ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: TRENDS, LESSONS AND CHALLENGES

Mohammad Shafiul Alam
&
Rizwan Khair (Editors)

Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre
Savar, Bangladesh
2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword		i
Introduction		ii
1.	Global Paradigms of Public Sector Reforms: Responses and Lessons -John Halligan	01
2.	Administrative Reform: From Original Naivety to Contemporary Challenges - Mohit Bhattacharya	15
3.	Administrative Reforms in Malaysia: Confronting New Dimensions in Government Administration - Phang Siew Nooi	30
4.	Integrity and Ethics: Reform and Reinforcement in the Malaysian Public Administration - Beh Loo See	37
5.	Recent Administrative Reform Initiatives in India -Jaytilak Guha Roy	42
6.	Recent Administrative Reforms in Pakistan - Iftikhar Ahmed	51
7.	Administrative Reforms for Effective Governance : Enabling Governments Deliver in Sri Lanka - Asoka S. Gunawardena	61
8.	Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh: Lessons and Challenges - Mohammad Mohabbat Khan	77
9.	Public Administration Reforms in Bangladesh - M. Mahbubur Rahman Morshed	86
10.	Administrative Reorganisation of Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat: A Move Towards New Public Management - ATM Obaidullah	102
11.	Civil Service Reform: 'Good' is Easy to Define and Agree- How to Achieve it is Much More Difficult - Donald Curtis	120
	Contributors 1	129

With best Compliments

Dr. M Aslam Alam
Rector (Senior Secretary)
BPATC, Savar, Dhaka

Bangladesh Public Administration Training Center, Savar, Dhaka
Savar
Dhaka
Estd: 1984

08 AUG 2019

BPATC LIBRARY
Accession No. 109696
Call No.
Source Gift Cost

Rector
Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre
Savar, Dhaka-1343, Bangladesh

Foreword

Administrative reform is concerned with the improvement of the overall public sector in accordance with public objectives and it adapts governments to changing needs of the society and enable public administration to reshape society in pursuit of developmental goals. Within the last two decades there has been a growing consensus about the limitations of the traditional structures and processes of governance. This has paved the way to re-examine the role of the public sector in a different light and added impetuous to administrative reform efforts in most countries of the world. The nations in South and South East Asia are also not immune to such changes and have responded in various degrees to the global shift in the role and functions of the public sector. By undertaking administrative reforms, countries in the region have achieved success in enhancing efficiency and effectiveness in their public sector. Thus, there are lessons to be learnt from the experiences of those countries and how they are coping with the complex challenges of the new millennium.

Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) as the apex training institute of the Bangladesh feels that administrative reforms are crucial for achievement of development goals of the country in light of the MDGs put forward by the United Nations. In the context of Bangladesh, since 1972 as many as 17 commissions/ committees and a number of reports have come out prescribing structural, procedural and pay related changes in the public sector. Recognising the importance of an effective and efficient administration, the government recently also constituted a Cabinet Committee on Administrative Reform and Good Governance to review existing administrative systems, rules and regulations, processes of the country and recommend changes. To facilitate such efforts, BPATC arranged an international conference on 'Administrative Reforms in South and Southeast Asia' on 28-29 June 2006 to share experiences of other countries in the region. In this conference distinguished academicians and practitioners from Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Australia, United Kingdom and Bangladesh presented as many as eleven papers covering global paradigms of administrative reforms, reform efforts in countries of the region and strategies to cope with the challenges of reforms. The conference was attended by 167 participants from government organisations, think tanks, development partners, NGOs and academic institutions.

The government of Japan and JICA recognising the importance of BPATC in the context of equipping officials of the public sector of Bangladesh to face the challenges of a new millennium provided financial assistance for a project called 'Strengthening of BPATC Project'. The conference was arranged under that project and we are grateful to the government of Japan and JICA for enabling us to host the conference.

This conference provided an opportunity to learn how countries in the region are coping up with the challenges of global paradigms of public sector reform. I hope that the papers and proceedings of the conference shall act as a catalyst for undertaking effective administrative reforms in this country through which the public sector could effectively play its role in providing efficient and responsive services to the people.

Md. Abdus Salam Khan
Rector

PABX : 7710010-16, Rector : 7710028, P.S : 7710021, Fax: 7710029, E-mail: *rector1@bpatc.org* Web : bpatc.org

INTRODUCTION

Administrative reforms are not easy and as quite some time back Caiden (1968:347) pointed out that reform is not based on the idea that people should wait for changes to take place natuarally, but rather they should seek to bring in improvements and if necessary reforms must be forced and in the process few people might be affected.

Considering that there have been many attempts in Bangladesh to bring about administrative reforms, and unfortunately the changes that have occurred have been largely cosmetic with a nip here and tuck there, the public sector in Bangladesh has remained largely unaffected by the winds of change transforming the public sector across the globe. However, in context of an increasingly globalised world which pose complex challenges for public sector, policy transfers are quite common and as ideas and best practices freely flow across regions, the two-day conference on "Adminstrative Reforms in South and Southeast Asia" arranged by Bangladesh Public Administration Centre created an opportunity for taking a fresh look at what is happening across the region. This volume is a slightly edited version of the papers presented in that conference.

As theoretical roots are crucial in understanding and pushing forward reform intiatives, John Hallingan and Mohit Bhattacharya in this volume point that while there are a variety of models and pardigms of administrative reforms and paths to choose from, reforms must be locally contextualised to be meaningful and respond to local needs and circumstances. Given the scenario that in many developing countries, most reform intiatives are donor and externally driven, the success and sustainability of reform efforts in most cases are compromised by this factor.

Phang Siew Nooi and Beh Loo See, in their papers present the scenario in Malaysia where by borrowing from global paradigm the country has made remarkable progress in administrative reforms. Success of reforms in Malaysia owe substantially to the willingness of its political leadership to adapt an agenda for change . As Nooi points out the reform efforts in the country conformed to the changes in leadership styles, economic conditions and global perspectives. See on the other hand examines the issues of ethics and integrity, which in fact are fundamental values underlying administrative reform efforts. In Malaysia, National Integrity Plan has manged to put changes in the public sector on a moral and ethical footing and is contributing towards transparency and standards in governance.

Guha Roy examines the recent reform intiatives in India, which largely conforming to the global paradigm has managed to bring about changes in the public sector of the country spearheaded by recommendations of different reform commissions. But Roy is of the view that while there has been changes, such improvements are not enough to meet the challenges of economic liberalisation and changes are actually devoid of human development perspectives crucial for a develping country.

Iftikhar Ahmad examines the Devolution Plan 2000 in Pakistan which has brought about sweeping structural changes in the local and grassroots level, with elected representatives taking over the reins of power from the civil servants, who for decades as a legacy of the colonial past have continued to be the steel-frame of state. While, devotionary intiatives are desirable, they are not without problems in implementation such as broader scope for corruption and bureaucracy losing its non-partisan and objective role-which Ahmad points out in his paper. However, the Devolution Plan of Pakistan has manged to bring in changes in governance structures and proceses in the country-which requires to be evaluated in depth. .

Gunawardena presents a sweeping overview of reform intiatives in Sri Lanka and comments that reforms in that country have been largely ad hoc with little view of the total system and there has no

---

[1]*Caiden, G (1968) 'Administrative Reform', International Review of Administrative Sciences, 34:347-354*

move to insitutionlise reform efforts to bring in sustainability. Moreover, changes have been largely bureaucratic with little poltical buy-in and has resulted in mere tinkering with the system.

Both Mohabbat Khan and Mahbubur Rahman Morshed examine the Bangladesh scenario, where major administrative reform efforts since 1972 have not been successful due to little political support, bureaucratic resistance and lack of appropriate implementation mechanisms. Both are of the view that in face of globalisation, administrative reforms are crucial to enable to country to move forward. Khan proposes creation of a reform friendly environment, with active support from public and private sectors and civil society to enable a participatory approach to reform.

ATM Obaidullah presents a case where the New Public Management paradigm has influenced the administrative reorganisation of Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat. This indicates that although in a broader context, major reforms initiatives have been largely unsuccessful in the context of Bangladesh, the country is not immune to global changes in the public sector. Although donor led intiatives in selected areas, such as the case of Parliament Secretariat have brought in changes, but these changes are fragmented and not cohorently supported by politicians and bureaucracy to set in motion holistic approaches for change.

Donald Curtis perhaps puts forward the most challenging task of administrative reforms which is reflected in the title of his paper - "Civil Service Reform: 'Good' is easy to define and agree-How to achieve it is much more difficult". Curtis reiterates the view that reform intiatives must be internally inspired and driven by committed individuals or groups to be successful. He argues that outsiders can only encourage and indicate options, but only a home-grown initiative, with harmonisation of individual interests and common good can result in a non-ideological and pragmatic approach for reform.

Administrative reforms are difficult and time consuming, but it must be realised that change is essential and one must take the bull by its horns. Bangladesh has, in the past, missed many opportunities to initiate substantial reforms. This status quo has to end and the policy makers must realise that determined steps must be taken to bring about changes in the administrative structure, system and processes inherited from our colonial past. This will lead to a citizen friendly, efficient, accountable, proactive and effective civil service and administrative system which would help the country to face the complexities of a globalised world and facilitate better enagement with other countries in its drive towards development. However, as Bhattachaya in his paper in this volume perhaps hits the nail squarely on the head when he aptly remarks that 'will to change' remains basic to reform efforts and its sustainablity. We hope that we will not fail in this.

Mohammad Shafiul Alam
Member Directing Staff
&
Rizwan Khair
Director
Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre
Savar, Dhaka

GLOBAL PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS: RESPONSES AND LESSONS

John Halligan

Introduction

The paper addresses the theme of the challenges of global paradigms of public sector reforms, how countries respond to them and lessons from their experiences. The paper is divided into three parts: global paradigms of public sector reforms and current approaches, how countries are coping, and the lessons from country experience.

There is now a considerable body of evidence about the experience of countries in engaging public sector reform over the last twenty years (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; OECD 2005). The challenges continue to apply both to those countries that have engaged and implemented global paradigms of public sector reforms; and other countries that have yet to engage and implement the reforms systematically. There are of course important choices to be made about which paradigm elements form the basis for reform.

Global Paradigms and Current Themes of Reform

The basic paradigms continue to be the familiar public administration, public management and public governance, with variants reflecting different emphases. Less clear is how to identify the global paradigm in the mid-2000s for each continues to be relevant.

Traditional public administration is well understood and need not be discussed here in detail beyond noting its identification with procedures, rules and process. There were variations in how the universal conception of public administration was applied in practice as different state traditions (e.g. the European and Anglo-Saxon) were important and local practice did not necessarily conform to norms (e.g. the definition of merit). However, several features continue to be relevant - such as the professional civil servant - and some features became salient again recently.

Public management has provided the dominant paradigm for the reform era. Where the introduction of a management as the main operating principle has been pursued - sometimes know as managerialism - a number of reforms have followed seeking to strengthen capacity and the resource focus. This agenda continues today even in countries that managerialised some time ago (cf Ingraham et al 2003).

The more radical new public management variant has a range of components, the most distinctive being disaggregation and market principles. New public management (NPM) has assumed distinctive forms in different countries that have not usually reached a full-fledged version. Where there has been a high commitment to neo-liberal reforms, the civil service has become highly decentralised, marketised and even contractualised. It should also be noted that reform extends well beyond the conventional conceptions of NPM. The traditional cycles and pendulum swings have not abated in the reform era, indicating the limitations and transience of this approach.

Public management in turn has been overtaken by public governance, at least in public discourse (e.g. Bovaird and Loffler 2003). The concept of governance has become so pervasive that it cannot be ignored even if it is hard to pin down. Public governance also has several variants with the common defining feature centred on the external dimension that emphasises relationships and partnerships with actors outside government. Network governance is one variant that resonates particularly at the sub-national level. There is however also a pronounced internal construction that emphasises integration - the reconstitution of the basic structural elements to reflect coherence and control. This range of uses suggests an elastic concept.

As a consequence, countries have a menu of possibilities to choose from (or as Pollitt 1995 suggests, a 'shopping basket'). The demand for reform does not produce the same combinations of reform types. Elements of the three paradigms can be seen to coexist in country systems - and different levels of government - with different emphases.

Another conception of a global paradigm is in terms of a reform process that is centred on making reform work. A major theme in the pre-reform era (prior to the 1980s) was about the failure to implement reform. The Achilles heel of reform was the process: reform failure derived from implementation problems (Caiden 1969; March and Olsen 1989). But this gave way in the reform era to the notion of sustaining the reform agenda over time and focusing on having the capacity and flexibility to evolve reforms responsively. There are other attributes of the reform process that make a difference - the pace and type of reform (e.g. comprehensive versus sector) - but the ambitions and expectations for and approach to reform need to be tailored to country contexts.

Current Themes in the 2000s

What have been the main reform themes and what do they add up to? Six prominent ones can be identified.

1. Performance

Performance has become a defining feature of modern government (see OECD 2005; UN 2005). Two big questions in public management during the last fifteen years - markets and performance - have attracted the most controversy internationally in this era of public sector reform (Bouckaert and Halligan 2005). Both have recent origins in new public management, and reflect private sector ideas. Both are interlinked for some purposes as in many inter-agency relationships - but long-term trends now appear to support the ascendancy of performance ideas as a dominant force in public management and this is the case in old Anglo-Saxon countries.

The most striking feature of performance management is its continuing expansion over the last two decades making this current period its international apogee. The antecedents of performance management - various approaches to performance and measurement - have a long lineage. But the high international commitment goes well beyond a resurgence of interest in measuring performance. Moreover, performance management continues to have evolved and to involve more sophisticated measures.

2. Joined up and Horizontal Government

Traditionally public organisation has been centred on the functional principle and a vertical conception. The horizontal dimension has been discovered (or rediscovered if it is seen to be new wave coordination). Whole-of-government is at the centre of the current reform agenda within civil services internationally as an interlinked approach that involves government agencies working across boundaries to achieve more cohesive and effective policy and service delivery. It has counterparts in various OECD countries: 'joined-up-government' in the UK; 'networked government' in the US; 'horizontal government' in Canada; and 'integrated government' in NZ (Bogdanor 2005).

Many of the most complex and intractable problems faced by governments may only be improved through working across governmental boundaries. Priority to solving a number of such problems, involves government departments working collaboratively, across jurisdictions, and with businesses and community organisations. The focus is on critical policy developments where implementation is sufficiently complex to require whole-of-government approaches. The whole-of-government reform agenda is usually driven by central agencies, and may be envisaged as forming the basis for cultural change in the civil service.

3. Responsiveness and Political Management

Reform programs have been driven by the concern with increasing political control as a means to

achieve more effective implementation of policy, but also as an end in itself. To achieve this requires a redistribution of power between the bureaucracy and the politicians. Other reforms are not ignored; they may have to conform to political objectives (e.g. a top-down, centrally-directed budgeting and management) or become subservient to them. Governments have embraced managerialist approaches to enforce and maintain control with managerial change becoming mainstream, and complementary to political agendas.

Measures designed to gain influence over the civil servants have been prominent, with the direction of movement being towards greater influence, but the levels and the devices used vary considerably. The United States has depended on political appointees who have monopolised senior policy positions. Australia has relied heavily on the use of ministerial offices and political advisers, plus advice from competing sources. The increasing use of fixed-term contracts, performance agreements and performance pay provides a managerial means of handling the relationship but also offers scope for political manipulation. In the United Kingdom, early pressure on civil service appointments was deemed to be 'personalisation', but the influence of advisers and 'irregulars' has grown (Halligan 2003a). For Canada, Aucoin's (2006) conception of 'new public governance' is based on the changing political management recently apparent in that context: concentration of power at centre, growth of the role and influence of ministerial staff, personalisation of appointments, and politicisation of public communications. Such strengthening of the political executive occurred much earlier in Australia.

4. Improving Service Delivery and Implementation

A core principle of the 1980s was to require departments to manage as well as to provide policy advice. The language of the mid-2000s has become to enforce effective delivery as well as policy advice in terms of outcomes.

Implementation has often been the neglected end of the policy spectrum. Under a market agenda, outsourcing, agents and specialised agencies were favoured for service delivery. Public expectations of the performance of delivery agencies have continued to increase. One option has been for acting on implementation blockages and delays has been to establish delivery or implementation units at the centre of government to pursue effectiveness by ensuring government policies and services are delivered in a timely and responsive manner. In the United Kingdom, this involves targets and statistical measurement of agency performance. It has also been depicted as a partnership with government agencies in producing systematic reform to the implementation of government policies, and ensuring effective delivery.

In Australia, the authority of cabinet is drawn on both as 'a gateway' and a 'checkpoint'. With new proposals, appropriate details regarding implementation are required. Cabinet submissions with a risk element must address implementation through a delivery framework (milestones, impacts etc), and adopted policy proposals require formal, detailed implementation plans. Based on these plans, progress is reported to the prime minister and cabinet against milestones in a 'traffic light' format, which is regarded as a powerful incentive for organisational learning for public servants.

5. Towards E-Governance

E-government has evolved with the increasing maturity of ICT usage. The first step of on-line government - a basic web presence - has been surpassed as countries move through other levels of on-line delivery capability towards the advanced stage of service transformation. These earlier levels are essentially about taking existing processes that typically exist within a single department or agency and computerising them with little or no change. The purpose of a transformative on-line service is to transcend organisational boundaries by integrating departmental silos. A further objective is the broader conception of e-government as e-governance, which encompasses a range of non-government participants and addresses the challenges in the complexities of service integration across agencies and governments.

6. Flexibility and Balance in Designing and Modernising Public Governance

The levers of reform identified by the OECD (2005):

- Open government,
- Performance budgeting and management,
- Modernising accountability and control systems,
- Restructuring organisations and reallocation,
- Using market-type mechanisms for services, and
- Changing public employment.

These levers are designed to modify the behaviour and culture of organisations and public servants by changes to incentives, values and structures.

At the same time the interrelationships between elements of the redesign of public service systems need to be understood in order to minimise unintended consequences and conflicts between objectives.

Whether it is managing for results or outcomes, a new management framework - an integrated package of reforms - will need to be developed over time. This is likely to cover the strategic directions and objectives of ministers, financial planning and management flexibility for meeting objectives, incentives to improve management performance, and public servants accountability to ministers for achieving objectives. If there is to be a devolved environment, it will need to be balanced by enhancing public accountability (of secretaries to ministers and parliament) and possibly through an overview of the condition of the public service .

How Countries are Responding to Reform

How countries handle reforms depends on their place in the reform cycle, the generation of reform, how many generations of reform passed through, and their capacity to engage reform (including obstacles). Country contexts and administrative traditions continue to play a role in the level of modernisation. Some still talk language of new public management, while others have already worked through that phase. The OECD (2005) review of levers of reform is directed more at countries that have experienced difficulties modernising traditional structures and employment practices, such as those operating under the European administrative law tradition, than those that have experience fewer constraints (Anglo-Saxon and North European) (Halligan 2003a).

Types of Reform and How Reform is Engaged

Administrative change has traditionally been recognised as a constant feature of organisational environments, and has been regarded in terms of adaptation to that environment. In the public sector, this has typically involved the expansion of activities and the organisations which provide them, and has normally been incremental, piecemeal and based on a department, ministry or another type of agency. There is a lack of coherent and sustained strategy or direction in application and implementation (Halligan 2001).

What is different in the current reform era is the presence of at least three major orders of reform. These involve both questions of scale and substance: the magnitude of change is greater, but there is also a qualitative dimension because the substance represents a fundamentally different way of doing things. Two less extensive but nonetheless significant orders of reform are specialised reform (significant reform types such as corporatisation or decentralisation); and sectoral reform of a policy field (e.g. such as health) or one major system component (e.g. local government or the outer public sector). By comprehensive reform is meant that a range of reforms are introduced that affects most aspects of the functioning of a public service or public sector or both. This large-scale reform may of course encompass various specialised and sectoral reforms.

Types of reform can be adapted for classifying reform in OECD countries. In practice, at least four main types have been identified on OECD (Halligan 2001):

- *Hesitant reformer*: Implementation of some principles but essentially old style (or in slow transition) with a reliance on adaptation and instrumentalism on a sectoral basis.
- *Specialist reformer*: The focus is on one or more distinctive types of reform.
- *Ambivalent reformer*: There is a commitment to general change but cross-cutting pressures (or inertia) means that implementation is mixed.
- *Comprehensive reformer*: Makes a major commitment to reforming systemically employing a range of reform types.

The majority of OECD countries had not reformed comprehensively, most generally falling into some variation of the first three categories (Halligan 2001; cf Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; and Kellough and Nigro 2006) .

The constraints on and obstacles to reform vary between contexts. The lack of preconditions - reform leadership and support, resources and a strategy that can be sustained over time - is pervasive. Capacity deficits - low capacity level and weak personnel management systems - may preclude reform implementation through converting objectives into practice.

Even advanced reformers - those that have experienced two or more generations of actual reform continue to have significant reform issues. The trends discussed in the next two sections - towards reintegration in some countries and the condition of performance management - offers insights about the continuous search for improved public management and governance. This draws on current research on Australia and New Zealand, two countries in their third generation of reform. (Halligan 2006).

Cases of Reintegration

The 2000s have been a time when movement within the public management reform cycle became more apparent: from an intense reform agenda, reflection on the results was producing refinements and revaluation of the worth of the public service under new leadership of central agencies that suited different circumstances. The features of new public management - disaggregation, devolution, outsourcing, and multiple services providers - supported specialisation but also encouraged fragmentation and reinforced vertical structures (or silos). For example, New Zealand's failure to correct well-known weaknesses was widely reported with outstanding questions in the areas of accountability, performance measurement and strategic management. There was a need to redesign the less successful elements (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).

It is clear that new conceptions of governance address a different mix of features than those that have been prevalent during the last twenty years. The reaction to 'autonomisation' and other new public management features has produced similar trends in countries (see Christensen and Laegreid 2006). Thus 'reaggregation' is being used in the United Kingdom to refer the reincorporation of executive agencies in ministerial departments.

New mechanisms have emerged in Australia and New Zealand for more effectively integrating and controlling the components of the executive branch. The result is a synthesis of elements suggesting integrated governance has become the prevailing approach of the mid-2000s at the national level in Australia (Halligan 2006). While the commitment to integration in New Zealand appears to be less developed, nevertheless 'the mode of governance' favoured by Boston and Eichbaum (2005: 34) is a 'variant of "joined-up governance" .

Underlying new directions were political control and performance issues. Governments that had driven neo-liberal reforms confronted their limitations and the contradictions of complex reform programs. For example, the Australian government's was concerned that political priorities were not being sufficiently reflected in policy directions and not being followed through in program implementation and delivery. The intensity of the reassertion of the centre and the ministerial department in the two countries resulted from both system shortcomings and environmental uncertainty favouring the stronger centre. A

combination of internal and external sources of change facilitated the emergence of a new approach.

This new integration allows a combination of devolved dimensions with a reactivated centre. The relational basis retains a strong hierarchical dimension underpinned by political authority but with a reliance on performance management and the employment of project management for some purposes. The elements that emerge are the search for coherence, strengthening of internal capacity and performance improvement. First, organising for coherence is occurring within and across portfolios and organisations with the whole-of-government agenda. The reliance is less on legislation, the management framework and values for sustaining organisational operations - although each remains prominent - and more on bureaucratic structures and formal centres of influence such as the ministerial department.

Second, there is a strengthening of internal capacity, through the whole-of-government agenda, enhancing central agencies' roles in coordination, and improving implementation and capability. While the previous agenda was to shed responsibilities, and the devolution component continues to be anointed as a cornerstone because it has produced improved performance and productivity, now there is a preference to reincorporate, to clarify, to establish better accountability, and to improve performance. In response to the challenges of complexity and through attentiveness to maintaining system attributes, in the new official construction horizontal governance ranks equal with vertical relationships and hierarchy.

There has been a reconfirmation of the organisational components of the traditional system: cabinet, central agency and the department. Diminished central agencies - the Australian Public Service Commission and Department of Finance, Administration and the NZ State Services Commission - have been reconstituted with stronger roles. Prime minister departments have also been enhanced, particularly in Australia.

Third there is the question of performance. Overall the performance management ethos presides. The concept of the 'performing state' is employed for a system 'that is continuously open to, and reading its environment, and learning and changing in response: a state "inherently in transition"'. To produce and sustain this condition, according to the head of the Australian public service, the public service must 'embrace a culture of collegiality and creativity' (Shergold 2004: 6).

The revival of features associated with traditional bureaucracy - such as risk aversion in fields with an external orientation - suggests the emergence of neo-Weberianism. However, there are a number of significantly different features from the earlier hierarchical model of integration. The public service is operating under a political executive with more instruments for securing and sustaining control and direction. There is a brace of instruments for working the system strategically and at several levels. The empowered departments have substantially greater responsibilities than traditional arrangements. This adds up potentially to a formidable apparatus for control, scrutiny and performance.

Performance Impacts and Unintended Consequences

The age of performance has produced commitment to, but not necessarily clarity about, the universal objective of organisational and government improvement. Performance and performance management continue to be enigmatic concepts. There is a paradox too in that the adoption rate of performance approaches continues to expand despite the mounting critique. One limitation has been the failure to integrate performance and measurement within a broader system of management and within a conception of organisational life that invests practice with greater meaning.

Some of the main challenges of comprehensive reform over time relate to the interconnections between parts, in particular performance management and the overall management framework and relations with politicians. There is much scope for disconnects. The following discussion draws on a range of reports produced by central and oversight agencies, such as the auditor-general.

Performance information: A review of performance reporting in departmental annual reports by the Australian National Audit Office reports the need for improvement in performance information with respect to specification of the performance framework and the quality of measures and the reporting of results. A continuing problem is that civil servants are not making much use of performance information in their work, focusing on satisfying the management requirements rather than seeking to use it to improve program outcomes. Performance information is used by decision-makers for policy development, refinement and resource allocation, but the impact of outcomes and outputs information on decision-making is limited. The focus on outputs has not necessarily assisted decision-making. For New Zealand, the link between the budget cycle and performance matters was limited, because budget is largely fixed and performance information is not used much during the process (Shand and Norman 2005).

Reporting: It is standard practice for agencies to provide annual reports to parliament, and these may be subject to specific guidelines. Analysis of annual reports indicates that agency outputs and perhaps outcomes are generally well specified. However, in order to provide accountability and transparency to parliamentarians and other stakeholders, agencies' annual reporting frameworks need to be improved, particularly in relation to performance measures regarding quality and effectiveness and specifying agency contribution to shared outcomes. The presentation and analysis of performance information in annual reports may not allow stakeholders, including MPs, to properly understand the results, and the reports may therefore not achieve the primary purpose of accountability.

Outputs and outcomes: A number of countries have moved to an outcomes basis during recent years. The Australian outcomes and outputs framework has used outcomes as the basis for performance information and measurement for about twenty years. Outputs were introduced more recently to provide 'an explicit measure of service delivery to people outside an agency' (McPhee 2005: 3). In other countries, outcomes have been a neglected aspect of performance systems. According to the Australian Auditor-General: 'There is no evidence to suggest that either approach is more effective in terms of embedding a performance culture. What is clear is that the initiative is unlikely to be effective if it does not include both outputs and outcomes as part of an integrated performance information and evaluation framework (McPhee 2005: 2).

In managing for outcomes, there continues to be scope for improving the links between outputs and outcomes and output and outcome indicators. Output information is considerable better and more reliable than that for outcomes.

Evaluating performance improvement: Formal evaluation systems have been unsuccessful but there are doubts too about the value of evaluation as a routine management activity undertaken on a day-to-day basis. Surveys indicated that few agencies collected data about achieving goals and outcomes and their impact on individuals and group performance. Some senior executives rejected evaluating the impact of performance management systems. Evaluation of delivery strategies is important, but considerable variation among agencies exists.

Individual and organisational performance: Variability exists in the alignment between goals and organisational priorities of many agencies and their performance management systems. There has been little attempt by agencies to assess the organisational impact of the performance management systems and its contribution to business outcomes.

With regards to the individual civil servant, performance management in Australia has been depicted as a 'work in progress' with major challenges, particularly on the issues of credibility and staff engagement. The credibility of performance management systems remained problematic with employees reporting gaps between intentions and practice. Similarly with performance pay, there are credibility issues according to the results of employee surveys. The significant investment in performance-linked remuneration has been seen to deliver mixed results and unclear benefits.

Lessons from Country Experiences

In the longer term we can discern generations of reform. Generation has two meanings: in terms of time it denotes countries that can be considered first generation new public management reformers (ie the 1980s) in contrast to latecomers; and it also applies to systems that have sustained reform sufficiently long for several generations to be evident, hence the use of say third generation reformer. Generations reflect distinct phases in extended reform programs in which the overall tenor is significantly modified. There are different ways of characterising generations, for example a sequence of phases with a distinctive leitmotiv (e.g. management, market and governance for significant phases in Australia). With regards to the first meaning, we can observe that some countries moved towards public management in the 1980s while others came to it later in the 1990s.

1. Reform as a Continuous Process

The earlier discussion of global paradigms referred to the new ability to implement reform as a major development. It also needs to be recognised that reform has become a continuous process and that there are important lessons about sustaining reform over time (Halligan 2001).

Preconditions for Initiating and Sustaining Reform

Reform agenda begin to be implemented when governments learn from the failures of the past and the preconditions for reform are present. Five 'prerequisites of reform' - political will, resources, institutional support, time, and an explicit strategy - may need to be realised in order to minimise resistance and the undermining of the implementation of reform. Five 'levers of change' have also been found to be significant: new legislation, the new institution, recruiting new people, and changes to formal processes and organisation structures (Wilenski 1986; cf Khan 1998). Compare also the recent set of levers advocated by OECD (2005).

The starting point varies widely between countries with some having the basic administrative systems and professional public service as a foundation for undertaking reform (although it may also represent an initial obstacle). Sustaining reform as a continuous process requires a relative stable environment and institutional support for the reform process as discussed below.

Roles of Reform Leaders in Central Agencies, Departments and the Political Executive

The architects and actors of reform are a combination of senior ministers and a few reformers in the central agencies. The key ministers, including prime ministers, are needed to make sustained strategic interventions following their election and at other points. They are essential for plotting and supporting new strategic directions. In disaggregating the processes we need to differentiate the system designers - those operating in central agencies with responsibility for cross-service change - and the key line operatives, those who test and experiment with the applications at the agency level, although we cannot deal directly with the latter here.

Central agencies are part of the internal apparatus, but often function as detached drivers of change. There is much evidence of the blocking capacity of entrenched central agencies to initiatives of reformers who sought change that conflicted with convention, e.g., moving from input to output budgeting. The political weakness and low standing of relevant agencies, and their location within a polycentric model for the organisation of reforms can work against progress.

Once converted to a new approach, the central agency becomes a most potent driver of change. One well-known case of the reform era was the role of the New Zealand Treasury, which engaged in the rigid application of public choice and related theory (Scott 2001).

The redesigning of the public service to reflect the political and managerial directions is in the hands of a few key bureaucrats in the relevant central agencies. However, the roles of the central agencies is likely to pass through several stages as the new arrangements for managing the public service evolve, each reflecting a turning point in the reform program. It becomes important for the lead agencies collaborate

and for any fragmentation at the centre to be addressed to produce coherent purpose.
The role of external direction has been identified as one significant factor in reform generally. The primary element is likely to be the political executive: the more significant the reform, the more likely there will be involvement of politicians as well as officials. The conventional wisdom once regarded the lack of political support and the failure of politicians to sustain their commitment to reform as key factors in reform failure (March and Olsen 1989). There is much evidence that major change requires the intervention of politicians, and that politicians have been actively seeking to play a more active role in reform (Halligan and Power 1992).

The political executive is a key factor in the success of major reform, at least at certain strategic points in the reform process. The reasons for this are obvious: fundamental change means a new paradigm and approaches, and inevitably some new leadership. The existing senior public service is unlikely to support change of this order if it undermines their positions and values. Contrariwise, where governments are divided and reliant on special interests for support, or on lack of tenure in office, they face greater obstacles to achieving change.

Of all the strategic decisions, the use of political appointments as a means of obtaining leverage over a public service is one of the most important. Successful reformers do not rely heavily on such appointees, favouring instead a mixture of selective appointments and conventional reform methods, but there are however variations between countries' approaches in terms of the degree of reliance on tight political control. The non-implementation of proposals in the past was attributed to the neglect of political factors. The development of appropriate mechanisms may centre on the increasing use of ministerial advisers and avoiding isolated changes in strategies for strengthening political control. The enhancement of the political executive's power may proceed through several phases to achieve a set of political mechanisms for influencing and directing the public service, but the package is likely to remain incomplete unless it is complemented by an and complementary effective management framework (Halligan and Power 1992).

The combination of external (key politicians) and internal direction (key civil servants) is highly potent, but is most formidable where they have drivers of change such as a financial agenda shaped by economic factors and an organisational mission such as decentralisation that derives from management mantra.

A strongly top-down process will need to be balanced at various points by the increasing the responsibilities delegated to line departments and enlarging roles given to departmental secretaries under a devolved model to take the lead on implementing reform in their agencies. A use of collective processes consisting of departmental secretaries for oversighting reviews of issues affecting their agencies. These organisations are of great importance for developing proposals and setting directions and guiding change.

Capacity to Manage Change and to Learn from and Act on Reform Shortcomings
Active reforming countries often rely on monitoring by central agencies like Finance, the use of collective process, a reform committee for reviewing issues and setting directions, and more annual report on progress. The analysis may draw on surveys of employees and agencies, and the reports scrutinise more closely the institutionalisation of values in public service organisations as part of a greater focus on quality assurance.

Government must be able to confront the limitations and the contradictions of complex reform programs. A particular lever for change is likely to a government's concern that political priorities are not being sufficiently reflected in policy directions and being followed through in program implementation and delivery.

Where there is an extensive range of reforms across public organisations, conflicting objectives and will

need to be handled. Where there is a new paradigm, extensive reorganisation and the systemic application of new approaches across all agencies, the question of how it is given coherence arises. A good indicator of such reform is where an attempt is made to draw the strands of reform together in a coherent way. The countries that have reformed comprehensively - Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom - have relied on some form of framework as the basis of their long-term reform program. There are however potential weaknesses to a comprehensive reform approach: high commitment to a new framework is necessary to secure progress, but can blinker reformers to its defects; and while it paves the way for paradigm change, the breadth of reform types increases the potential for conflicts between them.

Integration through Frameworks

The need to define a framework has been important in comprehensively reforming countries (eg Australia and New Zealand). Of interest is the apparent lack of concern in other countries with forging a new model through some form of framework. This is not to say that aspirations have not existed in countries that have launched reform programs that have fallen short of objectives. Relying on declarations of intent is old fashioned in an age when action (i.e. reform activity) is what counts.

The process of major change is more likely to result from a period of fairly concentrated change over time, with adjustments made on the basis of experience and contingencies. There are different tasks to perform in moving to, working through, and implementing, reform. A distinction can be made between changes that contribute to the development of a new paradigm, including facilitating processes of change, and those which serve to implement the new framework, including the employment of new techniques in furtherance of the framework (Halligan and Power 1992).

2. Civil service and Public Administration Systems

Getting the Basics Right

The basic messages are universal: sound public management, a professional public service and effective accountability within a coherent framework and balanced institutional structure. Much of what is talked about can be viewed through the lens of traditional conceptions and thinking of public administration, but there are some new elements.

Boundaries and Open System

The traditional public service's identity derived from being relatively closed and clearly demarcated from its environment, particularly the private and political spheres. These boundaries have been systematically eroded in the reform era. The boundaries that traditionally defined, demarcated and insulated the public service have been substantially demolished. This allows greater responsive to the environment. One position views boundary change positively. The public service is less self-sufficient and is more integrated with other sectors of society for of sharing ideas and practices.

Claims that international global forces have significant internal effects on governance have been contested because across a number of policy arenas, capacity has not necessarily been diminished. The range of options open to governments has expanded greatly as they have moved beyond traditional bureaucracy to utilise the external contractors and partners.

Another position raises questions about the capacity of the public service, particularly where it has been dismantled. The transfer of production and delivery is understood in an age when the enabling role has become accepted; less so is the loss of core abilities to handle policy, operate strategically and retain and enhance knowledge. Anecdotal evidence indicated capacity was missing in many areas. An official view is that a major challenge for the future within a changing environment is that of building workforce capabilities.

External Focus and Learning

Successful reformers are usually externally oriented with an inclination to scan the experience of kindred

systems and the broader international environment. Increasingly in the 1980s, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development and other international bodies have provided the basis for an important network on management improvement, the publications and forums becoming important sources of knowledge on and debate about managerial change.

Learning from the private sector has been integral. Many elements of the reform programs were based on private sector practices, techniques and modes of operating. Government resorted to business people for advice, and increasingly management consultants, and regular benchmarking with private sector practice became routine. The influence can be seen in many management processes (e.g. risk and performance), leadership, management improvement, devolution of managerial authority, output assessment and improved financial management and, of course, the focus on competition. There has also been a backlash against excessive reliance on the private sector as the only source of innovation, and of outsourcing as an end in itself.

Design Options

The range of options available for public agencies in delivering services has been enhanced as they draw on third parties in the private, voluntary sectors and sub-national government. The acceptance of more flexible approaches to delivery systems for public services and the need to move beyond the traditional monolithic departmental structure was an importance change in thinking, breaking the nexus of integrated policy and implementation. The continuing advocacy of market options (OECD 2005) is to provide options for reformers not to subjugate the civil service to the private sector and competitive principles.

Focus on Performance

A performance focus is now considered to be relevant to all countries. Much depends on how it is conceived and applied. It may not be possible in many contexts to quantify performance, but this does not preclude at least a qualitative approach.

The conventional wisdom is that performance management is only appropriate in developed countries since advanced public management techniques are seen to require a distinctive environment. This has been challenged for several transitional economies where it has been shown that the structured introduction of performance management principles in 'very new public management systems' can produce achievements despite an adverse environment (Verheijen and Dobrolyubova 2006).

In terms of personnel, it is also clear that attention must be given to incentives relating to performance, and that under-performance must be actively managed .

Leadership Development

In the era of reform, the focus on leadership reflects current management thinking and the need to more effectively deliver change and performance in the public sector. A leadership development approach is important where government is decentralised and comprehensive reform has succeeded incremental change (OECD 2000). Where senior service is more managerial and open, as in Australia, leadership is being reviewed and more balance is sought between central guidance and decentralised implementation. A leadership framework has been developed and successfully implemented in countries such as Australia. The introduction of a senior executive service has been another means for developing leadership. The efficacy of contracts and performance incentives continues to be debated with mixed reports about how to measure and reward performance. Despite changing values that recognise external influences, there has been a renewed interest in core values that define the publicness of services and the role of leadership in promoting them (Halligan 2003b; cf UN, DESA 2005).

Capacity to Manage and Development

Capacity covers the different types of resources available (financial, human and information etc) and government's ability to make effective use of them for public purposes. A high capacity government and

agency is expected to produce high performance. Government capacity relies on four levers: the quality of management systems, the handling of leadership, the extent of alignment and integration of management systems and the commitment to managing for results (Ingraham et al 2003).
The focus on 'capacity development' as a process for enhancing and sustaining capacity in the longer term provides fresh options for moving forward (DAC Network on Governance 2006).

Accountability
The importance of active external oversight bodies - parliamentary committees, auditor-general and ombudsman - continues to be reaffirmed. This must be combined with effective reporting by government agencies through annual reports and budgetary statements.

Global paradigms and learning
The overriding lesson is of course the need to relate global paradigms to country contexts and conditions and to adapt reforms carefully and creatively.

Conclusion
The paradigm changes of the 1980s and 1990s have now been substantially superseded by public governance, which is widely accepted as providing a focus for reform. Yet what was valuable in traditional public administration and recent public management are still important, particularly for the new generation of reforming countries. Some countries have been successful at exploiting the environment as a basis for sustaining reform, whether fiscal issues or other external pressures. There is an argument for a distinctive model that has coherence and balance.

For third generation reformers, the dominant trends of the mid-2000s are in part designed to moderate some of the more radical public management features. There is now an emphasis on horizontal as well as strengthening vertical structures and processes. Risk aversion and risk management coexist. Overall these questions are about enhancing capacity and rebalancing the mix of system features. These trends towards strengthening the state and extending its scope are apparent in a range of countries (e.g. Christensen and Laegreid 2006).

Of the broader trends, there are limits to a heavy reliance on a performance management approach (Bouckaert and Halligan 2006) with a potential danger being a culture of micro-management.

There is now a large inventory of reform experience in different types of country contexts. Making effective use of this knowledge depends on both political vision and sustained support and a distinctive leadership for the public service, which can master, articulate and sell ideas about fundamental questions of public administration while serving the political executive.

REFERENCES

APSC/Australian Public Service Commission (2005) *State of the Service Report 2004-05,* Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

Aucoin, P. (2006) Corporate Governance for the Public Sector: the Canadian Perspective, presentation to the Conference, Corporate Governance in the Public Sector-from Theory to Practice', Canberra, 8-10 March.

Bogdanor, V (ed) (2005) *Joined-up government,* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Boston, J. and C. Eichbaum (2005) State Sector Reform and Renewal in New Zealand: Lessons for Governance, paper for Conference on The Repositioning of Public Governance: Global Experience and

Challenges, National Taiwan University, Taipei, November 18-19.

Bouckaert, G. and J. Halligan (2006) 'Performance: its measurement, management, and policy' in B.G. Peters and J. Pierre (eds) Handbook of Public Policy, Sage, forthcoming.

Bovaird, T. and E. Loffler (eds.) (2003) Public Management and Governance, Routledge, London.

Caiden, G.E. (1969) Administrative Reform, Aldine, Chicago.

DAC Network on Governance, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2006) The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice, OECD.

Halligan, J. (2001) 'The Process of Reform in the Era of Public Sector Transformation: Directive and Retrospective' in Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid (eds.) New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice, Ashgate, pp. 73-89.

Halligan, J. (2003a) (ed.) Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Halligan, J. (2003b) 'Leadership and the Senior Service from a Comparative Perspective', in B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds.) Handbook of Public Administration, Sage.

Halligan, J. (2006) 'The Reassertion of the Centre in a First Generation NPM System', in Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid (eds.), Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, forthcoming.

Halligan, J. and J. Power (1992) Political Management in the 1990s, Oxford University Press, Melbourne.

Halligan, J. and M. Turner (1995) Profiles of Government Administration in Asia, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra.

Ingraham, P.W., P.G. Joyce and A.K. Donahue (2003) Government Performance: Why Management Matters, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London.

Kellough, J.E. and L.G. Nigro (eds.)(2006) Civil Service Reform in the States: Personnel Policy and Politics at the Subnational Level, State University of New York Press, Albany.

Khan, M.M. (1998) Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi.

McPhee, I. (2005) 'Outcomes and Outputs: Are We Managing Better as a Result?' CPA National Public Sector Convention, 20 May.

March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, Free Press, New York.

Mukherjee, R., O. Gokcekus, N. Manning, P. Landell-Mills (2001) Bangladesh: The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials, World Bank, Washington.

OECD/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) Modernising Government: The Way Forward, OECD, Paris.

Pollitt, C. (1995) 'Justification by Works or by Faith? Evaluating the New Public Management', Evaluation, 1 (2), pp. 133-54.

Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2004) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Schick, A. (1998) 'Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms', World Bank Research Observer, 13(1): 123-31.

