

**CADRE CONFLICT: AN INVESTIGATION INTO
CONFLICTS IN BANGLADESH CIVIL SERVICE**

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Savar, Dhaka. September, 1998

DEDICATION

This research work completed within a short span of time with a very small resource support is dedicated neither to the members of the cadre services nor to the non cadres, but to the millions who groan and bleed when the members of the conflicting cadres sharp their knives on the razor-strap.

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Researchers' Note

This study recognizes that there exists conflicts among different cadres in Bangladesh. It also attests that the conflict is basically manifested around BCS (Administration), particularly with the powers and functions of deputy commissioner. Although cadres like Foreign Affairs, Audit and Accounts and Taxation enjoy higher promotion prospects, the attack is essentially on Administration.

Members of the civil society sees BCS (Administration) as a colonial liability and want deputy commissioner's functions to be curtailed drastically and paradoxically they prefer BCS (Administration) for their sons and daughters. Specialists do not like deputy commissioner to coordinate, they do not like any specialist either. On the question of resolving conflicts suggestions ranged from abolishing cadre system to enhancement of number of cadres. This is a study that opened up a series of contradictions.

The research group is a cadre and non-cadre mix. None in the group appeared to have maintained a prejudiced view.

The group thanks BPATC for this assignment and support. Thanks are also due to the respondents who made this study possible.

Finally the researchers think it a moral duty on their part to apologise to the readers who might have felt hurt because of any comment or recommendation. They like to remind the readers that this study, its findings, and suggestions that came up in course of time reflects the minds of the respondents only.

Again, this is not the whole truth, but a slice of the scenario. Tomorrow's researchers will dig out the truth.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

For most Third World countries, colonialism introduced bureaucracy. Following independence, patterns of administration established by the erstwhile colonial rulers continued to operate without a great deal of adaptation. At the same time, however, independence brought pressure to bear on bureaucrats to achieve the various goals of development. How best to improve on bureaucratic performance is thus an extremely challenging question, it is also one to which there is as yet no completely satisfactory answer (Wallis 1989: 20).

In the 1950s and 1960s, parents were more eager to see their brilliant son come out successfully in the nation-wide superior service examination, while the rich and powerful fathers with marriageable daughters were equally interested to hand a daughter over to a young CSP. Things have changed over the years. Wealthy parents of marriageable daughters in the 1980s and 1990s were not equally keen to offer their daughters to a member of BCS (Administration). Recognition of this reality is also an admission of the fact that the much of the demand for the civilians as Prince Charming in the competitive marriage market has already eroded and a new class has emerged replacing them gradually from their previous glorious position.

The engineers and doctors with higher academic achievement and higher prospects of income found themselves to be more in demand in the recent decades. Are they being replaced by the new genre of MBAs? Researchers with keen interest on the changes in marriage market may like to undertake a research in this line. It will reflect the changing social values. In industrially developed countries, there remains the conflict between the generalist and specialist. Commissions set up to delve deep into the problem and find solutions in mitigating conflicts, have come up with sets of recommendations. But in the real world the conflicting scenario did not change radically. In industrially developed countries the conflict has taken a new shape with brilliant MBAs in the job market and these new managers are now being viewed as the real threat to the specialists. Days are not too far when the chapter on conflict need to be rewritten by giving the managers a right space in the arena.

Bangladesh civil service with its broad based structure, now faces the challenge of disintegration due to emerging conflicts, primarily on the grounds of inequitous distribution of power, status, functions, and prospects of promotion. The nearness of the senior bureaucrats to the power structure and their capacity to influence policy issues have also generated a hot debate. A catalogue of inequalities may be identified which over the years have grown slowly contributing to a state of dysfunction in the government and maladministration in the secretariat and beyond. It is expected that the conflicts existing in the services, particularly in the public sector be resolved logically, providing a greater equity among the service-holders belonging to different cadres.

