals and objectives, and in light of the incumbent's expected contribution to the accomplishment of the organization's goals. This linkage to organizational goals may mean that the exercise of developing position descriptions will necessarily follow (but directly) on the review of organizational functions and goal/objective/target setting.

34. Provide adequate infrastructure for women officers, including attention to issues of child care and transportation

Women officers and staff need comfort facilities, and safe transport. Also, so long as women have major responsibility for rearing of children, they need to know that their children are safe and happy during the work day. This often means the Government provision of on-site child care.

REFORM PROPOSALS

35. As envisioned in Article 33 of the Constitution, enact appropriate civil service laws and rules to regulate appointment and conditions of service of persons in the service of the Republic

The various laws that pertain to the civil service should be consolidated into one law, and updated to reflect civil service management reforms.

36. Decentralize implementation of personnel policies to Ministries and divisions

Following the arguments above, officers at lower levels are more appropriately managed by their own Ministry, in which their superiors best know their performance and the needs of the positions to be filled. The management of the personnel within the units would be monitored, evaluated and reported on by the MOE.

37. Revise leave rules to accommodate special requirements of women

Women officers usually have family responsibilities, especially the bearing and the management of the raising of children. Also, women are often expected to give due attention to assisting elderly parents and in-laws, as well as numerous other relatives. To accommodate these social responsibilities, leave rules should be revised to allow women to attend to these responsibilities without adverse impact on their seniority, posting, training and other professional opportunities. If men also wish to be responsible for the rearing of children and caring for relatives, they should also be given accommodation. These policies should be responsibility-specific and gender-neutral.

38. Replace cadre and class system with personnel management system based on position classification and grades, for transparent and efficient management of officials in a democratically responsive civil service

In order to emphasize performance --both organizational and personal-- it will be necessary to move to a more objective and more open, transparent method of placement of officers into positions, namely, through the method of position classification and grades. This is the only method, as stated above, of ensuring a proper match between the best person and the position, and of creating a sound basis for performance appraisal.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING

Consolidation Proposals	Reform Proposals
39. Revise content of training programme to reflect the needs of a parliamentary democracy, private sector development, and a market economy. Training schedules should cover people-centred development and public service ethics 40. Professionalize the civil service through enforcing, and initiating where necessary, mandatory periodic training, including performance assessment and examination, directly linked to promotion to specific levels and types of posts 41. Develop special top-level seminars of short duration, based on participatory format, and using high level experts, for highest level civil servants and heads of industry and NGOs, so as to increase awareness of better management practices, wider global perspectives, and the need for consensus-building and greater trust within society 42. Design and initiate orientation programmes and policy seminars for Members of Parliament 43. Strengthen training institutions through computerization, training equipment and the acquisition and development of advanced materials	44. Carry out on a regular and systematic basis training needs assessments, in order to develop appropriate training and other measures to enhance technical and managerial skills among the civil servants 45. Provide professional development opportunities for individual officers, to be determined in the context of the Annual Confidential Report and career development needs 46. Design and offer special training programmes for collective teams within Governmental units at all levels, where these teams are developed 47. Expand and strengthen training programmes for local level leaders 48. Initiate mandatory inclusion in all training programmes of gender awareness for women and men officers and staff, and develop curricular modules on gender and management and special courses for women managers as appropriate

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

39. Revise content of training programme to reflect the needs of a parliamentary democracy, private sector development, and a market economy. Training schedules should cover people-centred development and public service ethics

The content of training programmes must be reviewed and updated continuously to current issues, the most modern management methods, and trends in global developments. Specifically, major influences on Bangladeshi public administration in the 1990s include the reintroduction of parliamentary democracy and private sector development within a framework of a market economy. Parliamentary democracy requires a re-thinking of the relationship between Secretaries to Government and politicians, and to Parliamentary institutions. Private sector development within a market economy framework requires Government officials to shift from a focus on management of industrial enterprises to a focus on regulation and facilitation of private sector development. Also, given the need for the Government to be responsive, open and transparent to the public, the orientation to people centered development must be re-emphasized in operational ways. A service orientation must be encouraged. Given the nature of public discussion on the behaviour of Government and other persons, and the co-terminous updating and consolidation of conduct rules into a Code of Conduct, it is imperative that curricular attention be paid to public service ethics.