Shand, D. and R. Norman (2005) Performance Budgeting in New Zealand, paper prepared for IMF Fiscal Affairs Department seminar on Performance Budgeting, Washington DC, 5-7 December.

Shergold, P. (2004) Plan and Deliver: Avoiding Bureaucratic Hold-up, Australian Graduate School of Management/Harvard Club of Australia, 17 November, Canberra.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2005) Unlocking the Human Potential for Public Sector Performance: World Public Sector Report 2005. United Nations, New York.

Urban Institute (2006) Assessment Report: Pakistan Devolution Project, Prepared for USAID, February.

Verheijen, T. and Y. Dobrolyubova (2006) Performance Management in the Baltic States and Russia, what are the chances of success? Paper prepared for Conference, A Performing Public Sector: The Second TransAtlantic Dialogue, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, 1-3 June.

Zafarullah, H., M.M. Khan and M.H. Rahman (2001) 'The Civil Service System of Bangladesh', in J.P. Burns and B. Bowornwathana (eds.) Civil Service Systems in Asia, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 24-78.

[i] See for example the annual report on the state of the Australian public service (APSC 2005).

[ii] This pattern is not confined to the public sector: private organisations have mixed success, the majority not achieving major transformations.

[iii] It should also be noted that some conceptions incorporate citizen engagement and intergovernmental dimensions, which are not the focus here.

[iv] Note the observation that: 'Lack of rewards for good performance and sanctions for substandard performance of unproductive or absent workers undermine morale and reduce output, which in turn leads to a spiral of overall poor performance' (Urban Institute 2006: 48).

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: FROM ORIGINAL NAIVETY TO CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

Mohit Bhattacharya

"It was this aid-related discussion of good governance, a matter between aid givers and aid seekers, and the arrogant manner in which it was raised by the aid givers that discredited the whole subject in the eyes of many of us in Africa and other parts of the South. For used in this manner, good governance sounded like a tool for neo-colonialism. We have therefore tended to despise the concept even as, out of necessity, we try to qualify under it." Julius Nyerere, Chairman of the South Commission, 13 October, 1998

Early Efforts

Public Administration as an academic discipline was born with a pronounced bias toward change and reform. Woodrow Wilson's founding essay of 1887 was as much an exhortatory piece to work for a 'science' of administration as a passionate plea for 'purifying' public administration of his time. Writing in the context of corruption and patronage politics that took a heavy toll of administrative efficiency, Wilson with his wide knowledge of administration in other European countries had a firm belief that comparative knowledge and scientific approach to administration would help build a corpus of scientific knowledge about administration. This new knowledge, when applied properly, would be helpful in banishing corruption and inefficiency and establishing a public interest serving pure administration. Classicists including Taylor and his followers, and even Weber - the protagonists of the 'machine' concept of organization - were all staunch believers in the magic properties of the organizational 'structure'. The 'proverbs' of classical administrative thought, despite Simon's caustic criticism, had a strong staying power. Even to this day, the belief in structural reform persists among advocates of organizational productivity enhancement. The later Behaviouralists brought about a salutary shift of emphasis from 'structure' to 'behaviour', focusing on the human side of the enterprise. The underlying theme, however, remained constant: how to increase productivity by bringing about as close a fit as possible between structure and human behaviour. Different versions of 'systems' approach, developed later, sought to blend structure and behaviour together, and induct other variables such as 'environment', 'culture', 'politics' (which was abhorred at inception of the discipline), and so on. The salient point to note is that Public Administration has grown up basically as an overly 'reform'-sensitive discipline. As March and Olsen (1983) commented, concern about administrative reform has been ever-present throughout the twentieth century.

The Problematique of Reform

Strangely enough, despite the innate drive toward 'efficiency' oriented thinking on change, scholarly discussion on 'reform' as such has been scanty, notwithstanding Gerald Caiden's earliest effort to clarify its nature and significance. The two terms - change and reform - have often been used almost synonymously. Other familiar concepts that have been in use are 'modernization', 'reinvention', 'reorganization', 'renewal', and 'innovation'. The general understanding (without a consensus though) has been that 'reform' connotes a deliberate and planned action to bring about significant change in an important segment (budget and accounts, for instance) of administration or in the wider governmental system. According to Caiden, it is almost systemic that reform effort is bound to face opposition. This kind of definition is more an input-oriented one, as it is silent about end objectives. To bring about 'efficiency' in administration does not adequately answer the question: why go for reform? Broader socio-political concerns such as improving the standard of quality of living or dispersal of power to facilitate people's participation in administration, to exemplify, must inform any worthwhile administrative reform effort. Also, the contextual aspect of reform - under what circumstances the idea of 'reform' as such and the specific kinds of reform issues surface - is generally ignored in conventional discussions on reform. These and other related aspects of 'reform' are taken up later in this discussion.

One important reason why 'reform' has earlier not been subjected to deeper analysis could be due to inordinate emphasis laid on bureaucratic 'stability' as both an attribute and a virtue. A fully developed bureaucracy, as Weber wrote, becomes almost indestructible. Shunning the company of 'politics', advocated by the first generation administrative analysts, might be another reason too. Change was not a preferred subject, and if at all it has to take place, it should be left to the autonomous and insular working of the bureaucracy. Again, as against the idea of any big-bang 'reform' with wide publicity, it was implied that sundry, routine alterations would take place within administration often enough as a matter of course at the administrator's own initiative. Also, it was not easy, at least at the early period of administrative studies, to have access to the kinds of detailed information about comparative cross-country experiences in the field of administrative reform that would have been helpful in the development of a general theory of 'reform'. Comparative public administration is basically a post-World War II academic enterprise.

The complex world of governmental practice today has been undergoing sea change under pressures coming from both within and without. Corresponding academic thoughts on reform and change have, however, been rather slow in coming. In traditional public administrative thinking, as earlier stated, 'reform' as such has never been a core theme, although the classical thinkers were almost obsessed with the idea of structural manipulation to enhance organizational productivity and efficiency. At best, there have been occasional country specific and/or sector or theme specific discussions. Reform efforts of UK, USA, India, or for that matter, of any country, have been generally discussed in overall terms. Alternatively, discussions have centered around particular themes such as civil service reform, financial and budgetary reform, health service reform etc. Detailed presentation of descriptive accounts of such overall, or sectoral/ thematic reform efforts can be found more in the sister disciplines of history and comparative government, rather than public administration. So, our record of academic treatment of such an important theme as 'reform' in our discipline has been far from optimum.

Whatever be the space devoted to the theme, it needs to be admitted that earlier discussions on administrative reform - and this trend is evident even today in most text books on Public Administration - had a certain naivety around it. Narrow empirical base, personalized experiences and normative considerations used to characterize most treatments of the theme. Conventional discussions of the subject generally failed to comprehend the complexities involved in real-life administrative change and reform. More specifically, under the enduring spell of classical theory, Public Administration as a discipline had generally remained more in-ward looking, being engrossed in its core concern about organizational productivity. It has basically stuck to an engineering view of organization whose productivity was considered dependent on deft manipulation of the internal mechanics of the administrative machine. Two major deficiencies of this perspective have been: (a) administrative analysis was carried on without regard for broader theoretical concern for state capacity-building, and (b) the impact and feed back aspect - what have been the consequence of administrative action on society and the citizens, and how the citizens feel about governmental business - was of secondary concern to the analyst. It is only recently that, due to a variety of circumstances, administrative reform in all its complexities has assumed critical importance, and the contexts, contents, motivation, causalities, and the intricate processes of administrative reform are being subjected to more rigorous analysis from the standpoints of state capacity-building and citizen-responsiveness. Bluntly speaking, more informed and analytical academic discussion of administrative reform has come of age only recently.

Periodization of Reform

It may not be an exaggeration to say that informed, evidence-based and analytical discussion of 'Administrative Reform', as we witness today, is not even two decades old. Although written basically in the context of evolution of American public administration, Paul Light's 'tidal' metaphor of reforms movement deserves special mention in this context. According to Light, all reforms fall in four basic philosophies: (i) scientific management, (ii) war on waste, (iii) watchful eye, and (iv) liberation management. Of these philosophies, we are familiar with the first - scientific management - that has

been concerned with building a more efficient bureaucracy by centralizing and coordinating authority and systemizing activities. The second - war on waste - assumes that bureaucrats are wasteful consumers of public money; hence, the concern is about creating appropriate mechanisms to reduce scope for possible abuse of bureaucratic discretion. The third philosophy of 'watchful eye' seeks to create transparent processes and accountability, rather than pinning on imposition of specific procedural limitations on bureaucrats (as per the second philosophy). The fourth philosophy - liberation management - in Light's formulation, relies on bureaucratic efficiency and capacity for innovation. To quote Light, "Waste is the product of structure that fails to empower workers to meet customer needs, not lazy or sneaky bureaucrats". Hence, what is needed is to 'strip away unnecessary layers of constraint on diligent bureaucrats', promote increased autonomy and remove complicated accounting and personnel practices.

Paul Light's conceptual scheme and the 'tidal' metaphor are both imaginative and innovative. It points out the waxing and waning of reforms, as these moves through twists and turns in course of the administration's coping effort over time. Following Light's lead, for rough periodization, one can start with the conventional structuralist discourse of the classicists and their subsequent flag-bearers as the first generation discussants on 'reform', although the theme was not explicitly broached as such by them.

The emergence of the post-colonial 'third world' after World War II heralded the beginning of a new era of aggressive state-led socio-economic reconstuction of the 'developing' countries. 'Development' turned out to be the core objective of these countries, which, according to experts and donor agencies, necessitated a new form of administration called 'development administration'. This occasion marked the rise of a second generation of 'reform' discourse. There is a vast, albeit overgrown, literature on the theme and as such we need not dilate on it any more at this stage.

The third generation discourse is of recent origin, and contemporaneously this is holding the center stage of debate and discussion on 'administrative reform'. Its roots could be traced to the Thatcherite reforms in UK and Reaganomics in USA in the 80s of the last century under the spell of Neo-liberal politico-economic thinking. About the same period witnessed the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, which meant a sudden transition to an altogether new politico-administrative system. This was considered to be the unique moment of history registering a decisive victory for liberalism and democracy. The anti-state wave swept through the western world demanding down-sizing of bureaucracy and giving prominence to people's voice and the civil society. The other momentous event of great contemporary relevance is 'globalization' characterized by the slow but steady economic integration of the globe with free flow of goods and services across national boundaries backed up by an unprecedented revolution in information technology. Contemporary discourse on 'administrative reform' needs to be located in this complex historic milieu. The World Development Report 1997 captured this spirit aright as it noted: "In the contemporary world of dizzying changes in markets, civil societies, and global forces, the state is under pressure to become more effective. There is, however, no unique model for change; reforms will often come slowly because they involve a fundamental rethinking of the roles of institutions and the interactions between citizens and government (and in today's circumstances, close interactions with supra-state external institutions such as WTO, WHO, ILO etc.). An effective and responsive state is fundamental to the long-term health and wealth of society. Reforms, even if small and incremental, provide their own virtuous circle. Small improvements in the state's effectiveness lead to higher standards of living, in turn paving the way for more reforms and further development."

Administrative reform has conventionally been looked at as propelled by internally generated forces and drives. While this is generally true, there has, in recent times, been strong externally induced impulses for administrative change. This has given rise to a new perspective or lens through which to observe administrative reform which can be called 'an international political economy perspective'(IPE) of reform. Ian Pownall's paper (2000) on the theme is worth our attention in this connection. In this perspective the nation state is seen as a competitive actor in the international arena that continually seeks advantage compared with other competing nation states. Administrative reform, looked at from this

perspective, is a crucial method pursued by the nation state to have an edge over other nation states. Drawing insights from 'policy transfer' and 'competition state literature', Pownall argues that 'a motivation for implementing public sector reform is to derive an increased competitive advantage over other regions and nation states'. In today's context of 'globalization' and international trade regime under the auspices of the WTO, the IPE perspective opens up newer possibilities of studying administrative reform 'through a focus upon the role and function of policy transfer structured by concepts of power derived from international political economy'.

Status of Development Administration

The study of administrative reform, as earlier mentioned, took a new turn in the post-World War II period when the post-colonial Third World emerged as a new phenomenon needing urgent changes in public administrative structures, processes and behaviour to bring about speedy development of the Third World. Development Administration, as a new category of Public Administration, was ushered in to respond to the special needs and requirements of 'development'. Since development, at least initially, was a state-led enterprise, changes in bureaucratic structure, attitude and behaviour came to occupy the center-stage of discussion, the overarching concern being how to make a close fit between the objective contents of development and the nature and structure of the primary agency of development - the bureaucracy. Development Administration has been overtly reform oriented since its inception under the auspices of the Comparative Administration Group led by Fred Riggs. The evolution of development administration is a separate story altogether which, justice demands, needs to be narrated fully in a separate volume. Suffice it to say in our context that development administration passed through at least three distinct phases of evolution: (a) technical-bureaucratic phase when 'development' was conceived in more technical terms to bring about speedy change in a country's productive capacity through state-led (which boiled down to essentially bureaucracy-led) centralized planning and implementation; (b) bureaucracy-reform phase, acknowledging the urgent need to change the dysfunctional mind-set of the inherited administrative regime which had been more 'power' and 'privilege' oriented rather than 'people' oriented; and (c) decentralization-participation phase realizing the failure of top-down centrally dictated planning that reinforced the power of the already privileged group, aggravated inequity and perpetuated poverty, and what is more important, that was not 'owned' by the large masses who remained voiceless beneficiaries, not active participants, of the development process. The current thrust of development administration is toward redefining 'development' in more 'human' terms (human development being the core concern), and toward reshaping administration in more decentralized and people-centric forms to harness civil society, and people's power and local knowledge.

Post-Communist Nations

As stated earlier, revolutionary changes had come about in the eighties of the last century, which marked the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, and along with it, the end of the Cold War. The post-communist nations as they had come out of the traumatic experience of the erstwhile USSR-led centralized regime, provided a fertile ground for innovative, decentralized 'reform' thinking. This new phenomenon opened up rich opportunities for fresh, evidence-based academic discourse on 'administrative reform' that was admirably supported by actual field-level consultancy work funded by the international donor agencies such as World Bank, OECD etc. The issues are too many in their context, as the state itself has to be reshaped from the past party-based, centralized monolithic control to a pluralist, democratic regime. Fairly free play of the market and the private sector would have to be assured within the framework of appropriate rules and regulations. The civil service has to be created as a new instrument of state administration. Decentralization and local people's voice should be institutionalized, and the civil society would be having free space to play its role outside the state. These and many other innovations have to be introduced against the backdrop of the lingering memory of a failed state system. Thus 'reform', in this situation, will be having its own nuances and idiosyncrasies.

The New Public Management

Within the developed capitalist countries, almost simultaneously, there was the rise of strong anti-bureaucratic, anti-state criticism against what came to be called 'government overload' as a consequence

of 'welfare backlash'. The state, it was alleged, has over the years taken upon itself a large array of welfare activities that have inflated its budgetary and financial commitments, and led to the overgrowth of bureaucracy. The battle cry was thus to downsize government and allow more free play to the market and the civil society, giving rise to the new ideology of 'neo-liberalism'. Public Administration, at this stage, was christened as New Public Management with accent on 'privatization' and debureaucratization, and emulation of the 'private 'sector as the role model in terms of job specificity, productivity and performance accountability. The idea of 'Reinventing Government', alongside NPM, appeared in a new garb, laying emphasis on the 'quality' aspect (as distinguished from size or quantity aspect) of government, imagined in a much more policy-competent (being skilled in 'steering' rather than 'rowing'), accountable, responsive, participative, and citizen-friendly incarnation.

Environment and Decentralization

Two other strands of thought that gained prominence during this period exerted strong influence on different levels of public administration in most countries: one centered around environmental management as a global concern to be acted upon locally, and another focused on decentralization and people-centric, local participative management. Since the publication of the Brundtland Report and the holding of the follow-up Earth Summit in Rio (1992), 'environment' reemerged as a major public policy issue for innovative legislation, and appropriate organizational designing with pronounced locality-based decentralization for the propagation and implementation of Agenda 21. The other strand of thinking that has had positive effect on administrative redesigning is 'decentralization'. Both as providing a salutary relief to the overloaded center and as a mode of harnessing societal energy for local self-governance, decentralization has in recent times been gaining in popularity as a preferred form of participative public administration. The first generation ideas on decentralization, which we owe to Mill, Bryce, and Tocqueville, were basically liberal in spirit. They were more philosophically oriented thoughts to serve the needs of building up democratic citizenship from the locality base of the state structure. They were not concerned with actual designing of decentralization in terms of structure, functions, personnel, finances and inter-governmental relations. Currently, these operational aspects of decentralization have gained in prominence to ensure efficient and effective delivery of civic services through a variety of instrumentalities - such as revamped local government (more cost-conscious and citizen-responsive), contracting out to private agencies (privatization), public-private partnership, and activation of citizens' group and non-government organizations.

Convergence of Reform Thinking

The neo-liberal thought found favour with the Western donor agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF that were engaged in the funding of the development projects of the debt-ridden Third World countries. The convergence of thought in regard to change reached its apogee in the newly emergent phenomenon of globalization, facilitated by the free flow of fund, goods and services as dictated by the new conditionalities laid down by the World Bank, the WTO and other overseas donors, and by the new IT revolution (internet, fax and web-based communication). This is also the moment of emergence of 'good governance' as a novel conceptual rubric - a medley of politics, management and ethics. Sound development management was at the core of good governance idea. Its desired attributes such as accountability, transparency, rule of law, and respect for human rights served as yardsticks for governmental reform and performance appraisal. 'Governance' also signified the participation of alternative social actors in the processes of collective problem solving such as civil society and the private sector. Formal 'government' will just be one of the actors and has to allow enough space to other actors to co-govern.

The World Development Report 1997

The impact of all these on government and public administration has been forcefully and systematically argued out in the World Development Report, 1997(World Bank, 1997). A brief summary version of the Report is presented here to understand contemporary thinking at the global level about the meaning and different dimensions of 'administrative reform' as reflected in actual governmental practice. Dispelling earlier doubts about state's effective role in socio-economic development, the WDR asserts that 'even

with more selectivity and greater reliance on the citizenry, and on private firms, meeting a broad range of collective needs more effectively will still mean making the state's central institutions work better'. Reforms can relate to changes in macroeconomic policy such as trade policy, fiscal policy or exchange rate policy. Alternatively, it can deal with regulations, social services, infrastructure, finance and public works that might involve changes in the institutional structure and a general overhaul of long-established systems of patronage and corruption. Political opposition is more likely when comprehensive reforms are attempted. As the Report cautions, 'Change comes when the incentives to throw out the old policies and old institutional arrangements become stronger than the incentives to keep them. An economic crisis or an external threat, or the arrival of a new government with fewer vested interests in the old system may provide the impetus for reform. Reform can be delayed if those in power stick with outdated policies because it is in their interest to do so.' Motivation for change can come from changes being introduced in a neighbouring country. The threat of being left behind when the next-door neighbour is progressing often acts as a motivator. In a veiled way, the Report admits the essentially political nature of reform, as it observes: 'analysis of winners and losers yields a prediction of when - or at least whether - reforms will be undertaken. Reforms have little appeal if the winners cannot compensate the losers. Even when the potential gains are enough to allow for compensation, reform can be hard to achieve, because the gains are spread over many people, whereas the losers, although smaller in number, are powerful and articulate. The other problem is that benefits come in the future, whereas losses are immediate'.

Two key concepts used in this context to explain Bank's notion of 'reform' are: capability and effectiveness. Capability is the ability to undertake and promote collective action efficiently (eg. law and order, basic infrastructure provision, public health etc.). Effectiveness stands for results that flow from the use of capability to meet society's demand for public goods. The first step toward 'reform' is to develop a strategy in terms of assessment of where state's capability is week and how the state should intervene and where. Reinvigorating the public institutions is the necessary next step to actualize strategy. This involves the following:

- Designing effective rules and regulations
- Checking arbitrary state actions and combat entrenched corruption
- Subjecting public institutions to greater competition to increase their efficiency
- Improving performance and pay and incentives
- Making the state more responsive to public needs, and to this end
- Bringing government closer to people through broader participation and decentralization

Five fundamental core tasks of government have been identified without which sustainable, shared and poverty-reducing development is deemed impossible:

(a) establishing a foundation of law; (b) maintaining a non-distortionary policy environment including macroeconomic stability, (c) investing in basic social services and infrastructure, (d) protecting the vulnerable, and (e) protecting the environment. As a rider to this, there is the suggestion that the state has also to keep its eye on 'social fundamentals'. Lawlessness is attributed to a sense of social marginalization, and breaking the law can seem the only way to get the voices of the marginalized heard. Growth has therefore to be shared to bring about reduction in poverty and inequality. The Report alerts that too often the benefits of development are cornered by the politically powerful, and resources and services are diverted from the people who need them most.

A competent civil service, according to the Report, is the lifeblood of the state. Civil servants need to be motivated to effectively perform through a combination of mechanisms to encourage internal competition such as merit-based recruitment system and promotion system, and adequate compensation policy. Other prescriptions are rule-based compliance, financial accountability, proper performance measurement and greater accountability for results.

Provision of public goods and services should be subjected to more competition. Contracting out services through competitive bids and auctions, handing over services to non-government organizations are some of the suggested methods in this context. Another recommendation is to set up, along the lines

of New Zealand's reorganization of the conglomerate ministries, focused, performance-based public agencies with more clarity of purpose and greater managerial accountability for outputs or outcomes.

The WDR pays special attention to how the state can be brought closer to people. It is asserted that 'governments are more effective when they listen to businesses and citizens and work in partnership with them in deciding and implementing policy. Where governments lack mechanisms to listen, they are not responsive to people's interests, especially those of minorities and the poor, who usually strain to get their voices heard in the corridors of power.' The need is therefore to embed policy making in the regular consultative processes involving the private groups, labour and the civil society. The voice of the people, particularly that of the poor and the marginalized, has to be brought into the very center of the policy making process, while deciding on expenditure priorities, designing social assistance programmes, managing forests and other resources.

Tools such as client surveys and citizen's charter need to be used to get to know the people's mind. Broadening people's participation generally, enlisting the support of potential users and drawing on the community's reservoir of social capital are correctives to the faulty practice of top-down approach to development. Talking about 'decentralization' in this context, the Report acknowledges its importance in improving the quality of government by bringing in representation of local business and citizen's interests. At the same time, its pitfalls need to be noted. Decentralization can lead to regional inequality, macroeconomic instability and capture of benefits by the locally powerful interests. So, there has to be a degree of central management of division of powers through strong monitoring mechanisms and insistence on rule-bound behaviour.

On the issue of sustainability of reform, the WDR's comment is that reforming the state requires a broad societal consensus. Pro-reformers need to take decisions 'that widen people's options, articulate benefits clearly and ensure that policies are more inclusive'. Reforms are often obstructed because of non-publicity and general incapacity, even latent unwillingness, to open up the issues for widest possible public discussion. To quote the Report again: 'Benefits of change need to be made clear to all; also coalitions need to be built to give greater voice to oft-silent beneficiaries. It pays to spell out a long-term vision, allowing people to see beyond the immediate pain of adjustment. More importantly, people should have a sense of owning the reforms - a sense that reform is not something imposed from above'. There is a noticeable bias of the WDR toward the private sector and the civil society; yet, it underscores the importance of enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of the state as a catalyst and facilitator of societal development. In fact, there is a shifting emphasis today on the role of the state from the earlier roll-back and 'privatization' obsession to a more positive stance (as is evident in the WDR) which has in consequence been provoking fresh thinking about different ways of reshaping governance in most countries in the world.

Homogenization of Reform Paradigm

While diversification of 'reform' has been happening in reality on the ground, there is a parallel tendency, noticeable alongside this, to 'homogenize' reform thinking, ignoring the fact that government reform is a multifaceted subject. Concern or skepticism about reform, its scope, timeliness, resolute or half-hearted pursuit, implementation and sustainability - all these issues are not amenable to any one-best model of reform. Countries differ in their constitutional-institutional systems that evolve over long time through their historical experiences of living political and governmental life. Change or reform takes place within this life process of governance. Reform, one should note, can take place at different levels of government, and it can be incremental or gradualist at one end and sweeping and holistic at the other. Unification of Germany generated peculiar problems of integration of a liberal-democratic system with a failed communist system. A highly centralized state like France or Belgium has been steadily moving toward 'regionalization' and 'decentralization' which may not be viewed as 'reform' by experts whose interest basically is in public sector reform or even much narrower civil service reform. India, which started the post-independence political life within a framework of pronounced centralist bias, has been gradually 'federalizing', under strong political pressure from the regions. This kind of meso-level

transformation has been going on over a long period of time which may be overlooked by conventional reform analysts. Interestingly, this trend in India has triggered simultaneous changes at the micro level. The landmark constitutional amendments (73rd and 74th Amendments, 1992), recently enacted by Indian Parliament have accorded constitutional status to 'local self-government' at the sub-state level, assuring a more decentralized and participative grass-root people's government at the local level.

There is no reason why all these governmental changes taking place under different constitutional systems and at different levels at varying paces should not form part of 'reform' studies. The 'New Public Management' movement or the 'Reinventing Government' idea has emerged almost as brand names for administrative reform. Behind this orthodoxy lie partly the sponsorship of the donor agencies like the World Bank, the OECD etc, and partly the subtle and persuasive peddling of the 'success' story of the Anglo-Saxon paradigm of 'reform'.

Although differing on contextual parameters and other attributes such as developing country situation, organized private sector, firmer regulatory framework etc., and the worldwide search for governmental reform today exhibits certain striking similarities as if there is one and only one best way to 'reform' government. The common features are broadly identified as under:

- Concern about the unconscionable 'size' of government: its obesity being linked to problems of performance and productivity
- Search for alternatives to centralized, overgrown bureaucracy: options suggested are (i) creating more opportunities for the 'market' to play its role (as against government agencies), (ii) privatization (in diverse forms), (iii) facilitating civil society formations such as NGOs and CBOs to undertake much of the social development functions in such fields as education, health, and poverty removal, and (iv) promoting decentralized local government relying on active citizens involvement and local resource-based, eco-conscious, autonomous local development
- Crafting or designing of 'quality' of governance (as against 'quantity' or 'size'): (i) improving government products and output, (ii) assessing/monitoring effectiveness through citizen surveys and report cards, (iii) introducing citizen's charter, (iv) creating transparent administrative processes through simplification of complex rules and regulations and making them easily available to the citizens in easy and clearly understandable language and format, (v) instituting a statutory system of 'right to information' and 'openness' in government (as against conventional secrecy), (vi) systematizing receipt of regular feedbacks about impact of administration on the society and the people, and actually using the feedback information/data (going beyond mere ritualistic feedback collection) for bringing about conducive administrative/procedural changes, (vii) enhancement of the 'moral' dimension of government through imaginative training programmes, strict supervisory guidance, enforcement of a code of conduct, and institution and effective enforcement of a properly devised vigilance machinery, (viii) popularization of well-designed e-governance instrumentalities such as access to on-line, computer-based information, citizens information kiosks etc., (ix) institution of really effective, simple and quick citizens' grievance redressal mechanisms and (x) aggressive campaign (involving both media and civil society forums) against corruption to convince the people that government has zero tolerance for administrative corruption.

Administrative Reforms in Practice

Ideas about administrative reforms (AR) - theoretical conceptual understandings - are derived from the world of administrative practice. AR is intensely practical. In fact the origin of the intellectual field called Public Administration (PA) can be traced to the nineteenth century Wilsonian exhortation for building up a science of administration for reforming administration.

AR efforts are as old as organized government as an institution. The underlying reasons for these may be many such as the birth of a new political regime (eg. Post-Independence India), emergence of a new vision of collective life (eg. Development Agenda of Third World countries), major environmental influences buffeting government such as Globalization and Neo-liberalist trend, and externally induced

(particularly, donor- driven) change programme, like, for instance, the Structural Adjustment Policy of the World Bank.

In the 1960s India had embarked upon a wide-ranging and fairly massive administrative reforms enterprise. The main guiding idea was to 'modernise' public administrative machinery and procedures and to make a close fit between public administration and the developmental needs of the country. China in 1998 initiated a long-drawn-out process of reforms motivated by both internal and external causes. Chinese 'socialism' had to be adjusted to global economic forces and to the need for internal 'market' economy, demand for new employment creation, and the restructuring of the large number of public enterprises, particularly the loss-making ones. Similarly, many countries - both 'developed' and 'developing' - have in recent times been engaged in wide-ranging AR efforts.

As regards African countries (particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, it has been observed that one could identify distinct periodization of AR exercises starting with (a) post-independence efforts to maintain delivery of public services and sustain public administration, (b) creation of public enterprises in almost all sectors, and centrally controlled development projects administration in the 1960s and 70s, (c) reforms under externally induced structural adjustment policy in the 1980s onward - basically 'down-sizing' and wage-bill reduction efforts, and (d) introduction of 'governance' programme in the 1990s with emphasis on rule of law, accountability and transparency, citizens' participation and civil society's involvement in social development.

Broadly, a general sequencing of reforms in public administration can be presented in the following way:

(i) Changes in governmental structures, organizations, functions and personnel as first generation reforms;

(ii) Reforms in public 'management' as second generation reforms; and

(iii) Third generation reforms characterized by broad 'governance' agenda providing for accountability and transparency, citizens' participation and responsive public administration, and ethical values in administration.

This is obviously a broad thumb-nail sketch of wide-ranging AR efforts in different continents and countries. Any change programme has always to take into account situational peculiarities of the country concerned - its institutional history, culture, and demographic and resources position, and external relationships. A rigid blueprint idea of AR is obviously not a feasible proposition. Also, indiscriminate transplanting of institutions from one country to another without proper regard for the specificities (situational peculiarities) of the recipient country has found, on experience, to be non-workable.

World Bank's Reforms Experiences

In this context, it is worthwhile recounting the rich experiences of the World Bank in the broad field of civil service reforms. There have been varied types and complex modes of reform. For instance, governments have reshaped rigid, hierarchical bureaucracies into flexible, decentralized and citizen-responsive organizations. In quite a few countries, sweeping reforms processes have been on, pushing through radical, systematic transformations based on the 'new public management' model. Reforms have been in terms of narrower government functions (down-sizing), demands for value for money, and a definitive focus on results. More conservative reforms in other countries have attempted incremental improvements, without much of an alteration in the basic administrative structures and functions.

The major highlights of Bank's track record in this area are presented here, drawing on the Bank's PREM notes (public sector), no.31, 1999. The purpose is not to glorify the Bank's role but to provide a sketch of the complexities and problematics of real life reforms efforts in specific (developing country) situations.

In line with first generation 'neo-liberal' civil service reforms ideas, the central concern of Bank's reforms policy had been to bring balance to government pay and employment and practices. This is the conventional 'downsizing' exercise that has not been politically acceptable at many places. Hence, a

major paradigm shift in reforms enterprise took place soon in terms of formulation of a broader policy embracing 'revamping government functions and organizational structures, improving human resources policies in central, local and sector governments, revising legal and regulatory framework, providing institutional support for decentralization, and managing the process through which these changes are implemented'. Civil service reform, on Bank's own admission, has usually been like 'palliative measures to solve problems that require major surgery'.

Reflecting on whatever has been achieved so far in the area of AR, Bank's creative reminiscences are worth our quotation in this context. To start with, it has been observed that too often 'technical administrative fixes have been applied to fundamental problems of political economy'. Ignoring critical links with other parts of the larger politico-administrative system, reforms attempts have tended to assume narrow technical exercise. Any worthwhile reforms exercise has to have a comprehensive and realistic framework as well as an outline of indicative instruments of support for it. On the issue of more conventional pay and employment policies reform, the comment has been that such partial policies are 'necessary but insufficient conditions for performance and capacity improvements'. Mere 'downsizing' is not the solution; the goal has to be fixed on long-term right-sizing and performance improvements.

In this connection, some important principles enunciated (implicitly) are:

- Addressing first order questions about the role of the state with important implications for functions, structures and organizations, and the processes of government
- Working out functional links between civil service management and the framework of controls and incentives embodied in the government's financial management systems, and forging strong links particularly between personnel and budget functions essential for sound government management
- Making well-thought-out decisions about decentralization/deconcentration keeping in mind implications for personnel, functions and finances and considering, in this context, their linkages with policies related to central civil services departments
- Ensuring coherence and consistency in reforms programme by taking into account the linkages between central government's civil service reforms and institutional reforms in individual sectors such as health and education with high concentration of government personnel
- Pursuing a flexible approach to reforms in view of the exceedingly complex nature of governmental reforms as institutional reforms require adaptability and participants' understanding and commitment to reforms goals
- Avoiding blind adoption of 'new public management' recipes and finding the right reforms strategy to carry out the essential tasks by leveraging scarce resources through, among other things, creative technology application or innovative management initiatives.

Reforms Balance-Sheet

There is no one single miracle model of reform. Rather, the heterogeneity of reform is a salutary reminder to the complexities of governmental reform and reflects more truthfully the ground situations in different country contexts. While the number of reform efforts has been quite substantial, the track record of 'reform', sponsored by the donor agencies in different countries (particularly in the developing countries) has not, however, been very encouraging. Expected results from reforms have not flowed in many instances for a variety of reasons.

World Bank's Introspection

World Bank, the biggest donor agency, has done some introspection on what has really happened to reforms in terms of desired results. On the Bank's own admission, the tendency, firstly, has generally been to take a rather narrow, technocratic supply-side view on public sector management. Secondly, the common practice has been to work "exclusively with government interlocutors, and funding consulting services, computers, and other inputs in the absence of a deep and sustainable demand for institutional reform on the part of the borrower". Thirdly, often consultation with key stakeholders (expanding 'voice' and participation) has been shirked, whereas critical support for meaningful reform would possibly have come from this very exercise. Reliance on higher level government officers alone was not enough to mobilize real pressure for much-needed change. Fourthly, suggested solutions have many a time been

ill-prescribed. Consultants have gone in for relatively easy technocratic solutions 'when changing the role and scope of government activities (e.g., through contracting out or decentralizing public service delivery) might have led to more fundamental institutional change'. Fifthly, applying one 'best practice' that might have worked very well in one country, to other countries as well has been a rather common practice with consultants. As it is now admitted, 'While comparative knowledge and broad principles can help illuminate options for reform in any situation, they are no substitute for in-depth country knowledge'.

Public sector reform is much wider than mere civil service reform. Many a time the latter has been resorted to without taking into account the larger framework of the government sector. In a candid review of the World Bank's own interventions in the sphere of civil service reform, it is admitted that four factors undermined the efficacy of these interventions: (a) the poor quality of information on the performance of civil service; (b) the limited role afforded to strategic management and cultural change; (c) the absence of checks and balances on arbitrary administrative action; and (d) a failure to appreciate key contextual constraints such as macroeconomic performance, labour market trends and overall institutional endowment.

It was also admitted that in most cases the focus on pay and employment had been too narrow to bring about broader institutional changes. Rather the need was to address first order questions about the role of the state with important implications for the functions, structure, organization and the processes of government. The suggestion now is to consider a more integrated model of reforms subsuming well-worked-out linkages (i) between civil service development policies and the framework of controls and incentives embodied in government's budgetary and financial management systems, (ii) between central civil service reforms policies and those relating to devolution and deconcentration of functions, personnel and resources to sub-national levels of government, and (iii) between central civil service reforms and institutional reforms in individual sectors such as health, education etc. There cannot be any one-size-fits-all approach to administrative reforms. At the same time, two basic principles underlying an integrated model of reform should be: (a) to guard against overloading government's already burdensome requirements for reform, and (b) to tailor reforms to specific and unique regional and country circumstances.

Other Critics

Reflections of experts and consultants on their extensive work experience in country projects for governmental reforms are worth our quotation in this context. For instance, Barbara Nunberg, who has worked on several World Bank projects, thought that in resource-strained environments countries could embark on a course on 'smart government'. By this she meant "finding the best, most strategic way to carry out essential tasks by leveraging scarce skills and money, possibly through creative technology applications (e.g. stretching staff capacity through computerization or increasing government transparency through use of the internet to disseminate public information, as in Bulgaria) or inventive management solutions (e.g. using quality circle mechanisms to enhance staff motivation, as in Burkina Faso)." This sounds a pragmatic management approach beyond the oft-cited New Public Management model. Nunberg's other remark on World Bank's funding philosophy is also noteworthy. In her view, which seems justified on all accounts, World Bank support should be 'de-projectised' and the approach should instead be toward "a programmatic mechanism that affords borrower more voice over the nature and pace of reform and replaces the short-term down-sizing focus of adjustment lending to civil service reform with efforts to institutionalize management controls over the longer term".

Recounting the experience of wider public sector reform (PSR) efforts, particularly in the developing countries, Mark Schacter (2000), another noted international consultant, made the following important observations:

- PSR's main motive force must come from within the country's well-placed local leadership as it is an intensely political process that will inevitably threaten the interests of strong local stakeholders.
- There must be strong internal pressure from organized civil society, political parties, private sector

and other influential domestic institutions that would compel the public sector to serve the society better.

- 'Failed accountability is at the root of public sector dysfunction'. There has, therefore, to be a strong bond of accountability between citizens and the public sector agencies. Key institutions of accountability should hold the public sector accountable in order that a healthy accountability environment is created for the sector.
- To promote a more accountable and better-performing public sector, there has to be wide dissemination of information that would allow citizens to monitor public service delivery and public expenditure.
- High-performing public sector organizations are found to be 'mission-driven' and outcomes-oriented. This underscores the need for internal organizational leadership style and management practices that would focus on results and quality service to the public.
- 'Providing timely and well-argued policy advice to public decision-makers is generally regarded as a core responsibility of the public service'. Attention, therefore, needs to be paid to 'policy capacity building' in developing countries.
- A more sophisticated view of 'downsizing' (than what has been taken so far) is necessary to achieve the desired objectives of public sector pay and employment reform. 'This means integrating downsizing programmes into a larger frame of reference that includes a view on the appropriate role and size of government, an appropriate system for setting performance objectives and measuring progress against them, and a reformed pay structure conducive to attracting, retaining and motivating highly qualified staff'.

From the perspective of the developing countries, critics point out that reforms, as pursued by the Bretton Wood institutions and the United Nations have aimed to provide efficient public administration systems to implement development policies which concretely meant construction of physical infrastructure such as ultramodern roads and highways, five-star hotels, airports and similar other showcase projects to catch up with the Western industrialized, developed nations. While in reality poverty and large-scale human misery continued almost unabated, a persistent tendency of 'development policies' has been to 'allow instrumental rationality and obtrusive materialism to diminish the people's value systems'. As an informed observer of the African development scene has aptly commented with particular reference to Ghanaian society, "Liberal reforms are often implemented....without due regard for the experiences of the people and their socio-cultural values. Several families, communities and informal networks characterizing the urban and rural landscapes often get ignored, although they are the basic structures for organizing social, economic and political activities. Reform ought to begin by analyzing and understanding these communities, which are organized around cultural, social and economic activities (small-scale farming, food processing, knitting, craft making, music, dance and more)." It is being argued that recent orthodox reforms miss entirely the vital 'social capital' as the basis for facilitating cooperation in pursuing common purposes. What is needed is 'a communitarian approach' as a more 'viable alternative to the rhetorical propositions of structural adjustment and accelerated growth - an attempt to creatively build on local institutions and capacities to ensure steady and sustainable progress'. This is a timely warning against attempts to impose a straightjacket formula of administrative reform that is out of tune with the life and living of the people who are supposed to be the target of reform.

One more suggestion, in consonance with these ideas, is that 'reforms' can take the form of broad-brush recommendations as is often found in most official reports on administrative reforms. Alternatively, these could be spelt out in details including a clear charting out of the road map and the expected outputs or outcomes. The process aspect of proposals is of paramount importance in order to ensure that the implementation of 'reform proposals' becomes easily understandable to the insiders - the members of the bureaucracy. It may even be advisable to have a regular hand-holding arrangement between the consultants and the internal administrative group from the start of the reform discussions and formulation of concrete proposals*. As the African story cited above suggests, genuine and well-thought-out stakeholders' consultations at every step is of paramount importance if reform has to be

really effective and implementable. Administrative reform affects established power relationships, as there would always be gainers and losers in the reform game. In other words, it is naïve to think that 'reform' is politically neutral. Any reform effort has to consciously flesh out political dimensions - overt or covert - and plan to confront them to make sure that reform proposals receive at the end of the day broadest possible agreement among the major contending parties/stakeholders.

Account of Success and Failure

Success and failure of reform efforts need to be contextually and substantively evaluated. Professor Jose Oscar Monteiro has succinctly prepared two checklists of reforms in the context of developing countries: one for successful reforms and another not likely to be successful. These are reproduced verbatim as under:

1) One fairly generalized lesson is that institutional reproduction and replication - called "administrative mimesis" - has rarely been successful. In fact, there have often been disastrous consequences as existing institutions disintegrated while governments failed to replace them with new and better structures.

2) The more reforms are demand driven, the higher the success rate. If reforms are mainly the brainchild of some overseas development agency with local decision makers going along solely to avoid denying their country aid money, reforms are likely to fail.

3) Clearly defined and realistically planned reforms have a higher success rate. It is important that reform initiatives are based on proper political, financial and capacity-building analysis. That, rather than some blueprint or example from another country, should be the basis for reforms. The implication is that one would have to accept and go along with less than ideal reforms. In this sense, the saying that "the perfect is the enemy of the good" is fully applicable. However, this is not obvious as governments are not likely to accept second rank solutions and it is usually in those countries where the need for change is greatest that one has to be most restrained and unambitious.

4) Stimulating innovation initiatives by special rewards and competitions, demonstrable and tangible quick wins (usually process re-engineering exercises of administrative services) and visible and audible reform champions or pioneers - all help to take reforms forward.

On how reforms are most successfully implemented, the following points are important:

1. Political will and effective leadership are absolutely essential, without these features reforms will be a mere formalistic exercise in window-dressing.
2. Reforms have been most successful if implemented in a consistent and incremental way, rather than a revolutionary shock therapy, but at the same time real or perceived crisis is usually beneficial for reforms. Reforms triggered by problems and conflicts should be given priority.
3. Problems in the administration are often considered as technical issues that can be resolved by a sequence of almost critical interventions while they cannot be isolated from wider political and financial parameters. A technocratic approach is bound to fail.
4. Capacity building should not only be technical, but also process oriented.
5. Both directive (centrally guided and decided) and participative approaches can be effective, depending upon the situation. Participation can however also serve as a tool to slow down or undermine reforms.
6. Potential and real opposition and resistance should be anticipated and properly taken into account at any time. Resistance not only emerges when vested interests (political, bureaucratic or private) are at stake, but is also due to bad previous reform experiences.
7. Negative unintended consequences and poor results of earlier reforms hamper new reform initiatives.

8. Traditionally, the reward for reform initiatives taken by civil servants themselves is very uncertain, while failure may have a disastrous impact on someone's career.
9. Focus should be on principles and values such as public interest, responsibility, efficiency, etc, rather than specific results.
10. It is crucial to have a consensual, comprehensive vision or purpose for the reforms, but in terms of implementation an organic approach can be more suitable. As the differences are so large between countries (also within countries), one has to combine a unity of principles with a diversity of implementation methods. The operational aspects need to be based on raw empiricism and practical knowledge, rather than a set of guidelines.
11. Interventions need to take into account local routines, tacit beliefs and informally organized interactions.
12. Civil service reform is a political process. So politics need to be taken seriously and not as a disinfected notion of management, governance or administration.

