



**THE CAPABILITY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCE OF
BANGLADESH TO MEET FUTURE WAR**

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Certificate

This is to certify that Major Tawfiqul Bari, second in command 8 BIR, Rajendrapur Cantonment, bearing Roll number 135 of 126th Advanced Course on Administration and Development (ACAD) has prepared this seminar paper title on "Capability of Unconventional Warfare Forces of Bangladesh to meet Future Warfare". He has done this seminar under my direct supervision for the partial fulfilment of the course and he has followed all my instructions during his work.

I wish him every success.

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MEET FUTURE WAR

ABSTRACT

The mission of Unconventional Warfare Forces is to ensure public safety and security; mobilize the force for socio-economic development and to come under operational control of army during emergency/war. UCW will remain as an enduring and effective means of fighting war and recognized as a force multiplier. As per our existing military doctrine, UWF will be employed in conjunction with the regular forces from the very beginning of the war. To have a large number of well-trained UWF seems to be the most practical option for Bangladesh for future battles. The main objective of this paper is to assess the effects of blending the conventional warfare with unconventional warfare. In this paper it was found that the present training system and the capability of UWF of Bangladesh by following statistically and analytically method. Besides, it is also found that whether UWF of BD is presently capable to meet the future challenges or not by following the same method.

Keywords: Unconventional Warfare, Future War, Guerilla Warfare

1. INTRODUCTION

The Guerrilla/Unconventional Warfare has its glorious history. The warfare fought in different form and nature in the Boer War, the American Civil War and in the Spanish Civil War. The Cuban Revolution, the Algerian War and Indochina War are also famous for Guerrilla Warfare. Its application was again witnessed in Burma, Greece, Russia, Malaya and Yugoslavia during 2nd World War. The method of Guerrilla/Unconventional warfare got further matured in the Chinese Revolution under Mao Tsetung. In the recent past, Iraqis adopted unconventional methods during the war in Iraq against the USA and her allies. Bangladesh has its glorious history of fighting such warfare in the Great War of Liberation in 1971. This is more applicable in today's world where the belligerents are disproportionately stronger or weaker. This is where the concept of UCW comes in. At present context, UCW has got different views and connotations in different countries. However it is always employed to defeat the enemy, be it weaker or stronger. As such it is crucial to understand the contemporary thoughts relating to UCW and their connotations which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Present day's war is likely to be short and intense. To identify the vulnerabilities of the threat force and his doctrine, it will be essential to know his force structure, deployment, battlefield operating system, cohesion between various elements and personalities of the commanders. Future military confrontations will be multi-dimensional with non-linear operations characterized by movement, maneuver and high lethality. These necessitate Bangladesh to conserve her limited resources and employ those for maximum effect with minimum cost. To meet fourth generation warfare requirements UWF should be trained and equipped with the latest technology. Force concentration against threat forces weakness instead of the strength is likely to pay dividend. This paper will highlight the threat perspective, guiding parameters for blending conventional forces with unconventional forces and evaluation of the present condition of UWF.

2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1 List of Literatures Consulted. Literatures consulted during the conduct of research are given at bibliography.

2.2 **Findings from the Reviewed Literatures.** To get a general idea on UCW, UWF and the future war, the researcher analyzed few books, individual papers and research works. Findings from above mention literature which are seminal for the study are outlined below:

2.3 **Literatures Reviewed for UCW.**

2.3.1 **Sam, C Sarkesian** (1993) in his book, he undertakes a comparative study of U.S involvement in unconventional conflict based on the conviction that unconventional conflicts are likely to be most challenging for the United State and the least likely to be understood and the most difficult to reconcile with the American psyche.

2.3.2 **Thilanga Jayasuriya** (2003) talked about how UCW has begun to play a key part in national and international conflicts. He also assumed, it is likely that the future of warfare will be increasingly dominated by unconventional ways of fighting.

2.3.3 **The Draft GSTP** (2004) formulated by BD Army has specially outlined the organizational structure of the UWF, its command - control arrangements and coordinating agencies at different tiers including the process of force generation. It has also deliberated in sufficient details about the training modality, for the UWF both during peace and war.