40. Professionalize the civil service through enforcing, and initiating where necessary, mandatory periodic training, including performance assessment and examination, directly linked to promotion to specific levels and types of posts

In a parliamentary democracy it is essential that systems be in place to ensure that the best candidates are promoted and posted to positions, where their expertise, training and experience can best be utilized. Organizational performance is the strongest criteria for promotion, and contribution to organizational performance can best be predicted or anticipated from successful training, examination and past performance evaluations.

41. Develop special top-level seminars of short duration, based on participatory format, and using high level experts, for highest level civil servants and heads of industry and NGOs, so as to increase awareness of better management practices, wider global perspectives, and the need for consensus-building and greater trust within society

Even top level officials are in need of constant updating and increased awareness of global trends and better management practices. The professional development of top-level officials must be treated in a manner sensitive to their positions and their schedules. It is also assumed that these top-level officials have already progressed through a series of mandatory promotional training

experiences and through positions of increasingly greater responsibility. This recommendation also suggests that there is benefit to be gained in laying a foundation for consensus-building and mutual trust; if the top-level officials participate in attractive and convenient seminars with their peers from other sectors; namely, the private sector and NGO sector.

42. Design and initiate orientation programmes and policy seminars for Members of Parliament

It is standard procedure in parliamentary democracies to provide orientation for new Members of Parliament, as well as to provide short seminars on policy issues facing the country. As the key decision-makers in the country, Parliamentarians wish to avail themselves of as many perspectives and as much research as possible. These seminars can be organized by policy institutes, think-tanks, or the Government itself. Informed policy-makers are a key to high performance of democratic institutions.

43. Strengthen training institutions through computerization, training equipment and the acquisition and development of advanced materials

The various training institutions are in need of further strengthening in all areas, as noted above. In particular, there needs to be a vigorous effort to develop materials, cases, and multi-media training packages, in order to make training relevant, attractive and impactful.

REFORM PROPOSALS

44. Carry out on a regular and systematic basis training needs assessments, in order to develop appropriate training and other measures to enhance technical and managerial skills among the civil servants

The content, methods and delivery mechanisms of training programmes must be constantly updated. Systematic means of assessing training needs must be scheduled on a regular basis, with due attention to both technical and managerial skills needs among the civil servants.

45. Provide professional development opportunities for individual officers, to be determined in the context of the Annual Confidential Report and career development needs

It is important for individual officers to experience their careers as a logical progression of learning experiences, both on the job and in specialized training programmes. In order for their training experiences, promotions and postings to be fully integrated within a framework of best utilization of officers in the right positions, it is necessary for individual officers to analyze, together with experienced supervisors and personnel managers, the strengths and weaknesses identified in the Annual Confidential Report in order to make and carry out a plan to remedy weaknesses and enhance strengths, as well as to sufficiently prepare the candidate for higher responsibility. This career planning process in no way

guarantees career progress due to the need to compete openly for posts and promotions, in an open civil service system which emphasizes performance.

46. Design and offer special training programmes for collective teams within Governmental units at all levels, where these teams are developed

When and where collective teams are developed within Governmental units at any level, these teams should be able to access on-site training in corporate planning, team-building and results-oriented management. This on-site training should be available at regular intervals as needed, to facilitate high level performance.

47. Expand and strengthen training programmes for local level leaders

To the extent that local government will be enhanced in its responsibilities for development and responsiveness to citizens, it will be necessary to expand and strengthen training programmes for local level leaders. To the extent that Government decides that local administrators will report to and be responsible to local Governments, there may need to be training programmes that assist officers and local leaders to properly adjust themselves to these new relationships.