These are very practical recipes no doubt; but country and situational variations are so diverse that this list might appear to the reform practitioner rather short and simplistic.

Concluding Observations

Governmental reform, whatever be its scope, is admittedly an exceedingly complex exercise involving numerous stakeholders, a general societal consensus and a determined political will appropriately backed up by the much-needed skill and capacity of the bureaucratic machinery. Administrative reform is prima facie a technical job of capacity building of 'administration'. But, experience tells us that from initiation to implementation administrative reform is deeply embedded in 'politics'. Any exercise in administrative 'reorganizing' of an existing set-up affects various kinds of power and interest groups on both fronts - political and bureaucratic. An adequate understanding of the political sensitive nature of 'reform' is the first requirement of a projected inquiry into the processes of administrative change. The impulse for bringing about changes in administration surfaces in unusual moments of a nation's life such as a major political change replacing an old and entrenched regime, a sudden realization, followed by ready acceptance, on the part of the power holders that 'changes' are an imperative necessity to enhance administration's coping ability and refurbish the regime's image and legitimacy. There are also other pressing moments when powerful exogenous forces impinge on administration and compel vital changes to grapple with them. In recent times, 'globalization' and its attendant pressures and prescriptions (e.g. 'good governance') emanating from the various international agencies such as the WTO, the World Bank etc. have been impelling the nation states to gear up their administrative and financial systems to face up to the newly emergent challenges. Depending on how the scope of a projected reform is sensed and delineated, administrative reform, in all its varied aspects, is a long-drawn-out process requiring rare investigative talent, resources, time and patience. As the history of the Western industrialized countries points out, it took centuries for them to develop reasonably effective public institutions. What is encouraging is that most of the developing countries, whose central concern has so far been 'development', have now accepted governmental 'reform' at different levels as an essential agenda item. The 'reforms', however', have in most cases remained donor driven and not people driven. People are often treated as silent and passive 'beneficiaries' of reform. Fortunately, there is now a wider recognition of the fact that the nature and scope of reform should be widely publicized to allow people to understand and own the 'reforms'. Popular acceptability, practical implementability and long-term sustainability of reforms are squarely dependent on their deep social embeddedness. Otherwise the fear is that 'reform' would mean continuation of the age-old practice of cornering the benefits of donor-funded projects by a microscopic elite and the maintenance of status quo. Ill-publicized and 'secretive' reform, apart from being difficult to implement, may terminate halfway, blocking all opportunities of future changes in administration.

Admittedly, AR initiatives and experiments are time-consuming, long-gestational, and uncertainty-producing, apart from being costly both in monetary and personnel terms. Hence, some cautionary

remarks should be in order in this context. First, conventional 'projects' approach to reforms is based on 'engineering model' with emphasis on tight time frame and de-emphasis on the human variables. Second, a highly integrated and long rolling approach to reforms needs to be avoided to obviate overloading of the already burdensome requirements of government reform. Third, reforms initiatives have to make sure that obsolete and discarded systems are not installed in the name of 'reforms' impeding thereby progressive change which is at the heart of any worthwhile AR exercise. Fourth, guidance on the design and implementation of carefully sequenced governmental reforms can not be provided through a universal (one-size-fits-all) blueprint approach. Countries must be able to choose reforms path and modalities that are appropriate for their specific needs and circumstances. 'Will to change' is very basic to a country's reforms initiative, and its determined pursuit and longer term sustenance.

REFERENCES

Caiden, Gerald E. (1970) *Administrative Reform*, Penguin Press, London.

Haruna, Peter Fuseini (2003) 'Rethinking Political and Administrative Reforms in Africa', *The American Society for Public Administration*, **26** (8).

March, James and Olsen, J. (1983) "Organizing Political Life: What Administrative Reorganization Tells us About Government", *American Political Science Review*, 77(2)

Nunberg, Barbara (1997) 'Re-thinking Civil Service Reform; An Agenda for Smart Government', *World Bank Working Paper*, Washington D.C., The World Bank.

Pownall, Ian E. (1997) "An International Political Economy Perspective of Administrative Reform'

Schacter, Mark (2000) *Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries: Issues, Lessons and Future Directions, Canadian International Development Agency, Ottowa*

World Bank (1997) *World Development Report 1997*, Washington D.C., World Bank

World Bank (1999) *Civil Service Reform. A Review of World Bank Experience*, Operations Evaluation Department,

World Bank (2000) Strategy Paper: *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance*, World Bank Strategy Paper, Washington, D.C., The World Bank.

* It has been the experience of the author, while working on a number of international donors-funded public sector reforms projects in India that the tendency on the part of the OD or Process consultants, generally, is to suggest 'reforms' in broad outlines (with token stakeholders' consultation) without working out the detailed implementation plan and the road map, including indications of 'risks' involved in implementation.

109696

LIBARY
Bangladesh Public Administration
Training Center Savar, Dhaka.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN MALAYSIA- CONFRONTING NEW DIMENSIONS IN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION

Phang Siew Nooi

Introduction

Malaya obtained its independence from the British in August 1957, and duly became the Federation of Malaya. Since then the country has seen remarkable changes to its government administration in terms of policy changes and civil service reforms. Another milestone in the country's transformation occurred on 16 September 1963, when Malaysia was formed with the admission of Sabah and Sarawak to the existing Peninsular of Malaya. With this addition, Malaysia has today an area of 330,433 sq.km. and a population of 26.64 million in 2006 . Malaysia now consists of 13 states, equal in status though different in internal organisation and administration. The Federal Territories comprising the capital Kuala Lumpur, the newly established Putrajaya and the island of Labuan, are administered by the Ministry of Federal Territories.

While British influence is pronounced, the Head of State is a unique Malaysian institution. The Head of State or King is a constitutional monarch who serves a term of five years and acts on the advice of the Cabinet. He is elected by the other Rulers (Sultans) of the nine Malay states in Peninsular Malaysia and acts in accordance with government's advice.

At the federal level the product of government is via a Parliament which is bicameral, consisting of a senate (Upper House) and a House of Representatives (Lower House). Elections to the Lower House are held every five years on the basis of universal suffrage, the latest being the 11th General Elections held recently on the 21 March 2004. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, consists of members of the Legislature and is collectively responsible to Parliament.

At the State level, other than the States of Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak, a Malay ruler or Sultan is sovereign in the State. The non-sovereign States are headed by a Governor, who is federally appointed for four years and who acts on the advice of the respective State Governments. Each State has a unicameral Legislature, elections to which are held every five years concurrent with federal elections. The State government is headed by a Chief Minister who is normally the leader of the political party at the state level and enjoys the majority of popular votes cast in the elections.

At the local level is the Local government which is non-elective and does not adhere to any political party majority votes to form the government. Local government in Malaysia is provided for in paragraphs four and five of the Ninth Schedule to the Federal Constitution. Although the Federal government exercises certain powers over Local government, it is the States that ultimately have general responsibilities for the local authorities within their districts. Hence, in the system of government in Malaysia, there are three levels of government, namely, the federal, state and local.

The Malaysian Civil Service

From independence until the period of the 1970's, the role of the civil service remained relatively unchanged. It still performed the perfunctory duties of general civil services, in effect a continuation of colonial administration in maintaining peace and order in the country. The issue of implementing any programme towards physical and infrastructural development was never at the forefront as the civil service was from the moment of gaining independence involved in consolidating its efforts towards peace and confronting the problem of communist insurgency occurring within the country. It was towards the later part of the 1960s that pressures were exerted upon the civil service to gear itself away from its maintenance culture to a more developmental and performance oriented role. Conceptually, the

[1]Malaysia, Department of Statistics, as at 31 May, 2006.

Malaysian civil service since independence was unquestionably an efficient bureaucratic apparatus but still having the aura of colonialism being attached to it. This was due to the fact that most of the expatriate officers were still employed in responsible administrative positions. Only a small percentage of local officers were given the opportunity to assume specific administrative posts if they possessed the required educational qualifications. Certainly, this limited the quantum of locals that could be duly appointed to high office in the civil service.

The process of "Malayanising" the civil service was put into place by the newly independent government when it adopted a Malayanisation programme in the civil service. Basically, there were two objectives; namely to replace the expatriates and secondly to enlarge the bureaucracy. This exercise was carried out in stages where once a suitable local understudy was available, the expatriate was requested to retire and replaced by the local officer. Indeed, this made for a smooth transition with comparatively little problems. Some comparative figures indicate the success of this programme. In 1957, expatriate officers staffed 67% of all Malayan civil service posts (around 1564 officers), but by early 1963, there were only 9.2% expatriates (about 24 officers) left in the service (Tilman 1964). While this was reflected in the administrative side of the civil service, in the technical and professional sectors, the process of Malayanisation was taking a much longer period as the number of local technical professionals was limited and training still had to be expanded to this group of officers. Efforts at increasing the number of government officers also took on a rapid pace especially with the inclusion of the states of Sabah and Sarawak with the formation of Malaysia in 1963. For example, in 1962, the size of the central and state bureaucracies was around 119,516 employees; in 1972, this increased to around 166,569 employees (Government of Malaysia 1962-1972).

Need for Administrative Reforms and Training

The process of change had been set in motion the moment the country put into place its Malayanisation programme. This period of the country's transformation and the need for further administrative changes hastened the government's efforts towards reorganising the civil service structure. However, this change process had to be carried out bearing in mind the needs of a population that had just realised independence and full of expectations of a better tomorrow. There was also a need to control government expenditure, continue rural development to bridge the gap of economic imbalance between those in the urban and rural sectors, caring for the wellbeing of the citizens and raising the standard of living. Foremost was the need to generate more officers capable of taking over the tasks of civil administration. The philosophy was bent towards a more active and vitalised bureaucracy. Fresh from its triumphant election victory in 1964, the government in power wanted to show the electorate that it was giving great attention to the efficiency of the public service, as it was the instrument that "delivers the goods to the people". It was of utmost importance to improve the government administration to meet the needs of a rapidly developing nation and aspirations of the people. Yet at the same time, it had to be acknowledged that the civil service had been shouldering more and more since Independence and its capacity for growth and development was only constrained by the lack of training opportunities for the civil administrators.

As was mentioned previously, while there was a large increase in the number of government employees, they were mostly generalists. The country was expanding rapidly but the civil service experienced insufficient professionals and technocrats. There was also a need for these administrators to be trained and equipped with special skills such as scientific tools of management; in short, there was a dearth of a special group of social scientists, economists and professional administrators. It was imperative then that certain administrative reforms and innovations had to be deliberately introduced into the administrative system. This idea and intention was subsequently put into action with input from external consultants in a study undertaken to review the Malaysian public administrative system. In fact the main objective of the study was "to improve the administrative system and achieve efficiency and administrative leadership in the public service to meet the needs of a dynamic and rapidly developing country" (Montgomery and Esman 1966). As acknowledged in the study, the need for administrative reforms was "to speed government action, reduce costs and improve the quality of service" (Montgomery and Esman 1966:1).

Post-entry Training

Leading from the recommendations was the proposal for improvement of the government's education and training programmes for all levels of civil service. One such programme was the call for the creation of a graduate study programme in development administration in the Faculty of Economics and Administration (FEA) of the University of Malaya for the purpose of post-entry training of Malaysian Home and Foreign Service (MHFS) officers. In addition it was also proposed that mid-career university level education should be provided to those officers in the professional cadres. Finally, the recommendations also envisaged that there should be expanded in-service training facilities in the technical and clerical staffs and seminars for top level officials. In all, it was recognised that the professional competence of the Malaysian civil service should be strengthened. This was essential as a rapidly developing country requires the necessary leadership for it to push forward its reforms and development plans. With this in mind, the government pursued the idea of a post-entry university course particularly in development administration for selected newly recruited officers.

In tandem with the recommendations as set out in the report by the consultants, the government established a unit called the Development Administration Unit (DAU) and proceeded with the implementation of training programmes for all levels of the civil service. Thus began the training and strengthening of the professional capabilities of administrative officers. The onerous task of training was initially thrust to the University of Malaya and it was upon the Faculty of Economics and Administration (FEA) that the programme was entrusted.

Although the impetus for training was keenly felt by the government, the set back was that not all administrative officers could be released for training at the same time. Some officers were still required to continue working while others could not be released for long durations as the civil service was constrained by a shortage of serving officers. The consequence was that the government was not able to release that many officers for training and for duration longer than a year. It was agreed that the FEA would offer a one year post graduate diploma course for those administrators who could be released from service. Consequently, the Diploma in Public Administration (DPA) was conceptualised and implemented to provide postgraduate training to this group of civil servants. These officers would be specially trained in the field of management and equipped with specific skills in public administration and the DPA programme was structured to be completed within a year. At the completion of the programme, the officers would have been trained in specific areas of public administration and return to their respective postings equipped with knowledge in administration and skills in functional management. These were perceived to be essential to help the nation chart its growth and outline development policies and implement economic and social projects as soon as possible. Some of these officers were to be despatched to the various districts and towns to spearhead government policies and plans on the ground. In fact these officers could be perceived as providing a strong link between the citizens and central administration. Overall, this link provided the leverage necessary for the ruling party to reinforce its political strength. These field officers possessing the necessary skills and qualifications were highly regarded by the local people. Naturally, the work carried out by these officers would be seen as contributing towards raising their standard of living thereby reflecting well upon government administration.

The Malayanisation process not only replaced existing expatriate officers but also equipped Malaysian officers with the necessary skills in public administration thereby contributing to the transformation of the civil service into the backbone of the government. This process of change strengthened the government's position and reinforced its image as a government that delivers. Politically it served the ruling party well as having government policies and programmes accepted and implemented presented less political mileage to the opposition parties to criticise the government.

Confronting New Dimensions in Government Administration and Re-orientation

Reality had begun to set in amongst some civil servants who were not necessarily contented with merely a postgraduate diploma in public administration, but were seeking options to obtain higher

qualifications. In addition the civil service was increasing its staff with the employment of many new graduates from the various local universities who required in-service training. A re-look into the options available for postgraduate training of the government officers was necessary. Certainly, an expanded civil service allowed some of the officers to be released from their jobs for a longer duration since there will still be ample staff to carry out the duties. On that assumption it was possible to consider allowing government officers to continue furthering their education for a period of more than a year. A small number of senior officers were being sent abroad for postgraduate training in public administration. However, overseas training incur higher expenditure and with increasing numbers applying for the opportunity to pursue a higher degree, the time had come to seriously consider using the local institutions of higher learning to train government officers. Definitely a change in mind-set was necessary as many still preferred to be sent abroad, but with rising costs, the alternative of training staff locally had to be seriously considered.

Another factor that contributed to the idea of placing more officers in local universities was the accelerated pace taken to develop the country during the 1980s. This was the beginning of the era of the Mahathir administration. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister from 1981 - 2003 and during his tenure as Prime Minister there was a dynamic change in government administration. It signalled the implementation of a series of major policies and actions which set new dimensions in Malaysia's political and socio-economic developments. This phase of administrative reforms in modernising the bureaucracy required the civil service to work closely and in tune with the political leadership in every aspect of government operations. For instance, the government instilled the "Leadership by Example" motto and began to liaise with the private sector under the concept of "Malaysia Incorporated".

During this era, civil servants needed to go beyond a postgraduate diploma that equipped them with basic management techniques and administrative knowledge. The time had come for a re-look into the viability of the DPA programme. Much more was now required from the civil servants. At the same time many local graduates were also seeking opportunities to continue with their postgraduate studies. The demand for an opportunity to pursue a postgraduate degree leading to a MPA and a PhD especially among the government officers fraternity meant that the local institutions of higher learning had to re-evaluate their courses and programmes in public administration. Certainly, there was an immediate need to establish courses that could meet the requirements of the public sector. All these were being pursued bearing in mind that the development of the country was moving at a rapid pace and the scope of public administration included knowing issues related to foreign trade, international affairs and political negotiations. It was imperative that with the pace of the country's development and the quest for specialisation in training in public administration, a postgraduate degree solely catering for public administration had to be established. It was with this in mind that the local universities expanded their postgraduate programmes and INTAN (National Institute of Public Administration), a government staff training centre under the Prime Minister's Department, established in-service training courses for government officers. Government requirements have now begun to go beyond mere functional management

During this phase of administrative reforms, major emphasis was given towards efficiency, political stability and economic growth and training courses were tailored to enhance the competence of government administrators. The mind-set of the civil servants was set to change during this period as major innovations and new ideas were constantly being introduced by the government. For instance, work manuals and desk files were introduced. Civil servants were encouraged to be more punctual and efficient. Name tags were worn to make the officers more personally accountable to the general public and stated working hours were strictly adhered to. New policies such as the "Look East Policy", "Malaysia Incorporated", "Client's Charter", "Privatisation" and "Paperless Administration", were incorporated into government administration. The successful implementation of these varied policies and programmes highlighted the achievements of the civil service. It prompted the former premier, Dr. Mahathir to state that "We should be grateful because we have an administrative machinery which we can be proud of. It is not only efficient, disciplined and productive, but also provides quality service and is

comparable to the administrative machinery found in more developed nations. This enabled our nation to implement the development process in a smooth and effective manner." (Government of Malaysia 1994).

Nevertheless, administrative reform is a continuous process and although leadership is vital in determining the vision of the nation, the rate of success in any government reorganisation is determined by the quality of its employees. In this respect, the training programmes instituted by INTAN and institutions of higher learning were to a large extent depended upon to provide the paradigm shift. Certainly, with a postgraduate degree in public administration, civil servants can serve the government with greater confidence, especially in areas that required specialisation in public administration. These include undertaking tasks that involve policy planning, coordination and implementation, project evaluation and preparation of reports. It did appear that such programmes and initiatives undertaken during this period of the 1980s leading up to the early 1990s mooted the nation's growth and development.

Global Events and Economic Performance on Government Administration

By the mid 1990s, the country was experiencing strong economic growth. The country was riding a wave of economic boom with the GDP averaging 8.7% per annum during 1996-1997 (Government of Malaysia 2001). During this period, there was a demand for workers by all sectors. The unemployment rate for 1996 was 2.5% and 2.4% in 1997 (Government of Malaysia 1999). Many graduates were encouraged by the prospect of being employed immediately upon graduation with salaries that were at times beyond their expectations, especially from the private sector. The private sector became more attractive in terms of employment and was encouraged to continue its involvement in the nation's growth with impetus given to the privatisation policy. Malaysia, as with other Asian countries, was at this juncture experiencing high productivity and growth as reflected in oft-mentioned East Asian miracle. But, by 1998, the financial bubble had burst and the economic slowdown had begun among the so-called Asian tigers which would ultimately bring down the economies of the other smaller nations.

Malaysia was not spared and faced a negative growth rate with the GDP recording a -6.7% in 1998 (Okposin and Cheng 2000). The crisis affected all in Malaysia and there was a spiralling downturn in the country's productivity resulting in a dampened economy and decreased employment opportunities. The government became sensitive to the needs for greater distribution of wealth between the urban and rural sectors and between the "haves" and the "have-nots". Above all, the crisis exposed the nation's vulnerability to external influences and government administration took cognizance of existing limitations within its internal organisation. Further accentuating these problems is the impact of digitisation and information technology that made communities aware and note the changes taking place within and outside their localities. The impact on government administration, especially in local government, resulted in the need to engage the local community and allow more openness and accountability.

The systemic forces of democratization, the new world order and deregulation have made great impacts upon the nation itself and necessitate the government to put in place policies that will allow it to sustain the forces and pace of globalisation. Recent global events such as the Iraq war, rise of terrorism, oil crisis, natural disasters and increasing incidences of separatist movements in various regions have influenced government administrative policies. The government realises that it has to address these changes while taking cognizance of the effects of such incidences on the domestic environment. Towards this end, the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) was prepared and officially launched by the fifth Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who assumed the post of Prime Minister in October 2003. It is the government's intention that this Plan will provide the opportunities for the country to advance further and to face the challenges from global competition and influences. Civil servants are expected to improve the delivery system and the key performance index will be a means to gauge their performance.

Government administration under the present Prime Minister has taken on a more consensus approach with public participation. Malaysia's economic structure has changed to one less dependent upon external demand, thereby reducing the country's vulnerability and risks involved in over dependence on

imports. Although the anticipation is that the manufacturing sector will continue to grow, government administration has given prominence to the primary sectors of agriculture and tourism. These two sectors have been earmarked to contribute significantly to the economy, especially in the nation's efforts to reduce import of food and changing the people's preference for foreign to local products. Notably, the Ministry of Tourism has been revitalised to put in place programmes to encourage and increase the number of tourists to Malaysia. Malaysia is now being promoted as the country of destination for tourists given its lower cost of living, favourable currency exchange rate and its appeal as a moderate Muslim nation.

Concluding Comments

Some observations can be discerned from the reforms in Malaysia's government administration thus far. Initially, administrative reforms in Malaysia had begun with the peaceful transfer of independence, and the desire of a nation to seek an identity of its own. The perfunctory duties of civil administration continued with the legacy of maintaining law and order setting the country in the mode of growth and economic development. The next phase of administrative reforms proceeded with more speed with the emergence of Malaysia as one of the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia. The momentum gathered when the fourth Prime Minister, Mahathir, assumed leadership. He provided the catalyst needed to reform government administration in line with his vision of Malaysia attaining a developed status in the year 2020. Confronted with this challenge, the civil service underwent drastic changes and innovations were introduced into government administration. During this time, change was a constant factor and civil servants had to undergo various training programmes to be able to implement the multi varied projects in the country. However, the Asian financial crisis exposed certain weaknesses in the government administrative system such as its inability to sustain external pressures, growing disparity between the rural and urban sectors and emergence of a community aware of its rights for participation. The phase of change in administration following this was a public sector more inclined towards the principles of good governance.

Finally the change in political leadership to the present Prime Minister brought with it a government administration that gave importance to an efficient delivery system, effective communication and better accessibility to the political leadership. Clearly, administrative reforms in Malaysia have undergone periods of transformation conforming to changes in leadership styles, economic development and global perspectives.

REFERENCES

Ahmad, Abdullah Sanusi (1993) *Development in Public Administration & Management: Current Issues*, Universiti Utara Malaysia Publication, Kedah, Malaysia.

Gill, Ranjit (1998) *Asia Under Siege: How the Asian Miracle Went Wrong*, Management Services Pte Ltd, Singapore.

Government of Malaysia, Auditor General's Report on the Accounts of the States, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Government Press, 1962-1972.

Government of Malaysia (1999) Ministry of Finance, *Economic Report 1999-2000, Kuala Lumpur*, Malaysia.

Government of Malaysia (1994) *The Civil Service of Malaysia: A Paradigm Shift* (A Report by Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid), Government Printers, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Government of Malaysia (2001) *Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001-2005*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Montgomery, John D., Esman, J. Milton (1966) *Development Administration in Malaysia, a Report to the Development of Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printers

Norris, Malcolm, Phang, Siew Nooi (1992) *Urban Management in Penang Island: State of Penang, Malaysia*, Case Study No. 7, Institute of Local Government Studies, The University of Birmingham.

Okposin, Samuel Bassey, Cheng, Ming Yu (2000) *Economic Crises in Malaysia: Causes, Implications & Policy Prescriptions*, Pelanduk Publications, Selangor, Malaysia, 2000.

Suffian, Mohamed, Lee, H.P., Trindade, F.A. (eds.) (1978) *The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development: 1957-1977*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur.

Suryadinata, Leo (ed.) (2000) *Nationalism and Globalisation: East and West*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Tilman, R.O (1964) *Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya*, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C.

Websites

http://www.statistics.gov.my/english/frameset_keystats.php?fid=a (accessed on 20 June 2006).

http://www.pilihanraya.com.my/english/Index.asp (accessed on 20 June 2006).

http://www.jpa.gov.my/statistik/MyWorkV1/index.html (accessed on 22 June 2006).

INTEGRITY & ETHICS: REFORM AND REINFORCEMENT IN THE MALAYSIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Beh Loo See

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of integrity and ethical issues pertaining to the reforms and reinforcement taken under the current public administration and public management generally. This paper seeks to develop an understanding of the forefront issues that public administrators should strive to provide via several case examples.

Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration

The business of ethics and integrity in the public administration is not easy. Ethics as a concept is difficult to define and therefore even more difficult to measure. Nonetheless, we may make headway by promoting a return to a holistic approach to ethics and integrity (Schley, 2002). It does not mean that ethics is not amenable to analysis and improvement. Government and society have changed and the means of improving the accountability of public administrators and elected officials to citizens have taken center stage. Accountability of ethical and integrity is imperative and that government agencies and programs should strive to provide and these issues have come to the forefront recently. In some respect this is consistent with the longstanding criticism of watchdog status of government anti-corruption efforts. Political deal making and government policy making can often flirt with unethical measures. On the other hand, it is such bargains and decision making that form the basis for how government and other entities function at the local, state, and federal levels. And in this scenario, interests of the citizens can be served and at times, they are not. Keeping the government accountable and ethical should be the charge of all public administrators and elected leaders. However, in this regard, much improvement is needed. Political considerations must not stand in the way of public interest. Elected representatives are responsible to those who elect them, not to those who appoint them as representatives.

Integrity and ethics often tend to focus on principles of action, on the action itself and its consequences. How should a state and a society be structured in a country? How must public institutions be judged, and how must one argue for social regulations in a country? In the political sphere, the task of creating an ethics ought to be no different in the individual sphere with regard to practice of living and to be taken seriously by explicit basic integrity and moral ideas. The discourse for establishing social norms is supported today strongly by the existing government. Attempts are made within which the moral existence can unfold to establish social regulations. The moral principle is "Do unto others as you will have them do unto you" A good part of the time is that many try to do to others as he hopes others will not do unto him.

Role of Government

Government is recognized as the appropriate body to formalize and to formulate public policy for society as a whole. Some form of response by government to most social issues is believed to be inevitable and government has a legitimate right to formulate public policy in response to changing public expectations. Public policy is about values and value conflicts, and public policy solutions to problems are built on a conception of ethics that concerns the promotion of human welfare. Ethics is thus an important component of the social-political context in which public policy is formulated. Ethical concerns and ideals interact in a very complex manner of the social-political environment and thus help to determine the public issues that are given attention by a society and the eventual outcome of the debate about issues that reach the public policy agenda.

Resources are allocated through the public policy process, and this participation must involve more than self-interest to be considered ethical. Some concern must exist for the public interest and the good of the

society and the country. For regulations to work there must be some commitment to implement the law effectively and must even go beyond what the law requires to solve problems not covered by public policy.

Guide on Integrity Practices

A training manual for promoting integrity nationwide will be ready by the end of this year. This is the result of an18 month collaboration between the National Integrity Institute and United Nations Development Programme. The manual was prepared by Transparency International Malaysia co-founder Jeremy Pope and will be used by the National Integrity Institute's trainers and by the states, and will be simultaneously launched by the Prime Minister in mid July. The training manual marks the end of the Institute's first phase of projects funded by UNDP and the targeted groups are namely, the civil servants, corporate governance groups, socio-cultural groups and political groups to promote the National Integrity Plan. They will also deal with issues related to elections and ensure they are clean and properly run.

The National Integrity Plan

The Prime Minister emphasized the concerns of a formation of a public ethics institute and hence witnessed the launching of the National Integrity Plan (NIP) and the National Integrity Institute in 2004 and thereafter declared November 5 as a National Integrity Day annually. The NIP is to be implemented in five stages and the first stage of the plan has five priority targets:

- ❒ Effectively reduce corruption, malpractices and abuses of power
- ❒ Increase efficiency in the public service delivery system and overcome bureaucratic system;
- ❒ Enhance corporate governance and business ethics;
- ❒ Strengthen family institution;
- ❒ Improve the quality of life and people's well-being.

The National Integrity Institute has conducted courses on ethics and integrity for the public sector, and organized conferences such as World Ethics and Integrity Forum in 2005. Further, Transparency International Malaysia, (the Malaysian Society for Transparency and Integrity) also assists in strengthening the institutional pillars of the integrity system and reviewing anti-corruption policies and laws. An Integrity Agenda has been developed with eight strategies for family institution, community, civil society, socio-cultural institutions, religious, economic, political, and administrative institutions. The National Integrity Institute has also identified 10 non-financial performance indicators that impact an organization directly. These are communications, compliance and ethics, corporate culture, earnings quality, environmental and social responsibility, executive compensation, governance, leadership, risk and stakeholder perceptions. A Parliamentary Select Committee on National Integrity has been set up and has been conducting public consultations to seek views on the implementation of the NIP.

Example: Political Institution - Parliament

One of the factors which has been identified as affecting integrity in the NIP is the lack of transparency in the management of the public interest. Indeed, one of the strategies which have been identified in implementing the NIP is Strategy 7: Integrity Agenda for the Political Institution of which the objectives among others include:

- Upholding the sovereignty and integrity of Parliament as a legislative body;
- Strengthening the principles of transparency, accountability and good governance.

At present, there are no mechanisms for effective checks and balances to ensure that correct positions and decisions are taken in the public interests. Though legislation is the function of Parliament, the Cabinet dominates the legislative sphere. Cabinet decisions may be questioned on the floor of Parliament. However, the parliamentary function of overseeing the executive is not being performed adequately. Steps need to be taken to improve the institutional efficacy of the legislature in the matter of enforcing ministerial responsibility. There is no total separation at the institutional level. But there is a functional separation at least as to the independence of the judiciary. There have been several

recommendations that include making White Papers public. The practice of putting an embargo on Bills until they are laid before the House of Representatives prevents the ministers from studying them in depth and seeking outside assistance. It also hinders participation by interested groups in the policy formulation.

Public Accounts Committee

Nevertheless, there exists the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) entrusted by Parliament with the duty of ensuring good governance in the management of public expenditure. The PAC's oversight is to ensure that financial prudence is truly observed, conflicts of interest avoided and that the projects concerned meet the people's real needs. It is inevitable that PAC is accorded such legitimacy to elevate to a new level of public accountability. Recently PAC queried into expenditure of ongoing projects and the issue on payments for cancelled or shelved projects whether there is a precedent on such payments.

Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament

The Cabinet has approved a Code of Ethics that requires elected representatives to declare their assets every two years in detail. To ensure work performance ethics, the MPs have to file a report every three months to the Prime Minister's Department so as continuous monitoring is administered on their respective constituencies.

A case in point is a MP who was recently accused by a public department of interference on unlawful consignment of goods and as a result, faced a four-man panel investigation committee which discussed the gray areas on MPS being allowed to be involved in business.

Political Business Links

Given the hegemony of powerful vested interests between the government and business, the current prime minister is compelled to introduce transparency and accountability in government. Greater transparency is seen to eliminate the structural causes and effects of such links. One such reform is that major government-linked companies (GLCs) are required to implement and achieve the key performance indicators (KPIs) in providing transparency to investors and a better step towards governance. It is also to provide for consistent regulation of products, individual, institution and market on a functional basis.

In demonstrating the seriousness of the current administration policy, a former CEO and substantial stakeholder in a GLC, is being sued for over half a billion ringgit in relation to a RM1.792 billion loan which enabled him to buy a controlling interest in the airline in 1994 being the monies owed in a rescue package.

One other reform is the decision that government representatives who are also regulators will no longer be directors at companies they regulate. This is to ensure transparency and avoid conflict of interest situations. For example, there are representatives of the Treasury and Transport Ministry on the board of Malaysia Airlines.

Currently a corporate governance committee, headed by the chairman of the Securities Commission and comprising top officials from the Companies Commission and police is set up. It would provide regular progress reports to the Prime Minister regarding corporate investigations, particularly those that are overdue. Put simply, the Prime Minister would like to know why some investigations into allegations of corruption, massive theft and criminal breach of trust against certain prominent tycoons were taking a long period.

Another issue is related to the recent impropriety in the awarding of Approved Permits (AP) to import cars where politicians were among the recipients. Transparency was witnessed where the current administration released information pertaining to the full list of AP recipients and as a result the government would possibly enforce stricter regulations pertaining to the issuance of APs.

recommendations that include making White Papers public. The practice of putting an embargo on Bills until they are laid before the House of Representatives prevents the ministers from studying them in depth and seeking outside assistance. It also hinders participation by interested groups in the policy formulation.

Public Accounts Committee

Nevertheless, there exists the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) entrusted by Parliament with the duty of ensuring good governance in the management of public expenditure. The PAC's oversight is to ensure that financial prudence is truly observed, conflicts of interest avoided and that the projects concerned meet the people's real needs. It is inevitable that PAC is accorded such legitimacy to elevate to a new level of public accountability. Recently PAC queried into expenditure of ongoing projects and the issue on payments for cancelled or shelved projects whether there is a precedent on such payments.

Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament

The Cabinet has approved a Code of Ethics that requires elected representatives to declare their assets every two years in detail. To ensure work performance ethics, the MPs have to file a report every three months to the Prime Minister's Department so as continuous monitoring is administered on their respective constituencies.

A case in point is a MP who was recently accused by a public department of interference on unlawful consignment of goods and as a result, faced a four-man panel investigation committee which discussed the gray areas on MPS being allowed to be involved in business.

Political Business Links

Given the hegemony of powerful vested interests between the government and business, the current prime minister is compelled to introduce transparency and accountability in government. Greater transparency is seen to eliminate the structural causes and effects of such links. One such reform is that major government-linked companies (GLCs) are required to implement and achieve the key performance indicators (KPIs) in providing transparency to investors and a better step towards governance. It is also to provide for consistent regulation of products, individual, institution and market on a functional basis.

In demonstrating the seriousness of the current administration policy, a former CEO and substantial stakeholder in a GLC, is being sued for over half a billion ringgit in relation to a RM1.792 billion loan which enabled him to buy a controlling interest in the airline in 1994 being the monies owed in a rescue package.

One other reform is the decision that government representatives who are also regulators will no longer be directors at companies they regulate. This is to ensure transparency and avoid conflict of interest situations. For example, there are representatives of the Treasury and Transport Ministry on the board of Malaysia Airlines.

Currently a corporate governance committee, headed by the chairman of the Securities Commission and comprising top officials from the Companies Commission and police is set up. It would provide regular progress reports to the Prime Minister regarding corporate investigations, particularly those that are overdue. Put simply, the Prime Minister would like to know why some investigations into allegations of corruption, massive theft and criminal breach of trust against certain prominent tycoons were taking a long period.

Another issue is related to the recent impropriety in the awarding of Approved Permits (AP) to import cars where politicians were among the recipients. Transparency was witnessed where the current administration released information pertaining to the full list of AP recipients and as a result the government would possibly enforce stricter regulations pertaining to the issuance of APs.

Money laundering among politicians was also appropriately dealt with, if convicted under the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2001, where one could be fined up to RM5 million or jailed up to five years, or both. Allegations of money politics appear especially during party elections. The fact that actions were taken despite lack of clear regulations by the Disciplinary Board of the political party which exercised much discretion resulted in 61 found guilty out of 99 cases with punishments ranging from warnings for 15 to suspensions for 46 for various periods up to two terms of office or six years and 32 have appealed (The Star, 17 April 2005).

Given the trend for more transparency, it was not suitable for one single person, i.e. the Attorney-General to decide if there is sufficient evidence to prosecute corrupt officials. As such, The Bar Council has proposed a commission to promote a transparent process and a better judicial conduct extended to the Judicial Appointment and Promotion Commission.

Besides, the establishment of the Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission has also been mooted but yet to be implemented by the police force in the period of new adjustment to develop the fortitude to bear public scrutiny of police case handling. In the interest of integrity and ethical behaviour, such proposal is indeed timely and justified given the report made public in the previous year.

Public Expenditure

Government needs to ensure that the authorities at all levels - local, state, and federal curb public expenditure, especially on unnecessary and extravagant infrastructure, which has proliferated. More important is the need for all segments of the government machinery to ensure that public funds are not wasted on uneconomic projects. Previous in house monitoring of public expenditure has not worked well. It is important that the government carries out reforms of the public expenditure monitoring system at all levels to ensure that it is efficient, effective and proactive. As part of the reform, it will be necessary to bring in the participation of civil society organizations and other independent and competent stakeholders. Continuous accountability and prudence will help to ensure that the people get full value of how expenditure is spent, what is it spent on, who spends it, and how is it accounted for at all ends, including sources of generation, expenditure and recipients.

Public expenditure on local governments was also under much scrutiny recently due to uncontrolled, inefficiencies, and irresponsible development with relation to environment where disasters of flash flood, mudflow and landslides in destabilized slopes occurred.

On issues of integrity and ethics, thirteen officers from local councils were arrested for corruption in the year 2005 together with 239 officers from other government departments. Such cases have increased over the years with nine (2004), eight (2003) and 10 (2002).

Environment

The revamp of environmental impact assessment rules is being undertaken to shift the onus of responsibility for ensuring the safety of development projects from the approving authority to the development company and its consultants. On the positive side, this measure announced by Natural Resources and Environment Minister in early June would free the resources of the planning approval committee of local and state government from the onerous task of ensuring compliance with the plethora of rules governing construction projects. Instead, these panels can focus on due diligence to detect lapses and act to uphold the guiding principles of development blueprints including structure and local area plans. It is expedient for state administrators in particular to refocus on ensuring that their development decisions do not lay the groundwork for future tragedies by merely reassigning responsibilities. Instead of a mindset that focuses on getting around the rules, to avoid the need for seeking public feedback on developments bigger than 50ha, approving authorities should be guided by the cautionary principles, where risk factors are taken more seriously rather than downplayed.

Concluding Remarks

In order to inculcate a culture of integrity and ethical accountability, it would have been so much better for the public interest if the specifications and obligations of contracts of large projects were available in public domain to ensure transparency. This should be undertaken with a view to recommending steps to ensure that the weaknesses in the contracting and surveillance systems are identified and fixed. Failure to do so would encourage the view that the lessons to be learnt about the proper management of public projects may remain unrealized as recently experienced by the late delivery of headquarters of Ministry of International Trade and Industry which started work in 1994 and scheduled completion in 1997 but only delivered in May 2006 with a total cost of RM287.5 million from the original cost of RM167 million (The Sun, 23 May, 2006).

Reforms currently experienced in the GLCs are consolidating in the hope that removing GLCs from ministerial control and setting up special governance and oversights management will kick off the process. Such reform will reinforce both achieving financial goals and improvement in the public service and strengthening regulatory institutions from post privatisation restructuring. By reforming the boards of GLCs, governance issues will be addressed and policy makers can clarify and quantify costs of national development agenda on periodic basis not to mention opening up greater investment opportunities in the region.

Reforms and reinforcement are apt with administrative decisions by providing the public with a greater sense of control of good governance. The political approach to maintain and broaden public confidence by emphasizing the values of integrity and ethics truly reflect the accountability and responsiveness to the public. It is evident that public today are demanding far greater accountability from public officials where reforms are reinforced through monitoring process and responsibility as indicators of good governance are essential component framework for improving the effectiveness of public administration and policy. By far, integrity and ethics are the fundamental values for which government institutions stand and face enormous challenges. Reforming public administration is a worthy but difficult cause yet reinforcement would lend credibility to the efforts.

REFERENCES

Schley, D.G. (2002) 'Integrity as the ethical basis of business', *Public Administration & Management: An Interactive Journal*, 7(4): 252-271.

Government of Malaysia (2004) *National Integrity Plan*

New Straits Times, 22 April 2004.

The Star, 2 April 2004.

The Star, 17 April 2005.

The Sun, 20 April 2004.

The Sun, 23 May 2006.

http://www.transparency.org.my

RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM INITIATIVES IN INDIA*

Jaytilak Guha Roy

Prologue

With the adoption of the New Economic Policy by the Government of India in 1991, India not only became a partner of the ongoing globalisation process, but also entered into a new era in the history of administrative reforms. This new era was particularly significant as it witnessed a paradigm shift, for the first time after independence, from the Nehruvian philosophy of socialistic welfare state to a Westernised model of development through globalisation, liberalization, free-market economy and good governance.

Globalisation and liberalization reinforced by information and communication technology (ICT) revolution have indeed been posing a major challenge to developing countries as also providing new opportunities. However, for a developing country as ours, the unfortunate part of the ongoing process of globalisation appears to be threatening since the agendas for economic and other reforms are likely to be imposed by international and Western donor agencies rather than adopted by choice in consonance with one's own national needs and interests. And herein lies the dilemma of the ongoing reform initiatives being faced by the planners and policy makers of the developing nations.

It is against the above backdrop that the present paper seeks to highlight significant administrative reform initiatives in India during the present era of globalisation and economic liberalisation, and also their strengths and weaknesses so as to draw certain learning lessons for other developing counties as well.

Reform Initiatives

No wonder that in consonance with the ongoing process of economic reforms several initiatives in administrative reform were also taken by the Government of India during the past one and half decades. These reform initiatives inter alia aim at efficiency enhancement in public service delivery, simplification/consolidation of administrative rules and procedures, capacity building of public functionaries for good governance, pruning the size of the public bureaucracy, expenditure reforms in governments, civil service reforms and ensuring accountable, responsive, transparent and citizen-friendly administration.

Recommendations of Official Bodies

During the current phase of administrative reform initiatives in India (From 1991 till the first half of the decade 2000-10) a number of commissions, committees and other official bodies made several important recommendations relating to administrative reforms. Let us now highlight those recommendations with critical observations as and where needed.

(i) The Fifth Central Pay Commission

This Commission was appointed by the Government of India in April 1994 to review the pay structure of Central Government employees including Armed Forces personnel, examine and recommend their service conditions. There was a conscious departure from the past as far as the Terms of Reference of this commission was concerned as it had been asked for the first time since the appointment of the First Central Pay Commission way back in May 1946, to examine the work methods and work environment

---

* *The views expressed in this paper are of the author and not the Government of India or the IIPA*

[2] *As the Report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission has noted: "Pay Commission is a peculiarly Indian Institution today. Historically, it is a successor to the Royal Commissions set up during the British period for various purposes, including for pay revision, like the Aitchison Commission (1886-87) and the Islington Commission (1912-15). The practice of setting up of Commissions at intervals with the specific objective of revising pay and allowances of government employees has been discontinued by most, if not all, countries of the world, including the United Kingdom." Govt. of India,* Report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission, 1997, Vol. I, Para 1.1 p.1.

and suggest rationalization and simplification thereof with a view to **promoting efficiency in administration**, reducing redundant paper work and optimizing the size of the Government machinery. The Commission presented its report in 1997.

Having visualized the possible national scenarios by the year 2010, the Fifth Central Pay Commission recognized a modified role for government including withdrawal from its direct participation in manufacturing, mining and economic services and discontinuation of its direct control of economic activity in the private sector. Further, in view of the emerging trends of coalitional politics at the Centre, the commission aptly envisaged a minimal role of the Central Government, and as such, recommended transfer of functions, powers and resources to the States as well as self-governing institutions. Whatever is then left with the Central Government as its **legitimate preserve** need to be further rationalized with the retention of only matters requiring policy initiatives and overall monitoring and coordination in the Central Ministries and Departments, and also through measures such as winding up redundant activities, privatization or contracting out those services which could be performed by the private sector.