2.3.4 **Literatures Reviewed for Employment of UWF.**

2.3.4.1 **Wahab** (2004) in his book described the events leading the creation of BD. He also explained how Mukti Bahini challenged the military hyenas of Pakistan on the battlefield. With the assistance of Indian Army how they used to conduct their operations and created fluid conditions in war. Therefore, it gives us a clear idea about the capability of our UWF during liberation war of 1971.

2.3.4.2 **Hossain** (2005) in his paper, he opined that the Special Forces of BD can be integrated with UWF for attaining the goal of regular forces. If the UWF and Special Forces are integrated together, it will pay more dividends to the commander of regular forces. Here, he highlighted the synergic effect of special force and unconventional forces, not the capability and challenges of UWF of BD to meet future war.

2.3.4.3 **Khan** (2011) in his article, he emphasized the adoption of unconventional warfare strategy by BD army will allow to maximize relative strengths, exploit weaknesses and gain greater freedom of action. He also argued that with some modification of present UCW doctrine, the capability of BD Army will be increased to fight for future conflicts. But he ignored the capacity building requirement of original UWF of BD to meet future challenges.

2.3.4.4 **Ahmed** (2014) considered that to face a numerically and technically superior enemy fighting a war in an unconventional way will be a more viable option for a country with a growing economy like BD. But, whether our UWF is capable of tackling the challenges of future war or not is ignored.

2.3.4.5 Literatures Reviewed for Future War.

2.3.4.5.1 **Terry** (2011) explained the changing character of war and what we need to do to meet its challenges. He forwarded some thoughts about fourth generation warfare by describing political, economic and ideological changes of various nations. This book gives us a clear idea about future war scenario.

2.3.4.5.2 **Herd** (2002) this paper deals with current UCW doctrine and capabilities and their role in future war. He then discussed the current UW doctrine, thinking and the US capability to fight in future environment.

2.3.4.5.3 **Comments.** After consulting all the works stated above, it was found that mostly, the works were aimed at identifying the importance of UCW, the experiences of unconventional war and describing the battlefield of future separately. But, the UWF of BD was a less discussed issue and their capability in terms of meeting the challenges of future is totally ignored.

3. **PROBLEM STATEMENT** The geographical reality of Bangladesh (BD) and the threat perception denotes that BD Armed Forces would face difficulties in deterring any external aggression by a numerically and technologically superior threat within the existing shallow boundary. At this backdrop, the concept of blending conventional and unconventional warfare surfaced and drew attention of most military leaders. It is being viewed as an appropriate and viable tool to offset or counter the superiority of the potential adversary. The liberation War of 1971 has given us a battle-tested organizational structure which can be revived during the unconventional war.

4. Future military conflicts will be multi-dimensional with non-linear operations characterized by maneuver and high lethality. Therefore, to face future challenges, we should also be ready. Considering the geo-political and economic realities, in the recent past BD has embarked on UCW concept to meet her superior adversaries in future. A draft doctrine in this regard has already been published. It is needless to mention the importance of judging the unconventional capability of Bangladesh considering the future war requirement.

5. The research entails to bring out the challenges for unconventional warfare force of Bangladesh with present capability to meet future war.

6. **OBJECTIVES** The objectives are as follows:

- a. To identify the capabilities of unconventional forces
- b. To assess the effects of blending the conventional warfare with unconventional warfare.

7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the objectives of the research following

research questions has been developed to gather empirical evidence:

- (1) Why is unconventional warfare forces capability is crucial in the context of Bangladesh?
- (2) How it is blended with the conventional warfare (Bangladesh perspective)?
- (3) What are the main challenges of the Unconventional Force? how can these challenges might be overcome?


8. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

Present days' war is likely to be short and intense

In our Army, apart from blending conventional and unconventional war during the prosecution of the national war effort, BD may have to resort to total people's war after its conventional power diminishes. Therefore, unconventional warfare demands new thinking on development for better suiting to future days' war. This research will immensely contribute in developing new concepts, technology and tactics for UWF to meet future war requirement.