48. Initiate mandatory inclusion in all training programmes of gender awareness for women and men officers and staff, and develop curricular modules on gender and management and special courses for women managers as appropriate

Due to the relatively recent introduction of women officers into the civil service, the Study Team views as necessary the development of gender awareness for both women and men officers and staff, taking into consideration social and religious values. This awareness can be communicated through the inclusion of modules concerning "gender (women issues, but especially a comparison of the similarities and differences between the ways that women and men are treated both informally and formally in the offices, especially) and the public service" into relevant training programmes. Also, as women officers experience a number of special difficulties, including the establishing of respectful relationships, there will need to be special courses for women managers, until there are a sufficient number of women officers that both men and women accept the gender balance as natural and acceptable.

TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Consolidation Proposals	Reform Proposals
49. Computerize and/or upgrade major systems of information on finance, personnel and performance management, within Government units, to improve the quality of policy and decision making as noted under the section on policy and decision making 50. Develop linkage with international information networks for professional development, policy development and all aspects of enhancing global perspectives	51. Develop decentralized and coordinated information systems, linking central Government units with local administration and local Governments, as noted in the section on organization and structure 52. Provide special infrastructure and computerized information systems to support collective decision making teams, as noted in the section on policy and decision making

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

49. Computerize and/or upgrade major systems of information on finance, personnel and performance management, within Government units, to improve the quality of policy and decision making as noted under the section on policy and decision making

In order to ensure the highest quality of policy and decision-making, it is necessary to improve continuously the information and its accessibility available to decision-makers. The Study Team notes that eventually all relevant persons should have ready access, presumably at a computer terminal on their desk, to all relevant information for their decision-making. In the meantime, information relevant to financial, personnel and performance management should be collected, and computerized as much as possible.

50. Develop linkage with international information networks for professional development, policy development and all aspects of enhancing global perspectives

International networks with considerable relevant information on management innovations, emerging and ever-present policy areas, and global perspectives and initiatives, are available for direct linkage and only dependent upon telecommunications foundations for exchange of computerized information.

REFORM PROPOSALS

51. Develop decentralized and coordinated information systems, linking central Government units with local administration and local Governments, as noted in the section on organization and structure

Once decisions about the extent and dimensions of decentralization are made, information linkages will need to be established for sharing computerized and other information.

52. Provide special infrastructure and computerized information systems to support collective decision making teams, as noted in the section on policy and decision making

When and where collective decision-making teams are operating, their operations can be enhanced through computerized information systems, as well as decision-support systems.

Appendix 3

Bio Data on the Public Administration Sector Study Team

Dr. A. T. R. Rahman

Dr. A. T. R. Rahman, Team Leader of the Public Administration Sector Study is currently Chief of the United Nations Programme in Public Administration in the United Nations Secretariat. He was Professor of Political Science at Dhaka University, Associate Director of the International Development Research Centre, Canada, and Public Administration Expert in Comilla Rural Development Academy. Dr. Rahman was educated in Political Science at Dhaka University, Public Administration at Karachi University, and received his Doctorate from Duke University (U.S.A.). Dr. Rahman's work experience spans over thirty years in teaching, research and managerial responsibilities in national and international development focusing upon public management and rural development. Highlights include organising substantively international expert group meetings on various governance issues, focusing on changes and trends in administrative restructuring, civil service reform, financial management and preparing the Secretary-General's report for the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, initiating a global project on improving aid accountability by harmonizing donor accountability requirements and strengthening host country capacities, organizing regional research programme on public enterprise reform and deviant bureaucratic behaviour in Asia and the Caribbean, developing training guidelines for and evaluating the Public Works Programme in 1963-1964 in East Pakistan and teaching and experimenting in rural public administration in Comilla Academy. Dr. Rahman wrote several books and articles and occasionally contributes feature articles to The Bangladesh Observer and The Daily Star.