On the whole, the Central Government, as the pay body has visualized very poignantly, "will have to alter its perceived role, delegate much more to other levels of Government, transfer many of its functions to the non-governmental sector and fashion a public service that would be geared to the new tasks. It is sometimes thought that an altered role for the bureaucracy would reduce its importance. This is too simplistic an approach. It is our considered view that the **public services** have a **critical role** in the task of **building up a resurgent nation.**" (GOI 1997: 98)

As regards the critical or crucial role of public services, the Commission recognized the following functions which could be performed exclusively by none else than the public functionaries:

- They are catalytic agents of change by virtue of their education and exposures.
- They enforce socially beneficial regulations with reference to crucial inputs like land, forests, minerals, energy, water, finance, manpower, training, education, health, housing and so on.
- As watchdogs, they are capable of regulating the actions of all the players and ensuring a level playing field.
- They provide inputs to the maintenance of the macro-economic equilibrium, by controlling the total money supply, keeping inflation under check, etc.
- They are the ones wedded to the task of promoting peace, stability and tranquillity of the country, without which no economic, social, political or creative activity can ever flourish (GOI 1997: 102-103).

These apart, the Commission also emphasized the need for changes in work methods and work environment, improvement in administrative productivity, enforcement of accountability, promotion of transparency in government, adequate machinery for redressal of citizens' grievances. More significantly, the Fifty Pay Commission recommended reduction in decision-making layers from seven to three, abolition of 3.5 lakh vacant posts in the government and downsizing of the central bureaucracy by 30 per cent within a time frame of ten years. Simultaneously, the Commission recommended what it called **reinventing** the government office by adoption of several measures such as level jumping and delayering, transformation of unwieldy sections to tiny, business like desks, etc. Needless to say, these recommendations could be an integral part of the agenda of New Public Management.

Despite its recommendations for a package of laudable measures for administrative reform, the Fifth Pay Commission did not deal with certain important and relevant aspects of administrative reform. As an eminent scholar in Public Administration has observed very forthrightly: "...it did nothing to restructure the public service to bring in harmony with the developmental and promotional goals of independent India. It perpetuates the hegemony of a particular service, a hangover from the colonial era. Too much security of job has made the civil service complacent: the pay commission should have de-privileged the civil service and given its approval to the `hire and fire' system of recruitment. Similarly, the pay body did nothing to delink the public undertakings managers' salary from that of the bureaucrats. A pay body

working in the nineties must be motivated by triple objectives - cut the size of the bureaucracy, remunerate them well and make them efficient, accountable and productivity oriented" (Maheshwari 2002: 245-246).

Moreover, the Fifth Pay commission agreed to hike salaries only if the government implements simultaneously its recommendations for reduction in decision-making layers, downsizing the bureaucracy and abolition of 3.5 lakh vacant posts, etc. Unfortunately, "the recommendations were ignored, but the **babus** (or, bureaucrats) got the biggest ever hike" (Khan 2004: 123).

(ii) The Tenth Finance Commission (1995 - 2000)

In its Report for 1995-2000, submitted in December 1994, the Tenth Finance Commission advised the Central and State Governments to prune the size of the bureaucracy as one of the effective measures for expenditure control. As it observed very forthrightly: "Over the years employment in government has grown manifold. There is scope for Central and State governments to shed many an activity and absorb the staff rendered surplus in other activities and to encourage them to avail of retirement with attractive benefits." It urged very strongly that "viable methods of reducing the strength of government employment must be explored, otherwise, economic reform may lose its way in a new bureaucratic maze" (GOI 1994: 63).

The Commission advocated further for selective privatization of public enterprises as a measure of ensuring fiscal discipline. As it observed very pertinently:

"Selective privatization of public enterprises will relieve the governments of the burden of recurring losses while at the same time giving them the benefit of a one-time accretion to their resources. Privatisation should be viewed as a method of providing the same service in a cost-effective manner and raising resources which can be deployed to reduce the accumulated debt" (GOI 1994: 63).

It should however be noted here that instead of "selective privatization of public enterprises", as suggested by the Tenth Finance Commission, the Central Government had adopted the policy of disinvestments which allowed private capital and foreign direct investment (FDI) even in the profit-making public sector undertakings (PSUs). This policy has been criticized time and again by various political parties and economic analysts as it discourages PSUs to compete with the private sector as well as the multinational corporations (MNCs) on a level-playing field.

(iii) The Commission on Review of Administrative Laws (1998)

As in any other post-colonial Third World country, the colonial legacy or hangover still haunts our administrative laws, regulations and procedures. There is no denying that these laws, regulations and procedures are based on the colonial policy of exploitation of the subjugated nation as well as distrust and mistrust between the ruler and the ruled. Consequently, many of them have now become irrelevant as well as incompatible with the policy of economic liberalization and globalisation of the late 20th and early 21st century.

It was against this backdrop that a Commission on Review of Administrative Laws was set up by the Government of India's Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances in May 1998 with a view to identify proposals for amendment of the existing laws, regulations and procedures having inter-sectoral impact and also for repeal of all dysfunctional laws. In its report submitted in September 1998, the Commission made certain important recommendations (GOI 2004-2005: 115) as follows:

- Repeal of more than 50 per cent of Central Laws (1382 out of 2500 Laws);
- Expeditious amendments to a critical list of about 109 Acts;
- Documentation of administrative laws, rules, regulations, executive instructions, etc. by all the Ministries/Departments;
- Harmonization of statutes and laws from the perspective of domestic and foreign investors, trade and industry, consumers, exporters and importers; and

- Development of a viable alternative disputes resolution machinery.

According to the Annual Report 2004-05 of the Ministry of Personnel Public Grievances and Pensions, Government of India, out of 1382 Central Laws of different categories recommended for repeal by the Commission on Review of Administrative Law, only 409 Acts including five War-time Permanent Ordinances have since been repealed, while various Ministries/Departments have decided to retain as many as 819 Acts which include 700 Appropriation Acts and 27 Reorganization Acts (GOI 2004-2005: 115). This reveals once again the bureaucratic mind-set and its resistance to change.

As regards the Commission's recommendations for "expeditious amendments to a critical list of about 109 Acts", only 51 Acts have been amended so far, while 18 Amendment Bills have been introduced in Parliament. The remaining Acts are reported to be at various stages of processing which again indicates how unwieldy our implementation process remains even in this era of economic liberation.

However, as regards the Commission's recommendation for "documentation of administrative laws, rules, regulations, etc.", the governmental response appears to be positive, thanks to the potentiality of ICT revolution. As reported by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, (GOI 2004-2005: 115) the Legislative Department of the Government of India has, with the assistance of the National Informatics Centre (NIC), placed all the un-repealed Central Acts of all-India application, which find a place in the scheme of the India Code available on NICNET and INTERNET. Action has also been initiated by the Legislative Department to make subordinate legislations also available on NICNET and INTERNET with the assistance of the concerned administrative Ministries and NIC. An Action Plan has been prepared and communicated to concerned Ministries/Departments for making all subordinate legislations available on NICNET. The Legislative Department has also taken steps to bring sector-wise compendium of legislations beginning with compendia of Electoral Laws.

(iv) The Expenditure Reforms Commission (2000-01)

This Commission was set up by the Government of India in February 2000 under the chairmanship of K.P. Geethakrishnan, the former Union Finance Secretary, to recommend `a road map for reducing the functions, activities and administrative structure' of the government. It submitted 10 reports, recommending some isolated cuts and reduction of staff here and there. To quote an eminent scholar in Public Administration, "No coherent, wide-ranging philosophy underpinned the deliberations of the Expenditure Reforms Commission - excepting one of down-sizing." (Maheshwari 2002: 250).

(v) The Committee on Civil Service Reforms (2004)

This Committee was appointed by the government of India on 3rd February 2004 under the chairmanship of P.C. Hota, Former Chairman, Union Public Service Commission and Secretary (Personnel), with comprehensive terms of reference to examine the whole gamut of civil service reforms and to submit its report within a period of six months. The Committee submitted its Report on 30th July 2004. The terms of reference were as follows:

1. Making the Civil Service responsive, transparent, accountable and ethical.
2. Making the Civil Service e-governance friendly.
3. Putting a premium on intellectual growth.
4. Protecting the civil servants against wrongful pressure.
5. Changes, if any necessary, in various All India Civil Service Rules and Central Civil Service Rules to provide a statutory cover to the proposed civil service reforms.
6. Changes in rules governing the disciplinary proceedings against civil servants; and
7. Any other matter relevant to civil service reforms.

In all, this Committee made 64 recommendations (GOI 2004: 94-106) which, inter alia, include the following:

- After 15 years of service, a rigorous review is carried out of performance of civil servants based on the earlier quinquennial review of performance. If an officer is not honest and performance-oriented, he is weeded out of service on completion of 15 years on proportionate pension.
- Each Department/Ministry should be required to identify the points of citizen interface, benchmark the quality of services and strengthen the existing grievance redressal mechanism.
- After every five to seven years in service, a civil servant should spend at least two months with a non-government organization, academic institution or the private sectors.
- Annual Property Return of all public servants to be put on the website.
- Article 311 of the Constitution be amended to enable President/Governor to dismiss/remove public servants summarily in case of corrupt practice/having assets disproportionate to known source of income.
- Every programme of government should specify the deliverables in terms of services.
- Functioning of government offices having large interface with the common man should be assessed once in three/four years by independent organizations.
- Citizen Centres should be set up to build capability for analyzing and suggesting changes in government policies.
- To provide a clean, honest and transparent government, antiquated rules and procedures in government must be discarded and new simplified ones are put in place.
- The National Informatics Centre (NIC) should function as a vehicle for disseminating best practices across the country.
- Government should actively support and encourage outstanding work done by civil servants through National/State awards and commendations.
- The proposed comprehensive law on the Civil Service shall incorporate, inter alia, a Code of Ethics and a statutory minimum tenure in a post to an officer.
- Under the new Civil Service law, a member of the higher civil service should not be appointed to any statutory commission or a constitutional authority after his retirement or superannuation.

The Committee on Civil Service Reforms has indeed made valuable recommendations, which are currently under examination of the government. However, keeping in view the long-time practice of our Government to appoint commissions and committees from time to time to recommend measures for administrative reform as a ritual rather than a commitment, one may reasonably predict that the report of this Committee, like most of the earlier reports of other commissions and committees, may either gather dust or be implemented marginally so that the vested interests in public bureaucracy are not endangered.

After having discussed critically the important recommendations of a number of commissions and committees relating to administrative reform, appointed by the Government of India during the present phase of administrative reform initiatives, let us now focus our attention on some of the significant reform initiatives during this phase.

Citizen's Charter

Globally, citizen's charter has increasingly been recognized as an important instrument to provide for prompt, responsive and cost-effective public services. Citizen's charter owes its origin to the UK where John Major Government launched it in June 1991 as a strategy "to raise standard of public service by making them more responsive to the wishes and needs of the users' (Jain 1998: 366).

Conceptually, citizen's charter is a document prepared by the provider of public services in a clear and precise manner about the quality and mode of delivery of services to the users of the service. It is based on the mutual or bilateral trust between the service provider and its users. More explicitly, it implies on the one side trust of the user that the service provider will deliver the service according to commitment, while on the other side, trust of the service provider that the users' expectations will be legitimate and realistic and that they shall fulfill their own obligations. On the whole, citizen's charter is a voluntary commitment by the service organizations.

The spirit of citizen's charter lies in its focus on the citizens as the customers or users of public services. It must however be mentioned here that long before the idea of citizen's charter was conceptualized, Mahatma Gandhi, Father of the Nation of India, adorned its spirit in the following words:

> "A customer is the most important visitor in our premises. He is not dependent on us; we are dependent on him. He is not an interruption in our work; he is the purpose of it. He is not an outsider to our business; he is part of it. We are not doing him a favour by serving him; he is doing us a favour by giving us an opportunity do so."

In India the citizen's charter initiative received endorsement of the Central and State Governments/Union Territory Administrations in the Conference of Chief Ministers held in May 1997. In accordance with the Action Plan for effective and responsive administration adopted at the Conference, it was decided that both Central and State Governments would formulate Citizen's Charter starting with those having a large public interface. As on 31st January 2005, according to the Annual Report 2004-2005 of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Government of India, 29 Ministries/Departments of Government of India had brought out 100 citizens' charters and 24 State Governments/UT Administrations had brought out 628 charters (GOI 2004-2005: 123).

It needs to be noted that a case study on implementation and evaluation of citizens' charters (Ray 1999: 76) has revealed that there is a great variation in terms of coverage, procedures, redress of grievance systems and dissemination of information necessary for the citizens. Some charters are very brief, while some are very detailed. While many do not provide any information about the redressal functionaries (names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc.), some others provide useful information regarding redressal system. However, in almost all cases there is an absence of provision for compensation for any loss or damage suffered by the citizens due to non-performance of the targeted services by the concerned agencies.

These apart, there are also problems pertaining to lack of awareness about citizen's charter amongst employees and citizens. Hence, with a view to address these problems as well as to initiate the process of consultation with stakeholders, the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances (DoAR & PG) has, of late, undertaken a project of organizing Department specific awareness workshops on Citizens' Charters for State Governments. So far, 14 such workshops have been organized for the States of Assam, Haryana, Maharasthra, Rajasthan, Tripura, Sikkim and Uttaranchal. This Department is also in the process of developing a scheme for the award of the `Charter Mark'. Charter Mark is a quality standard, which encourages and reward improvements in public service with reference to the commitments and standards notified in the charter. The agencies that are implementing their charters examplarily and are providing an excellent standard of service will receive certification/recognition in the form of a `Charter Mark' after an independent assessment. The Charter Mark is to be given, according to the DoAR & PG, after assessing results, rather than just completing the process, depending upon the quality of services that the users actually receive (MOI 2004-2005: 123-124).

E-Governance

The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution of the present age breaks the barriers of national boundaries, and makes every individual a `global participant' and every place in the world a part of global village. With its ability to link information resources world wide the ICT has profound implications for the future of mankind. In such a scenario, there is no wonder that with the paradigm shift from traditional Public Administration to Public Governance, there has been increasing applications of ICT for good governance all over the world.

In India, despite suspicion, resistance and hesitation in the initial stage during the 1980s, the scenario has been changed significantly over the years. Today, we are witnessing increasing applications of ICT for improving the quality of governance in diversified areas, namely:

- *Urban services* through on-line integrated information and monitoring system for delivery, accounting, compliance and payment for services such as water supply, electricity, telephones, etc.

- *Compliance* and payment of taxes electronically.
- *Filing of Complaints* to public authorities through internet.
- *Traffic management* on the roads with various electronic devices.
- *Planning and execution of development projects* at the national, state, district and village levels with the application of IT-based model.
- *Management of social security schemes* such as the creation of `a countrywide integrated information backbone' through time-bound organization-wide IT reform for the Government of India's Employees Provident Fund Organization which happens to be the World's largest and the oldest Provident Fund organization.
- *Management of Imports and Exports* Cargo through IT systems.
- *Payment of Bills and Booking Passage* through on-line integrated system.
- *Appointment and transfer of personnel* through a computerized system.
- *Citizen-Government interface* through computer-based information, communication and control systems in areas like issue of passports, registration of vehicles, public distribution system, immigration information and monitoring, management of public health, etc. (Kapur 2000: 386-395).

In the existing socio-economic context of India, `knowledge connectivity' through ICT is fundamental to bridging the rich-poor as well as urban-rural divide not merely in education but other sectors as well (Guha Roy 2005: 19). It is heartening to note that Mission 2007: Every Village a Knowledge Centre is a nationwide initiative to facilitate setting up of such centers by the National Alliance of voluntary organizations led by M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation in each of India's 600,000 villages by the year 2007. The Government of India is a partner in the alliance. All these knowledge centers will be equipped with communication tools like the internet to provide information to the people in the context of the lifestyle and local needs of a particular village. Mission 2007 is indeed "a glaring example of public-private partnership in information and communication sector which could be emulated in other sectors as well." (Ibid, emphasis added).

Right to Information

Citizen's right to information has now been universally recognized as an effective means to accountable and transparent administration. There is no gainsaying the fact that `invisible government' has become obsolete in the present era of liberalization and globalisation. In modern world, which has witnessed the far-reaching impact of ICT revolution, the citizens of almost all countries, irrespective of their political systems, forms of government and state of development, are now very well aware that they must get the information they require from the public authorities as well as private bodies entrusted with delivery of public services and essential functions of the state, relating to their administration, management, operations, policies, programmes and decisions. This is possible only when the citizens have the requisite right to information (Reddy 2006).

It was against the above backdrop that the Right to Information Act was passed by the Parliament of India in May 2005 and received President's assent on 15th June 2005, thereby replacing the Freedom of Information Act 2002, which did not recognize the very important notion of right. The new Act of 2005 is indeed **a unique and landmark legislation** for various important reasons (Guha Roy 2006: 11) as follows:

1. It recognized citizen's access to information as a right.
2. It sets the **deadlines for operationalsing this right**, and accordingly, makes obligatory for every public authority including government-aided institutions to provide detailed information about the organization and its important policies, decisions, etc. within 120 days from the enactment of this Act, as also to designate within 100 days officers as Central Public Information Officers (CPIOs) or State Public Information Officers (SPIOs) in all administrative units or offices under it to provide information to persons requesting for information under this Act.

3. It provides for **penalties** against CPIOs or SPIOs for refusal to receive an application for information without any reasonable cause, malafide denial of request of information and other lapses mentioned in section 20 of the Act.
4. It provides for constitution of Central and State Information Commissions.
5. It also lays down the powers and functions of these Commissions as the appellate authorities.
6. The Act covers central and state governments, Panchayati Raj institutions, local bodies and recipients of government grants.
7. **Last but not the least**, the Act clearly stipulates that "the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.

Unfortunately, despite these progressive provisions, the Act has serious shortcoming as it does not apply to the private sector. Most importantly, there is an urgent need for "debureaucratisation of the statutory bodies under the Right to Information Act, 2005. As an example of bureaucratic domination in these bodies, we may refer to the composition of the Central Information Commission (CIS). Although the Act stipulates under Section 12 that the CIS shall consist of the Chief Information Commissioner and Central Information Commissioners not exceeding ten, who shall be "persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance", the Central Government have so far appointed retired or serving civil servants as Chief Information Commissioner or Commissioners for adjudicating the Right to Information law indicating thereby that only civil servants are "persons of eminence in public life." Such a move on the part of the present United Progressive Alliance - led government at the centre may defeat the very purpose of the RTI law despite its credibility to enact an unique and progressive legislation on citizen's access to information (Guha Roy 2006: 13-14). As the distinguished members of the National Campaign for People's Right to Information have observed very aptly: "There would (also) be many occasions where the Commission (CIS) would need to decide on releasing information that might embarrass the erstwhile colleagues and subordinates of such retired civil servants. In these circumstances, both being objective and appearing to be objective would be difficult" (Mishra 2005).

Learning Lessons

From our foregoing discussion on recent administrative reforms initiatives in India, we may draw certain learning lessons which would be relevant and useful for other developing countries as well. These lessons are as follows:

- These initiatives have indeed brought about some improvements in the spheres of deregulation, simplification of rules and procedures, delivery of public services, public-private partnership, downsizing of the bureaucracy, management information system in government, etc. However, such improvements are not enough to cope with the emerging of needs of economic liberalization.
- The reform initiatives appear to be more of a ritualistic exercise rather than a conscious endeavour with commitment, thereby resulting in colossal wastage of public funds for futile exercises.
- These initiatives are by and large imitative in nature rather than innovative and indigenous. Consequently, there is hardly any human development perspective in such initiatives, which is a must for any developing country.

Epilogue

There is a no denying that the post-1990 economic reforms have resulted in a significant annual growth rate of the Indian economy from no more than 3.5 percent till 1979 to 6.8 percent during 1992-97, and nearly 8 per cent at present. Nevertheless, as per the 2002 Human Development Report of UNDP, India is placed at 124 among 173 countries in Human Development Index (HDI). There is no denying that one of the major reasons for such poor performance in human development is the poor quality of governance in post-independent India. As the 2001 National Human Development Report of the Planning Commission of India observes very pertinently:

"There is a general acceptance now that human deprivation and inequalities are not merely for economic reasons; rather they go hand-in-hand with social and political factors rooted in poor governance. In the case of India, one can find any number of reasons in the country, or states within a region or even district within a State, where development outcomes, in terms of social indicators, do not match with the available resources and the inherent potential of the people." (GOI 2001: 115).

There is still no doubt that given our colonial past and the inevitable consequences thereof; there are attainments in some of the aspects of governance in India, as indicated earlier in this paper. Amongst all the post-colonial Third-world countries, India has the unique distinction of having the functional democracy during the past over five and half decades. Consequently, the presence of vibrant and committed civil society organizations, independent media and proactive judiciary provide the ray of hope in the midst of darkness; and herein lies the strength of India's democracy and her human development prospect. It is heartening to note that the UNDP's Human Development Report 2002 not only appreciated the role of India's judiciary and voluntary sector, but also predicted that India is one of the few countries on track to halve the number of people living in poverty by 2015.

As the great English Philosopher, Bertrand Russell said, "Where there is hope, despair is a coward's part." Hence, when there is hope, let us not despair, but proceed with optimism and zeal along with all other post-colonial developing countries from poverty to prosperity, stagnation to growth, and above all, from darkness to light.

REFERENCES

Government of India (1994) *Finance Commission Report for 1995-2000*, New Delhi.

Government. of India (1997) *Report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission, Vol. I*

Government of India (2001) *National Human Development Report 2001*, New Delhi, Planning Commission.

Government. of India (2004-2005) *Annual Report 2004-05*, Ministry of Personnel Public Grievances and Pensions, New Delhi.

Government of India (2004) *Report of the Committee on Civil Service Reforms*, New Delhi

Guha Roy, Jaytilak (2005) *"Science, Technology and Society"*, Theme Paper for the 49th Members' Annual Conference of the IIPA, New Delhi, IIPA, 2005

Jain, R.B. (1998) "Citizen's Charter - An Instrument of Public Accountability: Problems and Prospects in India," *Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XLIV (3)*, July - September.

Kapur, Jagdish C. (2000) "IT and Good Governance," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Special Number on IT and Indian Administration, Vol. XLVI (3), July - September.

Khan, Amir Ullah (2004) "Administrative Reforms in India," in Bibek Debroy (ed.), *Agenda for Improving Governance*, New Delhi, Academic Foundation.

Maheshwari, S.R. (2002), *Administrative Reforms* in India, New Delhi, Macmillan.

Mishra, Bisheshwa (2005) "Questions raised over retired babus' role" (a report), New Delhi, The Times of India, December 13, 2005.

Ray, C.N. (1999) "Citizens' Charters" Implementation and Evaluation: A Case Study", *Management in Government*, July - September.

Reddy, P.L. Sanjeev (2006) 'Foreword' to Occasional Paper titled *Right to Information: Initiatives and Impact, Delhi, IIPA, 2006.*

RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN PAKISTAN

Iftikhar Ahmed

Introduction

One of the major obstacles in the developing countries which have hampered achievement of National development goals, has been the highly centralized government authority. Many a time half hearted attempts were made for devolution of authority at a local level, but it still remains to be achieved in its true spirit. The experience of industrialized countries clearly indicated that economic growth has been accomplished by significant growth in the size, efficiency and effectiveness of local government vis-à-vis the central and provincial governments.

The Pakistan Government have introduced recent Administrative Reforms in Pakistan under the Devolution of Power Plan 2000. Devolution of power to the grass root level is a time tested idea. Even the Mughals who had a centralized and autocratic regime interfered very little with the ancient customs of village government .In fact they incorporated the village into the administration as a unit for revenue and police purposes. Villages made their own laws and took their own decisions. Thus a kind of local government concept was in vogue even at that time, i.e. many centuries ago. A local government elected through a democratic process is essential in the development of rural as well as urban areas. This institution has a vision of felt needs and requirements of the public at large. There has always been an acute recognition of the important role that local government can play in coordinating as well as directly delivering services to the local community. Moreover local bodies are building blocks of a democratic process itself. One cannot visualize a stable and solid political system at the federal and provincial level without there being a strong local government at the grass root level. The very essence of efficient administration and good governance emerges out of empowerment of community, and decentralization of power and authority to them. In the contemporary world, decentralization is acquiring a pivotal position in the structure of governance. But unfortunately a local government in Pakistan was a sad story. The democratic institutions at local level remained ineffective and as a result thereof, the state has miserably failed in delivering socio economic services and basic amenities to its citizens. One of the most important reasons for this failure was lack of resources, lack of commitment of the government and the vested interests behind the creation of local bodies.

Political governments in the past had been pledging "Government at the doorstep" which broadly outlined elected district governments headed by Deputy Governors, supported by a Cabinet of members in control of all governmental activity. The previous proposed system of elected District governments called new social contract which promised delegation of state authority to the lowest tier of our political system i.e. the elected representative s of the local bodies. The idea could not be materialized due to a change of Government.

Devolution of Power Plan- 2000

Historical Perspective and the Rationale

According to the National Reconstruction Bureau, which is the architect of the Devolution of Power Plan in Pakistan, "on independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited a colonial system of governance, the foundations of which were rooted in the feudal- imperial system largely influenced by the British Raj?? The economy of the subcontinent remained agricultural and the system of governance was designed to seek just the twin ends of collection of land revenue and raising troops of fight and adversary. Government thus existed for the sovereign, and the governance paradigm was that the "interest of the Crown must never be sacrificed" the people's will or welfare was non-issues and even their existence was justified merely in relation to the twin objectives of the sovereign.

Lacking the advantage of neutrality that the colonizer enjoyed, the Pakistani ruling elite handled power without ethical restraints that led to corruption. A gradual decline in the professional standards because of the quality of the intake led to deterioration in the provision of public service. The same phenomenon overtook the corporate sector because of the nationalization of private banks and industry in the early seventies. The consequent combination of corruption and incompetence coupled with the emergence of unscrupulous political leaders, led to the collapse of governance.

This led to the take over by the army, and a new beginning became necessary. The Chief Executive of Pakistan defined devolution of power as one of his seven main objectives on October 17, 1999 and announced his intension to set up a think tank in support of the newly announced National Security Council. This think tank began to come on the ground on November 16, 1999, as the National Reconstruction Bureau, with the mission of reconstructing the institutions of the state necessary for establishing genuine democracy in the country, as soon as possible.

Under the colonial system, Pakistan was previously administered by the provincial governments through Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners who had strong arms of judicial authority and control over police. NRB was of the view that, "it had no corresponding political entity. However, the divisional commissioner served as the de-facto controlling authority for the district councils and the municipal corporations. It was an un-integrated entity of government with representatives of different departments of the provincial government stationed at the seat of divisional headquarters not answerable to the commissioner except in some cases, informally, where coordination was required. As far as the people were concerned, if they were not served by the district they could go to the divisional headquarters and obtain redressal. Its main functions related to law and order, served as an appellate authority in revenue cases and coordinated development related activities."

While this situation persisted governments changed often. Groups became entrenched and increasingly posting and transfer politics determined political futures and personal fortunes at various political tiers. The bureaucracy for its part needed reliable political partners to obtain choice postings and protection. Through repeated elections, the bureaucratic structure became exposed to politicization and corruption. As the effectiveness of governance at the provincial and local level broke down the local government system became obsolete, and service delivery also suffered,

Aims and Objectives of Devolution Plan - 2000

The general break down in public service delivery, law and order and general administration had been a common experience over the years particularly due to colonial system of governance ingrained in authoritarian rule than service and control instead of cooperation. Previous political governments, despite being aware of this malady adversely affecting the socio-economic needs of common man, preferred to be content with status quo for obvious reasons mentioned above. This is because that in the past, the guiding principal of governance was" never should the interest of ruling elite be sacrificed". The Chief Executive undertook to break this status quo approach by including "devolution of power plan" as one of the seven points in the agenda for reforms on 17th October 1999.

The three tiers of governmental system are Federal, provincial and District level. It is at the local and District level that people's socio-economic problems and welfare had been treated as non-issues. The govt., thereof, chose to take a bottom (local level) up approach to ensure that power is transferred to the people comprehensively. The rationale of the devolution plan is to set up a decentralized system of governance which is capable of identifying and articulating the needs of the people and formulating social and development plans and programs at the local level. It implies devolving political power, decentralizing administrative and financial authority and transfer of resources to accountable local governments for good governance, effective delivery of services and transparent decision making through institutionalized participation of the people at grass root level. It also requires reorientation of bureaucracy by empowering communities which necessitates fundamental changes in the government agency operations/structure including changes in job definitions, performance criteria, bureaucratic procedures and organizational responsibilities.

Based on the above National Local Governments Ordinance, 2001 laid down five fundamentals principals:

1. devolution of political power
2. decentralization of administrative authority
3. deconcentration of management functions
4. diffusion of power-authority nexus
5. distribution of resources at the local level and five objectives which imply that the:
   I. people will be allowed to become masters of their destiny;
   II. administrative functionaries will be under the elected representatives;
   III. development decisions will be taken locally;
   IV. financial autonomy will be given to the local government ;and
   V. speedy justice will be provided at the door steps for the benefit of common man.

Genesis of the Administrative Reforms

Unfolding his government's ambitious and much-awaited "Local Government Plan 2000", The President General Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief Executive on 14th August,2000 said the implementation of this plan would mark beginning of a new era in the history of the country, and promulgated Local Government Ordinance 2000 in the country.

"Let people be master of their own destiny," the President said in his televised address to the nation, adding that under this plan the government functionaries would be subordinate to the elected representatives, the local governments would be financially autonomous and speedy justice would be provided at the door of the common man. The President said that people who thought that these reforms could be reversed after the end of the tenure of his government were highly mistaken." We will bring about a system which will guarantee the sustainability of this plan. This Plan cannot be reversed."

"We want to introduce essence of democracy and not sham democracy which promotes the privileged people and their off springs. We will bring to the people essence of real democracy." The President said" the local bodies (LBs) election would be held on non-parties basis." We want the elected representatives to solve the problems of the people instead of looking towards their party leaders."

He said that age limit for the voters had been reduced from 21 years to 18 years." With this, I hope that the youth of Pakistan will bring about more dynamism and strong nationalism and national spirit in political activity."

The President said the local government plan would be implemented at three levels with bottom-up approach- Union Council, the Tehsil Council and District Council." If the government had started to bring democracy from the top it would not have transferred power to the masses".

Local Areas and Local Governments

According to the Local Government Ordinance 2002, the following shall be the local areas, namely:

I. Union
II. Tehsil
III. Town: and
IV. District and City District

Union Council

A Union Council would comprised 21 members-18 elected, 12 men and six women .Six seats will be reserved for the representatives of the peasants and workers. The Union Council will be headed by a Union Nazim and assisted by a Naib Union Nazim. They will be directly elected as joint candidates.

Every Union Council will have three administrative secretaries who will help its head in performance of his functions.

Tehsil Council
The Tehsil Council will be headed by Tehsil Nazim and assisted by Naib Tehsil Nazim. The election to the Tehsil Council will be indirect and all Naib Nazims of the Union Councils will automatically become its members.

The Tehsil Nazim will be the Municipal Administrator of the entire Tehsil in urban and rural split by ensuring equal and organized development. Besides, five per cent seats will be reserved for peasants and workers. The electoral college for reserved seats will be Union Councilors of the Tehsil. The Tehsil Council will be run through its Municipal Administration which will provide all the municipal services across the Tehsil.

District Council
Every District will have a District Council. It will be headed by the Zila Nazim and assisted by Naib Zila Nazim who will be indirectly elected as joint candidates. All Nazims of the Union Councils in the district will automatically become the members of the District Council. The Zila Nazim and Naib Zila Nazim will be elected by the Union Council members. Besides, five per cent seats will be reserved for the workers and peasants.

For administration of the district there will be a District Coordination Officer (DCO) of Grade-20. All government departments will work under the DCO who will be a subordinate to the Zila Nazim. However, the head of district police will not be under the DCO and will be subservient to the Zila Nazim. The District Public Safety Commission (DPSC) will monitor police functioning in every district.

Run-Off Elections
Run-off elections would be held for the elections of Nazim and Naib Nazim of Tehsil and District. In case all the contestants get less than 50 per cent of the votes, the two top pairs would again go to election to make their mandate and authority greater and stronger.

Provincial Finance Award
Under the local Government Plan, each district will get funds on the basis of its size and level of the backwardness. This money will be released through a Provincial Financial Award (PFC) which will soon be instituted. The developmental activity would start from the Union Councils level. The members of the Union Councils will identify the projects and would send their recommendations to the District Council which would take decision and release funds. The committees of the Union Councils will monitor the execution of the projects to check delays and corruption.

City District System
It was also decided to introduce a City District System (CDS) initially in the Federal Capital and in all the provincial capitals. The decision was taken in view of over expansion of some of the districts. The idea was to introduce the CDS in a Tehsil which had become too big to be properly and efficiently managed. Under this system, there will be planned development activities instead of a haphazard expansion. The original idea was to introduce the CDS in 15 districts but later the idea was dropped.

Deputy Commissioner
Earlier, the responsibilities of the Deputy Commissioner included exercise of magisterial powers, collection of revenue and administration. Under the Local Government Plan, there is a DCO, a Grade-20 officer, who coordinates with the government departments in the district and is subordinate to the Zila Nazim. The authority to exercise magisterial powers and collect revenue is no more with the DCO. These two functions have directly gone down from the Centre to the district level.

Divisional Commissioner
The post of the Divisional Commissioner was abolished as it was considered to be redundant at headquarters.

Minorities

The government decided to retain the separate electoral system for the minorities. According to NRB, "It is in the interest of the Minorities to have this system. Had they not retained this system, no minority man or women would have got representation in these bodies".

The minorities have representation in local bodies even if they have less than one per cent population in a constituency. They get representation proportionate to their population if it exceeds 10 per cent of the total population.

Police System

The police force would be provided with mobility, communications and accommodations facilities in order to bring about basic changes in the existing infrastructure. 50 per cent of ASIs would be directly recruited while the rest of the seats would be filled through departmental promotions.

Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP), recruited through Federal Public Service Commission, would be the head or in-charge of a police station. This plan will be completed in three years throughout the country. With the appointment of the ASPs as in-charge of police station, it will bring about qualitative change thana culture, Monitoring and overseeing Committees would be setup to check corruption in police department.

Justice System


The Chief Executive said the Chief Justice of Pakistan was looking into this matter and hoped that reorganization of judicial system at district level would be put in place by July next year. He said the idea of reconciliatory courts would be also revived for speedy disposal of the cases.

Implementation of the Plan

All the four Provincial Assemblies of Punjab, Sindh, N.W.F.P, Balochistan, passed their ordinances for the implementation and enforcement of the Devolution of Power Plan. The plan of theses administrative reforms was duly implemented on 14th August, 2001.

Composition of District Government

The District Government are consists of Zila Nazim and District Administration. Zila Nazim shall head the District Government and perform such functions and exercise such powers as have been assigned to him under this ordinance and be assisted by the District Coordination Officer. The Zila Nazim shall ensure that the business of the District Government is carried out in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance and other laws for the time being in force.



The functions and powers of the Zila Nazim shall be to :

a) Provide vision for the district-wide development, leadership and direction for efficient functioning of the District Government.

b) Develop with the assistance of the District Administration strategies and time frame for accomplishment of the relevant goals approved by the Zila Council.

c) Perform functions relating to law and order in the district.

d) Ensure implementation of the functions decentralised to the District Government.

e) Oversee formulation and execution of the annual development plan, delivery of services and functioning of the District Government.

f) Present proposal to the Zila Council for approval of budget for District Government, Zila Council and intra-district fiscal transfers.

g) Maintain administrative and financial discipline in the District Government.

h) Present tax proposals to the Zila Council.

i) Issue executive orders to the District Coordination Officer and Executive District Officers for discharge of the functions decentralised to the District Government.

j) Perform any other function as may be assigned to him by the Government.


Structure of District Administration

The District Administration shall comprise the district offices, including sub-offices of the Departments of the Government decentralized to the District Government and other offices set up by the Government and grouped under the Executive District Officers and coordinated by the District Coordination officer. According to section 28 of the Local Government Ordinance 2000, in every district , The Government shall appoint a District Coordination Officers who shall be a civil servant of the federation or of the Province , as far as possible in basic Scale - 20.Provided that in a City District , the District Coordination Officer may be civil servant of the Federation or province in Basic Scle-21.The District Coordination officer will controlled and supervised the following group of offices in a District:

1. District Coordination
2. Agriculture
3. Community Development
4. Education
5. Finance and Planning
6. Health
7. Information technology
8. Law
9. Literacy
10. Magistracy (Omitted vide Notification No.13-59/2000/p-VIdated 25th August ,2001.
11. Revenue
12. Works and Services.

Each group of these offices will be headed by an Executive District Officer and assisted by District Officers and Assistant District Officers in the line hierarchy.

THE DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION



The Underlying Assumptions of the Devolution of Power Plan

The new administrative setup i.e. devolution plan was based on the following underlying presumptions

I. Elections to the local councils under the devolution plan would be on non party basis.
II. The elected Nazims would remain apolitical .
III. The elected Nazims would exercise their powers above their party and constituency considerations and would be equally accessible.
IV. District as a unit of Administration would be financially and administratively viable in terms of revenue generation, financial self- sufficiency and access to it's headquarter.
V. District coordination officer would b able to run the phase without any external influence or pressure.
VI. Magistrates would be able to provide justice in the much efficient manner under the section judge rather under a DCO.
VII. Police would become depoliticized and by putting a direct under the district nazim it would be much more independent in maintenance of law and order in the districts as compared to that under the DCO.
VIII. There would be rapid development by the district and union level representatives fully monitor by the community and void of any corruption.

Issues in Transition and Practice

After the pronouncement of the local government ordinance (devolution plan) on 14th August 2001, the Administrative set up in all the districts and divisions was changed. Offices of the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners were taken over by the DCOs and the newly elected Zila Nazims .A one line budget was transferred from the Federal government to the District governments through the provincial governments. Though the magistracy was initially envisaged under the District Coordination Officers but was withdrawn immediately on 25th August, 2001 and the DCO was allowed to run 12 departments in a district. Though the devolution plan has been enforced yet there are many problems which need to be resolved.

According to Analysts, in principle there is nothing wrong with devolution; the institution of 'mai baap' will theoretically be replaced by accountability to the public. However, instead of moving in stages, we seem to have decided to go in at the deep end without properly learning how to swim. Although the local

government elections have technically been held on a non party basis, in fact most of the people returned have political affiliations with one of the main parties. The major problems likely to arise with nazims are (i) settling scores with opponents (ii) favouring their areas of support in development activity, (iii) trying to get kickbacks from the funds placed at their disposal,(iv)influencing, if not outright rigging, of elections in favour of the candidate they support for MPA or MNA.

How is the District Coordinator going to deal with these problems unless he has some leverage? Given our political track record, how are the central and provincial governments going to deal with nazims with political affiliations different from the party in power at the centre or the concerned province? Will they favour their own party nazims over others in making allocations for development activity or budgetary support?

How are resources for district management to be raised? For instance, in Britian only 5% of their expenditure is raised by local councils, 95 % comes from Whitehall. This leads to an element of irresponsibility in the approach of councils to financial and economic issues. However the least of the problems is financial allocation.

The most important problem is the political neutrality of the district administration. What happens if the nazim, the district coordinator and the police chief gang up to form an unholy trinity? The ZCs and TCs have been empowered to levy new local taxes, specified in the Local Government Ordinance 2000.This brings us to the question of the costs of the system and the effects of added taxation on the common citizens. Given the recession, inflation and rising unemployment, any new taxes may prove the proverbial of feather that broke the camel's back.

Some districts may prove too small, and at least 53 of the 105 districts in the country may not have the capability, because of being underdeveloped, to carry out the functions devolved to them. Of these functions, some are beyond the scope of individual districts- for example, irrigation, marine fisheries, forests, populations planning.

The retention of separate electorates for local bodies' elections widens the scope of discrimination against the minorities, who will continue to be treated as second class citizens. Reservation of seats for women and other marginalized groups in society could cut both ways: positive discrimination is a good thing conceptually, but could remain open to manipulation by entrenched interests. Non- party elections at the local level, as in the past, will push the country deeper into the mire of clan biradiri politics .

Whether the system of power and patronage distribution, traditionally controlled at the local level by large landowners in the rural areas and privileged classes in the urban, will be disturbed substantially is open to question. Certainly, grave reservations exist whether, without changing the socio-economic realities through land reforms and other measures, these vested interests will not install their traps and thereby perpetuate the status quo.

Presently office of the district tehsil and union nazim has become very attractive because of unchecked power, control over bureaucracy and use of unlimited funds. Many members of national and provincial assemblies have left their seats and gone in to district politics. Most of the nazim have strong roots in their political parties and the election to these positions have become more political rather apolitical as envisaged under the devolution plan. The district governments are unable to become self sufficient therefore they get their budget from the Federal government to finance their development and non-development expenditure. Maintenance of law and order have also become problematic due to absence of magisterial powers previously vested with the Deputy Commissioners and commissioners. Nazims who are politically linked are generally hesitant to take any action because of the fear of losing popularity. On the other hand police also faces difficulty to take any action because of the fear of the justification of their actions in courts of law subsequently. Similarly district bureaucracy has gradually turned into servile mode and has started losing their traditional objectivity and non - partisan approach.

On the development side, in most of the cases, funds are distributed to the chairmen of the union councils and virtually end up in small and insignificant schemes. Once an audit is conducted, only then it would be cleared as to how much amount has been embezzled. Since no funds remain available for other projects therefore the provincial governments have started introducing mega projects at their own.

Conclusion

It is very difficult to say about the success or the failure of the administrative reforms (devolution plan) in Pakistan. However, a lot of activity has been generated at the local government level and the people at the village Tehsil and district level have started taking keen interest in their local politics, development works and day to day management. The system still needs to be improved and upgraded i.e.

I. Some level of magisterial powers can be given to the local government functionaries in order to assist maintenance of law and order, discourage hoarding and management of disasters.
II. Police is an effective instrument of enforcement. It may must be regulated and deployed by an objective, neutral and judicial authority which may be entrusted to the DCO and his staff in order to improve their acceptance and avoid any politicized use of this force
III. District as a unit of administration, may be enhanced to the divisional level in order to improve the economies of scale and better management of development activities. Incidentally, police in Pakistan have not been devolved. There is still division tier, i.e. DIG police is in place. The proposed arrangements would also remove this anomaly.

Since most of the system analysts and planners are in agreement with the above proposals therefore according to some reports the provincial governments in Pakistan are actively considering these proposals in order to maximize public welfare and enforce real devolution of power i.e. administrative reforms at grass root level.

REFERENCES

Asia Report N 77 Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression? 22 March, 2006. International Crisis Group (ICG) Islamabad/Brussels.

Azfar, Omar (2002) "Conditions for Effective Decentralized Governance: A synthesis of Research Findings" (http://www.inform.umd.edy/IRIS/IRIS/PEG/synthesis_).paper presented to the Regional University Consortium Conference: Regional Economic Development in a decentralizing Indonesia. Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector. College Park MD.

Blair, Harry (2000) "Participation and Accountability at the periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries," World Development, 28 (1): 21-29.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. 2004. "Police Torture and Illegal Detention." HRCP: http://www. hrcp-web.org/police_torture.cfm. Access date: Feb 1, 2004. Last Update:n/k.

Kennedy, Charles H. (1987) Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press.

May, June 1997. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer: A comparison of Nine Countries"(http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/workpapers/WPS1800series/wps1822/wps1822.pdf). Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.

National Reconstruction Bureau (2000) "Local Government Plan." Government of Pakistan. Islamabad.