The regular force is unsuitable to conduct unorthodox warfare because of their traditional organizational set up and commitment to the conventional warfare. UCW Forces can act as force multipliers and can bring better dividend if both the warfare are blended together. Hence, **UWF capability building is the most viable option for Bangladesh to undertake future war.**

paper is as fol.



METHODOLOGY

10. Researcher endeavors to prove the hypothesis by finding out the present capability of UWF of BD in comparison to meet the challenges of future war. This study followed Mixed-Method Study design and the hypothesis were validated in following ways:

10.1.1 By statistically and analytically finding out the present training system

And the capability of UWF of BD.

10.1.2 By statistically and analytically validating whether UWF of BD is presently capable to meet the future war challenges or not.

Time did not permit the researcher to observe the UCW activities of different units/Headquarters personally. The research is mostly based on the data collected through the survey, interview and discussion with the officers. Hence the study is more of a perception based one.

AN OVERVIEW OF UCW

11.1 The popular concept of fighting unconventional war on termination of conventional war no longer stands valid as it deprives both the war efforts of significant advantages that can be gained by blending them together (GSTP-0032,p3-31). Our doctrine also strongly advocates the concurrent conduct, although one would always dominate a particular phase of the campaign. Whatever is the case, both conventional and unconventional war must be blended together to achieve the combined effects that would produce the desired end state on conflict termination.

11.2 Worldwide UCW has two concepts; Offensive and Defensive. These are illustrated below (US FM, 2008):

11.2.1 **Offensive UCW.** The definition of UCW has evolved over time. The initial doctrinal concept for the US to conduct offensive UCW originated with the creation of the Office of Strategic Service during WWII.

11.2.2 **Defensive UCW.** US define defensive UCW as “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy controlled or politically sensitive territory”.

11.3 **Strategy and Tactics of UCW.**

11.3.1 Usually the UCW will go for hit and run tactics, ambush/raid the opportunity targets and render the enemy Lines of Communication unsafe and insecure.

11.3.2 Principles of war are equally applicable for UCW, as it is also a form of warfare. However, UCW tactics should be guided by following additional precepts (Draft GSTP, p.7-5):

11.3.2.1 Maximum use of intelligence.

11.3.2.2 Bold and unorthodox approach.

11.3.2.3 Strike at an opportune moment.

11.3.2.4 Alertness.

11.3.2.5 Avoidance of enemy retaliation.

11.3.2.6 Conductive local environment.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT TRAINING SYSTEM

12.1 **10 Weeks Basic Training.** Normal Ansar members initially undergo 10 weeks basic training in Ansar and VDP Academy. The aims of 10 weeks basic military training are as follows (Training Instructions 2016-2017, p.37):

12.1.1 To make him confident and capable to perform his duties as an Ansar.

12.1.2 To attain the qualification to be enrolled to fill up the vacancy of Ansar Company at Upazilla level and platoon at Union level.

12.1.3 To gain workable knowledge on the functional system and organizational structure of Ansar.

12.1.4 To attain skill on weapon handling with the aim of providing security to key point installations of the nation.

12.1.5 To attain certain degree of physical fitness and efficiency in drill.

12.2 **Yearly Vacancy.** A total number of 3,750 Ansars are trained in the Ansar Academy every year. The training is conducted in total four phases having 1250 participants in each phase (Training Instructions, 2016-2017, p.37).

12.3 **Qualifications of Candidates.** The candidates need to pass the Junior School Certificate Exam. They should be physically fit and candidates having tall figure are given preference during the selection procedures (Rahman, 2016).

12.4 **Course Curriculum.** Within the stipulated ten weeks' time the participants undergo training on Physical Training, Drill, Weapon Handling, Fire Fighting, Unarmed Combat etc (Training Instructions 2016-2017, p.37).

12.5 **Joint Exercise with Army during Summer and Winter Training.**

12.6 **Aim.** To attain limited knowledge and be able to perform the wartime role as UWF

12.7 **Vacancy.** It will be determined by Army Headquarters.

12.8 **Qualification of Candidates to Join the Exercises.** Participants must have qualified 10 weeks basic training from Ansar Academy and the age limit is 35 years (Training Instructions 2016-2017, p.39).