Sir Derek Andrews

Sir Derek Andrews served in numerous important positions in the Government of the United Kingdom. After graduation from the London School of Economics, he joined the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in 1955 and served in a number of posts concerned with production and trade in agricultural and food products. From 1966 to 1970, he served in the Prime Minister's Office as a Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. After a one year sabbatical in the United States at the Harvard University School of Government and Business School (1970/71), he returned to the Ministry of Agriculture. He was involved in the negotiations in the European Community which led to U.K. accession. From 1976 to 1980, he was Director of Establishments with responsibility for personnel and organisation. He was Deputy Secretary responsible

for agricultural production and external trade relations from 1981 to 1987. He has had extensive experience of international negotiations in the European Community and other international contexts. He was appointed Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in 1987 and served in this capacity until his retirement in 1993. He is serving as a Consultant to the Public Administration Sector Study Mission.

Dr. Jeanne-Marie Col

Dr. Jeanne-Marie Col, member of the Public Administration Sector Study Mission, is currently Special Technical Adviser in Public Administration in the United Nations Secretariat. She earned her Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of South Carolina and has served as Professor of Public Administration at Sangamon State University, Illinois, State University of New York, and Makerere University, Uganda. Dr. Col's work experience spans more than twenty years of teaching, research and consultancy in public management. Dr. Col specializes in management of change, organization development, legislative administration and comparative/development administration. Dr. Col is a leader in the American Society for Public Administration, chairs the International Task Force, has chaired the Section for Women and has been nominated for President of the Society. Currently, she is working on implementing programmes of administrative reform, management development, and public administrative revitalization for national economic development, in Vietnam, Uganda, and Bulgaria. Dr. Col manages the global research programme concerning Changes and Trends in Public Administration and Finance, as well as serving as Managing Editor of the new UN journal, Management Innovations Review: International Perspectives on Administrative Innovations.

Dr. Dai Young Kim

Dr. Dai Young Kim has had a distinguished career as a government servant and academic. He received his B.A. in Political Science from Yonsei University (Republic of Korea), a B.S. in Mathematics from Amherst College (U.S.A.), and his Ph.D. in Statistics from Stanford University (U.S.A.). Of the many important positions he has held in the government of the Republic of Korea, the following include: President, Korea National Housing Corporation (1992-93); President, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics (1992); Vice Minister of the Ministry of Construction (1990-91); Assistant Minister of Economic Policy Coordination for the Prime Minister (1986-90); Director General, Bureau of Planning, Economic Planning Board (1982-85); and Director General, Bureau of Statistics, Economic Planning Board (1980-82). He has served as Visiting Professor, Korean Advanced Institute of Science Technology (1973-77) and Senior Fellow, Korean Development Institute (1971-

78). He is currently Visiting Fellow, Korean Research Institute for Human Settlement. His contributions to major policy measures include the revision of the 5th socio-economic development plan, anti-speculation measures, clear water supply, reformation of the water management system and safety measures in the transportation sector. He is serving as a Consultant to the Public Administration Sector Study Mission.

Dr. Robert LaPorte, Jr.

Dr. LaPorte is Professor of Public Administration and Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University. He served as an International Consultant to the local research team and currently serves as a Member of the Public Administration Sector Study Mission. For almost three decades, Dr. LaPorte has studied the public administrative systems in South Asia. He has written numerous books and journal articles on public administration and development administration in both South Asia and Latin America. His consulting assignments for UNDP, The World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development and his research and lecturing tours have taken him to all of the countries of South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), Southern Africa (Botswana, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe), Egypt, Chile and Peru. He received his Ph.D. degree in Political Science/Public Administration from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University (U.S.A.).

Dr. Syedur Rahman

Dr. Syedur Rahman is Research Associate, Institute of Policy Research and Evaluation, The Pennsylvania State University. In this capacity, he also is the Program Coordinator for the Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Fellowship Program at Penn State. He is Consultant to the Public Administration Sector Study Mission. He received his B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from Dhaka University, his M.P.A. from The Pennsylvania State University, and his Ph.D. from the Maxwell School, Syracuse University. He currently serves as Treasurer and Member of the Board of Trustees of the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies. He is the author of numerous articles on public administration and management in South Asia with a specific focus on Bangladesh.

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