Qadir, Ghulam (2003) "Socio Economic Variances in the Devolution and Service Delivery Study", World Bank/DFID, Islamabad.

Rahman, Rashed (2000) "The Bumpy Road to Devolution", The "DAWN" Wednesday September 6, 2000.

Tinker, Hugh Russel (1954) The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma,

London, University of London - Athelone Press.
The "NEWS" August 16, 2003: Chief Executive Unveils Local Govt. System 2000 -Deputy Commissioners to come under District Nazims.
Triesman, Daniel (ed.) 2002. Decentralization and the Quality of Government (Mimeo): Los Angeles, University of California.
World Bank. (2003) World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington DC, The World Bank.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE: ENABLING GOVERNMENTS DELIVER IN SRI LANKA

Asoka S. Gunawardena

Introduction

A public administration system performs in the context of a country's social, political, and economic milieu. It is tasked with undertaking public actions that address welfare needs of the citizens. The role that the state assumes in addressing societal needs have important implications for what a government does and what the public administration is called upon to do. It is how well the public administration is organized to act and the ensuing quality of its actions that determines the efficacy of its performance. Administrative reforms then address public administration performance and thereby enabling governments deliver on societal expectations and achieve its goals.

The Sri Lankan public administration, as elsewhere in the developing world, finds itself in a constantly changing policy milieu. Emerging from the colonial law and order administration in 1948, the government of the new nation assumed sole responsibility for meeting societal expectations and for providing citizen welfare. The governments that followed continued to work through the centralized public administration restructured to accommodate emergent social and political interests in further extending the welfare state. However, problems in reaching out to the periphery created social tension breaking out in conflict in the south. A series of reforms within the framework of the centralized state sought to contain and accommodate conflict.

Fundamental problems in delivering welfare with growth made the new government in 1977 opt for a path of deregulation and withdrawal from the micro-management of the economy, by assigning a greater role to the private sector. However in the meantime, problems of delivering development opportunities to the periphery within the framework of the centralized state took on an ethno-political dimension in the north, eventually breaking out in a protracted conflict, forcing the Sri Lankan state to move on to a devolutionary path, establishing Provincial Councils as a tier of sub-national government.

Successive Governments formulated the question of public sector performance in the context of specific policy objectives. Public sector performance was first envisaged in terms of structures and systems within a state-centric development strategy. Thus the period up to the mid seventies was one of restructuring of the delivery system both in terms of de-concentration and de-bureaucratization. This was followed by a period during which public administration performance focused on the capacity to undertake new tasks arising from a liberalized economic regime. In more recent times fiscal management issues have focused public administration reform attention on the civil service in terms of functions, numbers and salaries.

Two distinct sets of institutional change processes were set in motion during the post liberalization period. First was the reallocation of government responsibilities to the market-based processes. The second was the reallocation of responsibilities to lower tiers of government, especially the provincial councils. These have remained distinct and perhaps discrete institutional change processes, superimposed on an overly centralized and fragmented public administration system and as such did not get integrated in a holistic institutional framework for governance. The associated reform efforts addressed capacity needs of either specific service delivery sectors or public administration functions in isolation rather than in the context of the performance of the total system basis and governance imperatives of delivering development.

Sri Lanka's development attainments are impressive. However reducing poverty, eliminating regional disparities and attaining peace remain further challenges. These require a radical change in the public administration system. It can no longer be designed, structured and staffed for serving a centralized

polity and directing an administered economy. It must be re-oriented to meeting the challenges of guiding change towards a decentralized polity and supporting the needs of a de-regulated market oriented economy. At the same time intergovernmental reforms and de-regulation of the economy cannot move forward in isolation and must seek synergies in order to deliver on the development challenges. These changes have created dualities and overlaps that undermine development performance. This involves achieving coherence and focus in administrative reform. This therefore is the challenge of administrative reform in Sri Lanka.

The paper examines the evolving scenarios of administrative reform in Sri Lanka in responding to the twin processes of development policy change, the shift from state-led to market-oriented governance of development and the shift from centralized to devolved modes in the governance of state responsibilities. The compulsions driving these forces of change were incongruous, being driven at the same time by imperatives of centralized (de-concentrated) and decentralized (devolved) governance, perceived as technical and political aspects of government and governance. This conflict in compulsions driving the public administration system failed to bring about a synergy of development outcomes. Hence administrative reform in the post eighties failed to address the management of development in a holistic manner.

In this context the paper argues that the governance of administrative reform cannot be divorced from the governing of the public administration system. Administrative reform has both a political and a technical content since a public administration system must respond to both sets of imperatives of change in a coherent manner, in the absence of which it will remain dualistic and disjointed, as has happened in Sri Lanka. The challenge of administrative reform is to bring about coherence in the change process whereby deregulation of the economy, devolution of the polity and civil society participation move forward in tandem and not get separated between a dichotomy of technical (bureaucratic rationality) and political (accountability to people).

The institutional arrangements for governing administrative reform must then be posited in and be constituted as an integral element of the institutional framework for governance. They cannot remain separated as technical and political processes. Only then will it be possible to establish an essential symbiotic relationship between administrative reform and development, in the absence of which it will remain largely irrelevant to enhancing public administration performance and enabling governments deliver development.

Administrative Restructuring and Debureaucratization: Transition to a National Public Administration

During the decades following independence, Sri Lanka sought to transform the colonial bureaucracy into a national public administration. It involved the restructuring of the bureaucracy to provide for national ownership and de-bureaucratizing the administration to make it more responsive to indigenous concerns and interests. Working within the framework of a centralized state and a unified administration the bureaucratic reform sought to address administrative imperatives of expanding the welfare system, bringing about development and coping with emerging social and political conflict. The transition to a national public administration involved bureaucratic expansion and differentiation, administrative coordination, and de-bureaucratization and de-concentration of the delivery system. However despite the restructuring of the bureaucracy the public administration system remained largely unchanged during the period up to the late 1970s.

Bureaucratic Expansion and Consolidation: Managing Administrative Differentiation

The establishment of the Crown Colony government and the civil service administration under British rule in 1802 marked the beginning of the bureaucracy in Sri Lanka. The transition to a national bureaucracy and administration commenced in 1931 when limited self-government was granted and an elected national Board of Ministers was constituted under far reaching constitutional reform. The character of new political institutions based upon universal suffrage brought about radical transformation of the role and orientation of the bureaucracy and the administration. There was also a concomitant

change in the content of government activity.
The implications for the bureaucracy were clear. It had to be converted into an effective administrative machinery not only to implement expanding social and economic activities of the new government, but also to advise the government on social and economic policy. It was therefore necessary to restructure the colonial law, order and revenue collecting bureaucracy into a development oriented administration capable of coping with an undertaking the vastly expanding scale of development activities. A significant feature of bureaucratic expansion was the pattern of growth and change of the integrated model of the provincial administration under the Government Agent. Bureaucratic change was marked by the transfer of new functions under the purview of elected Ministers being placed outside the Government Agent's authority, while expansion was marked by the increasing numbers of offices and officials at the provincial level.

However the powers of the colonial Governor in regard to public service personnel were retained with a purely advisory Public Service Commission. This resulted in a duality of control over the public service that continued to be a contentious and sensitive issue in balancing the independence of the bureaucracy and ministerial control of the administration.

With independence in 1948 a parliamentary system with a cabinet of ministers was introduced. The cabinet system based upon the implicit assumption of the separation of policy from administration added a new dimension to the extant vertical administrative differentiation through de-concentrated sub-offices. The process of bureaucratic expansion and administrative differentiation was further accelerated with the departmental structure expanding rapidly both in terms of the number of departments as well as the spread of their de-concentrated sub-offices. The territorial administration was reconstituted at the level of districts disaggregated from the provinces. The burden of social and economic development and of extending the welfare state fell on the new administrative system.

The public administration system of independent Ceylon provided for several new roles and functions.

a. Centralized financial management and control through the Treasury function.

b. Centralized setting of norms and standards of bureaucratic operations through an Organization and Methods functions.

c. Centralized public personnel function through an independent Public Service Commission

d. Instruments of legislative oversight, especially the Public Accounts Committee.

The rationalization of the differentiated administrative roles and functions was sought through greater centralization. The basis of centralization was uniformity of systems, procedures and styles across ministries and departments as well as the territorial units through the role of the Government Agent. The administrative and financial regulations and public service rules constituted the common denominator of the bureaucratic style. The centralized management of finances, personnel and performance standards together provided for the continuity of the centralized administration established by the British.

Bureaucratic Adjustment and Adaptation: Managing Administrative Coordination
Thus independence did not bring about any fundamental change in the structure and functioning of the bureaucracy. The passage from colonial rule to independence had been conflict free, the colonial rulers and the national leadership having shared a common frame of values and attitudes. The national leadership and the bureaucracy shared a common social and cultural background giving them a common orientation and interest in the theory and practice of the systems of government and administration.

The impetus for administrative reform came from the political and social changes set in motion by the electoral change of 1956. Radical and far reaching policy changes were introduced in the socio-

economic sphere ranging from agrarian reform, nationalization of private economic enterprises, to social and labour reforms. The bureaucracy was being called upon to perform in a dynamic and changing policy environment. The independence of the public service and the ministerial responsibility and accountability to the electorate was gradually emerging to be come conflicting. It was argued that the independence of the public service should not be allowed to interfere with the development agenda of the government. The scene of development activity was shifting to the rural periphery, with the imperative of adjustment and adaptation of the departmental model for delivering development services.

Thus the structure of the centralized administration was found to be unsuitable for carrying forward the development tasks of the new nation. The rapid expansion of the bureaucracy in terms of increasing numbers of departments had already begun to bring up fundamental problems of a centralized system. Thus problems of inter-departmental coordination, inter-departmental competition and rivalry (especially between new and old departments), implementation bottle-necks and delays in development programmes were causing serious concern to a government that was keen to get on with the job. The position was made worse at the district level where departmental sub-offices were being directed directly from the centre through circular instructions along a clear chain of command.

An integral feature of the post-colonial adaptation was the socialization of the administrative system through the introduction of "rural organizations" as the participatory outreach of the central government departments. It constituted an enduring dimension of the emergent system of de-concentrated administration. The allocation and application of resources into a broad spectrum of departmental programmes was managed through the de-concentrated network of departmental district offices. The pivotal role of the district administration in the implementation of development policies and programmes was recognized by the appointment of a Committee on District Organization for Agricultural Development (1967).

The Committee recommended:

a. Direct and more effective linkage between the Government Agent and the central administration;

b. Re-organization of the Office of the Government Agent;

c. Integration of the activities of the district offices into a development organizational system; and

d. Providing opportunities for popular participation in development activities.

Thus the key administrative reform initiative was to strengthen program integration at the district level through the coordinating role assigned to the district Government Agent. The reforms led to the re-vamping of the District Coordinating Committee (DCC) and the District Agricultural Committee (DAC), which emerged to become the key institutional arrangements for the decentralized management of development.

Significant changes had meanwhile been taking place at the centre. The overall structure of ministries and departments continued to expand with the new dimension of non-departmental public enterprises brought into the development scene in the post 1956 economic reforms agenda. Emerging as the instrument for nationalization public enterprises became the policy instrument for the state to move into entrepreneurial activities. The State Industrial Corporations Act (1956) established public enterprises as institutional basis for State engagement in economic development

Several changes took place in the structure and environment of the bureaucracy as well.

a. The abolition of the elitist Ceylon Civil Service and the establishment of the Ceylon Administrative Service (1963).

b. The change in the language of official business with the introduction of the Official Languages Act (1956), changing from English to Sinhala as a fulfilment of a 1956 electoral promise.
c. The entry of public service trade unions into the bureaucratic system.

d. The establishment of a National Planning Council (1956), the Planning secretariat reconstituted as the Planning Department (1961), and a Ministry for Planning and Economic Affairs (1965) emphasizing the importance of economic planning as a responsibility of the public administration.

These changes had far reaching implications for the coherent functioning of the administration and the need for rationalization was recognized by the appointment of the Committee on Administrative Reform (1967). The major reform measures introduced were the following.

a. The integration of the ministries and departments into a single organizational unit. The separation of policy from administration was found to have hampered the quick resolution of policy problems as well as the effective integration of the activities of the departments under a ministry.

b. The establishment of an institute of public administration, established as the Academy of Administrative Studies (now Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration) for introducing modern management systems through induction and in-service training.

c. Reforms in public financial management, including the establishment of an Accountants Services.

d. Monitoring and evaluation of the progress of foreign funded projects.

e. The establishment of a Standing Committee on Administrative Reforms.

Bureaucratic Transformation: Managing Administrative Interdependence

A significant development in the political environment of the bureaucracy was the growing role of the politicians as elected representatives of the people in the day to day administrative decision making. Consequently, the separation of administration from politics, a cardinal principle that the public administration system had subscribed to so far was slowly but surely blurring and changing the pattern of relations between the two spheres of public responsibility and activity. As far as the politicians were concerned there was a serious need to re-appraise the systems and styles of the bureaucracy's operations and functioning.

In the meantime there was growing disenchantment of the people with the social and economic situation in the country. The youth insurrection of 1971, brought into focus the socio-economic disparities underlying Sri Lanka's welfare achievements. The de-concentrated re-distributive programmes giving effect to the welfare and growth strategies failed to address the underlying structural basis of poverty signifying the emergent gaps in social integration, it also reflected the social distance of the extant development administration and its failure to mainstream the resurgent youth. The inequalities in social and economic opportunities created social tension breaking out in open conflict, weakening the effectiveness of the state structures as a system of political integration. A series of reforms within the framework of the centralized state sought to contain and accommodate conflict.

While the need for administrative coordination arose from the differentiation in development interventions through an expanding network of government agencies, the youth insurrection was seen to reflect the need for active political engagement in the implementation of development programmes, through the management of "district" (i.e., local level) development. The thrust of decentralization strategy thus took a new turn, towards closer liaison if not partnership between political and administrative action. Political action for decentralized development management was given effect

through the new institution of the "District Political Authority" (1973), later institutionalized through the Office of the District Minister (1977) appointed by the President, both of whom were elected officials of the central government. An instrument to decentralize finances to undertake "capital works" of a "local" nature, the Decentralized Capital Budget (DCB) introduced along with the District Political Authority provided fiscal space for sub-national discretion in development.

The new republican Constitution (1972) vested responsibility for appointments, transfers, dismissal and disciplinary control of state officers in the Cabinet of Ministers, away from the independent public service. The Public Service Commission was replaced by two new structures assisting the Cabinet of Ministers in discharging its public personnel responsibilities, the State Services Advisory Board and the State Services Disciplinary Board. The extant system of rules, regulations and procedures was carried over to the new arrangement. These changes formalized the emergent trend towards political control of the public services. The independence of the public service was in serious doubt.

A significant development accompanying these changes in the political environment of public administration was the creation of a Ministry of Public Administration (1970). The public personnel function had hitherto been the responsibility of the Treasury located in the Ministry of Finance and carried out through its supply and cadre function were reconstituted as "establishments" and "combined services" functions. While on the one hand the establishment of a Ministry for public administration signified the recognition of the role and responsibility of the public service in implementing the development agenda of the country it also provided for a greater thrust and focus on the public administration system of the country.

The separation of public administration from finance was accompanied by changes in public sector planning and financial management. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs was reconstituted as the Ministry of Planning and Employment with specific focus on the functions of National Planning, Regional Development, and Progress Control. The imperatives of effective implementation of development programmes and projects led to the creation of a Ministry for Plan Implementation. (1974). The managerial segment of planning, with its concern for monitoring and review was strengthened by the introduction of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the Ministry of Finance (1974).

Administrative Efficiency and Capacity Building: Reacting to Problems of Delivery

The development policies of post-independent Sri Lanka had sought to achieve a reasonable rate of growth, equity and social welfare. The country achieved a high level of social progress relative to its level of per capita income. However the state-centric inward looking policies that constituted the institutional framework for providing development services to people had reached its limits in the 1970s leading to a change in the course of development policies in the late 1970s with the adoption of outward looking market oriented policies. It resulted in the acceleration of economic growth, driven by a massive public investment program on the one hand and de-regulation of the economy to allow for increasing participation of the private sector in economic growth and development on the other. These changes in the policy milieu of the country defined a new role for the government away from a largely operational to a more policy, regulatory and facilitating role. These changes had fundamental implications for the role and functions of the public administration.

Administrative Improvement: The Systems Approach

The changing role of the government was perceived as requiring new capacities and re-orientation on the part of the public administration to deliver new policies. The public administration was steeped in rules, regulations and procedures which did not support the performance of the new role and functions. On the other hand there was increasing dissatisfaction on the part of the citizenry about the quality of public services being delivered by the public sector departments.

Events following the Committee on Administrative Reforms (1967) had overtaken their reform recommendations. The crucial recommendation for the establishment of a Standing Committee on

Administrative Reforms was not followed through beyond the period (1966-1969), during which period the Chairman of the Committee on Administrative Reforms functioned as the Chairman of the Standing Committee. In the words the Chairman, "it had little achievement to its credit". It was noted that administrative reforms not having been assigned to any Ministry as a special responsibility did not come under ministerial supervision or direction. It was further noted that very few suggestions emanated from the public service. The Ministry of Public Administration that had been established precisely for this purpose failed to deliver.

Thus exercises in reform through individual ministerial reports and ad hoc committees followed. Each of these dealt with some aspect of the administrative system under focus. In this context the initiative at appointing a Committee of Members of Parliament (1977) to report on the bureaucracy is noteworthy. A positive out come of the Committee's recommendations was the decision to introduce work norms into government departments. However the subject of administrative reforms continued to remain on the government's agenda.

Thus in 1979 the Cabinet of Ministers appointed a Sub-committee of Development Secretaries, chaired by the Secretary to the Ministry of Public Administration "to look into the need for extensive administrative reforms". The Sub-committee working through the Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration (successor to the Academy of Administrative Studies) sponsored a Colloquium on Administrative Services followed by another on Administrative Reforms. The Colloquium on Administrative Services clearly brought out the deterioration of the quality of performance of the administrative service and made proposals for remedial measures essentially dealing with the selection and training of administrative officers into the Sri Lanka Administrative Services and the General Clerical and allied services.

The Colloquium on Administrative Reforms (1979) sought to address "urgent problems needing improvement" and propose "improvements for the professionalizing and modernizing of the public service system to meet modern day challenges". The Colloquium addressed four themes of current interest and concern.

a. Need for a Central Personnel Agency in introducing human resource management practices across government in the context of a multiplicity of agencies performing public personnel functions.
b. Role of the Public Service Commission in ensuring political neutrality and accountability of public officers.
c. Rationalization of functions amongst ministries in terms of the effective functioning of government through the rational allocation and organizations of government functions facilitating coordination and integration.
d. Public service recruitment, promotion and evaluation in introducing merit, efficiency and personnel development into the public service.
e. Administrative reform

Thus the thrust of issues and approaches focused on management systems and structures in government especially in the context of the need for professionalizing and modernizing the public service. The focus on the public service reflects the diagnosis of malaise of the public administration system in terms of the capability to cope with the emerging demands of outward oriented approach to government's role and function.

Administrative Effectiveness: The Systemic Approach

The inadequacy of an approach that addressed improvement and capacity building needs in the different areas of the public administration system to re-orient its role and function to the new challenges was being raised in many quarters. The problem was that there were many reform expectations depending upon the perceptions of the different groups in regard to the problems and solutions that are often contradictory in terms of the actions and results. Accordingly the need to approach reform on a total

system basis in a holistic manner addressing the systemic issues of public administration performance was recognized. In terms of the need to be comprehensive the work of the Administrative Reforms Committee (1987) constitutes the high water mark of administrative reform in Sri Lanka.

The Administrative Reforms Committee (ARC) was constituted by a Presidential directive. The following were the Terms of Reference.

"To examine and report on reforms required in Ministries and Departments of government with particular reference to:

1. (a) Policies related to cadres.
   (b) Broad principles and guidelines for determination of salaries in public services.
2. Training and management development
3. Decentralization of the administration, including the structures of District Administration and Local Government.
4. Schemes and procedures for recruitment, promotion and transfers.
5. Financial management systems, procedures and practices.
6. Administrative work systems and procedures.
7. Distribution of subjects and functions among Ministries and Departments.

The ARC made their recommendations in ten reports.

1. Administrative Reforms - An Agenda for Action
2. A Policy framework on Cadres and Salaries
3. The Senior Management Group
4. Reform of the Personnel System
5. Training and Career Development
6. Administrative Changes in Support of Devolution
7. Rationalization of Functions of Government
8. Financial Management
9. Systems Improvement
10. The Government and its Public Enterprises

The ARC while laying down its approach noted that it "views administrative reform as the reform of a system, not merely addressing of an individual problem or a limited group of problems within such a system". It was emphasized that administrative reform is a "comprehensive review and evaluation of the system as a whole". In this context, the ARC perceived the objective of administrative reform to be "the enhancement of the effectiveness of the system as a whole".

The ARC found the Sri Lankan administrative system to be "overly centralized and at the same time fragmented through the proliferation of ministries, departments and public corporations; lacking a management orientation at higher levels, overstaffed and under compensated; subject of disproportionate levels of political considerations in its personnel management and decision making; lacking in coordination due to the absence of central policy making organs; observing outdated work systems and procedures; and to be far behind in terms of training and management development compared with its counterparts elsewhere in the region".

The ARC further noted that the agenda of action as having been conceived not as a series of disparate steps, but as an integrated programme which should be implemented as a whole". It emphasized that the different elements have been designed to provide support to one another, and, together, to generate a transformation in the totality of the system which would lead to the level of efficiency and effectiveness required by the demands of the development process".

The ARC identified several deficiencies in the administrative system, which falls into three categories.

A. Structural deficiencies

i. The absence of a system wide focal point for public personnel management.
ii. The proliferation of ministries, departments, authorities and enterprises within the administrative system.
iii. The lack of effective decentralization, delegation and devolution of authority and responsibility within the administrative system.
iv. The role and level of autonomy as well as the nature of their accountability and relationships with the rest of the administrative system as being vague and undefined.

B. Deficiencies in the personnel system

i. The management of cadres in the public services and the structure of public service compensation.
ii. The neglect of training and management development in the public sector.
iii. The institutional mechanisms to deal with the tasks of personnel management of a professional public service in a scientific manner so as to restore confidence and a sense of dignity and thereby arrest the brain drain.
iv. The absence of a scientifically and objectively selected multi-disciplinary group of senior managers for staffing the senior positions in the public service.

C. Deficiencies in work systems and procedures.

i. Financial management and the related procedures and systems.
ii. Work systems in government offices and the reforms required to effect productivity improvements.

The ARC made two fundamental recommendations.

a. The establishment of a Ministry of Public Services with five directorates (Personnel Policy, Organization Audit and Cadre Review, Administrative Systems, Training and Career Development, and Services).
b. The transfer of functions of recruitment, discipline and related matters in the public services to a new Public Service Commission.

In conclusion the ARC noted that the recommendations would involve a major re-alignment of authority and responsibility within the administrative system; would entail giving up of familiar tasks and functions; require working with new systems and procedures and within new patterns of organizations in order to improve productivity in a context of reduced manpower; and the public officers would be called upon to continuously re-equip themselves for the continually changing tasks which the administrative system is called upon to perform.. This was the scope of administrative change envisaged by the ARC.

Administrative Change: The Public Sector Re-structuring Approach

The Government accepted the recommendations of the ARC by decision of the Cabinet of Ministers (1990). However the will to carry through systemic reform was lacking both at the political and bureaucratic level. In retrospect the architect of the administrative reform initiative noted that "from the very start itself, there was a serious gap in the management of the integrated implementation of the ARC recommendations". What seemed to be of interest to the Government was restructuring of the ministries and departments with a view to downsizing the public service on the one hand, and pay reforms on the

other. Administrative reforms seemed to be driven by fiscal management imperatives rather than by the need for ensuring its overall efficiency and effectiveness. This was demonstrated by the subsequent reform actions taken by the Government.

Thus at the conclusion of its work, the ARC was reconstituted as a Salaries and Cadres Committee with more or less the same terms of reference. However in practice the focus of the new Committee shifted almost entirely to cadre management and salary review. In fact as time passed it came to be almost totally pre-occupied with salary review. The efforts of the then Ministry of Public Administration to fill this gap ran into many problems and eventually abandoned. Whereas the Ministry of Public Services as recommended by the ARC was to be constituted with five directorates, the Ministry was allowed only one position at the required level (of an additional secretary). The Policy Division of the Ministry of Public Administration that was thus established was not adequate to the task of carrying through the ARC agenda.

What followed were sporadic efforts at administrative reform. While these efforts were constituted as follow-up on the ARC agenda, administrative reform action quickly slid back to its earlier ad hoc approach. Shortly thereafter the Government invited a UNDP Mission (1991) to develop a programme for "Enhancing Public Sector Management". The Mission presented a plan of action for public sector management improvement focusing on the Government's provincialisation programme and its implications for the central government structures, processes and management improvement. For the implementation of the proposals a Restructuring Management Unit (RMU) located in the Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation was established reporting directly to the President and headed by a Director at the level of an Additional Secretary. It was envisaged as a Sri Lanka government staffed and financed unit.

The RMU initiative ended in failure as the agenda could not get to engaging with the reform stakeholders. First, it was established as a UNDP funded Project rather than a government programme. Its agenda was changed mid-course to support the President's de-concentration programme and thereafter the rationalization of structures and cadres of apex line ministries, departments and provincial councils in the context of devolution. The evaluation of the project three years later recommended its termination until "the readiness of the government to activate a new programme of administrative reform and restructuring is evident".

The next initiative in administrative reform was focused on the improvement of efficiency, effectiveness and the quality of public service delivery, funded by the ADB (1997). The agenda of the public sector reform initiative was set on a system wide basis with a re-structuring focus. It sought to incorporate the following.

a. A clearly formulated vision of government's future direction which is then fully communicated as a part of improved policy process.
b. Structural re-organization of government to promote efficiency through
    - Providing clear goals and performance information
    - Rationalization
    - Competition
c. A management framework for service delivery which centers on detailed performance objectives.
d. Reducing the demand on funds leading to a shrinking of the budget.
e. An enabling environment to promote private sector-led growth.
f. Training of public service staff to more effectively realize their potential, responding to the new environment.
g. Re-deployment of staff to new functions within the government or to new opportunities in the private sector.

For implementation of the reform initiative the government set up an Advisory Board on Administrative Reform working through an Administrative Reform Management Division located in the Presidential Secretariat. The Advisory Board was first chaired by the Secretary to the President and later by the Minister for Public Administration. Several new studies were undertaken and remedial actions identified. There were two items of the agenda that were set in motion.

a. Preparation of a mission statement, through a participatory process, by all
b. ministries and departments facilitated by the Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration. The objective of the exercise was to follow-up with a functional review of the ministry or department.
b. A Performance Appraisal System linked to annual salary increments and career prospects.

However none of these initiatives were followed up to their desired end for a variety of reasons, not the least the lack of political and administrative commitment as well as the lack of managerial and technical expertise to carry through the reforms.

The ARC modality was revived with a new Administrative Reforms Committee established under the Chairmanship of the Secretary to the Prime Minister (2002). The Committee comprised of Secretaries of Ministries, Academics and Private Sector representatives. The point of departure for the Committee was the ARC agenda. The reform effort was short-lived with a quick change of government.

A flurry of wide ranging public sector reform programmes have been launched in the last couple of years (post 2004) reflecting a concern with institutional gaps in pursuing a policy of equitable development of the country.

a. The Administrative Reforms Committee, following upon its immediate predecessor with a mandate for the promotion of institutional reforms in the public sector in order to make the government machinery an efficient, citizen friendly and modern entity. The major area of reform undertaken was the rationalization of the functions of governmental agencies. The Committee has since become defunct.

b. The National Council for Administration (NCA), established concurrently by Presidential warrant with system-wide responsibilities in regard to the public sector, but confining itself to the review of public sector cadres, salary structures, and developing a national wage policy.

c. The National Procurement Agency (NPA), established as an independent regulatory body to oversee procurement monitoring, capacity building and policy related matters to strengthen and streamline the government procurement system.

d. The Strategic Enterprise Management Agency (SEMA), established to facilitate and ensure the efficient management of strategic state enterprises. The number of State enterprises coming under the purview of the Agency has since increased reflecting a withdrawal from privatization of state enterprises in the financial, utility, services, trading and manufacturing sectors.

e. The National Council for Economic Development (NCED), to bring together stakeholders from the public and private sectors to jointly develop national economic policies. The Council working through policy clusters constituted a Public Sector Reform Cluster to coordinate the various initiatives in public sector reform.

These policy measures represent a reform programme focused on public sector re-structuring in support of a development strategy that seeks a middle ground in combining economic growth and poverty reduction.

Improving Performance: Enabling Governments to Deliver

Sri Lanka's development strategy is premised upon pro-poor growth, income improvement and re-distribution with complementary participation of a socially responsible private sector and a strong public sector. The ultimate objective is to ensure that Sri Lanka steadily progresses towards the status of an upper middle income country within the next ten years. In the pursuit of this objective it is necessary to respond to challenges in economic management, needs of the poor, and decentralization imperatives. Each of these development policy thrusts has their distinct reform implications. However in order to make governments deliver it is imperative that their inter-connectedness is clearly articulated in a reform agenda. This is the necessary basis to create a strong public sector capable of guiding and undertaking effectively the delivery of public services and of development programmes.

Responding to the Challenges in Economic Management: Clarifying the Role and Functions of Government

Fundamental to a coherent administrative reform strategy is clarity as to the role and functions of government. Reform must respond to the changing policy milieu. The economy, the polity and the society are not static entities and continue to be driven by internal as well as external pressures for adjustment and change. The role and functions of government is about promoting societal transformation for human development. Hence the reason why governments should be institutional reformers par excellence if markets were to perform effectively and citizens were to be assured of their basic rights to services.

The Government's economic management agenda that had embarked on a process of withdrawal from the micro-management of economic activities in 1977, was assumed would gather further momentum in the decades ahead. It was expected that in time this would extend to such traditionally public sector areas as production, infrastructure, services etc. However the SEMA initiated by the Government (2004) and being continued under the new presidential regime (2005) would suggest that investment especially in infrastructure will remain high in the public investment agenda. In fact, the New Development Strategy (2005) asserted that the reduction of public investment to reduce fiscal deficits is counter productive and therefore a higher level of public investment will be a key element of the new policy regime.

It would seem therefore that the current policy regime for the management of the economy seeks to bring about a partnership between a socially responsible private sector and a strong public sector. As far as economic management is concerned the public sector will need to adapt their rules and procedures to facilitate competitiveness The public sector would continue to manage strategic services and enterprises, exercise regulatory oversight in ensuring that services are available to the citizens, and engage in modernizing the economy. The public service would then need to become proactive in anticipating and responding to emerging needs of economic management and. pubic-private engagement. Further the public expectations of quality will increase even as the public sector will have to operate in an increasingly tight financial resource situation and hence will need to maintain a continuing focus on productivity and efficiency in the provision of services.

Responding to Needs of the Poor: Improving Service Delivery

The mobilization of the poor through building their capacity to participate in development is premised upon the strengthening of formal and informal institutions that link the poor to the service delivery mechanisms. This calls for the improvement and re-orientation of public sector delivery systems for expanding employment and income opportunities as well as for effective targeting of public support systems.

Sri Lanka's National Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (2005) have five core objectives.

a. Create pro-poor growth to catalyse the poor to engage in productive economic activities within a micro level territorial framework.
b. Satisfy basic human needs, reach/surpass Millennium Development Goals and achieve a holistic improvement in the quality of life of the poor.
c. Minimize the sharp regional variations and disparities in terms of wealth creation and poverty.

d. Help the poor to understand the cause of their poverty, identify their needs and potentials and match needs with resources.
e. Reform and synergize existing poverty alleviation programmes and projects.

Underpinning the poverty strategy is a matching of needs with services (i.e., development opportunities). There are three areas of institutional strengthening that are required for matching needs with services.

a. Appropriate mechanisms for the poor to exercise collective voice and oversight in order to be able to identify their needs, be able to articulate as to what services are needed, and be able to exercise oversight over the delivery of services.
b. Appropriate service delivery arrangements with standards, quantity and quality of services to be provided.
c. Appropriate institutional arrangements for enabling the poor to engage with the service delivery system

Public service deliveries often fail to reach the poor. This is not only a problem of physical access to services but more one of policies and practices of government agencies responsible for the provision of such services. Public agencies responsible for the services continue to operate in a supply oriented manner and have failed to re-orient themselves to function in a demand driven manner. There is a need to approach service delivery in a comprehensive and an integrated manner where the policy makers, providers and clients engage in a coherent manner.

Then matching services with needs requires clearly stated service delivery policies. This involves the review of the operational activities from a service delivery perspective, tracking how services flow through the chain. The reform of the service delivery system will involve separation of the roles and functions of policy, provision and oversight. It will also involve the setting of standards relating to quality and quantity of services to be provided, that will enable benchmark performance in terms of quality, access, costs and equity of provision. This is a fundamental re-orientation in the approach to provision of services by governmental agencies.

Responding to Decentralization Imperatives: Rationalizing Inter-governmental Processes

Sri Lanka opted for devolution of power to elected provincial councils (1988) to resolve the ethnic conflict rather than to bring about regionally balanced development. Thus the sub-national administration functions as an uneasy dualism of devolved and de-concentrated structures creating parallel service delivery arrangements. While localized solutions are necessary for poverty reduction and hence decentralized responsibility for the provision and delivery of public services, Sri Lanka continues to operate centralized service delivery systems working through de-concentrated units in parallel with services that have been devolved to provincial and local levels. It makes for lack of clarity as to who is responsible for what in respect of development results.

Sri Lanka's State structure is a three tiered one, with national, provincial and local tiers of elected governance. However, the territorial units carved out for the exercise of de-concentrated administrative authority of the centre, districts and divisions, continue to function in an agency relationship. Indeed in recent times the centre has sought to increasingly by-pass the province and the local level elected tiers in regional development initiatives through the districts and the divisions. In fact the elected tiers hardly had any role in the post-tsunami recovery operations. Thus all tiers of administration engage in service deliveries.

Therefore the intergovernmental allocation of responsibilities for service delivery varies across sectors. There are several systemic problems in the devolution/de-concentration arrangements.

a. Expenditure assignments are duplicated, with both deconcentration (i.e., central spending through districts and divisions) and devolution (i.e., provincial and local spending). This has led to unclear accountability and to excess employment without commensurate results in service

delivery. Additionally there is direct central spending on provincial and local service areas.

b. The provincial and local tiers account for about 15% of total government expenditure while tax revenues account for around 7% of total government revenues. The small size of devolution is made more difficult by excessive dependence on central grants amounting as much as 85% for the provinces and averaging at around 50% for local authorities.

c. The provinces and local levels have little autonomy regarding personnel. All positions are approved by the central government and higher level staff is assigned from national level cadres.

d. Recurrent expenditures predominate at the provincial (85%) and local (65%) levels. This makes the provincial and local mandates essentially a maintenance one and hence they have little fiscal space to address service delivery needs.

These result in excessive costs and sub-optimal service delivery outcomes. Thus indeed at present the state structure reflects a striking dualism, a de facto de-concentrated form of government with some devolved features. To move forward it is necessary to clarify what de-concentrated district and divisions should do in providing services. At the same time it is necessary to clarify what service delivery results the provincial and local are responsible for. This clarification of who is responsible for what should be to a substantial extent be decided on a sector-by-sector basis, based on what will work best for the sector and reflecting the core principles of efficiency, economies of scale, and subsidiarity.

The process of transition to a devolved service delivery system is unlikely to be a smooth one, given the degree of resistance and vested interests, both political and bureaucratic. The task of administrative reform is to facilitate the process through the design of appropriate institutional measure for their elimination. Given the imperatives of improving service delivery and the resolution of the ethnic conflict a shift to greater devolution is imperative. The task of administrative reform would be to forge and strengthen the institutional links amongst central, provincial and local levels for coherence in service delivery and for enhancing performance at each level.

Governing Administrative Reform: The Challenge of Becoming Pro-active

Thus the history of administrative reform has been one of isolated proposals for reform in selected sectors or parts of the public administration system. While it is possible to rush to the conclusion that this has been due to the lack of a holistic approach, it is necessary to ask the question as to why this has been so. Indeed whereas Sri Lanka is hailed as a functioning democracy, on the negative side has been the all too frequent changes in the policy regimes with parts of the different policy institutions being carried over thereby making for incoherence in the public administration system. Hence it would seem that administrative reform has not been perceived as an integral part of the development policy reform process being treated as a purely technical activity falling within the domain of the bureaucracy. It is therefore imperative that Sri Lanka learns from the reform experiences in creating a strong public sector.

Learning from the Administrative Reform Experience

The lessons of the administrative reform experience are clear.

a. Reforms have been ad hoc and fragmentary with no comprehensive view of the total system. They have usually taken the form of short lived "drives" with the organizations often reverting to pre-reform practices, leaving serious wash-out effects. It also indicates the inability to sustain reform.

b. There has been a failure to institutionalize reform as a cumulative and on-going process, reflecting the absence of effective leadership for reform. These points out the failure to establish a focal agency for reform networking through counterparts in the ministries and department.

c. Administrative reforms have tended to be bureaucratic exercises leaving the political system

outside without any involvement. The goal of public administration guiding reform has been the Weberian rational-legal model that the bureaucracy is comfortable with.

d. Reforms have focused on structures leaving out the necessary changes in behaviour and attitudes for institutionalization of change. Most of these have turned out to be formalistic changes, as the actual processes as well as the content have not changed.

e. The ineffectiveness, if not the absence of institutional arrangements to monitor, review and take corrective action in regard to reform programmes. This reflects the failure to appreciate that administrative reform is a process and not a one-shot affair. There has been little advocacy for implementation. .

f. Sri Lanka's administrative reforms have been focused on four areas of change, i.e., the reform of policy and strategy, reform of structures, reform of personnel, and reform of technology. These approaches have failed to evolve into a coherent programme addressing economic management, poverty reduction and inter-governmental process.

In reviewing the reforms it is necessary to be mindful of the fact that the public administration is also a social system which is influenced by the wider society as well. The public administration system behaves as much due to internal factors as to external forces. It has been said that the attitude of Sri Lankans to its public administration is that they endow its members with the vices they themselves posses and demand from it the virtues that they lack. Hence in assessing reforms it is necessary to set it against the background of values and accomplishments as well as the limitations of the wider society of which it is a part. The societal context of public administration reform cannot be ignored.

Governing Administrative Reform

Thus critical to the success of any future programme of administrative reform would be the management of its implementation. The lessons of experience point towards several institutional imperatives for effective implementation of administrative reform.

a. A focal point in the public administration system for the conceptualization, planning, sequencing and coordination and evaluation of the implementation of the reform agenda. Its locus within the political and administrative system would be critical in order to be able to evoke system-wide responses to the reform initiatives, as well as to obtain ready participation of the different administrative agencies that should contribute to the process.

b, Total political support for advocacy, implementation and monitoring of the reform programme. Whatever the institutional arrangements, the programme will not become effectively operational unless political will at the highest level backs up the reforms.

c. Creating public awareness, interest and commitment for the reform programme.

d. Periodic reporting on the progress of reforms and its dissemination amongst the political, public and bureaucratic stakeholders.

e. Parliamentary oversight for public administration reform oversight. This can take the form of tabling (half yearly) reports and feeding them into Parliamentary Consultative Committees as a regular item of their agendas.

These have been missing elements in the earlier reform programmes.

REFERENCES

Asian Development Bank, Final Report on Public Administration Reforms (1997) TA No. 2616 - Sri Lanka, 1997

Asian Development Bank (2003) Review of Governance and Public Management in Sri Lanka, (Mimeo).

Bale, Malcolm and Tony Dale (1998) 'Public Sector Reform in New Zealand and its Relevance to Developing Countries', The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 13 (1) February, 1998

Fernando Lloyd.(2005) "The Role of Public Administration in Building a Harmonious Society", paper presented at a Workshop on Public Administration Strategies that Help or Hinder Societal Harmony, NAPSIPAG Annual Conference, 2005

Fernando, Neil, (1980) "The Need for Administrative Reforms", Kalamana (Journal of the Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration)

Gunawardena, Asoka S. (1989) "The Bureaucracy", in V.T.Navaratne et al (ed.), Public Administration in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Gunawardena, Asoka, S. (2003), Issues in Devolution and Governance Change in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Government of Sri Lanka, (1987) Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee, 1987

Government of Sri Lanka (1967) Report of the Committee of Permanent Secretaries on Administrative Reforms, Sri Lanka.

Ministry of Finance and Planning (2005a) New Development Strategy: Framework for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Ministry of Finance and Planning (2005b) Sri Lanka Development Forum Background Papers, Sri-Lanka

Nadarajah, S. (1997) "Evolution of Administrative Reforms", in. M.Somasunderam ed., The Third Wave: Governance and Administration in Sri Lanka, Konark Publishers, New Delhi

Navaratne, V.T. (1989) "Administrative Reform", in. V.T.Navaratne, et al (ed.) Public Administration in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration, Colombo, Sri Lanka

OECD (2002) Improving Service Delivery Through Public Service Reform: Lessons of Experience from Select Sub-Saharan Africa, KK Consulting, Nairobi.

Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration (1983) Report of a Colloquium on Administrative Reform, Sri Lanka

Turner, Mark and David Hulme (1997) Governance, Administration & Development Making the State Work, Kumarian Press, West Hartford.

Wanasinghe, Shelton (ND) 'Activating Administrative Reform Process in Sri Lanka', Research Studies Governance Series No. 1, Colombo, Institute of Policy Studies

Weerasooriya, Wickrema. (2004) The Law Governing the Public Administration of Sri Lanka, Post Graduate Institute of Management, Sri Jayawardenapura University.

World Bank (2003) Making Services Work for the Poor People, World Development Report 2003, Oxford University Press, 2003

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN BANGLADESH: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES

Mohammad Mohabbat Khan

Introduction

The Global Forum on Reinventing Government has made government reform as one of the global issues in its meeting held in Seoul, Korea in May 2005. This importance given to governmental reform testifies its key place in today's globalized world. In 2002 the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management (CAPAM) published a working paper titled "Public Service Development: Retrospective and Projection" containing survey data from twenty-five commonwealth countries as well as results of focused group discussion of one thousand senior civil servants. Most of the civil servants identified that they were affected by globalization. They had to face new trading and business environment, develop and implement new rules and regulations, and cope with new national alliances and agreements.

Role of government in the economy has already been redefined from strict control to facilitation and from regulator to one of the participants along with private sector and third sector organizations. So it is imperative that government focus on policy coordination and work more closely with the private sector and civil society organizations with the objective to create and sustain a free and fair market environment (Paine 2005). The assumption here is that implementation of major administrative reforms is extremely difficult if it is undertaken in isolation. Rather, implementation of major reform is possible if the government pursues "reinvention efforts by institutionalizing innovative practices and by working in close cooperation with (other) social actors to improve state capacity and the scope of public services" (Kim et.al. 2005:648). Civil society can facilitate implementation of major reforms by harping on the presence of such critical reform values as transparency, openness, responsiveness, accountability and capacity building in the day- to- day activities and operations of both the public and private sectors.

Administrative reform (AR) in this paper means and includes "those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the bureaucratic system of a country intended to transform the existing and established practices, behaviours, and structures within it" (Khan 1980: 57).
This paper describes AR efforts in Bangladesh; presents lessons and challenges in the arena of AR from a global perspective; and summarizes observations and reflections in the conclusion.