12.9 **Desired Outcomes.** It is expected that after the completion of joint training exercises with army, an UCW company will be able to carry out its assigned task independently in coordination with the regular force. (Enayet , 2016).

EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT TRAINING SYSTEM

13.1 **Data Collection, Analysis and Presentation.**


13.1.1 To evaluate the effectiveness of present training system of UWF, opinions were taken from a total number of 15 officers of different ranks of Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Ansar and VDP. Self-administered questions (Questionnaire is attached at **Annex A**) were circulated among the samples. The responses were measured and detailed data analysis was conducted accordingly.

13.2 **Evaluation of Present Training System.**

13.3 **Short Duration of Training.** UWF will act as an adjunct to the conventional force (Ahamed, 2016) According to present training system, a member of Normal Ansar receives basic training for duration of 10 weeks. Within this duration, they are to be transformed both mentally and physically to meet the operational requirements. Therefore, it will be very difficult for UWF to fight


as adjunct part of conventional forces. On the other hand, from the survey it was also revealed that 30% of the officers strongly agree about the present duration of training for the potential UWF is not sufficient. It is not possible to impart effective training within the short duration of 10 weeks. Details of the responses are given at Figure 4.

Figure 4. Responses on Short Duration of Training



(Source: Survey Results)


13.4 **Training Curriculum.** As per our present draft doctrine of UCW, training to be imparted for the UWF is of two types. These are general military training and special training (Draft GSTP, p.5A-1). Special training should includes training on explosive handling, firing of Light Machine Gun(LMG), Rocket Launcher(RL) and Mortars, combat intelligence collection, survival skills, etc. But, these essential elements are not included in special training. From the survey it was revealed that 58% of the officers agreed that present training curriculum for the potential UWF is not a complete one. Present training curriculum needs to be revised for increasing the effectiveness of the training. Details of the responses are given at Figure 5.



(Source: Survey Results)

13.5 **Inadequate Infrastructural Facilities.** At present, Normal Ansars who will constitute the main body of potential UWF are trained in Bangladesh Ansar and VDP Academy. The Academy is capable to train maximum 3750 members per year (Training Instructions 2016-2017, p.37). This number is not sufficient to have a large UWF. Moreover, from the survey it was revealed that 52% of the officers agreed that present infrastructural facilities for imparting training to the potential UWF is inadequate. It is not possible to impart effective training with these limited resources. Details of the responses are given at Figure 6.


6. **Figure 6. Responses on Inadequate Infrastructural Facilities**



(Source: Survey Results)

13.6 **Lack of Qualified Instructors.** To impart any military training requirement of a good number of qualified instructors is a must. The instructors of Ansar and VDP Academy are less in number and many of them are not recommended as instructor by training institutions. The Academy is presently suffering 20% shortage of instructors (Alam,2016).Due to this problem the quality of the training is being seriously affected. From the survey it was revealed that 21 % of the officers strongly agreed that present qualification state of the instructors of Ansar and VDP Academy needs definite improvement. Details of the responses are given at Figure 7.

Figure 7. Responses on Lack of Qualified Instructors




(Source: Survey Results)

13.7 **Lack of Coordination between UWF and Regular Forces.** Peace time unconventional cells both at Division and Brigade Headquarters do not have any dedicated manpower to maintain the coordination related to training with the UWF authority (Main, 2016). It has negative impact on the overall conduct of training and its effectiveness. From the survey it was revealed that 54 % of the officers agreed in favor of having a dedicated cell in the formation headquarters to coordinate the training related matters with the UWF. Existence of a designated cell in the formation headquarters will enhance the conduct of effective training. Details of the responses are given at Figure 8.

Figure 8. Responses on Lack of Coordination between UWF


and Regular Forces



(Source: Survey Results)

13.8 **Budgetary Constraint.** The economic condition of the country does not support to maintain a large standing army. One of the alternatives is to maintain a good number of well-trained UWF. To do so, allotted budget for Ansar and VDP needs to be increased to train more number of troops (Rahman, 2016). From the survey it was revealed that 40% of the officers strongly agreed that present allotment of budget for training of the potential UWF is not sufficient. Details of the responses are given at Figure 9.