AR in Bangladesh: Prescriptions and Outcome^

Since the birth of Bangladesh thirty-six years ago there have been several efforts both by successive governments and donors to discern the ills afflicting the civil service system. The reform bodies systematically studied the civil service and recommended a number of fundamental changes in its structure, functions and ethos. Many of these recommendations were intended to break free the civil service from its colonial and neo-colonial administrative heritage and prepare it to face the challenges of the modern era (for detail see Khan 1989; Khan 1998).

Government Reform Efforts

Almost every government, whether democratic or military, appointed committees and commissions to 'reform' the civil service. So far seventeen major civil service reform and pay commissions and committees have been appointed and all submitted their reports with recommendations. Of the seventeen reform bodies only seven dealt with the entire civil service and therefore had a broad coverage. Six bodies dealt with matters of micro restructuring within the civil service. Of them, three bodies examined exclusively pay structure of the civil servants. The rest analyzed specific aspects of the civil service like recruitment and promotion of civil servants.

Significant recommendations of seven major reform bodies and their fate are analyzed below. In 1972 two high-powered reform bodies-Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) and National Pay Commission (NPC-1)-were appointed. The ASRC recommended a single, classless, unified grading structure with an appropriate number of different pay scales matching different levels of qualifications, skill and responsibilities (Khan 1989:303). The committee recommended several measures for developing an integrated public personnel management system encompassing a rational selection process based on merit, long- term career planning, formulation of a general training policy and co-ordination of institutionalized training, and an employee promotion procedure based on merit-cum seniority (Khan and Zafarullah 1982:164).

But the government did not implement the 'radical' recommendations of ASRC.

The recommendations of NPC-1 for ten scales of pay in place of the then 2,200 pay scales were implemented partially.

The Pay and Services Commission (P& SC) appointed in 1976 recommended the creation of an all-purpose civil service to include all functions within the traditional government sector; emphasis on the merit principle for recruitment and promotion; constitution of a new apex cadre with talented, efficient, and experienced officers dawn from all cades through appropriately designed tests for providing administrative leadership and high level of coordination; the adoption of cadre concept in the civil service structure; organization of cadre services at the top tier to constitute the nucleus of the civil service structure; and proposed 52 scales of pay to reduce multiplicity of pay scales (Khan 1985:1031).

Some of the major recommendations were implemented in modified forms. Such implementation resulted in the creation of twenty- eight services under fourteen main cadres, the constitution of the Senior Services Pool (SSP) and the introduction of New National Grades and Scales of pay [NNGSP] (Khan 1989:304).

Between 1982 and 1984 two major reform bodies were appointed - one a Martial Law Committee (MLC) another a civilian one. The MLC recommended reduction in the number of ministries; cutting the number of civil servants, mostly at lower levels; restructuring of the role of secretariat and other executive organizations and delegating financial and administrative powers down the hierarchy (Khan 1987:352).

The implementation of the major recommendations of MLC resulted initially in the reduction of number of ministries and lower level public employees. But after sometime the number of ministries increased to its earlier size and the number of lower level employees went up as a result of new and unnecessary recruitment.

The Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR)-the civilian body - made significant recommendations to devolve significant administrative, financial and judicial powers to elected people's representatives at successive sub-national levels (Khan 1988).

Implementation of CARR's recommendations led to the elevation of lowest administrative tier with rather limited administrative and financial powers. But the real control remained at the hands of the national government.

The last significant reform initiative came with the appointment of Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) in January 1997. The PARC submitted its recommendations in June 2000. The Commission, influenced by the New Public Management (NPM) concept, made a number of significant recommendations relating to: improvement of service delivery, creation of functional clusters of ministries; for developing professionalism; and institution of Senior Management Pool (SMP) for overcoming inter-cadre rivalries and facilitating fast track promotion; introduction of strictly merit-based

recruitment and promotion in public service; devolution of governmental authority and reorganization of local government bodies; rationalization of institutions and manpower; creation of a powerful and independent anti-corruption commission; effective parliamentary oversight on administration; and creation of a public administration reform and monitoring commission [PARMOC] (PARC 2000: iii).

PARC made as many as 137 recommendations of which 30 were interim, 70 short-term and 37 long-terms. But only some of its recommendations have been implemented so far.

It may be pertinent here to raise the issue of poor implementation record of major AR proposals in spite of similarity among the recommendations of major reform bodies. First, there was very little political commitment for major AR reforms. This is evidenced by the fact that successive governments did not implement the recommendations of the reform bodies appointed by them. There may be two explanations for this situation. The most obvious one was to cling to the status quo and play safe coupled with belief in risk aversion strategy. The other one related to the way the reforms were viewed. The reform proposals were considered as ends in themselves rather than means to achieving higher level ends. Second, there was no organized and sustained movement from outside to mount pressure on the policy makers to bring about meaningful and needed reforms. Third, there was no centrally located and politically powerful agency specifically designated for reform monitoring and implementation. Fourth, involvement of relevant professionals in the reform implementation process was not sought. Fifth, there was very little interest and enthusiasm on the part of senior civil servants to implement major reform proposals.

Donor Reform Initiatives

Donors' interest in administrative reform has been noticeable since late '70s. All major donors the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Department of International Development (DFID) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) all invested considerable resources to make the civil service system efficient, productive, effective and accountable.

Donor-sponsored reform initiatives covered a number of important areas within the civil service. But only a few of these touched all the key aspects of civil service structure and management. The discussion below is confined to only those reform initiatives that recommended major civil service reform measures. If these reform proscriptions were accepted and implemented then radical changes would have resulted in the civil service.

Public Administration Efficiency Study (PAES) was funded by the USAID. The study was the first comprehensive donor effort to reform and redesign the civil service. The study was conducted from May 1989 to November 1989. The significant recommendations of PAES included: strengthening supervision through training and management support; reducing secretariat's operational activities through delegation of routine personnel and financial matters to departments, corporations and subordinate bodies; reducing layers in decision making; introduction of a two-tier career system to raise quality of the senior civil service; increasing incentives for high performance including wider use of merit as a criteria for promotion; and expanding practical, problem-solving training based on an assessment of organizational needs (USAID 1989:1-3).

The major recommendations of PAES were not implemented due to (a) enormity and complexity of the task involved; (b) poor manpower and insufficient financial resources available at Ministry of Establishment (the implementing agency); (c) presence of strong bureaucratic inertia; and (d) lack of conviction among senior civil servants as to the commitment of the government to carry reform measures to their logical conclusion (Khan 1998:134).

The Public Administration Sector Study (PASS), funded by the UNDP was conducted between February 1993 and July 1993. The study made as many as fifty- two recommendations. The significant recommendations were: establishing results-oriented management systems through setting up of

objectives and measures of outputs and impacts throughout the government; establishing units in each ministry, responsible for developing and applying performance criteria and measures and develop internal performance audit capability; rationalizing government structure by reducing number of ministries and divisions; review and streamline of government rules and regulations to eliminate red tape and redundant functions; selection and promotion of officers based on merit within a transparent process; strengthening of Public Service Commission; replacing grades and class system with personnel management system based on position classification system and grades; and appointment of a reform implementation commission (UNDP 1993:103-110).

Due to strong bureaucratic resistance none of the major recommendations of PASS were implemented.

The World Bank sponsored and financed a study titled "Government that Works: Reforming the Public Sector" (GTW/RPS). The study was conducted between 1994 and 1995 at different phases. This wide-ranging study's main thrust was on delineating core functions of the government and essential services to be provided to citizens (Khan 1998:138). Therefore, the study recommended redefining frontiers of public sector which means rightsizing the central government, enlarging the role of non-governmental organizations, local government, and the private sector; enhancing level and nature of accountability and responsiveness of public organizations to their owners, i.e., the parliament, citizens and consumers; streamline regulations, level and process to ensure transparency, fairness and atomicity of legal and regulatory institutions, policies and practices; overhauling rules and process by which government conducts its policy and decision making functions; and maintain an efficient, committed and professional public service (World Bank 1996:xvi).

The study understood the difficulty of implementing major administrative reforms and rightly warned that the cost of doing nothing will be lower growth, continued poverty and citizens continue to receive less for more (World Bank 1996:xix).

Still the government implemented none of the study's major recommendations.

Strengthening of Public Administration Training in Bangladesh (SPATB) was sponsored by the Ministry of Establishment and funded by the ADB. The study was conducted between May and November 1998 by a team of local and international consultants. The SPATB after a detail survey suggested a number of strategies for improvement of public sector training. These were: developing and introducing a National Training Policy; creating a management development program for all class I officers; developing in-house training programs; strengthening key training institutions; introducing key training institution clusters; developing BPATC as the prime civil service management training institution and focal point for improving training throughout the civil service; review the efficiency and effectiveness of all other training institutions; appointing training officers in every ministry and department; developing a civil service-wide training officer network; and undertaking a scrutiny of human resource management policies and practices with the aim of introducing improvements in key areas (GOB 1998).

On 6 May 2003 government approved Public Administration Training Policy. All other recommendations of SPATB await implementation.

Another donor initiative to reform governance in Bangladesh materialized with the publication of "Taming the Leviathan" by the World Bank (2002). The report offered a broad- based strategy to ensure better governance. The strategy to promote good governance had five critical dimensions: strengthening the core institutions of accountability; building civil society; decentralization to bring government closer to people; making public administration more effective and efficient; and mobilizing national efforts to bring about the needed reforms (World Bank 2002:IX). We focus below only on public administration, as it is not possible due to space constraint to discuss other dimensions of the study.

To 'energize' administrative reform the report made a number of recommendations. First, there should be strong correlation between performance and incentives. Competent and productive civil servants should

be given adequate pay and benefits to retain and to keep them honest. Second, promotions and postings should be based on merit. To encourage meritocracy a number of interrelated decisions need to be taken. Open competitive examinations should be held to select public servants for overseas training. Greater staff mobility between the private and public sectors needs to be encouraged as this would facilitate mutual understanding and increase public sector's awareness of the needs of the private sector. Third, there is a clear need to establish a credible oversight system to make the public service delivery system results-directed. An Ombudsman, as provided in the constitution, should be appointed to limit the abuses suffered by the citizens in the hands of public officials. Fourth, systematic and open monitoring of the public agencies should be undertaken as this can be a powerful instrument to increase their efficiency and customer satisfaction. Greater transparency is needed in all spheres. To make the government accountable, freedom of information legislation must be enacted. Fifth, adhering to relevant guidelines and rules should ensure delegation of administrative and financial powers from ministries to corporations, executive departments and subordinates. Sixth, benefit of information and communication technologies (ICT) is tapped so that the country moves towards E- Government. The ICT techniques can be utilized as productivity tools and a platform for improved service quality and strengthen government information flows (World Bank 2002: xix-xxiii).

DFID, UK funded Management at the Top (MATT I) trained about 100 civil servants on new techniques and approaches in public sector management in some selected British universities. DFID is now following up its earlier MATT I with MATT II program designed to train a critical segment of senior civil servants to develop and sustain human resource management system within the civil service system in Bangladesh.

During last two years the World Bank has sent consulting missions to Bangladesh to review and recommend measures to improve various facets of the civil service system. The areas focused during such missions included recruitment, training, performance appraisal and career management of class I officers; grouping of ministries into clusters; and forming of a senior civil service.

Though successive governments made repeated promises to take the donor- sponsored bodies' recommendations seriously, but, in reality, the opposite happened, and none of the major recommendations has been implemented.

But like the recommendations of government appointed administrative reform (AR) bodies, majority of key recommendations of donor bodies went through the same old routines intended to delay and lessen the impact of such recommendations and ultimately ensuring their place in the cold storage. High-powered committees were appointed, repeated consultations were held and ultimately old excuses were offered like recommendations were nebulous, insufficiently specific, not relevant, and inappropriate and put too heavy a burden on the national exchequer and the fate of the reform recommendations were thus sealed.

The major reason behind the failure of donor-sponsored civil service reforms is the unwillingness of the donors to collectively put pressure on the government to implement major reforms.

Way Forward: Lessons and Challenges*

Lessons and challenges that are presented below are global in nature. Almost every country in today's complex and interdependent world is attempting to bring about reform in the civil service. Though there are variations in terms of culture, political system, and economy among the countries still all have to undertake reforms in their civil services. There have been differences also in terms of nature, content, and breadth of the reforms undertaken by the countries. Still each country in its own way is trying to learn from the successful experience of other countries. A rich crop of materials are now internationally available that show what has worked and how to face the challenges of the future while undertaking major AR reforms. Only few lessons and challenges have been discussed below. These are intended to demonstrate to policy makers that major AR reforms are not only needed but can be implemented in

Bangladesh.

Lessons

Reform only matters if it actually strengthens organizational capacity.

This is a message for policy makers at the top as well as those scholars and practitioners who worry about loss of capacity of the public personnel system. Reform should lead to recruiting, retaining and training quality personnel and at the same time effectively disciplining poor and non-performers. Adequate resources, opportunities for advancement, the chance to develop new skills, ability to accomplish something meaningful, and public respect allow employees opportunities to do what they do best (Light 2006: 16)

Think carefully about both the rhetoric and reality of reform.

In any reform it is important to think what the reform really intends to achieve. There is always the danger that more emphasis is given to rhetoric rather than on the substance of reform. If this happens then there will be internal distrust for reforms thereby weakening commitment and encouraging resistance to reform.

Every reform, however well intended, has at least some unintended consequences.

One of the fatal mistakes that many reformers make in developing and proposing major reform proposals is to be blissfully unaware of the unintended consequences of such proposals. In the long run, the unintended consequences of well- intended reforms may weaken and dilute the effects of such reforms when implemented and may come into conflict with existing yet needed reforms.

A moratorium on appointment of new reform bodies.

Only appointing reform bodies do not imply the commitment of the government for reform nor that reform proposals will be accepted. In a country where a large number of commissions and committees have been appointed over the years without little reform- taking place then there is an urgent need to put an immediate moratorium there on appointment of new committees and commissions in the near future. Rather, a special expert body should be formed with membership from both from the bureaucracy and the academia to discern the causes for non-implementation of reforms and recommending action plans for speedy implementation of relevant reform proposals.

Implementation of reforms is dependent on whether there exists need for any change

Reform for reform's sake is never useful and sometimes counterproductive. Whether there is any need for reform needs to be assessed first before undertaking any new reform initiative. Otherwise, reforms will have high cost both in terms of human and financial resources.

Develop a strategy for implementing reform

Developing a strategy is critical for successful implementation of any reform. A strategy and a strategic plan involves collecting information both from the organization's internal and external environments about various aspects pertaining to a particular reform initiative in terms of resistance to be faced, support expected, and resources-human and financial- to be required.

Challenges

Achieving better integrated citizen-focused service delivery

Public service will have to continuously strive for mechanisms to ensure high quality service delivery to the clientele. Complex social problems will arise that need to be handled by multiple agencies. Hence there will be the need for well-coordinated, integrated citizen-focused service delivery.

Developing future leaders will be a critical challenge

Developing future leaders is critical to the successful delivery of services and meeting the challenges that lay ahead. One of the key prerequisites of developing future leaders would be to select, promote and

place them on the basis of merit. There should be continuous endeavour to search for customized learning programs, competency-enhanced techniques and appropriate leadership profiles. One of the vehicles that will be used for leadership development is networking and partnering institutions. Such institutions will include training institutions, universities, and think tanks. There will be continuous dialogue and interaction among and between such institutions.

Clarity of vision and strategic thinking and planning

Clear vision and strategic thinking will be required of top leadership to transform the public servants in such a way so that they can plan and manage efficiently in an increasingly globalised environment. Public servants will need to respond far more promptly to the implications of reforms and to undertake required modifications if needed to remain relevant and competitive in a fluid and fast-changing environment. Appropriate integration of strategic planning, resource allocation, performance management and accountability need to be in place and operational.

Utilizing e-technology

There will be increasing need to utilize information technology as an effective tool to introduce and facilitate integrated management information systems and improve service delivery.

Modernizing human resource management

Modernizing human resource management will be a key challenge for the future. The key challenge will center around attracting and retaining talented individuals in the public service as in the future all organizations will be based on learning and managing knowledge. To successfully manage knowledge public sector organizations will require individuals who can use their knowledge, know- how and ability to innovate. Competence will have to be more clearly situation-specific. More efforts need to be put to devise and put in place an appropriate human resource management system.

Improving political/administrative interface

With increasing complexities in the policy making and policy implementing process there will be increasing necessity in the future for politicians in power and senior civil servants working together in a harmonious and cooperative environment.

Performance management and measurement

Development and implementation of performance measurement and impact assessment mechanisms will be another significant challenge for public service in the years to come. These mechanisms would help to continuously evaluate the performance of public servants and move ahead with needed reforms.

Managing change

Managing change is important for the future of public service. This will involve preparing the civil service keeping in mind requirements and challenge of an uncertain future. There should be a balance among a number of key variables. These include: acquiring and utilizing appropriate resources for the change efforts, institutional strengthening and inculcating right types of values to civil servants.

Ethics and values

In future civil service there will be much more emphasis on values and ethics. Core values like honesty, punctuality, and courtesy must be adhered to and reinforced in the actions and behavioural patterns of civil servants. There is now a consensus that there should be a proper balance between democratic, professional, ethical and people values. It is also now agreed that ethics and values will form part of a specialized training program for future civil servants with provision for feedback and evaluation.

Ensuring people's benefit from reform

No reform will be of any use if it fails to benefit people. Keeping limited resources, global context, and increasing demand of the clientele in mind reform planners and implementers in future should be more aware of the potential impact of reform efforts. It needs to be remembered that in the ultimate analysis

the best judge of a reform is the people at large.

Conclusion

Hesse (2005) asserts that critical factors for successful governmental reform include: strong political will and support by the head of the state; innovations within crucial policy areas; a change in the rationale and attitude of the government one that is competent, value-oriented, knowledge-based, open, accountable, and participatory; step-by-step organization of an ambitious and innovation program; and a substantial, all -encompassing modernization process.

Lessons and challenges discussed and analyzed above indicate in no uncertain term that the need of the hour in Bangladesh is to successfully implement major administrative reforms. First and foremost, a congenial reform-friendly environment has to be created with support and cooperation of all three sectors-public, private, and civil society. Successive governments have not been successful in implementing major AR reforms. Working in isolation and in secrecy governments did not leave any scope for participation of all stakeholders in the implementation process. The present approach needs to be discarded and instead a participatory approach premised on open debate and discussion of all stakeholders or their chosen representatives should be the order of the day. Second, it needs to be kept in mind that tinkering here and there in the civil service system will take us nowhere however loudly we proclaim that reform has arrived. Major reforms and minor adjustments are not same. Third, all AR reforms should have the ultimate goal to better serve the common people. To achieve that objective, major reforms need to be undertaken to bring about major changes in the structure, working environment and ethos of the civil service. Fourth, political-administrative interface needs to be substantially improved so that ministers and senior civil servants can work in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. Reform, like change, is a continuous activity and is inevitable. What is needed for a reform to be successful and relevant is leadership with vision and strategic thinking, institutional strengthening, creation and sustenance of a facilitating environment, and presence of a suitable reward and penalty system.

NOTES

^ This section is taken from Khan, M. M. (2006).

* This section draws ideas heavily from Draper, G. (2003) and Draper, G. and Johns, C. (2004).

REFERENCES

Draper, G. (2003). "Public Service Reforms: Strategies and Challenges" in Commonwealth Public Administration Reform 2004. London: TSO.

Draper, G. and Johns, C. (2004). Looking Back Looking Forward. Toronto: CAPAM..

GOB (1998) Strengthening Public Administration Training in Bangladesh. Vol. 1, Dhaka: Ministry of Establishment (MOE), Government of Bangladesh.

Hesse, J. J. (2005) "The Korean Modernization Process-Looked at from Abroad", paper presented at the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, May 24-27, Seoul, South Korea.

Khan, M. M. (1980) Bureaucratic Self-Preservation: Failure of Major Administrative Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan, Dhaka, University of Dhaka.

Khan, M. M. (1985). "Major Administrative Reform and Reorganization Efforts in Bangladesh: An Overview", Indian Journal of Public Administration, 30 (3): 1016-1041.

Khan, M.M. (1987). "Politics of Administrative Reform and Reorganization in Bangladesh", Public Administration and Development, 7 (4): 351-362.

Khan, M. M. (1988). "Major Administrative Reform and Reorganization in Bangladesh, 1971-1985". In Campbell, C. and Peters, B.G. eds. Organizing Governance: Governing Organizations. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Khan, M. M. (1989). "Resistance to Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh, 1972-1987", Public Administration and Development, 9 (3): 301-314.

Khan, M. M. (1998) Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh, New Delhi and Dhaka: South Asian Publishers and University Publishers Limited.

Khan, M. M. (2006). "Public Administration Reform in Bangladesh: Incremental Changes, Reform Resistance and Lack of Political Will" included in Jabbara, J. G. et.al eds. Public Administration in Transition: A Festscrift to Celebrate the Scholarship and Intellectual Contributions of Professor Gerald E. Caiden.

Khan, M. M. and Zafarullah, H. M. (1982). "Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh" in Tummala, K. K. ed. Administrative Systems Abroad, Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, pp. 158-187.

Kim, P. S. et.al. (2005). "Toward Participatory and Transparent Governance: Report on the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government", Public Administration Review, 65 (6): 646-654.

Paine, L. (2005). "Free and Fair Market Order", paper presented at the Sixth Global Forum on Government Reinvention, May 24-27, Seoul, South Korea.

PARC (2000). Public Administration for 21st Century: Report of the Public Administration Reform Commission. Vol. 1. Dhaka: Public Administration Reform Commission, MOE, GOB.

UNDP (1993) Report on Public Administration Sector Study in Bangladesh, New York: United Nations Development Program.

USAID(1989) Report of the Public Administration Efficiency Study. Vols 5. Washington, D.C: United States Agency for International Development.

World Bank (1996). Bangladesh: Governance that Works: Reforming the Public Sector, Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

World Bank (2002). Taming the Leviathan: Reforming Governance in Bangladesh, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS IN BANGLADESH

M. Mahbubur Rahman Morshed

Introduction

Public service of Bangladesh has both comparative advantages and opportunities to improve their service. Such potentials were well documented and analyzed in many Public Administration Reforms (PARs) efforts undertaken during different periods under different regimes since independence of Bangladesh. There is also growing awareness and felt need to work and review further recommendations made by Public Administration Reforms Commissions in order to find out some doable and critical recommendations for immediate actions. Both development practitioners at government and non-government levels have special interest to explore further PARs' recommendations to build very specific agenda on "what to do" and "how to do".

This paper presents;

- A brief review of the major reform efforts in relation to public administration including Public Administration Reform committee (PARC).

- Identification of implementable or doable recommendations on short and medium term basis highlighting responsibilities of relevant government agencies and broader civil society.

Objective of the paper is to:

- give a conceptual idea of administrative reform
- present an overview of the administrative reform efforts with special emphasis on the short and medium term recommendations of the PARC
- generate and exchange of ideas in order to reinforce the process of implementation of some of the short term recommendations within the existing financial and human capacity

Administrative Reforms - Conceptual Perspectives

There is a range of definitions for administrative reform - not surprising since so many diverse activities have been progressively incorporated under the label. However, there are some common elements in the various definitions.

a) Administrative reform is about deliberate planned change to public bureaucracies.
b) It is synonymous with innovation.
c) Improvements in public service efficiency and effectiveness are the intended outcomes of the reform process.
d) Urgency of reform is justified by the need to cope with the uncertainties and rapid changes taking place in the organizational environment
e) It is a transformatory process.
f) It implies "changes of broad scope and high intensity in the governmental organization"
g) In more recent times the leading themes of reform agenda have included privatizing state institutions, reducing the size of bureaucracies, building management capacity and promoting greater accountability. All are undertaken in the name of performance improvement in the public sector.

The theoretical concept of administrative reforms should aim at practical implementation of the essence of good governance. The main prerequisite of good governance is to ensure transparency, accountability and efficiency in delivering goods and services to the citizens without discrimination. Another aspect of good governance is to ensure people's participation through community representatives, local government institutions, NGOs and civil societies.

Major Reform Efforts and Their Implementation Status

Administrative reforms and reorganisation claimed the continuing attention of the Government of Pakistan since 1947. From 1947 to 1962 twenty-eight reforms commissions were appointed for the purpose of reforming, re-organising and improving different aspects of the system. Despite the recommendations and some steps of implementation the system remained over centralised, over co-ordinated, under supervised and under propelled. The administrative system suffered from outmoded methods and procedures of work, delays in tackling new and enlarged responsibilities and lack of people's participation in the administration.

Bangladesh inherited a highly centralised administrative structure and planning process from the government of Pakistan. At the initial years some of the reforms or changes were adopted on an ad-hoc basis to meet the exigencies of the circumstances and needs. At the later stage the successive governments constituted more commissions and committees. The names of the commission and committees are as follows:

A. Commissions/Committees formed by the Successive Governments

Name of the Commission/Committee	Main focus
1. Administrative Re-organization Committee, 1971	*Government after emergence of Bangladesh*
2. Administrative and Service Structure Re-organization Committee, 1972	*Service structure*
3. National Pay Commission, 1977	*Pay issues*
4. Pay and Services Commission, 1977	*Service structure and pay issues.*
5. Martial Law Committee for examining Organization set up of Ministries/Divisions/ Directorates and other Organizations, 1982	*Organization and rationalization of manpower in public sector*
6. Committee for Administrative Reform and RE-organization, 1982	*Reorganization of district/upazila and field level administration*
7. National Pay Commission, 1984	*Pay issues.*
8. Secretaries Committee on Administrative Development, 1985	*Promotion aspects*
9. Special Committee to Review the Structure of Senior Services Pool, 1985	*Structure of Senior Services Pool (SSP)*
10.Cabinet sub-Committee, 1987	*Review of SSP and promotion aspects*
11.Committee to re-examine the necessity of keeping certain Government Offices in the light of circumstances, 1989	*Necessity or otherwise of keeping certain Government office.*
12.National Pay Commission, 1989	*Pay issues*
13.Commission for Review of Structure of local Government, 1999	*Structure of local Government.*
14. National Pay Commission, 1996	*Pay issues*
15. Administrative Re-organization Committee, 1996	*Structure and rationalization of manpower across Ministries/Departments/Directorates, etc.*
16. Local Government Commission, 1997	*Strengthening of Local Government Institutions.*

B. Reports prepared during 1971-97 with the assistance of development partners

Name of the Report	Main focus
1. Public Administration Efficiency Study, 1989 (Agency involved – US AID)	*Secretariat system. Relationship between Ministries, Departments, Corporations, etc.*
2. Report on Public Administration Sector Study in Bangladesh, 1993	*Public Administration reform in the Government with emphasis on certain specific areas.*
3. Towards Better Government in Bangladesh, 1993, (Four Secretaries Report-Agency involved-UNDP)	*Administrative and procedural improvement and related issues*
4. Government That Works: Reforming the Public Sector, 1996 (Agency involved – World Bank)	*Comprehensive administrative reform privatization, reduced levels of Government*
5. Local Government in Bangladesh-an Agenda for Governance, 1996 (Agency involved – UNDP)	*Local Government issues.*

Implementation Status of those Recommendations

- Most the recommendations of those committees or commissions were not fully implemented
- Martial Law Committee for examining organizational set up, 1982 (Enam Committee) worked seriously and lot of structural changes took place in the ministries, divisions and agencies.
- Recommendations of the Committee for Administrative Reform and Re-organization, 1982 were also got serious attention of the government. It has been pointed out by the critics that the reform efforts of the Martial Law regimes were carried out mainly to legitimize the government and establish political base at all levels.
- Pay Commission Reports were not strictly related to reforms. Recommendations of various pay commission reports were partially implemented.

Problems and Issues in the Implementation Process

- political regimes hindered the reform process over the years. With the change of the political governments the recommendations of the committees or commissions were fully or partially abandoned or scrapped. So the problem of ownership makes the efforts futile.

- Inherent weakness of the reports is that they do not reflect peoples' view. The process of formulation of the reports lack peoples' participation or even consultation of the appropriate stakeholders.

- Lack of institutional mechanism in the implementation process is another predicament to reforms. The institutions responsible for implementation of the recommendations lack capacity and capability to carry forward the agenda towards establishing better governance.

- Lack of interest among the powerful segment of bureaucracy for bringing about a positive change is also a factor of slow pace of implementation of reform efforts.

Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC), 1997

The Commission made 30 Interim Recommendations, 70 short-term and 37 long-term recommendations. The Present government, soon after assumption of officer in October 2001, formed a Secretaries Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary to scrutinize the PARC reports and make recommendations for implementation.

Based on the recommendations of the Secretaries Committee the following decisions have already been implemented:

- The Jamuna Bridge Division has been abolished and merged with the Ministry of Communication.
- Statistics Division has been abolished and merged with the Planning Division.
- Supply and Inspection Department under the Ministry of Commerce has been abolished.

The Secretaries Committee also made the following recommendations which are under process for implementation:

- Amalgamation of two organizations and two committees engaged in government employees' welfare activities and unification of those organizations and committees into one autonomous body.

In addition, 18 (eighteen) interim recommendations of PARC have been implemented. These are as follows:

1) Measures for improving the accountability and service standard of the government organizations (Report No. 1) (Modified).
2) System of receipt of letters in the secretariat (Report No. 2) (Modified)
3) Simplification of payment of travel tax (Report No. 5)
4) Capping on existing level of manpower in revenue budget (Report No. 6)
5) Simplification of payment of pension to public servants and removal of anxiety/hassle (Report No. 7)
6) Mechanism for implementation of interim recommendations of Public Administration Reform Commission (Report No. 10.) (Modified)
7) One Stop Utility Bill Payment System (Report No. 11) (Modified)
8) Simplification of issuance of passport (Report No. 12) (Modified)
9) Simplification of driving licenses, registration of vehicles, procedures regarding issuance of fitness certificate and payment of road tax (Report No. 13 (Modified).
10) Recommendations/proposals for abolition and merger of some Departments /Offices (Report No. 17)
11) Application / implementation of existing acts, Rules, Regulations, Order, Instructions, etc. (Report No. 18).
12) Slogan on administrative reform (Report No. 20)
13) Declaration of three-year old domestic utility bills as time-barred for payment (Report No. 21) (Modified).
14) Format for submission of annual report by the Ministries/Divisions to the Cabinet Division (Report No. 22) (Modified)
15) Use of A4 size paper in Government offices (Report No. 30)
16) Declassification of some classified documents (Report No. 15)
17) Steps taken for classification of Ministries and Divisions into 4 clusters (Vol. 1)
18) Formulation of policy promoting civil officers based on merit plus efficiency (Vol. I)

In addition to the Secretaries Committee, a Cabinet Committee headed by the Honourable Finance Minister has been formed to look into the matters of overall reform process of the government. This is still under process.

Short term Recommendations by PARC

Suggested responsible GOB Agencies and Potential Roles of Civil Society

At a Glance

A. Restructuring Field Administration and Decentralization

Sl	*Recommendations*	*Observations/ Comments*	*Further Action Suggested*	*Modality for Implementation*	*Responsibility for Implementation*
01	*Functions, personnel and budget of seven departments may be transferred to Zilla Parishad (ZP) and those of nine departments to Upazila Parsihads (UZP). The officials of the concerned departments should be placed on deputation in ZP and UZP. (The departments are: Secondary education, Health, Family Welfare, Social Welfare, Youth Development, Sports and Women Affairs)*	*This recommendation should be a part of overall steps of Strengthening the Local Government through appropriate Decentralization/ Devolution programme*	*Political bureaucratic relationship should be streamlined.*	*Necessary rules and procedures should be formulated*	*Ministry of LGRD and Co-operatives as lead agency.* *Opinion poll may be conducted to capture emerging needs and present situation highlighting which are most necessary departments at local level and their capacity to provide quality services*
02	*UZP and UP should be fully involved in the preparation, implementation, and monitoring of developing Programmes.*	*Appropriate*	*Training and capacity building of UP and UZP are required.*	*BCLG project of UNDP could be revived and BARD, RDA and NILG needs to be strengthened. To involve NGOs and Civil Societies a partnership network may be established*	*Ministry of LGRD and Cooperatives, Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance* *NGOs (They are playing complementary roles in building capacity of UP to make them more responsible towards community's needs. Such as NGOs are facilitating UP open budget dialogue session, coordinating meeting between GOs and NGOs. These activities need to be streamlined and standardized in coordination with GOB relevant agencies.)*

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
01	Concerned Ministries and Divisions should review the old and obsolete guidelines for appropriate revision that should ensure local participatory planning.		Resource mobilization is necessary. Relationship between UPs, UZPs and ZPS should be strengthened	Local level planning should be conceptualized and enhanced.	All the relevant Ministries. Local level participatory planning may engage relevant groups of NGOs, CS and private sector
02	Government activities should be co-ordinated by ZP and UZP in their respective jurisdictions. NGO representatives within the locality may attend meetings of ZP and UZP.		Women Representatives should be empowered with adequate responsibility and authority.	The Chairman of the committees should be chosen from among the stakeholders including women	Ministry of LGRD/Ministry of Women and Children Affairs. NGOs (Elected Upazila and Union Parishads may entrusted with the responsibility of selecting NGO/CS representatives)
03	It has to be ensured that no Ministry or Division encroached upon the powers delegated to their Department/Directorate/other Office and, similarly no Department/ Directorate encroaches upon the powers delegated to their Subordinated Offices/Units.	Devolution mechanism should be evolved at local level.	Decentralization at the Secretariat, administration is a must.	The recommendations of previous LG Commissions may be reviewed and implemented	Ministry of Law, Parliament Secretariat, Ministry of Establishment and Cabinet Division A participatory consultation process should be initiated where representatives of the CS can take part

B. Combating Corruption

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
01	*In order to reduce the scope of malpractice/corruption, the government should break up all utility monopolies and create competing private companies (e.g., Power, Telecommunication, etc.)*	*This is, in fact, a Long term recommendation and a continuous process*	*-Reward and Punishment;* *-Upholding Values;* *-A code of entitlement of facilities such as transport, accommodation, telephone, loans, office equipments and facilities based on seniority and status should be framed and implemented.* *-Political commitment;* *Transparency in providing privilege and opportunity by the government.*	*A permanent anti-corruption commission is in the making*	*Ministry of Law, Parliament Secretariat /Ministry of Telecommunication/Ministry of Energy and relevant agencies* *In order to improve poor governance and weak and corrupt institutions a wide range of governance improving tools should be in place like institutional and governance reviews, governance scorecards, corruption reports, public expenditure review and country procurement and accountability assessments. Independent watch group comprising civil society member may be involved in this process* *Privatization of services by phase may be introduced (private sector tele-communication is an example where civil society can participate)*

C. Improving the Delivery of Public Service

C.1 Clarity about Job responsibility

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
01	*All public offices should define their missions and functions and prepare job description for each position regardless of rank.*	*It is not known whether the Allocation of Business have been reviewed*	*Job Analysis based on the objective of the offices is needed.*	*Before doing this Allocation of Business should be reviewed* *OD exercise is required by phases*	*Cabinet Division, Ministry of Establishment, Planning Division and respective Ministries and Organizations*

C.2 Efficient and Professional Public Service

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
01	Professionalism in civil service must be ensured.	What is professionalism and How to ensure professionalism in the context of the country?	Specific definition and criteria should be fixed.	An academic exercise should be conducted	Ministry of Establishment along with the BPATC and professionals
02	Result-oriented performance audit should be introduced in all offices of the government, semi-government and autonomous bodies.	What are the instruments?	Expected measurable result should be determined first and explained to the person concerned.	An exercise on the Financial Management by Objective should be undertaken	Ministry of Finance and financial institutions, Private sector financial experts and academicians
03	For establishment of intra-departmental computer network Local Area Network (LAN) should immediately be introduced.	Appropriate	In phases	An Action and Implementation Plan should be formulated	Prime Ministers Office, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Establishment and Ministry of Science and Technology.
04	Training process, content and methodology should be radically changed to impart new skills, develop knowledge and change attitudes of public servants.	Medium-Term Action	Needs Analysis is needed	Continuous process	Ministry of Establishment in consultation with public sector training institutions and professional bodies including the BSTD
05	For establishment of inter-departmental computer network Wide Area Network (WAN) should be introduced.				Ministry of Information and Technology.
06	Market-based salaries should be given to all official and this should link to rightsizing the government. Moreover, this should be based on the principle of hiring and firing of training in the private sector. Such market-based salary can be introduced on a pilot basis following an agreement between the concerned employer and the employee.	Medium term No scope to introduce on a pilot basis.		A study is needed	Prime Ministers Office, Finance, Cabinet Division, Establishment

C.3 Improving transparency, accountability and delegation of authority

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
01	Appropriate administrative and financial authority should be delegated to subordinate/field level offices.	❖ What is appropriate? ❖ Nothing has been mentioned about the responsibility	More details should be mentioned.	An academic exercise should be conducted	Cabinet Division, Ministry of Establishment, Ministry of Finance.
02	Delegation of powers to the officers at various levels in such a way that no decision entails more than three tiers. The relevant paragraphs of the Secretariat Instructions 1976 should be amended accordingly to give effect to this recommendation.	Appropriate The revision may take longer time	Total revisions of the Secretariat Instruction (Already an exercise has been completed and finalization of the report is pending)	A Committee of government officials with professional background should be formed with time bound and clear Terms of Reference	Cabinet Division, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance.
03	For the sake of transparency and accountability the report of all Commissions/ Committees of national importance should be made available to the public.	Yes	Not free of charge but should be cost effective	Cost effective manner and in separate volumes	Ministry of Law, Parliament Secretariat /Ministry of Finance/ Ministry Home Affairs/Ministry of Defence and other relevant agencies
04	Judiciary should be separated from the executive in the light of the provisions of the Constitution of Bangladesh.	This is not short term recommendation			Ministry of Law and Parliament Secretariat.
05	Accounts should be separated from the audit. Audit should be empowered to perform its duties independently.	Appropriate	Accounts and Audit personnel should be separated.	An option may be sought from incumbent	Ministry of Finance.
06	Citizen Charter should be introduced in all service-oriented public organizations. (Citizen's Charter is an instrument where people will be able to become aware of their rights and entitlement in a particular service-rendering public sector and at the same time the responsibility and commitment of that sector in ensuring the desired or entitled services)	Who will prepare the charter?	-Political Commitment is necessary	A massive awareness campaign	Ministry of Law, Parliament Secretariat /Ministry of Planning and M/o, Information, NGOs and Civil society All public and private media

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
07	Enact Freedom of Information Act and amend Official Secrets Act 1923, the sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act 1872 and clause 19 of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1979.	It is a long term proposition	Political Commitment is necessary	A separate commission may be formed with representatives of public and civil society.	Cabinet Division, Prime Ministers Office, Establishment, Home Ministry, Law, Parliament Secretariat
08	Outdated laws, rules, regulations and forms should be updated and simplified.	This is a Long-Term Action. Updating of Forms should be identified as Short Medium-Term activities.	Outdated laws, rules, regulations should be identified first	An exercise should be undertaken	Ministry of Law and Ministry of Establishment

D. Reforming the Civil Service

D.1 Improving structure and system

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
01	In the Secretariat three clusters of closely related Ministries, namely, General, Economic, and Socio-Physical Infrastructure clusters should be constituted with the posts of Deputy Secretary and above. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs may remain outside the above clusters.	Further thought is necessary		5 clusters. Cluster based recruitment option for change in 2 years.	Ministry of Establishment, Finance and Cabinet Division
02	Senior Management Pool (SMP) should be introduced in the Secretariat, which should consist of the posts of Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary. Induction into SMP at the level of Deputy Secretary will be on the basis of competitive examination to be conducted by PSC. For the post of Deputy Secretary in a cluster of Ministries/Divisions officers from all cadres who are in the senior scale and have completed at least 8 years of service will be eligible for appearing at the examination.	This is a conflicting Area. This is not implementable in short term. Irregularities and unwanted Patronization may hamper the objective.	A separate study is needed.	A separate study team may be formed with professionals and experts	Ministry of Establishment, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Planning, Law and other relevant agencies

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
03	The existing officers of the Secretariat at various levels will continue to hold their present positions and officers up to national grade III should be given an opportunity to give their preference for joining a particular cluster. The SSB shall undertake a review to accommodate the existing officers into these three clusters, considering their qualifications, experience and performance. But while appearing at the examination for induction into SMP all cadre officers will opt for joining into the cluster (s) according to their preference Once inducted into SMP, they will lose their lien in their previous cadre posts. Officers up to grade III and all support staff should rotate within a cluster of Ministries. If necessary, to meet special requirements. Ministries/ Divisions within a cluster should be allowed to fill-up 10% of its total posts (Deputy Secretary and above) on transfer from Ministries/Divisions belonging to other cluster.	It will create anomalies.	A study is required.		Ministry of Establishment
04	Government may allow up to 15% lateral entry in the posts of the level of Secretary and up to 10% in the posts of Deputy Secretary and above. The above posts and the posts of all heads of Corporations and subject to the provisions under the concerned recruitment rules, posts of heads of other government Department or Directorate, etc. may be filled up through open competition for a fixed tenure. All government officers' up to two steps below the posts to be filled in and candidates from the private sector with prescribed qualification will be eligible to compete for such posts.	Executed. In case of private candidate only qualification can not be a substitute for experience	Filling up vacant posts regularly through SSB. All vacant posts should be filled up within in a month by the qualified incumbents There should be greater awareness and availability of information that private sector can compete for this post.	SSB meeting should held be regularly An in depth orientation training programme should be organized in BPATC for private sector lateral entrants	Ministry of Establishment Private Sector

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
05	The retirement age of public servants may be raised form 57 to 60 years and there should be no contractual appointments in the duty posts of the Government.	Immediate implementation is necessary	Rules/Laws should be enacted	Instead of contractual appointment of a few brilliant officers may be given advisory posts without hampering regular promotions	Cabinet Division, Ministry of Establishment, Law, PM Office, Finance Division
06	Three Public Service Commissions (PSCs) may be created - one for General services, another for Technical services and the third for Educational services.	No this will create anomalies and top heavy establishments	Instead PSC may have three branches	Only professional experts and personalities should be appointed members of the PSC.	Ministry of Establishment.
07	For expeditious redress of grievances and quick dispensation of justice to the government servants more than one Administrative tribunal may be established especially in Dhaka.	The tribunal should be established with incorporating 50% of retired civil servants			Ministry of Law, M/o. Establishment.

D.2 Improving efficiency of personnel

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
01	Merit should be the basis for appointment, posting and promotion at all levels in all spheres of public administration.	Appropriate Process should start from the recruitment then followed in promotion.	Criteria of merit should be set	Rules and procedures should be amended, revised, framed	Cabinet Division, Ministry of Establishment, Finance, Law and Public Service Commission.
02	Discipline should be enforced in all spheres of Public Administration.	What sort of discipline? How to be enforced at all levels?	Further study is needed	A committee to be formed to study and suggest actions	Cabinet Division, Ministry of Establishment
03	Merit, efficiency, integrity, training and service records evaluated on the basis of fulfilling performance targets should be the guiding principle in promoting officials. The present Annual Confidential Report (ACR) form may be amended accordingly.	Yes. However, Annual Performance Report should be a tool for Development not for punishment.	Annual career counseling system for performance measurement system should be introduced. Annual Performance Report should be written timely and objectively.	The name of Annual Confidential Report should be renamed as Annual Performance Report	Ministry of Establishment.