Figure 9. Responses on Budgetary Constraint



(Source: Survey Results)

13.9 Overall Comments on the Survey Result.

13.9.1 After an evaluation of the existing training system, it is found that present training system has got various serious limitations. These are short duration of training, absence of training doctrine, short training curriculum, inadequate infrastructural facilities, shortage of qualified instructors, lack of coordination with regular forces, budgetary constraint.

CHAPTER-III: AN ANALYSIS OF FUTURE WAR AND EVALUATING THE CAPABILITY OF UWF OF BD FOR FUTURE WAR

14.1 Characteristics of Future Operations.

14.1.1 Bangladesh Army Publication 'Operations of War' identifies the most important characteristics for future battlefields which are as follows (GSTP-0032, p.1-5):

14.2 Short and Intense. Maintaining armies but more particularly fighting wars will be exceptionally costly affairs in economic, social and political terms. Therefore the future warfare will be short and intense.

14.3 High Lethality. Short-intense wars will force all armies but particularly the more advanced armies to field and employ extremely lethal, precise and destructive weapon systems technological advancements in the present and in future will support these developments in lethality and destructiveness. Thus future battlefields and operations will be characterized by high lethality.

14.4 Restricted Support. Logistic lines of communications and bases will be the first targets of enemy interdiction operations in the future. Modern armies are highly dependent on large scale logistic support; should this support be cut off or interrupted, intensity of operations will be drastically reduced and enemy forces will attain a decisive initiative and freedom of action. Future operations will be characterized by restricted support thereby markedly affecting the design of campaigns and battles.

14.5 **UCW and Terrorism.** In almost all future conflicts the Army will find itself involved with terrorists, guerrillas and saboteurs. This is a cost effective means for opposing forces that threaten the security and continuity of operations. In future operations, therefore, Bangladesh Army will not only be ready to counter these but also be prepared to employ UCW whenever possible.

14.6 **Joint Operations.** The nature of modern battle and the broad geographical range (land, sea and airspaces) of Areas of operations makes it imperative that land forces fight as joint teams with Navy and Air Forces as well as with representatives of appropriate civilian authorities.

EVUALITING THE CAPABILITY OF UWF OF BD FOR FUTURE WAR


15.1 Data Collection, Analysis and Presentation.

15.1.1 To evaluate the capability of UWF of BD for future war effectiveness, opinions were taken from a total number of 15 officers of different ranks of Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Ansars and VDP. Self-administered questions (Questionnaire is attached at **Annex A**) were circulated among the samples. The responses were measured and detailed data analysis was conducted accordingly.

15.2 Evaluating the Capability of UWF of BD for Future War.

15.3 **Manpower and Equipment.** At present, our UWF strength is around 6 million. But, only the members of Battalion Ansar can be considered as readily available to go for war at any time. This means only around 16,224 people are ready to augment regular forces but they are not considered as UWF. The potential members of UWF (Normal and Disembodied Ansars) are also good in number but not well trained. They only receive small basic training, which is very insufficient. Therefore, this big strength will not be as effective as it should be. On the other hand, only Battalion Ansars hold some necessary equipment to serve the purpose of peace time. Other members of District, Upazila and Union level do not hold any equipment to meet war time requirements. From the survey it was revealed that 46 % of the officers strongly agreed that the present manpower that all are not well trained and equipment available with UWF is not enough to fight in future battle fields. Details of the responses are given in Figure 12.


Figure 12. Responses on Manpower and Equipment



(Source: Survey Results)

15.4 **Joint Operation Capability.** As per present policy, troops of UWF take part in joint exercises with army twice in a year. With their inadequate training, they cannot perform any operation properly in conjunction with the regular forces. In the survey, 44% of respondents opined that the present joint operation capability of UWF is very limited to meet the future war requirement. Details of the responses are given in Figure 13.


Figure 13. Responses on Joint Operation Capability



(Source: Survey Results)

15.5 **Superior Technology.** Technology will play a vital role to win a battle in future. The state which has superior technology will have an edge in battlefield. The way our Armed Forces are developing their technology, other Para Military Forces are not advancing in same pace. Our UWF is lack in these aspects. Moreover, from the survey it was revealed that 41% of the officers strongly agreed that UWF is not trained enough to fight, where enemy will have superior technology. Details of the responses are given in Figure 15.


Figure 15. Responses on Superior Technology



(Source: Survey Results)

15.6 **Fight a Short and Intense Battle.** The future warfare will be short and intense (GSTP 0032, p.1-5). At present, UWF is not capable enough to fight an intense battle as they are not trained in that way (Naim, 2016). Their training curriculum is following the traditional way of battle. From the survey it was revealed that 47% of the officers strongly agreed that UWF does not have the capability to fight a short and intense battle of future. Details of the responses are given in Figure 16.


Figure 16. Responses on Fight a Short and Intense Battle



(Source: Survey Results)

15.7 **Lack of Knowledge on Modern Weapon and Equipment** At present, our potential UWF received only 10 weeks basic military training in the Ansar and VDP Training Academy. This basic training proves to be insufficient as the basic requirements are not fulfilled. From the survey it was revealed that, 51% of the officers agreed that Lack of knowledge on modern weapon and equipment will not support the efficient employment of UWF in future battlefield. Details of the responses are given in Figure 17


Figure 17. Responses on Lack of Knowledge on Modern Weapon and Equipment



(Source: Survey Results)

15.8 **Administration and Logistic Capability.** Administration and Logistics are the fundamental requirements for conducting military operation. Due to budgetary constraint, lack of infrastructure facilities, and logistic installation. From the survey it was revealed that 47 % of the officers strongly agreed that the present admin and logistic capability of UWF is not sufficient enough to support future battles. Details of the responses are given in Figure 19.

Figure 19. Responses on Administration and Logistic Capability



(Source: Survey Results)

15.9 **Overall Comments on the Survey Result.**

15.9.1 After evaluating of the capability of the UWF of BD for future war, it is found that present capability has got various limitations. These are manpower and equipment, joint operation knowledge on superior technology, capability to fight a short and intense battle, knowledge on modern weapon and equipment, admin and logistic aspects.

CHAPTER-IV: THE CHALLENGES FOR UWF OF BD TO MEET THE FUTURE WAR REQUIREMENT

16.1 **The Challenges.**

16.1.1 **No Standardization of Training.** Training structure gets the paramount importance whatever might be the modification. Ansar, being the core member should be provisioned with small arms for adequate training practice (Naim, 2016). However, due to the absence of a well established training doctrine for UWF, the overall training activities lack standardization with the training of regular forces.

16.1.2 **Complexity in Conducting Exercises with Army.** As per present policy, troops of UWF are taking part in joint exercises with army twice in a year. For the coordination purpose there is temporary arrangement for UWF cell in the brigade as well as division headquarters. While conducting the exercises, it was found that standard of UWF training is not up to the mark.

16.1.3 **Difficulty in Imparting Specialized Training.** Military training is a gradual process. Prior to imparting the specialized training, the troops need to undergo various foundation courses. At present, our UWF received only 10 weeks basic military training in the Ansar and VDP training academy. This basic training proves to be insufficient as the basic requirement for imparting various specialized trainings is ignored.

16.1.4 **Logistics Support.** Pre-stocking at selected points should be done to make sure that these are available at the right time and place. But, The Logistic Doctrine of Army to perform that task. At the same time, their operation and conduct pose two significant challenges in present doctrine which are logistics and rapid urbanization.

16.1.5 **Poor Physical Fitness.** Physical fitness is a prime requirement for any component of military forces. Due to the short duration of training, members of UWF cannot attain required physical stamina to conduct military operations. Usually they exhibit poor physical fitness in comparison with the regular forces. It becomes more evident once this force carries out joint exercises with the Army (Mainullah, 2016). The employment nature of UWF demands a high standard of physical fitness. Therefore, the poor physical fitness of this force is a clear barrier and has serious effect on the attainment of future operational competency.