Sl	Recommendations	Observations/ Comments	Further Action Suggested	Modality for Implementation	Responsibility for Implementation
04	Government should continue to provide more opportunities and encouragement for employment of women. Enabling environment for working women should be provided with suitable field accommodation, transportation, day-care centers, and separate toilets.	Timely and appropriate	Awareness and Advocacy role should be strengthened	Government should set a target and this should be included in all documents, plans including PRSP	Ministry of Establishment/ Ministry of Women and Children Affairs. Also Civil Societies and NGOs for awareness building Private sector may play complementary role in providing facilities of day care center and other provisions.
05	The Ministry of Establishment may speedily implement the Action Plan on training recommended by Public Administration Training Strengthening Study 1998.	50% faculties should be recruited having Govt. background and from the trainers pool as stipulated in PATP.	Prioritization of recommendations of the plan is a must	Strengthening of training wing of M/o, Establishment with professional trainers.	M/o, Establishment, BPATC, APD, BCS (Admin) Acade y
06	Officers as well as support staff should be given, as integral part of heir service condition, proper training in computer literacy and other skills in the light of changed	Strengthening RPATC's by the members of training pool.	Regular Training Needs Assessment and PTU plan should be prepared NTC should be more active	Ministry of Establishment should be bifurcated in two divisions, one as HRD and the other as Regulatory one headed by Additional Secretary	Cabinet Division, Ministry of Establishment with BPATC, Finance Division.
07	Instead of making ad-hoc pay revisions from time to time Government should adopt a forward-looking positive pay policy. Wages and salaries should be linked to Cost of Living Index (CLI) to offset their erosion by inflation. A Pay research/adjustment cell should be created in the Ministry of Finance to adjust the salary annually to the cost of living index of the employees of the Republic	Appropriate	Regular adjustment is needed.	Permanent monitoring cell	Ministry of Finance. Private sector
08	For career advancement and equitable scope for promotion for all cadres appropriate steps should be taken and in case of non-availability of vacancies for the competent incumbents selection grade/time-scale may be considered.	What is appropriate step?	Special incentives for performance should be introduced equally for all cadres.	Necessary rules should be framed by experts	Ministry of Establishment and Ministry of Finance.

Strategie s for Implementation and Institutional Support

One of weaknesses of the previous commissions and committees was the lack of keeping provisions for appropriate mechanisms for implementation of recommendations. PARC has considered this issue and recommended in its interim proposals setting up of a Public Administration Monitoring Commission (PARMOC) for monitoring reform implementation measures. PARC has also recommended a structure of the proposed PARMOC to institutionalize the reform process. The present government has set up a high powered Secretaries Committee to review PARC recommendations and suggest necessary steps implementation of practical and immediate recommendations, besides the implementation of some major recommendations; present government has so far implemented 18 interim recommendations. This process may continue until further decision on the institutionalizing of the PARMOC or any other body.

The success or failure of reform depends largely on the influence and power structure in the organization and on the influence and power of persons and groups who support or oppose the organization. Administrative reform does not mean mere change of names and structure of some organization. Rather it means changing the behaviour of those involved. Administrative reform can be implemented effectively only if they have a high-level political support and enlightened public opinion behind them (here involvement of civil society is a must).

Administrative reform must be suited to particular conditions and needs that characterize a country's state of political development at a given period.

Conclusion

Improvement in governance will, in turn, improve public service delivery efficiency. PARCs also explained the scopes of such improvements which deserves due attention. The urgency also underscored the development partners like USAID, World Bank who also suggested a number of reform actions in government domain.

Enough measures have been suggested as far as the recommendations are concerned. Nonetheless, few have been implemented to date. A number of reform suggestions have been implemented and many of them are in the pipeline. Lack of political commitment, absence of relevance of the suggestion in the light of good governance, inadequate institutional support and legacy of bureaucracy, etc. are some of the loopholes hinder the progress. However, implementation of some of the suggestions indicated that this is an ongoing process, which is steered by the government.

Reforms in administration are become a diverse agenda as it covered a number of issues to spearhead improvement in public sector. A number of issues can be considered which is not recommended in the PARCs but deserves attention in order to ameliorate service in the public sector. Time management, intra and inter-departmental coordination to implement programs, handling grievances and training on governance are some of the issues which are concurrently associated with the daily business in the civil service.

Mere suggestions are not enough to reform government services and this must be translated into actions in this respect. Identification of doable tasks coined from the PARC suggestions will differentiate the line of action. Implementation of tasks demonstrates the actions of government, which is stepped up when certain tasks are prioritized from the rest. It will be spelled out in the government actions that are entrusted with the responsibilities to adopt the reform agenda in the administration. A proper implementation framework is expected to improve the efficiency of the government toward better governance in the civil service of the country.

REFERENCES

Ahmed, A. (1979) Administration of Local Self-government for Rural Areas in Bangladesh, Dhaka; Local Government Institute.

Ahmed, E. (1979) "Dominant Bureaucratic Elite in Bangladesh", The Indian Political Science Review, XIII (1) , January, 1979

Ahmed, S.G. (1972) "Local Government in Bangladesh Concerns and Priorities" , Local Government Quarterly, 1(2) June, 1972

Algorvine, (1966) "Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change" in Guthrie S. Birkhead (ed.) Administrative Problems in Pakistan, New York: Syracuse University Press.

Caiden, G. E. (1965) Administrative Reform, Chicago; Aldine Publishing Co

hund-Hyun RO (1984) "Social Change and Administrative Reform in Asia Toward the Year 2000" Proshashan, No.2, Nepal, March, 1984

Dey, B.K. (1971) "Administrative Reform-A Perspective Analysis", Indian Journal of Public Administration, 17 , July-September, 1971

Dror, R. Backoff, (1974) "Operationlizing Administrative Reform for Improved Governmental Performance", Administration and Society, 6 May, 1974.

Dror, Y. (1977) "Strategies for Administrative Reform", in Arne F. Leemans (ed.) The Management of Change in Government, The Hague; Matinus Nijhoff

Dubashi, P.R. (1984) 'Review to Theory of Local Government' by M.A. Muttalib and Mohd. Akber Ali Khan in the Indian Journal of Public Administration, XXX(1), January-March, 1984

Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (1968) Seminar Report on Administrative Reforms and Innovation, 11 (Kuala Lumpur; 1968)

Finan, W.F. and A.L. Dean (1957) "Procedures for the Preparation and implementation of Administrative Reforms", International Review of Administrative Sciences, 23, 1957

Gable, R.W. (1963) Introduction to District Administration, Lahore; University of Southern California, Public Administration Project.

Government of Bangladesh (1973) Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee, (M.A. Choudhuri Committee), part-II; The Administration, Dhaka; Government Press.

Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (1982) Resolution on Reorganisation of Thana Administration, Dhaka; Cabinet Division.

Government of Bangladesh (2000) Report of the Administration Reform Commission, Public Administration for 21st Century, Presented to the Hon'ble Prime Minister of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Volume 1, June 2000, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Hoque, A.N.S. (1970) Administrative Reforms in Pakistan, Dhaka, National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA).

Hoque, A.N.S. (1970) "District Administration in East Pakistan- Its Classical Form and Emerging Pattern", Administrative Science Review, IV (.1) March 1970

Hoque, A.N.S, (1986) Local Government Institution-Building in Bangladesh and Their Development Potentials, Seminar Paper, Dhaka; 1986.

Inayatullah and Q.M. Shafi (1969) Dynamics of Development in Pakistan Village, Peshawar; Academy for Rural Development.

Khan, M. M. (1980) Bureaucratic Self-Preservation-Failure of Major Administrative Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan, Dhaka; University of Dhaka.

Khan, M. M. (1980) Failure of Major Administrative Reforms in the Civil Service of Pakistan, Abstract for seminar paper, 1980

Khan, M.M. (ed.), (1981) Administrative Reform Theoretical Perspective, Dhaka; Centre for Administrative Studies, University of Dhaka

Khosla, J.N. (1970) 'Administrative Reform in India; Perspective and Lessons', in Lee and Samonte (eds.), Administrative Reform in Asia, Manila; EROPA,1970

Lee, Hahn-Been (1970) "Introduction" in Lee and Samonte (eds.), Administrative Reform in Asia (Manila; EROPA,1970); Also in 'An Application of Innovation Theory to the Strategy of

Administrative Reform in Developing Countries', Policy Sciences,I, (Summer),1970, pp177-189.
Misra, B.B. (1970) The Administrative History of India 1834-1947, General Administration, New Delhi, Bombay; Oxford University Press.
National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) (1981) A Study on Decentralisation of Administration and People's Participation at all Administrative levels in Bangladesh, Dhaka; NIPA.
Saxena, A.P., (1980) Administrative Reforms for Decentralised Development, Kuala Lumpur; Asia and Pacific Development Administration Centre.
Siddiqui, K. et. al. (1984), "Local Government in Bangladesh: Some Major issues and Problems" in K. Siddiqui (ed.) Local Government in Bangladesh, Dhaka; NILG
Tepper, E. (1964) Local Government in East Pakistan, Dhaka; Unpublished Paper
Tepper, E. (1966) Changing Patterns of Administration in Rural East Pakistan, Comilla; Pakistan Academy for Rural Development
Tinker, H. (1954) The Foundation of Local Self-government in India, Pakistan and Burma, London; University of London, the Athlone Press.

ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANISATION IN BANGLADESH PARLIAMENT SECRETARIAT: A MOVE TOWARDS NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

ATM Obaidullah

Introduction

With the ever-increasing demands and aspirations of the people in a modern democratic state, organizational and administrative instruments appear inadequate in coping with the new burdens being placed on them. In the contemporary global context characterized by triumph of market forces and reorientation of state policies towards deregulation, privatization and liberalization, there have been fundamental changes in the scope of structure, principles, missions and norms of public service all over the world (Djamin 1991, Haque 1991, 1996). Our epoch, in many respects, is full of radical novelty. There is therefore, a need for radical redesign of governance and policies based on a 'conceptual revolution' (Ball et al. 1988, Thsgrd 1992) in order to achieve the necessary capacities to govern". The event and issues may change and unforeseen problems may emerge, but public service must have the capacity to address such changing events, issues and problems. In recent years confidence in public services has diminished to a considerable extent all over the world. The leading political figures in the USA, the UK and Canada have overtly denounced public bureaucracies and introduced reforms emulating the techniques used in the business sectors (Campbell, Collin and Peters 1988, Dilamn 1988). In the last quarter of the 20th century there has been a significant shift within the field of public administration. Traditional bureaucratic values and norms have been undermined in a number of ways. One aspect of this trend has been the emergence of a new paradigm, which has come to known as New Public Management (NPM) (Yamamota 2003).

Imperatives of NPM Reforms

In Bangladesh like those of other countries, civil service lost its credibility and image in the minds of all strata of citizens, designated otherwise as "inefficient" and "ineffective" civil service both by the national and international analysts. The reasons underlying the low image, inefficiency and ineffectiveness of civil service are its incompetence, lack of managerial skills, knowledge and training to cope with the demands of hyper - rapid changes of time (World Bank 1996,. 1999). Government is seen as "preoccupied with process, too pervasive, too centralized, overly bureaucratic, and discretionary in governance, wasteful, unaccountable and unresponsive to the needs of the people' (World Bank 1996: 3-4). The large majority of government agencies do not appear to have any commitment to do and even acknowledge the principle of ultimate responsibility to the tax-payers. Public servants should be concerned with what users want, rather than what provides is prepared to give; regrettably GOB agencies do not view their activities from these perspectives. The relationship has turned into benefactor and beneficiary rather than service and provider and receiver. 'State is considered to be simultaneously omnipresent and virtually absent' (World Bank 1996: 3).

Against this backdrop the need for reforming public administration in Bangladesh in the spirit of NPM is all the more urgent since the existing system/structure is not at all congenial for coping with ever increasing demands of independent nation of a democratic polity.i. Considering the due importance of administrative reforms for ensuring pace of national development and process of democratization at both national and sub national levels Bangladesh Government appointed more than dozen of major administrative reform/reorganization committees since its independence in 1971. Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) of late in 2000 made several recommendations like performance based accountability of the civil servants, recruitment and promotion on the basis of merit, rationalizing/downsizing manpower in the public sector, increasing oversight on the executive, reducing waste and corruption in public sector, decentralization of administration, and increasing the speed and quality of service delivery, in line with NPM (GOB 2000). However, no significant change in the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the management of public affairs in line with NPM are discernible in last decade as recommended in PARC. In this paper I would like to make a modest

attempt to shed some light on the undergoing reorganization efforts in Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat which is the backbone of support and most crucial organization of ensuring good governance. For more than one decade Parliament Secretariat has been undergoing massive reorganization efforts . Here an attempt is made to examine its organizational and human capacity development within parameters/fundamental principles of NPM and assess ensuing result in the organization and behavior of its personnel. Of course, Parliament Secretariat reorganization will be measured not against the NMP as package rather, against certain parameters of NPM like efficiency, output control/result orientation, decentralization/delegation of authority, and higher service standard/delivery. In the following pages the areas which we will focus on are reorganization of secretariat in general with especial focus on the parliamentary committees and over all development of organizational and human capacity of the secretariat.

Conceptual Definition of NPM

For convenience of analysis of the reform efforts within the parameters of NPM we would draw brief a conceptual definition of NPM. There has been debate over the precise definition of NPM (Dunleavey, Patrick and Hood 1994) as it is considered to be an umbrella (Metcalfe 1998 cited in Yamamoto 2003) term covering wide range of meanings. According to Hope NPM outlines five key factors: (1) The adoption of private sector management practices in the public sector; (2) An emphasis on efficiency; (3) a movement away from input controls, rules and procedures towards output measurement and performance targets; (4) a preference for private ownership, contestable provisions and contracting out of public services; (5) The devolution of management control with improved reporting monitoring mechanism (Hope 2002 cited in Baird 2004) Hood and Hughes held the views that four kinds of changes constitute the NPM, such as: changes to focus on output, alternative to administrative inputs, changes in scope of governmental agencies, changing accountability relationships and political leadership as managers becoming more responsible for results (Hood 1995, Hughes 1994 cited in Khair 1997). According to Hood, despite the precise definitional problem, the guiding principles of NPM have basically been agreed among scholars, and summarized in the following seven doctrines:

3 See GOB (1972): Civil Administration Restoration Committee Report, 1972, GOB: Administrative and Service Reorganization Committee Report (ASRC), 1972, GOB: National pay Commission Report, 1973, GOB: Pay and Service Reorganization Committee Report, 1976,GOB: Committee for Administrate Reform and Reorganization (CARR) 1982, GOB Towards Better Government GOB: Administrative Reform Commission Report 1996, Public Administration in the 21st Century, 2000 (PARC) Report, etc. deserve mention.

4 Series of studies on increasing efficiency and effectiveness of Parliament have taken place for example, Asia Foundation 1991by Jane Ann Lindley, DFID Bangladesh 2001 Deborah Williams and David Watson, Dr. Nazma Chowdhury UNDP 2002, Linda Buchanan, Daniel Blais and ATM Obaidullah, UNDP 2004, David Butcher, UNDP 2005 Linda Buchanan and Dr. Nizam

1. An emphasis on hands-on professional management skills for active, visible, discretionary control or organization (freedom to management);
2. Explicit standards and measures of performance through clarification of goals, targets, and indicators of success;
3. A shift from the use of input controls and bureaucratic procedures to rules relying on output controls measured by quantitative performance indicators;
4. A shift from unified management systems to disaggregation or decentralization of units in the public sectors;
5. An introduction of greater competition in the public sector so as to lower costs and achievement of higher standards through term contracts;
6. A stress on private-sector -style management practices, such as the use of short term labor contracts, the development of corporate plans, performance agreements, and mission statements;
7. A stress on cost cutting efficiency, parsimony in resource use, and "doing more with less" (Hood 1991, 1995 cited in Yamamato 2003).

The principles of NPM are in general characterized by an emphasis on output controls, the disaggregation of traditional bureaucratic organizations and decentralization of management authority, the introduction of market mechanisms, and customer oriented services (Hood 1991 cited in Yamamato 2003). The NPM approach to public management was in general founded on a critique on bureaucracy as the organizing principle within public administration (Dunleavy 1991). Bureaucracy it was claimed, is plagued by progressive inflexibility based on complex hierarchical rule-based systems and top-down decision making process, which causes it to become increasingly distant from citizen's expectations (Yamamato 2003).

Parliament Secretariat in Bangladesh

Parliament Secretariat is established under the authority of the Article 79 of the Constitution and undertakes all its mandated tasks within the provisions of Parliament Secretariat Act 1994. It is the backbone of support for the Hon MPs and Committee chairs in the discharge of their onerous responsibility of legislation and oversight on the Executive. Parliament Secretariat will perform all secretarial services for the parliament and other responsibilities entrusted upon it under the Rules of Procedures of Bangladesh Parliament in general.

Hon. Speaker is the Executive head of the parliament secretariat. All authority is vested in him; he delegates power down the line for the due discharge of official business. Speaker makes the provision for the distribution of the work of Parliament secretariat by rules or standing orders.

Below the Speaker there is the Parliament Secretary who is also a secretary to the Government, supported by additional secretaries, joint and deputy secretaries and large body of officials/employees hierarchically organized for the due discharge official responsibilities. Secretary is held responsible to the Speaker and subject to overall control of the Speaker all other officers and employees are responsible to the secretary for the discharge of their official business. Parliament secretariat, like different government ministries, is divided into wings, branches and sections. There are six wings in Parliament secretariat. These are:

1. Legislative Support Wing
2. Committee Support Wing
3. Inter Parliamentary Affairs, Security and Planning Wing

5 GoB, Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Art. 79

6 For the responsibilities of the Secretariat see Art 4 of the Parliament Secretariat Act, 1994

7 For the kind of authority that Speaker exercises and position he holds, please see GOB, Parliament Secretariat Act, 1994 Act No. 8 (Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary), May 18, 1994

4. Administrative Support Wing
5. Human Resource Wing and
6. Finance and Information Services Wing

One of the distinguishing features that separate the Parliament Secretariat from different Government Ministries/Departments is its autonomous character enshrined in the Parliament Secretariat Act 1994 with the provision of having Parliament Secretariat Commission. Parliament secretariat is not under the jurisdiction and control of any Ministry/Division of the Government. It can directly communicate with any Ministry, Division, Department or any other institutions of the Government. The Parliament Secretariat Commission is the highest policymaking body comprising of the following members:

a. Hon Speaker, shall be the Chairman;
b. The Prime Minister or any MP nominated on his/her behalf;
c. The leader of the opposition or any MP nominated on his/her behalf;
d. The Minister in charge of the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs or any MP nominated on his behalf;
e. The Finance Minister or any MP nominated on his behalf.

The Parliament Secretariat Commission advises with regard to determining the number of the officers and employees of the Parliament Secretariat, their enhancement/ reduction, prepare annual budget for this Secretariat and expenditure of money allocated under the budget. Secretariat Commission also determines its own course/ procedure of action. The officers and employees of the secretariat are recruited by the Recruitment Rules made under authority of the Act of 1994.

Reorganization Efforts in Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat (1991-2005)

In last fifteen years Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat has been undergoing massive reforms in respect of its organization, procedures and human resource management so that it can provide efficient and effective support to the Members of Parliament and its Committees for efficient disposal of their mandated roles. In one and half decade six comprehensive studies have been undertaken under the sponsorship of Asia Foundation, DFID Bangladesh and UNDP, to increase effectiveness of Bangladesh Parliament in respect of legislation and oversight on the Executive. In the following pages, I would briefly outline the major findings and recommendations of the said studies.

Asia Foundation, 1991

Jane Ann Lindley from Asia Foundation for the first time undertook an extensive need assessment of the parliament in 1991 focusing on the how to strengthen oversight function of the parliament, reforming parliamentary committees, independence of parliament secretariat,

---

8 Parliament Secretariat Act 1994, Act No. 8, Art. 7(1)
9 Parliament Secretariat Act 1994, Act No. 8, Art. 7(2)
10 Parliament Secretariat Act 1994, Act No. 8, Art. 7(3)
11 For the method of recruitment see Parliament Secretariat Recruitment Rules 1994, Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary May 31, 1994.
12 See Jane Ann Lindley, An Assessment of the Institutional Development Needs of the Parliament of Bangladesh, Asia Foundation, 1991, Dr. Nazma Chowdhury, Implementation Plan on Strengthening of the Parliament, UNDP, 1997, David Watson and Deborah Williams, Support to Parliamentary Committees in Bangladesh DFID, 2001, Linda Buchanan, Daniel Blais and ATM Obaidullah, Organizational Review Report, UNDP, 2002, David Butcher, Efficiency of Parliament Secretariat, UNDP, 2005, and Linda Buchanan and Nizam Ahmed, UNDP,2005

refurbishing library, disseminating parliamentary knowledge, establishing code of ethics for the members, providing research and documentation services to the members and so on. Jane Lindley of course, acknowledged that in practice no two parliaments in the world are identical; however, she put forward a long list of recommendations drawing from the best parliamentary practices in the world. The major recommendation of Lindly Report is mentioned below:

Reorganizing the committee structure; reducing the total number of committees, eliminating chairmanship by any Minister, and circulating the minutes of committee meetings to all MPs,; make the Parliament secretariat independent of the executive and accountable to the House through the Speaker; ensure broad public dissemination of parliamentary documents, review and amend as appropriate the "Rules of Procedure of parliament and devise and adopt a " Code of Conduct and Ethics of Members of parliament; establish a Legislative Advisory Services Offices, to assist Members with legislative drafting and related legal research;. reorganize and expand the Parliamentary Library into a legislative information center; designate the library as a legal depository of all published documents; introduce computer technology for providing rapid bibliographic access to the library's collection; refurbish the Member's reading room with appropriate furnishings and incandescent lighting; launch a suitable member Orientation Program to educate members about the intricacies of parliamentary work and their rights and responsibilities related thereto; assess the adequacy of current staffing situation viz-a-vis Parliament's anticipated requirements under the constitutional mandate; Revise job responsibility; performance standards and service rules and regulations as necessary to bring them into conformity with the new requirements of an independent and more highly professionalzed parliament secretariat; establish a Manpower development and Training Section; continue the computer skills training program now in progress; commission a feasibility study in the very near future to fully assess the parliament's technology utilization requirements and to determine the cost effectiveness of and relative priorities for converting various secretariat functions to on-line computer operations (Lindley 1991).

Organizational Review Mission 2002, UNDP

Shortcomings of the Existing Structure

Prior to the organizational review by UNDP under the auspices of Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy Project (SPD), DFID Bangladesh conducted a prima facie assessment of the Parliamentary committees and staffing situation of the parliament secretariat. DFID noticed a haphazard situation of the parliamentary committees and very low profile of the secretariat officials particularly in the middle and upper levels. They suggested a through organizational review of the secretariat for providing effective services to the MPs and Committees chairs. Organizational review of the parliament secretariat as component of the SPD project and subsequent review by a mission is the outcome of the DFID observation.

An Organizational Review Mission consisting of international and national experts delved into the organizational and procedural aspects of the parliament secretariat in 2002 and made the prima facie observation that

Parliament Secretariat being a traditional bureaucratic structure focused inward on rules and procedures, compartmentalized, structured on a class-based system and essentially frozen in time to a high command control organization with all of the authority for decision making being vested in the Speaker's Office and work being manually done. The results indicated that the Secretariat, in its present form, finds it difficult to respond adequately to the needs of Parliamentarians and to changing circumstances particularly that associated with the introduction of technology (Buchanan and Ahmed 2002:ii).

See David Watson and D. Williams (2001)

The Mission identified a number of shortcomings in the organizational structure of the secretariat in general and chaotic conditions in its Committee Wing in particular. In addition, inadequacies in the IT infrastructure for proper dissemination of information to the MPs for debate and legislation in the House and oversight functions of the committees through the Legislative Information Center (LIC), lack of function based job-description of the officials and delegation of authority for quick decision making in administration and hold them accountable for result deserve mention (Buchanan and Ahmed 2002: ii).

Major Findings of the Review Mission

The Mission after having in - depth discussion with the senior management of Parliament /Secretariat, including the Speaker, Chief Whips of Government and Opposition along with top rank of the officials came up with 33 three findings against ten issues which included modernizing Organizational structure of the secretariat, reorganizing parliamentary committees, leadership and management, refurbishing human resource management, planning process, use of technology reallocation of office space and so on. The major findings of the Review Team are:

The Speaker is granted legislative authority to protect the independence of the Parliament Secretariat; the structure of the Secretariat provides for the management of human resources on the basis of employee class; information is collected along employee class lines; decision making tends to be compartmentalized and not supportive of a holistic organizational approach; the budgetary planning process does not seem sufficiently flexible, at the Secretariat level, to allow for adaptation to changing organizational needs; women, particularly at the Class IV level seem underrepresented.; Recruitment and promotion of staff appear not to be based on specific job requirements ;for appointment by deputation and contract, procedures have not been set out to assess the degree to which an individual meets the educational, knowledge, and personal suitability required for effective performance in the posts; The top senior management posts of the Secretariat have been filled on a contract basis or by deputation, the result of which may slow career paths of existing Secretarial staff; Managers are not delegated authority to effectively manage the recruitment and deployment of staff and are not held accountable for their decisions in this regard; concentration of the authorities in a single office has calcified the organization and rendered it less flexible to evolving changing needs and priorities; Management style is characterized by risk-avoidance consistent with a hierarchical bureaucratic structure emphasizing control and top-down decision making; current content and format of work descriptions severely limit their use in identifying the skills, knowledge and personal suitability required for performance; Annual Record of Performance reflects a traditional organizational culture with little opportunity for the manager and the employee to openly discuss performance issues, training needs and career aspirations; although managers indicated that they use job standards in the assessment of performance, documentation was not made available for review; Basic human resource management tools such as up-to-date organizational charts and data aggregated at the Secretariat level was difficult to obtain; dissatisfaction exists with the actual location of the offices in relation to the substantive units to which staff are attached; The ultimate authority for the preparation, review and approval of the budget is the Speaker; The ultimate authority for expenditure approval, other than salaries and remuneration, is the Speaker; The Speaker approves expenditures even if they have already been included in the budge; In fact the Speaker plays a dual role of being the approving officer for all budgetary items at the formulation stage as well as being the cash disbursements authorizing officer for most items; Approximately 55% of the 2002-2003 Secretariat budget is for direct Secretariat administration and staff expenses with the remainder for support and remuneration of MP's and VIP's; There is no on-line transmission of data and figures between the budget formulation /implementation unit, the Secretariat, and the recording unit, the Comptroller's office; the exact needs of the Parliament members as well as the needs of the Secretariat staff should be determined in a more detailed and systematic manner so that the services supplied by the library are more relevant to this needs (Buchanan and Ahmed 2002: 4-19).

Major Issues and Recommendations of the Organizational Review Report

The recommendations have been developed to build on institutional memory of the parliament secretariat. They focus on organizational issues, which the Secretariat needs to address to develop the

capacity to effectively and efficiently support Parliament and to respond to the needs of Parliamentarians. In the view of the Mission, the Secretariat, as all traditional bureaucracies, in their present structure, with their bureaucratic policies, management practices, management style and procedures remain incapable of focusing outward and responding to changing environments (Buchanan and Ahmed 2002: iii).
The recommendations are targeted towards creating an organization that is more flexible, that has the capacity to focus outwards to respond to the needs of Parliament and Parliamentarians, that creates an independent and professional group of civil servants, that allows for effective administration and managing of organizational resources (money, people and technology) (Ibid).

The Mission put forward 53 recommendations to address 10 crucial issues affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Parliament Secretariat in providing quick, objective and up date information to the Honorable MPs to discharge their legislative and oversight functions in the House and Committees efficiently. The mission envisaged core issues like a reorganized committee wing, decentralized decision-making, information technology based management, open, participative leadership style, and merit based human resource management in Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat where non-performers are corrected and good performers rewarded. With these issues in view the Mission Report recommended that:

- Adoption of a modern organogram for clear demonstration of organizational location of each office with existing manpower in the Secretariat
- Delegation of authorities to enable each section, branch and wing to manage their own domain efficiently and quickly respond to the needs of MPs
- Post descriptions all top-level and mid-level posts with specimen descriptions for selected non-supervisory posts for the proposed organization to shift towards understanding the role of their area of responsibility in contributing to the functioning of Parliament, and hold them accountable for carrying out mandated tasks;
- Set out Performance key performance standards associated with the post
- Streamlining the committee wing into four clusters of Ministries under respective deputy secretaries to create institutional memory for Parliament Secretariat
- Linking debate, editing and printing and publication sections through LAN for quick printing of House and committee proceedings
- Modernizing LIC with IT facility capable of responding to the needs of MPs
- Establishing an Information Technology branch and renaming deputy secretary establishment as deputy secretary 'human resource' under Establishment Wing for application of technology and efficient management of personnel and in the secretariat.
- Refurbishing recruitment and promotion policies
- Linking CAG office with Parliament Secretariat to reconcile expenditure inputs of parliament on time, and
- Adoption of integrated planning process to set priorities of Parliament Secretariat and get all sections, branches and wings involved in the planning process.
- Restructuring Accounts with the objective of having a more specialized and efficient segregation of responsibilities

  Redesigning office space for ensuring efficient and timely communication and accessible proximity to Parliamentarians (Buchanan and Ahmed 2002: iii-iv).

Benefits of Reorganization
Mission Report envisaged the ensuing benefit following the implementation of the proposed re-organization of the Parliament Secretariat.

- Reorganization of Committees Wing will contribute to better committee support
- Additional functions to the Establishment will assist to transform the organization from class-

based to function based

- Reorganization of accounts will produce more realistic budgeting decisions and timely and comprehensive management reports. It takes into account the CAG's role with respect to accounting and external oversight functions
- Introduction of Information Technology Branch will enable the Secretariat to manage the introduction of technology to increase efficiency and effectiveness. It will also provide the Secretariat with the capability to produce management and other reports necessary for planning and monitoring organizational results
- Sub- Delegation of authorities from Speaker's Office will enable the Secretariat to hold administrators accountable for producing results
- Introduction of integrated planning process creates the flexibility on the part of the Secretariat to responding to the changing needs of Parliament and changing external circumstances and to plan and coordinate work across wings, branches and sections
- Revised recruitment, promotions and other human resource policies will support the creation of a professional group of civil servants with improved quality of work
- Arrangement of office space allocation and accessibility supportive of flow of work among individuals, sections, branches and wings will provide increase efficiency and effectiveness
- More timely preparation of House proceedings and committee reports through the use of information technology
- Less administrative approval work for the Speaker allowing for more concentration on legislative issues. Better legislative, financial, human resource, and administrative control information on which to scrutinize Secretariat's decision making
- More realistic budget to support members needs. Better financial information of operating costs of wings, branches and sections

Bangladesh contribution to successful international development best practices experience in parliamentary and democratization issues (Buchanan and Ahmed 2002: 218-220).
Honorable Speaker accepted the Report after series of consultations and approved of its quick implementation. A seven member Implementation Committee with Secretary of Parliament Secretariat as its convener is constituted to expedite its implementation. Implementation Committee has already considered more tan 30 recommendations covering major issues like adoption of proposed organization chart, decentralization of decision- making, use and impact of technology and management style and leadership and integrated planning approach in the parliamentary secretariat.

Reorganized Parliament Secretariat

Capacity Development and Need for a Training Institute

Capacity building of parliament secretariat relates to the enhancement of capacity, where capacity means " the ability to carry out particular task or function (Larbi: 1998:188). As defined by Larbi it has two dimensions: 'internal organizational capacity, which is a function of human resource, management/leadership, financial resources, and information resources; and external institutional context within which the mobilization and use of organizational capacity occurs-factors emanating from economic, social and political environment (Ibid).

In this context the function which is to be carried out, is that of administration, and such capacity refers to the enhancement of the resources and environment necessary for administration. For many scholars who study the developing world, NPM should be a secondary thought, which can only be addressed once capacity building measures have been introduced, enhancing the basic skills and tools of administration. After steps have been taken to improve capacity then it may be appropriate to advocate NMP reforms, but for many people the initial goal should be limited to the establishment of traditional administration (Peters 2001: 176).

Efficiency does not grow automatically in vacuum, it has to earn and nourish over the years. It requires organizational streaming and enhancement of the skills of the personnel work in it. For no administration can be better than men and women who administer it. However, there is no such thing as universal efficiency as every organization calls for different kind of aptitude and skills to meet the specific needs and far reaching objectives of the of organization. That is the reason why almost every kind of organization today in the contemporary world - Government, Autonomous, Semi- Autonomous and even Non Government Organizations (NGOs) has its own Human Resource Development (HRD) Strategy and mechanism. Training, in this respect, is considered to be a sine quo non of skill augmentation for individual and institutional capacity building of an organization in general.

It goes without saying that Bangladesh Parliament is primer political institution in the entire fabrics of the government with special mandate, nature of jobs, norms and rules of the game, which the officials/employees should know to carry out its functions efficiently. It is engaged in the unique functions of making laws and exercising oversight on the Executive branch of the government and act as the focal point of governance.

Unlike any Ministry/Division Bangladesh Parliament is an autonomous body administered under the Parliament Secretariat Ac, 1994, managed by verity of officials with heterogeneity in character and diversity in experience and academic background. After induction in the Parliament Secretariat, any official may be assigned to any section, for example, legislation, committee, reporting, public relations, establishment, protocol etc under respective wings/branches/sections to carry out the specific responsibilities for any post and mandate of the section/branch and wing of the Secretariat. However, Parliament Secretariat, like other Ministries/Departments of the Government, has no " Established Training Institute", as such, for its new entrants to equip them with the new skills required for efficient disposal of the job that an incumbent is immediately assigned with or augmenting their knowledge for assuming greater and varying responsibilities in their career (SPD/UNDP 2004).

Here it is worth mentioning that Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat Act 1994 retains a provision for training of its officials and employees. And a Training Cell was established in 1998 with two Deputy Directors, designated as "Training Specialists" were appointed on deputation that ceased to exist after the launching of the "Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy" Project (Ibid).

At present all research, training, seminars, workshop/roundtable and orientation for the Hon. MPs and officials of the secretariat are sponsored under the umbrella of Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies (BIPS) as one of the components of the SPD project. To go ahead with this august intention, Parliament made an Act entitled "Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies Act, 2001 to institutionalize the project activities through the establishment of a full fledged Institute of Parliament, to be known as "Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies (BIPS)"

14 BIPS, as such, is the component of SPD engaged in the service of providing training and research support to the MPs and Committee Chairs

15 For the envisaged function of the BIPS see Art 7 of Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies Act, Act No. 14 Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary 2001, April .11

Organizational Capacity Development of Parliament Secretariat

Nature of Changes

On the basis of the recommendations of the Asia Foundation, DFID and UNDP studies Parliament Secretariat has undergone considerable structural reorganization. The kind reorganization that have taken place include adoption of a modern organization chart, reducing layers of decision making, delegation of authority in financial and administrative matters, reorganization of parliamentary committees, constitute a separate wing named Human Resource, introduction of control register to identify the implementation status of work, Refurbished Legislative Information center (LIC), Revamping Training Cell, Establish Budget Analysis Unit (BAU), job description for all officials and employees, and adoption of integrated planning approach for the parliament secretariat and introduction of E-Governance deserve mention.

For developing capacity of Parliament Secretariat it has adopted a modern organization chart/ Organogram for clear demonstration of organizational location of each office with existing manpower in the Secretariat. In order to increase speed in the decision-making and service delivery, decision making layer has been reduced; additional secretary level is taken off and brought at par with joint secretaries in the present organogram. Parliament Secretariat also adopts control register/ forward diary to regularly monitor assignment of work and status of implementation and matters remain pending.

Parliamentary Standing Committees on Ministries have been reorganized and clustered into four groups such as Finance and Industry, Social Sector, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Communication and Regulatory Ministry Committee under the overall supervision of the Committee Wing headed by Additional Secretary Committee (Buchanan et al 2002: 22). Again, each cluster is placed under the immediate supervision of Deputy Secretary supported by committee section manned by committee officer/assistant secretaries. This arrangement is meant for streamlining committee operations and creating institutional memory of the committee wing. For the easy retrieve of committee decisions, proceedings of the committees of different parliaments (first-eight) have been classified and preserved systematically. Long - standing backlog of the CAG Reports in the Public Accounts Committee has been cleared for disposal of audit queries.

As a step towards building capacity of the secretariat and better management of human resources for the first time ever parliament has instituted a separate Wing named as Human Resource under over all supervision of a Joint Secretary to identify the organizational needs and weakness of the officials where improvement of efficiency and effectiveness is called for and set out appropriate human resource policies, particularly the training of Secretariat officials to provide support to the members of parliament in their mandated roles.

In order to increase dynamism in the administrative management of the secretariat Delegation of authorities in administrative and financial matters has been granted down to branch level headed by Deputy secretary to enable each section, branch and wing to manage their own domain efficiently and quickly respond to the needs of MPs. And for that matter job description of all officials/employees have been put in place to hold them accountable for carrying out mandated tasks and gradually transform a traditional class based bureaucracy into a function/result based one. In order to ensure open style of management, integrated planning process and fixing the priorities of the secretariat, section, branch and wings have been integrated through the

16 Recommendations of the Organizational Review Report 2002 (Buchanan et al 2002) and decisions of the Secretariat
17 Order: Delegation of authority to Parliament Secretariat Officials, Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat 2004

mechanism of monthly coordination meetings. Every section and branches are undergoing monthly inspections in order to assess the extent of implementation of the decisions taken, produce result and locate the problems to streamline the system.

In order to make the government more transparent, accessible and responsive to the needs of the people and make offices/departments gradually paperless/ least paper based and in line with avowed E - Governance policy of the Government Parliament Secretariat is gradually being brought under the E-Governance scheme. E-Governance Scheme intends to establish a transparent and dynamic management of the parliamentary affairs and electronically link Hon MPs' office/residence and integrate Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and general public into the parliamentary practices and procedures and institutionalize democracy from the grassroots. As an immediate step of the e-governance scheme parliament secretariat will come under Local area Network (LAN) and all MPs and Committee Chairs would be connected with the secretariat and their constituents through email.

Legislative Information Center (LIC) the library of the Parliament Secretariat is provided with furniture, books, equipment and website. With the help of the project's technical expertise, LIC has now been able to sort and index its 100,000 pieces, including a rare specimen of historical documents. Books have been bar coded and online catalogue facilities have been instituted. Over 20.000 pages have been scanned and stored electronically. The LIC has dedicated a special room known as "MP's reading room" equipped with computers with access to internet and individual E-mail accounts. Parliament website was also established to expose our members of parliament to global parliamentary network.

Parliament Secretariat intends to provide enhanced support to the Hon MPs in respect of understanding and analysing national budget from multi-dimensional perspective with especial focus on implementation of PRSP. With this aim in view a Budget Analysis Unit in parliament secretariat is being established with expert support from both public and private sectors. This office will assist MPs in holding knowledge based debates in the House by providing sectoral analysis of budget and explanatory notes on economic policy in respect of macro economic development and governance.

Meanwhile, much of the project life has been elapsed and going to be winded up in December 2006 as planned so far. However, no progress is in sight towards the establishment of the said Institute since enactment of the said Act in 2001. Against this backdrop the project has planned to refurbish "Training Cell" of the Parliament vis-à-vis establishing BIPS, as "second line of defense" . Project has already started off to this new direction of refurbishing the "Training Cell" - provided logistics on the basis of need analysis of cell, training of the trainers to create a resource pool in the secretariat with the objective of providing training to all categories of the secretariat officials to render efficient services to the MPs and Committee Chairs in the law -making and oversight functions on the Executive and holding orientation of new Members of Parliament and Workshops/Seminars as and when necessary.

Reorganization of Parliamentary Committees

Transparency of the government and accountability of the Executive to the Parliament are the cardinal features of democracy and good governance and that can be achieved through the process of parliamentary committee oversight along with other control mechanisms like Question Hours, Adjournment Motions, Resolutions, Cut - Motions, Call - attention Notices in the House. Unlike those mechanisms, which refer to specific actions, committees provide the fora where the activities and functioning of the executive branch of the government could be examined and s

18 See David Butcher's Mission Report, SPD/UNDP, Dhaka 2004, pp.12-14

19 For details of organization and training cell see Report on Training Needs Assessment, SPD/UNDP, Dhaka, 2004

scrutinized. In fact committees serve as working arms of the legislature (Choudhury 1997:13). A regularly functioning and powerful committee system is a reflection of the empowerment of the parliamentarians themselves. A strong argument in favour of strengthening the committee system of parliament rests on the ground that it affords the parliamentarians the opportunity to directly oversee the executive. Participation in committees provide MPs with first hand knowledge of the working of the government, policy and programming issues and thus enable them to gain some degree of expertise in these matters (Ibid).

The Parliament of Bangladesh has traditionally made some use of committees. SPD, as part of its strategy of helping the Parliament improve its overall performance, has extended different kinds of support to make the parliamentary committees effective. The Project recognises that committees provide the backbone of Parliament and, as such, has adopted several steps to ensure that these function properly. A report prepared in 2004, by an international consultant in collaboration with a local consultant, has identified several areas such as, professional support to committees, logistic support, Rules of Procedure (ROP), orientation of committee chairmen and members, committee-ministry relations, where deficiencies are to be noticed. It has suggested a number of measures to rectify those deficiencies such as formation of a core team of professional and specialised support to committee chairmen and members, provision of improved logistic, orientation of committee chairmen and committee members, change in ROP, strengthening relationships between the PAC and the C&AG, improving the operational relationships between the committees and the ministries and provision for committee budgets.

Another report , prepared in 2005 by the same consultants, has suggested measures for improving the competency skills of the committee secretaries and committee officers. It has recommended standardised formats for preparing committee proceedings and writing reports, standards of service to be provided to committees by the Committee wing, training programmes for officials of ministries and training of committee officials. This report has also identified several areas where practices currently being followed by committees conflict with the ROP and suggested measures for rectification. Another report, prepared by an international consultant, has also suggested different ways of improving record keeping in the Committee Wing.

Most of these recommendations have been accepted in principle and measures have already been taken to implement some of the important recommendations, especially those relate to orientation and orientation of committee chairmen and members, training of Committee Wing officials, provision of logistic support to the Committee Wing and strengthening relations between the PAC and the C&AG. A Manual on the operational relationship between the PAC and C&AG has been prepared; while programmes for strengthening relations between committee officials and council officers of ministries have been finalised and are expected to be implemented early next month. Measures have already been taken to improve and update record keeping in the Committee Wing. Before the intervention of the Project, it was extremely difficult to locate different records. These were kept in a haphazard manner. Access to different documents was extremely difficult. Now almost all of the records have been kept in a systematic manner. Records of committee meetings, committee reports, and attendance of members, subcommittees, status of implementation of decisions and other related issues have now been updated.