16.1.6 **Lack of Confidence in Weapon Handling.** Weapon training is the most important training for a soldier. Every soldier is expected to be confident in handling his own weapon in the battle field. Presently imparted weapon training for UWF is very less. They will fire only 20 rounds of bullet during foundation training (Training Instruction 2016-2017, p-37). With this elementary training, it is not possible for this force to attain the operational competency of future war. They have to be trained more deliberately on various types of modern weapons.

16.1.7 **Specialized Training on Explosive Handling.** In the organization of UWF Company there are three 'Explosive Group' each with two persons per platoon. The amount of explosive authorization for a UWF company is not mentioned and there is no provision of separate explosive handling training for Normal Ansars. Therefore, when they will be tasked to perform according to the organ gram, it will not be possible for them to get the desired result. Rather, they may cause danger for other members due to their ignorance.

16.1.8 **Arms and Equipment.** To suit the modernization and transformation with conventional forces, UCW doctrine needs to be revised by adding more number of weapons to their organization. Considering the future battlefield environment it needs more attention (Mahfuzur, 2016). The equipment used by the UWF must be reliable under the most extreme conditions.

16.1.9 **Communication.** At present, Ansar and VDP only have walkie-talkie sets as their internal communication means (only battalion Ansars). The UWF units require suitable means of communication within itself and with formation headquarters to meet the future threats. Presently, the potential UWF does not hold any communication equipment. Therefore, High frequency wireless sets may be used for this purpose.

CHAPTER-V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

17.1 Recommendations.

17.1.1 It is recommended that following steps should be taken to improve the existing capability of UWF to meet the challenges of future war:

17.1.1.1 A permanent UWF doctrine should be published for better employment and perfect execution of their duties considering future battlefield challenges.

17.1.1.2 Training of the UWF may be modified and implemented basing on the threat of future battlefields.

17.1.1.3 To improve and test the effectiveness of UWF training and capability, more number of exercises may be planned with the conventional forces in addition to summer training and winter training.

17.2 Conclusions.

17.2.1 UCW will remain as an enduring and effective means of fighting war and recognized as a force multiplier. As per our existing military doctrine, UWF will be employed in conjunction with the regular forces from the very beginning of the war (Rahman, 2016). To achieve the desired battlefield effect by the employment of the UWF for future, this force needs to be highly trained. Hence it is important to understand the existing capability of the UWF of our country and bring out the challenges for UWF of BD to meet future war.

17.2.2 After a detail evaluation of present training system, it appears that, existing training system has various limitations to achieve the required level of operational efficiency for future battlefields. Very short duration of training is another serious limitation for this force in achieving the operational competency. Due to this short duration, this force also lacks having basic foundation for imparting special trainings. This force also suffers from logistics as well as infrastructural constraint. There is lack of coordination and interoperability between the regular force and UWF as well as shortage of qualified instructors is another problem for imparting quality training. This force receives very insufficient training on weapon handling. Existing training curriculum is a very short which does not cover the latest development regarding modern warfare tactics.

17.2.3 Future warfare will be on a much broader front than its predecessors. It is based on the assumption that the nation-state societies of the world will be violently challenged and eventually thrown into chaos. The present arms and equipment available with UWF is not enough to fight future battles. The joint operational capability of UWF is also very limited. UWF is not trained enough to fight, where enemy will have superior technology. Lack of knowledge on modern weapon and equipment will also not support the efficient employment in future battlefields.

17.2.4 Absence of a training doctrine results in inconsistency in the training system. Troops cannot achieve the required degree of physical fitness due to the short duration of training. Budget as well as logistics constraint also hinders the attainment of the objectives of training. Due to inadequate training in weapon handling, troops remain unconfident in operating different types of weapons. Without the up gradation of existing training curriculum, this force will not be able to achieve the operational competency for future. Due to incomplete training curriculum, this force lacks significantly in tactical knowledge which reduces the level of professional competency. There are also complexities in carrying out joint training with the regular forces for the absence of dedicated coordination cell at formation headquarters level. communication system and use of modern

technology are prime challenges to fight future battles. The more UWF will participate in joint training with regular force, the more it will be competent in various operational aspects.

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