---

20 See Buchanan and Nizam (2004) Final Report : Adviser to Parliamentary Committee, SPD/UNDP, Dhaka 2004

21 See Buchanan L, and Ahmed Nizam (2005a), Final Report: Competency Skills Workshop for Committee Secretaries and Committee Officers (Dhaka, SPD/UNDP, 2005

22 See Buchanan L, and Ahmed Nizam (2205b), Report on Record Keeping (Dhaka, SPD/UNDP, 2005)

Under the existing Rule, the Speaker has to get some of the proposals, especially those relate to change in ROP, approved by the Committee on Rules of Procedure (CROP). He has also to consult the Secretariat Commission and some important ministries to implement proposals for structural changes. CROP has already accepted the SPD proposal for sending the budget to the committee. Under the existing Rule, the budget cannot be referred to any committee. The proposal to allow a member to speak in the House on his/her dissenting opinion as appended in a committee report has also been accepted. Some other important proposals of the SPD that relate to committees are still under consideration by CROP.

The extent to which the reforms made in the Committee Wing on the basis of the recommendations of various reports has actually made any significant impact on the dominant behaviour of the people associated with committees and/or on their work procedures is difficult to ascertain. It is, however, now widely recognised that committees have become more client-responsive; committees can also undertake their mandated activities with relative ease now than before. Beneficiaries readily acknowledge its contribution. For example, those who have participated in different training sessions and workshops rated them just slightly below excellent. On average, they considered that the workshop/ training contents would be, to a significant degree, useful on the job. They also judged that the workshops/training have improved, to a significant degree, their skills and knowledge. They are now better capable of advising the committee chairmen and members; the latter (chairmen and members) also consider their exposure to parliamentary procedures and practices abroad made possible with financial support of SPD very useful and rewarding.

Human Capacity Development of Parliament Secretariat Need for BIPS

It is too much to expect that a training cell could bear the massive responsibilities of Training and refresher courses for all categories of officials of the Parliament Secretariat; Organizing study tours for the officials; organizing orientation program of the new Members of Parliament; holding seminars/roundtables for MPs on the Parliamentary Practices and Procedures that can be accomplished usually by a full - fledged Parliamentary Training and Research Institute like Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training in India. In view of the growing magnanimity of Bangladesh Parliament following the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1996, "Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy" BGD/97/003 duly conceived of the importance of establishing a similar type of 'training and research institute' named Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies (BIPS) for Parliament after experience of Indian Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Research, to constitute a body corporate for undertaking comprehensive training and providing research support on Parliamentary Studies to the MPs and Parliament Committee in particular and establish a knowledge base for the Parliament in general, and manage day today training for the secretariat officials and Orientation program/refresher courses for the MPs.

As such, all the capacity development programs for the members of parliament and secretariat officials are taking place under the initiative of SPD Project as mandate of proposed BIPS. For the last five years the project is imparting comprehensive training that emerged necessary following training need assessment by a training consultant.

Training Areas/Curriculum

The entire training curriculum for the secretariat officials is divided into three categories like foundation training, legal advance training and specialized training for specified section of officials for the particular competency development in view of the need of different sections of the staff member. It is worth mentioning that more than 500 officials of the secretariat ranging from Class 1 to Class III have been trained under the umbrella of BIPS of the Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy Project in the areas of parliamentary practices and procedures, in the budget making process, the committee

functioning and oversight mechanism, office management, record keeping, gender issues in parliament, use of information and communication technology through comprehensive computer training, and communicative English language training by the British Council experts. In addition, some officials have been trained overseas, especially in Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) UK and International Law Institute (ILI) USA, in the areas of Parliamentary Administration, Performance and Rewards and Management, legislative Drafting and Problem Solving and Financial Management, in order to expose them to developed parliamentary practices and replicate them to the Bangladesh Parliament to the extent it is applicable.

The "Foundation Training", was intended to instill preliminary knowledge amongst the officials of the secretariat on the Constitution of Bangladesh, Rules of Procedure, legislative process, Parliament Committees, budget process, organs of the government etc. that were considered fundamental to know about the Parliament, its mandate and its interfaces with other organs of the government. "Advanced Legal Training" (ALT) on the other hand, aimed at infusing knowledge about legal fabrics of government and society, important Acts, that help government administer the state, institutionalize democracy, ensure governance /good governance, protect rights of the citizen etc that officials of supreme law making body should know. Specialized training is imparted especially to the committee support staff and committee secretaries in view of the specialty of their job. They are trained in preparing agenda, writing minutes/reports and record keeping.

In addition, project is providing Communicative English Language Training (CELT) and Computer Skill Augmentation Training (CSAT) to the Secretariat officials by the professional trainers of the Dhaka British Council and Transvent Developers Consortium (TDC) all round the year to match them with global standard. Moreover, journalists who cover Parliament during session are provided training at BIPS with view to improving their capacity of writing and reporting on the affairs of parliament, particularly to cover the business of the House objectively and non-partisan manner to increase awareness of the people and educate public about the Parliament and its functions in general.

An impact assessment study (Lentz 2004) of the training for the secretariat officials show that "training so far imparted in different areas at different stages have got a varying range of success, however, one can undoubtedly say that trainings have made fairly satisfactory impression on the officials in their real job situation. Majority of the participants of the foundation and advance legal trainings have rated them as having almost fully achieved its objective (75- 100%). Impact study reveals that training should be focused in those areas where specific persons need specific skill development and include such areas as motivating subordinates, preparing minutes, setting objectives and so on

Implementation Arrangement

Implementation of the reform measures is the most crucial stage and uphill task where most of the major reform efforts get buried unceremoniously in developing countries. "The entire exercise of setting up commissions to formulate schemes of reform is basically utilitarian. It is absolutely pointless to engage in evolving recommendations if they do not gain, in a reasonably short time, acceptance and implementation. It is much better to have second class recommendations resulting in first class implementation rather than immaculate proposals with indifferent and partial implementation" (Maheswari 1972: 144). The high attrition rate of major reform efforts in this subcontinent is attributed to the resistance given by top bureaucratic machinery that holds key positions in the entire edifice or administrative structure. It is believed that where bureaucracy plays an institutional role instead of instrumental, have their own way of working virtually independent of political overseers. "Instead of being meekly obedient as expected, they challenged the right of political leaders to dictate to them, resisted any attempt by outsiders to impose administrative reform on them, and mustered their own independent power base to force political overseers to back down" (Bjur and Caiden 1981: 116). However, in the context of implementing reform measures in Parliament secretariat, it is rather sluggishness of the bureaucracy than the resistance caused much delay in the implementation in the initial phase of the reform initiatives. Consequently, Hon Speaker and UNDP agreed to sign a Letter of

Agreement (LOA) to higher United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to implement the activities under approved Annual Work Plan (AWP) of the SPD Project. Nevertheless, the pace of implementation has never been same or always as expected. In the last 2/3 years with the full cooperation of the Speaker and the senior management of parliament secretariat and UNDP, project comparatively easy to get all of the Project Reports approved and implement most of the planned activities under AWPs.

Observation and Conclusion

Despite implementation of administrative reform in the public sector being the uphill tasks, in the context of Parliament Secretariat it has not been so much difficult, though much time consuming and slower than expected. The extent of implementation depends much on the content and context of reforms and political will to implement it. In most cases, administrative reforms, both in national and local governments, have been thrust upon either as a donors intervention or a brainchild of powerful man at the helm of state authority for political expediency. In parliament Secretariat reforms have always been formulated in consultation with the stakeholders matching with the needs of the situation, which is implementable in the prevailing context.

In parliament it is advantageous to implement reform measures because of the unfettered position of the Speaker. He is not only the head of the Parliament but also the head of the Parliament Secretariat Commission-the highest body in respect bringing any reform. /reorganization under Parliament Secretariat Act 1994. Hence, if the Speaker is convinced that proposed reform/reorganization will benefit the Parliament, no one else is in a position to hinder it. Moreover, any reform measure where there is no major structural reorganization of the Secretariat is involved, Speaker can approve of it by executive order for implementation without placing it in the Secretariat Commission. However, in the case on-going reforms both the procedural and structural changes are called for and for that matter Speaker's approval in the form of Executive Order as well as in the Secretariat Commission were considered necessary.

Whatever is the process and however difficult it is to implement reforms, Parliament Secretariat has undergone quite considerable reforms in one decade or so. In the foregoing discussion we have mentioned about the major changes. Compared to 1990s, the present Secretariat is different in many respects in its organization and procedures.

It has adopted new organization chart/organogram, reduced the layer of decision making hierarchy; introduced performance based accountability of the officials through specific job description; reorganized parliamentary committees to create institutional memory; refurbished parliament library to provide wider access to information to MPs; adopted open style of management across the sections, branches and wings to facilitate integrated planning; introduces control registrar to monitor status of implantation of any decision; revamped parliament training cell to be self-sustained in training; introducing Budget Analysis Unit to provide MPs with more opportunities to analyse and understand budget in totality and help them hold more informed and knowledge based debates in the House during General Discussion; introducing E-Governance to ensure transparent and dynamic administration; and trained parliament journalists to widely disseminate the knowledge of Parliament to the public.

In respect of human resource development, creation Human Resource (HR) Wing under the supervision of a Joint Secretary is a commendable step. With the cooperation of HR Wing project now finds it easy to organize any training/workshop for the Secretariat officials. As a matter of fact in last five years all Class I officials up to Deputy Secretary levels have received trainings necessary for efficient disposal of their mandated roles including use IT and English language for effective conversation. Class II and Class III employees were trained in the areas of office management, research methodology and record keeping what they are meant for. In addition, they are also provided training with the use of computer technology

and communicative English language. As a matter of fact there is hardly any official/employee left out of the ambit of training that SPD Project imparted.

Finally, from the forgoing analysis of the changes that have taken place following the implementation of different Reports/activities of the Project "Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy" it is obvious that Parliament Secretariat has earned considerable capacity both - organizational and human, in respect of disposal of their mandated tasks and deliver services to the stakeholders quickly. Delegation of authority in financial and administrative matters down to the Deputy Secretary level has rendered parliament secretariat more dynamic to enable each section, branch and wing to manage their own domain efficiently and quickly respond to the needs of MPs. Reduced decision making layers help secretariat come to quick solution of the problem and provide effective services more expeditiously. Improvement of human resources through general and specific trainings have transformed secretariat into a backbone of support services to the MPs and Committee Chairs in making laws and keeping oversight on the Executive. The officials and staff are now in a position to perform both the administrative and specialized legislative functions like drafting private members bills, preparing agenda, writing committee minutes, preparing reports in proper formats, preserve records in classifieds manner and disseminate proceedings/information to the MPs, Committee chairs and Ministries according to schedule. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that parliament secretariat focuses on organizational and human efficiency that is required for producing results that a legislature is expected of. Parliament Secretariat, as such, is not engaged in input controls, rules and procedures, rather moving towards output measurement and performance targets, capable of delivering services to the stakeholders - the core values of New Public Management. However there is no reason to be complacent of, rather we can say that transformation of Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat within larger parameters of NPM is in sight. Yet it is long way to go.

Notes:

i See for example the annual report on the state of the Australian public service (APSC 2005).

ii This pattern is not confined to the public sector: private organisations have mixed success, the majority not achieving major transformations.

iii It should also be noted that some conceptions incorporate citizen engagement and intergovernmental dimensions, which are not the focus here.

iv Note the observation that: 'Lack of rewards for good performance and sanctions for substandard performance of unproductive or absent workers undermine morale and reduce output, which in turn leads to a spiral of overall poor performance' (Urban Institute 2006: 48).

REFERENCES

Ball et al, (1988) Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press

Bjur, W.E. and Caiden, G.E. (1981) 'Administrative Reform and Institutional Bureaucracy' in Khan MM (ed.), Administrative Reform: Theoretical Perspective, Dhaka: Center for Administrative Studies, Dhaka University.

Buchanan, Linda, Daniel Blais and ATM Obaidullah (2002) Organizational Review Report, UNDP, Dhaka.

Buchanan L, and Ahmed Nizam (2004) Final Report: Adviser to Parliamentary Committees Dhaka, SPD/UNDP

Buchanan, Linda and Ahmed, Nizam (2005) Organisational Review Report, UNDP, Dhaka.

Butcher, David (2005) Efficiency of Parliament Secretariat, UNDP report, Dhaka.

Campbell, S.J., Collin and B. Peters, Guy (1988) 'The Politics/Administration Dichotomy: Death or Merely Change?' Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 2:79-99

Chowdhury, Nazma (1997) Implementation Plan on Strengthening of the Parliament, UNDP Report, Dhaka.

Dilamn, D.L. (1988) "Thatcher Agenda, The Civil Service and Total Efficiency" in Ali Farazmand (ed), Handbook of Bureaucracy: Muscles, Prayers and Other Strategies, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

Djamin (1991), "Public Management in the Coming Decade: Perspective for Development and Reform" in G. Bahadur, N. Pradhan (eds) Public Management in the 1990s: Challenges and Opportunities (Manila: EROPA 1991), pp. 9-16

Dror. Y (1998) 'Delta- Type Senior Civil Service for the 21st Century', International Review of Administrative Science, 64: 13

Dunleavy, P. (1991) Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, N.Y. , Wheatsheap Harvester

Dunleavy, Patrick, and Christopher Hood (1994) 'From Old Public Administration to New Public Management', Public Money and Management, 14(3): 9-16

GOB (1972) Civil Administration Restoration Committee Report, 1972, Dhaka

GOB (1972) Administrative and Service Reorganization Committee Report (ASRC), 1972, Dhaka

GOB (1972) Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

GOB (1973) National Pay Commission Report, Dhaka

GOB (1976) Pay and Service Reorganization Committee Report, Dhaka

GOB (1982) Committee for Administrate Reform and Reorganization (CARR) Report, Dhaka

GOB (1994) Parliament Secretariat Act, 1994

GOB (1996) Towards Better Government, Administrative Reform Commission Report, Dhaka.

GOB (2000) Public Administration in the 21st Century (PARC Report) Dhaka.

Haque, M. Shamsul (1996) 'The Intellectual Crisis Public Administration in the Current Epoch of Privatization', Administration and Society, 27

Haque, M. Shamsul (1998) "Legitimization Crisis: A Challenge for Public Service in the Next Century" International Review of Administrative Science , 64

Hood, C. (1991) 'A Public Management for all Seasons?' Public Administration, 69: 4-5,

Hood, C. (1995)'The New Public Management in the 1980s: Variation on theme Accounting', Organization and Society, 20(2/3):.93-109

Hope, S.N. R. (2002) 'From Crisis to Renewal: Developing Policy and Management in Africa, p.157 in Matthew Baird, The Global Influence of New Public Management: Case Studies from Africa. http://www.publications.villanova.edu/Concept/2004/Global%20Influence%20of%20New%20Public%20Management.pdf

Huges, O. E . (1994) Public Management and Administration, NY: St Martin 's Press Inc,
Lenz, Katrin (2004) Impact Assessment: Training for Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, Dhaka, August 7, 2004

Khair, R. (1997) 'New Public Management: Panacea for Reform in Public Sector?' Bangladesh Journal of Administration and Development.
Larbi, G.A. (1998) 'Management Decentralization in practice: a comparison of public health and water services in Ghana' in Martin Minogue, Charles Polidano and David Hulme (eds) Beyond the New Public Management: Changing Ideas and Practices in Governance, Northampton, MA. E. Elgar
Lindley, Jane Ann (1991) An Assessment of the Institutional Development Needs of the Parliament of Bangladesh, Asia Foundation, Dhaka
Maheswari, SR, (1972) Administrative Reforms Commissions, Agra: Laksmi Narain Agarwal,
Metcalfe, Les (1998) 'Accountability and Effectiveness: Designing the Roles of Accounting Game' cited in Hiromi Yamamoto, New Public Management - Japan's Practice, IIPS, 2003.
www. Iips.org/bp293c.pdf
Peters, B.Guy (2001) The Future of Governing, 2nd Edition, Lawrence, KA, University Press of Kansas
Thsgsrd, P. (1992) Conceptual Revolution , Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press
UNDP (2004) Report on the Training Need assessment of Bangladesh Parliament, Dhaka: SPD/UNDP
Watson, David and Deborah Williams, D. (2001) Support to Parliamentary Committees in Bangladesh DFID Report
World Bank (1996) Bangladesh: Reforming Public Sector, Government That Works, Washington D.C., World Bank.
World Bank (1999) Bangladesh: Strengthening Public Administration Training, Washington D.C., World Bank.
Yamamoto, H. (2003) New Public Management - Japan's Practice, IIPS, 2003.
www. Iips.org/bp293c.pdf

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM; 'GOOD' IS EASY TO DEFINE AND AGREE- HOW TO ACHIEVE IT IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT

Donald Curtis

Introduction

This paper draws upon what I learned from experience in one small civil service improvement project in Bangladesh, the MATT (1) programme. Reflecting upon that experience I found;

- an excessive reliance upon 'the British experience' of reform, which is of limited relevance to Bangladesh
- too much donor pressure to establish agendas and processes; now possibly declining as aid dependence decreases
- a need to focus upon positive social, administrative and political dynamics wherever and whenever these can be identified
- and to find ways for remaining donor resources to catalyse rather than conditionally govern, processes of change

The analysis in this paper depends upon an understanding of good governance that is becoming widely acknowledged but the implications of which are not always thought through. As stated above, 'there are no simple, universal, formula for good governance'. Formulations such as 'The New Public Management' or 'The Third Way' [product of New Labour in Britain], or the World Bank's [post market ideology] recommendations for public service delivery (World Development Report 2004) all advocate a mix of state, market and civil society agents in public management. This sounds prescriptive but is only a recognition that the state cannot manage everything. It follows that a national civil service has to position itself and relate to other forces within the political economy of the society. Bangladeshi and UK civil services now find themselves operating are vastly different social and political contexts and we should expect rather different kinds of response.

The paper will make use of Cultural Theory to produce a framework for thinking about institutional structures, as well as internal and external processes and relationships. Cultural Theory analysts (Hood 2000) suggest that all institutions may be biased towards hierarchy, or group, or individualist, (sometimes fatalist) values BUT that no institution is a pure type. For instance the classic model of the British Civil Service saw it as based upon hierarchy, but mediated by 'old boy networks', without which nothing much got done. The present day model of the British Civil Service emphasises entrepreneurial skills and personal responsibility but has to temper this individualist trend with continuing elements of centralist, hierarchical controls. Post-modernists see positive virtues in such 'hybrid' structures - provided, of course that they 'work' - that they serve public purposes, not private.

This paper argues that hybrid structures are also both a necessary and inevitable feature of the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). Pure hierarchy is not only unachievable but would also be rigid to the point of paralysis. Effective civil service structures and processes still require ranked and ordered decision making, yes, but also, positive roles for both;

- individual initiative to 'get things moving' and personal networks of trusted persons ['personal equations'] to overcome hierarchical shortcomings and delays, and
- group solidarity, maintaining 'esprit de corps', mutually reinforced performance standards, and protection against arbitrary powers.

The problem is that personal networks can also be used for exchange of personal favours and as such are associated with rule avoidance and corruption. Solidarity is often seen as the means whereby privilege or bad practice is protected. So 'reform' is often set against these things.

This dilemma is addressed in this paper by arguing that it is not networks or solidarity that is the problem but rather their purpose. Using trusted personal relations to achieve public outcomes is good. Solidarity to protect service standards is good. How to put these things together while ensuring the BCS is public service oriented is a problem that only appropriately motivated Bangladeshis can work out. Possibly there are some pointers or examples in some existing well motivated large Bangladeshi organisations. The question for external parties - donors and others - is how to help create the conditions for such a happy process.

The Elusive Ideal

In my experience most civil servants in Bangladesh are remarkably willing to admit that their service has many shortcomings. Many would also join with international commentators in supporting the above-mentioned list of desirable public service qualities; honesty, transparency, accountability, efficiency, and so forth. However, in this paper my argument will be that;

- there are no ideal systems anywhere
- all systems are built upon contradictory values that sometimes clash
- in all administrations there is ongoing debate and conflict about values and good practise
- every system experiences tensions with the surrounding society

My analysis is sociological but I have a word of caution about sociological analysis in this context. The most sociological of the early Development Administration scholars, Fred Riggs (Riggs 1964) built elaborate explanations as to why modern administration would not easily take root in Asia. Subsequent writers such as Bernard Schaffer continued to argue that a public sector penetrated by inappropriate patron / client relations cannot function effectively, but took a less determinist position. He argues that accommodation to modernist realities can take place if there is 'room for manoeuvre'. This is a line of argument has been continued today in relation to Bangladesh by Geoff Wood (Wood 2000) to which I refer below. The point to note however is that the early scholars were referring to countries that today include the Asian Tigers where rapid and largely effective change has taken place in the administrations as well as the economies. However the dynamics of these changes - whether economic growth enables administrative change or the other way around - is far from clear. What is clear is that improvements have been made internally by people who see personal as well as collective benefits in making the improvements.

Effective Imperfection

My argument can be seen as a development of this 'political ecology' perspective. If the goal is good governance, the objectives need not be high moral principle or perfect systems but effective practice . Effective practice is about 'getting things done'. It is about whatever arrangements will achieve identified public [as against private] purposes. It will inevitably draw upon many social values and relationships and in so doing will accommodate a range of existing social mores within or around formal processes. The pragmatic approach to reform looks not to high principle but to the reality of social relationships within systems and at the interfaces between systems

---

23 One reason for Bangladesh's regrettably high ranking in Transparency International's listing of the 'most corrupt' is that, unlike some other countries, Bangladeshis are very open in acknowledging and complaining of weaknesses in their system. Since Transparency International bases its listings upon reported opinions this has the effect of pushing the country up the list.

24 Some donors have recognised this, as is evident in their shift from the term Good Government to Better Government

(Long 2002). It is at this level that room for manoeuvre can be identified and change can take place.

The paper concludes with a brief review of three different strategies through which necessary changes and accommodations can take place;

- strengthen entitlements by improving demand and accountability mechanisms
- restructure functions to 'fit' institutional strengths
- focus upon public purpose and adjust incentives

How to make Improvements: Two Considerations

1. Innovation is necessary but costly and often unsuccessful

There is no such thing as a static administration. Change is constant, whether for the better or for the worse. All change absorbs energy.

Improvement usually requires deliberate administrative initiatives. Existing routines have to be disturbed. All such disturbances cause a hiatus that has to be managed somehow. A large percentage of such initiatives fail to achieve their purposes because they are inadequately thought through or are not supported by affected personnel. Often reform initiatives are abandoned or replaced by another initiative. These problems are exacerbated when the initiatives are driven from the centre, or demanded by external agents who are not necessarily aware of local contingent circumstances.

2. Effective Administration Always Draws Upon Contrasting Principles Of Social Coordination


This statement draws upon a key finding of Cultural Theory and provides the basis of the analysis that follows. Cultural Theory suggests that all social systems are biased - in ways that I rehearse below. Public administration anywhere is likely to be biased towards hierarchical values and principles but effective practice calls for elements of group solidarity and individualist initiative, without which any out of the ordinary incident or activity cannot be managed. In the BCS the contrasting principles may include values that are often presented as entirely inappropriate within the administration such as the patrimonialism of tadbirkar / tadbir relations or the social solidarity of civil service associations and unions (T. Rahman forthcoming). I argue however that it is not the relationship that matters, rather it is the purpose to which it is put, private or public. The second reason for a pragmatic approach is therefore that such accommodations are not really predictable and must be allowed to emerge.

Social Systems Are Biased But Pure Types Do Not Exist

My interpretation of Cultural Theory relies heavily upon biology for appropriate metaphor. Social systems evolve. Within any social system, whether a public service or a kinship structure, there are many practices and relationships that appear redundant - are simply there because they 'always' have been. Like plant or animal species all social systems have their own particular characteristics. How seniors relate to juniors will not be precisely the same between one culture and another, for instance. Cultural Theory nevertheless attempts some generalisations about types of culture and biases within them. Cultures can be said to differ along two dimensions of relationship; one concerns the extent to which group values are promoted over individual - or the other way around. The second is about what the founder of the theory, Many Douglas, refers to as 'grid'; the degree to which the society is rule-bound (Douglas 1982).

Putting these two dimensions together one arrives at a four box diagram. Each dimension is said to represent a continuum but most writers in this tradition claim that four very different types of value system are so identified. Each describes a type of social coordination [except perhaps for fatalism which is rather isolated and passive]. For instance the organisational principles that keep a group together are not really compatible with either individualist values or hierarchical values. Individualism does not go with hierarchy...and so on. Yet, while one principle will dominate in any one setting, the others are always in evidence. All organisations live in a degree of tension.

Diagram 1: Cultural Bias



Cultural Theory also suggests that individual ac tors have their own preferences or biases (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990).

Diagram 2: Personal Biases

Fatalist	*Hierarchist*
'The system is against me I know my place My future is 'in the lap of the Gods''	'I am comfortable with: - known routines - clear instructions - acknowledged seniority'
'If I want it done I do it myself - Or ask a favour from my friend'	'I like to share, to; - be part of a team - have reliable colleagues - think together'
Individualist	***Groupist***

Most people within any particular society are however familiar with and able to operate across the whole range of types of coordination. Civil servants in Bangladesh all know how to 'Sir' their superiors in the service even if some are personally more comfortable in team-work situations where mutuality of commitment and effort takes precedence over boss / subordinate relations. Most know how to handle tadbir requests in different contexts. They may be more or less comfortable with such approaches and

more or less ready to comply or avoid compliance. Most officials can be happy within batch-mate settings or within the more obvious mutual interest relationships of a civil service association. All such relationships are within their repertoire of known behavioural patterns, even if each is perhaps personally happiest within one kind or another. So it is a multi-value repertoire that most civil servants will bring to work each day. It is multiple competences in the 'genetic codes' of social relations that enables civil servants to respond to new opportunities or challenges in public service.

All Systems Have Weaknesses As Well As Strengths

The BCS, in its formal rules certainly, is biased towards hierarchical principles, reporting lines and delegations, rules and disciplinary procedures. When these principles appear to be failing the normal response if to attempt to tighten the rules [grid], as Crozier (1967) noted many years ago in his study of French administration. Sometimes civil service reform programmes reinforce this tendency. In Cultural Theory this would be seen as increasing the 'grid' like characteristics of the organisation, which may have the effect of increasing the negative as well as positive features of hierarchical systems.

At this point the strengths and weakness of biased systems can be listed. Hierarchical systems have the strengths and weaknesses as in Diagram 3

Diagram 3 : Hierarchical System: Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths	**Weaknesses**
Speed	
Routine	
Order	
Obedience	Rigid
[as Max Weber noted]	Top –down
Can deliver deliverables	Unresponsive
	Absolutist
	Not a listener
	Corruptible
	Fails when faced with complexity

We can look also at the strengths and weaknesses of group biased institutions or organisations. Public managers in Bangladesh, both historically and today, often make appeal to the values and organising strengths of groups. The Comilla system relied heavily upon cooperatives. Micro-finance today is founded upon the idea that groups of poor people can be relied upon to generate mutual savings and to mutually guarantee personal loans. Some commentators take the view that mutual trust is seldom achieved in Bangladesh but there is evidence that traditional forms of cooperation are alive and well in some places. Jennifer Barenstein describes the complex patterns of cooperation through which flood protection, irrigation, drainage and fishing - all essential to livelihoods - are organised by the local population of the Sonar Hoar (Sunamganj District) (Barenstein 2000). A point of note, to which I will return, is that the benefits of this cooperation are huge and the costs of failure are potentially catastrophic. In other words the incentives to overcome the organisational problems of common or public goods are strong.

Diagram 4 : Strengths and Weaknesses of Groups

Strengths	Weaknesses
Many minds make light work	Prone to factionalism
Sum of the parts is greater than the whole	Inward looking
Builds moral consensus	Consensual decision making can discourage innovation
Egalitarian bias	Ready to externalise blame rather than acknowledge shortcomings
Based upon sharing	Can discourage leadership
Self monitoring	
Can rise to the challenge of complexity	

The individualism that is being encouraged within some reform programmes and is particularly prominent in the 'modernising' UK public service also has both positive and negative inherent characteristics

Diagram 5 : Strengths and Weaknesses of Individualism

Strengths	Weaknesses
Free choice	
Mutual interest partnerships	
Market or networked access to resources	Monopoly incentives
Immediacy	Neglects common good, merit good wider public good issues
Flexibility	No redistributive incentive
Self-monitoring	
Leadership potential	
Sum of free choices = 'the greatest good of the greatest number'	

When the weaknesses of the three primary means of social coordination are set out alongside strengths it can be seen that any actual organisation is likely to have negative as well as positive potential.

A Note on Regulation


Note in passing that organisations will often attempt to prevent weaknesses by balancing principles;

- hierarchy; politically governed by a council or powerful individual
- group; accepting a chief or charismatic leader [as long as s/he in not too powerful]
- individualist; appealing to a hierarchical judicial system to mediate or judge in the case of conflict

Fatalism

The top left box in diagrams 1 and 2 in this paper identifies a culture that is usually seen as fatalist. I am inclined to see it in terms of alienation. It implies a culture in which people are bound by rules that 'do nothing for them', or are actively repressive, leading to what Douglas somewhere refers to as 'atomised subordination'. Cultural Theorists tend to be a bit vague about this culture, so I am going to be a bit speculative. I feel, perhaps wrongly, that there is more than a bit of fatalism in Bangladeshi public management culture [Taiabur Rahman (forthcoming) agrees, labelling BCS culture as 'Hierarchical / Fatalist]. My speculation is that fatalism emerges when social rules fail to deliver the private or public goods that citizens might hope to achieve and which are 'promised' by the associated political ideologies. In other words, market failure [collapsing industry, etc.], associational failure [corrupt unions, unrewarding political parties, decline in relevance of caste-like groups], or failing state agencies, as well as specific exclusions, all leave people alienated from the formal structures of society.

Diagram 6

Alienation follows - 'all is for the worst' 	Hierarchy 'failure' - individualist 'tadbir' relations disrupt service - unions protecting incompetence /corruption
Market / network 'failure' - rent seeking by state agents - invasion by gangs of thugs	Associational 'failure' - excessive hierarchical regulation and control - individualist exploitation breaking trust

The Way Forward

What are the ways forward? What strategies may be pursued to re-form or adjust public agencies for better government?

The early part of this paper suggested that, while change is constant and inevitable in any social institution, the radical change does not always [or even often] work and the costs of change are high. So gradual change, undertaken at the level of social action, rather than overall system would seem to be sensible. This is the level at which individual civil servants will be aware of contradictions and weaknesses in the systems that they must operate.

Pragmatic change will allow individual civil servants to draw upon their personal repertoires of social coordination, networking, solidarity, as well acknowledging hierarchy; to achieve results. In thinking through strategies, pragmatists will assume that the public good will be advanced if: each individual participant must see personal benefit and advancement as well as; common benefit [in good organisational performance and reward], leading to societal benefit.

In other words there is absolutely no point in attempting reforms that leave individuals with the perception that they will be worse off or their organisation is loosing prestige or income.

Three Potential Strategies

1. ***Strengthen entitlements***
   Geof Wood in his 'Prisoners and Escapees' article (2000) argues that the way forward for state, for civil society and for market is to strengthen entitlements. As discussed above in the section of regulation [which draws upon Wood's article], a weak state institution that is failing to deliver entitlements to citizens, such as health care or schooling, can be challenged to deliver better if NGOs champion citizen entitlements. Similarly, if NGOs become self-indulgent or neglectful, they can be challenged by the press, or by state monitoring agents. If individuals find that their land rights or market access is being undermined by corrupt practices they can seek redress through land users associations or from the law of the state. This way forward is through micro-politics.

   Within the civil service this 'entitlement' strategy would require individuals to use civil service associations as well as the law to protect their proper entitlements and responsibilities, as does indeed happen.

2 ***Restructure To 'Fit' Strengths***
   In my reply to Wood ('Cutting the Bars…' Curtis 2002), which largely supported his argument, I suggested a modification that acknowledges the fact that institutions are always imperfect and there are no pure types. At its simplest the argument would be that, if a public function does not actually require to be administered bureaucratically, perhaps it should be moved to some other kind of institution in which the incentives would work better. Registration of births and deaths in the villages is, I believe, already conducted by private individuals contracted to government. Another much discussed example is irrigation management, which international experience suggests is much more efficient, just and honest if managed by farmer associations rather than state bureaucracies.

   Most administrations have some scope for breaking out of bureaucratic procedure. When an administrative task is complex, or requires a speedy response room for manoeuvre is created by:
   - Individual civil servants put at arms length [I do not mean on OSD] with a delegated task to perform.
   - Task Teams are a recognised way of drawing upon group strengths to draw up a policy or execute a task
   - Projectisation; using project management structures is a further means of breaking the mould to facilitate expeditious work.

   None of these devices work however unless proper delegations are put in place .

3. ***Turn Private Behaviour Patterns To Public Purpose***

A further strategy would draw deliberately upon the cultural repertoire of civil servants, seeking to turn potential weaknesses into strengths. For example, if there is a situation of low trust in objective postings within the service, perhaps the trust that develops between a senior officer and a junior [personal equations] can be recognised, so that senior officers move with a loyal team through the administration. This happens; it might help performance to make it legitimate.

---

25 In UK delegations and contracts management remains a major problem area as the government attempts to establish more action oriented means of getting work done

If public service associations do not at present have a good reputation as promoters of sound administration, individuals with a vision for the future or the government itself could challenge such associations into a new interpretation of how the collective interest of the service can best be advances and turned to the interest of the nation.

Conclusions

This paper has argued for a non-ideological, pragmatic approach to reform. It has recognised that there are high costs in managing change that can be minimised by allowing adjustment and re-form of systems to take place at the operational level, where individual officers can be encouraged to draw upon their personal repertoire of cultural skills to make changes that work. Reforms, it has been asserted, have to work both in the sense that they advance individual interests and the common good. The basic trick for reformers is to get individual, collective and public good appropriately aligned. This is an insider trick. Outsiders can only encourage.

REFERENCES

Barenstein, Jennifer Buyne (2000) 'Is there an Endogenous Approach to Participation? Collective action in the hoars' Paper presented at the Sixth Workshop of the European Network of Bangladesh Studies, Oslo

Crozier, M. (1967) The Bureaucratic Phenomenon Chicago UP, Chicago

Curtis, D. (2002) 'Cutting the Bars: Thoughts on Prisoners and Escapees in Bangladesh', Public Administration and Development, 22:123-134

Douglas, M. (1982) 'Cultural Bias' in M. Douglas In the Active Voice London, Routledge

Douglas M. (1992) Risk and Blame, London, Routledge

Douglas, M. (1986) How Institutions Think, Boston, Syracuse University Press

Long, N. (2002) 'An actor oriented approach to development intervention' http://www.apo-tokyo.org/icd/papers/Selected_Papers/Dr.Norman_Long.doc

Rahman, Taiabur, (forthcoming) 'Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Bangladesh', Bangladesh Journal of Public Administration.

Thompson, M., Ellis, R., and Wildavsky A. (1990) Cultural Theory Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford Westview Press

Wood, G. (2000) 'Prisoners and Escapees: improving the institutional responsibility square in Bangladesh' Public Administration and Development, 20: 221-237

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. John Halligan is Professor of Public Administration and Head, School of Business and Government, University of Canberra, Australia. He has published 10 books and over 100 chapters and articles concentrated in the fields of public sector reform and public management and his current research interests are in the fields of government institutions and comparative public management and governance. Recent books include Parliament in the 21st Century, Melbourne University Press, in press; Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries, Edward Elgar, London, 2003 (ed.); Reforming Public and Corporate Governance: Management and the Market in Australia, Britain and Korea, Edward Elgar, London, 2002 (co-ed); and Australian Handbook of Public Sector Management, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2001 (co-ed.). Professor Halligan is currently completing a book on international performance management

Dr. Mohit Bhattacharya is a former head of the Commission on Local Government Reforms in West Bengal, India. An Economics Honours Graduate from Presidency College, Calcutta, Mohit Bhattacharya did his Ph. D from Calcutta University. He had been Hon. Fellow of Birmingham University, UK, and National Fellow of the ICSSR, New Delhi. Professor Bhattacharya had held the position of Professor of Organizational Analysis in IIPA, New Delhi, and later joined the Calcutta University as Centenary Professor of Public Administration. For two terms he served as Vice-Chancellor of Burdwan University. He has a number of papers to his credit published in learned journals. Among his many publications, the two anthologies published from Oxford University Press on Public Administration, and Administrative Innovation and Change (jointly authored) have received wide publicity. Professor Bhattacharya has a long track record of consulting work for donor-funded projects. Currently, he is on the Board of Directors of a Delhi-based development consultancy firm

Dr. Phang Siew Nooi is a Professor, Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. She has special interest in public administration, urban environmental management, with particular interest in local government management, and is a specialist in this area of research and development especially in Malaysia. She is associated as a country expert and research consultant with various local and international agencies such as the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, INTAN, Municipal Councils, UNDP, UNCRD, ISEAS Singapore, APEC in collaboration with University of Sydney, Asian Productivity Organisation in Tokyo, IDS Sabah, CLAIR Singapore, and lately with the Ministry of Human Resource of Malaysia. Professor Phang has authored and co-authored numerous local and international publications on Local Government Management and Finance as well as on Urban Environmental Management

Dr. Beh Loo See is a lecturer at the Department of Administrative Studies & Politics, Faculty of Economics & Administration, University of Malaya. She has a M.A. in Political Science and a Ph.D in Training Management. She teaches and research interest in areas of Communication in Politics & Administration, Public Enterprise and Privatisation, and Human Resource Management, Policy Analysis and Evaluation. She has published articles in international and local journals and has also presented papers in international conferences. She has also served as consultants for several national projects and as trainer/invited speaker for several public service administrations/institutions.

Dr. Jaytilak Guha Roy is Professor of Political Science at the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi. He is the author of six books viz., Human Rights for the Twenty first Century, Policing in Twent first Century, Prisons & Society, Policing A District, Child Victims of Crime, and Subhas Bose: The Man & His Mission. He has contributed research papers, book reviews, articles, monographs, occasional papers and chapters in a large number of edited books, academic and professional journals and leading newspapers. He has also conducted more than sixty Training Programmes for senior and middle level officers of the Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service, District and Sessions Judges and Scientists and Technologists. He is the guest faculty of over thirty leading academic and training institutions of the country. He is the fellow of the International Institute of Security and Safety

Management. Professor Roy is the Resource Person/.Consultant for a large number of official and non-official bodies in India including National Human Rights Commission. National Commission for Women, Bureau of Police Research and Development, Government of India's Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances and Indian Council of Social Science Research.

Iftikhar Ahmed, is a Member Directing Staff (Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Pakistan & Human Development), Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore. Mr. Ahmed joined the Civil Service of Pakistan in 1979 as a member of the District Management Group and has served in various capacities of the government. He has a master's degree in Financial Management from Michigan, USA and his special area of interest is Risk Management of investment portfolios. He also holds a masters degree in English Literature and B.Sc. from Punjab University. Mr. Ahmed is the innovator of "The PSIC Industrialisation Programme 2000" and "The PSIC E-com Shopping Mall" and has initiated the "Chief Minister's Self-employment Programme for Livestock Sector" and "The Punjab Dairy Development Programme" as private public partnerships in Pakistan.

Asoka S. Gunawardena is the Chairman of the Finance Commission of Sri Lanka, formerly of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS), having held varied positions in the public service of Sri Lanka. He has worked for the UNDP as Chief Technical Adviser, Management Development Programme in Myanmar and as Training Specialist in Law and Judicial Process, Building Capacity for Local Governance, Bangladesh. Mr. Gunawardena holds a Bachelor of Arts (Hon's) from University of Ceylon, Post-graduate Diploma in Development Administration, University of Leeds, UK. and a Master in Social Science from the University of New England, Armidale, Australia. He is a governance specialist with particular interest in decentralisation and sub-national government.

Dr. Mohammad Mohabbat Khan is a Professor of Public Administration at the University of Dhaka. He has been teaching in the University of Dhaka since July 1970 after obtaining his BA Honors in Political Science and MA in Public Administration from the University of Dhaka. He studied MPA at Syracuse University and did another MPA and then Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of Southern California, USA. .Professor Khan did his post-doctoral research at Cornell University and the University of Texas at Austin and had been a Ford Foundation Research Fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore in 1997. Proessor Khan, besides working in University of Dhaka, has also taught in University of Southern California, USA, University of Benin, Nigeria and Yarmouk University, Jordan. He served as a Member of Bangladesh Public Service Commission for five years, 1999-2004. He has also worked as a consultant for USAID, UNDP, World Bank, ADB, ILO, UNCHS and SADC. His areas of research specialization are corruption, governance, globalization, democracy, public sector management and reform, women and gender and urban management. Professor Khan has authored 13 books and 6 monographs and published over one hundred and sixty articles in professional refereed journals and contributed chapters in edited books. His recent books are Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh (South Asian Publishers [SAP], 1998), The Bureaucratic Ascendancy [co-authored] (SAP, 2005) and Dominant Executive and Dormant Legislature (SAP, 2006).

Dr. Mohammad Mahbubur Rahman is Secretary, Ministry of Establishment, Government of Bangladesh His expertise ranges from designing, managing and implementation of research programmes, programme/project and fund/ resource management & evaluation, Human and Institutional Capacity Building & Management (Human Resource Development/Management, Training and Re-engineering), Environment and Local Governance Specialist. While Dr. Rahman has worked in various capacities in different ministries and departments in the civil service in Bangladesh, he has also worked as a consultant for UNDP in areas of Sustainable Environment Management and Local Governance, for DFID in area of management of health sector, for NORAD in global warming and environmental issues in Bangladesh and for GTZ in area of training in health and population sector. He has experience as a lead country researcher for CIDA and UNDESD/UNDDSMS in areas of poverty policies and aid accountability. He has also worked as a training specialist for World Bank in area of environmental management. He has extensive publications which include books, articles and papers. His books include-

Poverty and Policy Coherence: Canada's Development Cooperation in Bangladesh, The North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada, November, 2001. (with Dr. Fahimul Quadir of Queens University, Canada); Bureaucratic Response to Administrative Decentralization. A Study of Bangladesh Civil Service, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1997; How to Get a Job, Matra Books, Dhaka, 1997; The Civil Service of Bangladesh, Khosroj Kitab Mohal, Dhaka, 1986; and The NGO and Consultancy Guide, 1986.

Dr. ATM Obaidullah is a Professor of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh. He is presently engaged in UNDP / UNOPS as Team Leader of the Project "Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy". His area of academic interest include Administrative Reforms, Bangladesh Constitution and politics, development administration,, public sector management, project management, parliamentary affairs and administrative law. Professor Obaidullah has published articles and books and among his books are Bangladesh Public Administration: A Study of Major Reforms (Academic Publishers Ltd) 1998; Democracy and Good Governance: The Role of Ombudsman (BIPS) 2001; Parliamentary Committees in Westminster System: Lesson for Bangladesh (UPL) 2006, forthcoming (coauthored with Dr. Nizam Ahmed). Professor Obaidullah has also worked for UNDP as a consultant on public sector reforms and parliamentary affairs.

Dr, Donald Curtis is an Honorary Senior Research Fellow, School of Public Policy, The University of Birmingham. Formerly, faculty member and Director of the International Development Department, The University of Birmingham, he now works as independent consultant and writer. Dr. Curtis has experience in research, consultancy, and teaching in public sector management, institutional development and governance. He has worked as a consultant in Nepal, South Africa, and Bangladesh in areas of local government, .He has written books, chapters and articles over the years, which include Giving and Sharing in Social Reconstruction; An account of the 'learnings' of the NGO-FP, Nepal (monograph, GTZ Nepal) 2002 and Beyond Government: Organisation for Common Benefit, MacMillan, 1991.

109696

LIBARY
Bangladesh Public Administration
Training Center Savar, Dhaka.