Starting from wearing black badges and pen-down strike to strike for days together on the issues of cadre-based demands have become so common that these do not come as a surprise. The projected beneficiaries of public services i.e. the common people have become passive watchers of the conflict regime. All these have a paralyzing effect on the economy, polity, administration and management, and overall welfare of the country. The common people consider that the conflicting cadres are concerned more about their rank and status, pay structure or prospects of promotion rather than the welfare of the people. The study, however, does not maintain that these issues which affect the delivery of services are less important.

The history of public administration in Bangladesh and elsewhere shows that grievances on the grounds of power and authority, rank and status, posting and promotion have certain depressive effect on the overall performance of development administration. Hence asking for an overall equity based promotion and incentive structure within the government does not appear to be totally irrelevant.

The years immediately after the Second World War generated a need for comprehensive planning and a strong centre-focused administration in developing countries. But no more than two decades were required to elapse to see that the vision of and need for strong administration and comprehensive planning had undergone conceptual changes. The administration, now focused as management in the west gets a flexible but more of output oriented version in the development literature. Johnson (1983) sees the stronghold of the magic of the word administration has loosened and

the ideas and images of administration of the 1950s and early 1960s have faded. The word administration in the 1990s sounds quite old-fashioned. In the context of Bangladesh generalists as managers face hindrance for wearing the title of administrator and more for the power and authority they administer within and beyond their prescribed authority.

The administrator, as a bureaucrat is under severe attack from different corners, including that of civil society, political regime and technocracy for providing all negative images that bureaucracy may offer. Although efforts are in abundance to search for alternative to bureaucracy, the developing world has continued to rely on the rigid structure of bureaucracy often manned by persons with non-technical background. They are the generalists and for Bangladesh they are predominantly the members of BCS (Administration) cadre. Any study on bureaucracy in developing countries instantly links it to the administration of the colonial past. Bangladesh does not make an exception. Now the question that surfaces over everything is whether we need to entertain the idea of continuation of the colonial structure of bureaucracy.

Whenever conflicting issues resurface it is hard to escape the temptation to refer it to its colonial heritage. The essence of criticism that goes against the generalist-bureaucrats is that they should remember that they are not serving their colonial masters but the people. The prevalence of conflicts among different cadres of Bangladesh Civil Service cannot be overruled. This study proposes to examine the conflicts, and suggest solutions that might mitigate, or to be optimistic, resolve the conflicts existing within the cadres.

When the researchers undertook the job of writing a proposal on cadre conflicts, solutions in mitigating conflicts appeared to remain within the very reach. But when field level study was being undertaken it seemed to be a difficult task. Now, as the researchers have started to round up the research and begin the write up, solutions appear almost beyond the reach.

A recent news item of promoting about three hundred officers of BCS (Administration) by the Prime Minister (who incidentally occupies the portfolio of Minister for Establishments) cadre sparked off serious debate on the promotion criteria.

of officers belonging to different cadres. The Prime Minister, on the face resistance from other cadres suspended her decision and ordered an overall review of the conflict around the prospect of promotion. It has been reported that a summary signed by the prime minister, on upgrading of some BCS (Administration) posts now rests under the carpet. It has at least put some water on the anger of the members of agitating cadres, while it has generated no less anger among the members of BCS (Administration) cadre

By the end of July 1998 about three dozens of deputy secretaries and six dozens of senior assistant secretaries were promoted to next higher post viz joint secretary and deputy secretary. It was found that about seventy per cent of the officers promoted belonged to the BCS (Administration) cadre. This has further infuriated *Prokrichi* (a forum for the engineers, agriculturists and doctors) and the coalition of members not belonging to BCS (Administration). They have once again demanded the abolition of BCS (Administration) hegemony, and has raised a demand for ousting them from the high offices at the secretariat. They have asked for them adequate positions at the higher echelon of bureaucracy.

This study, banking on both primary and secondary resources explores the conflicting situation, analyses the demands of *Prokrichi*, reviews contemporary reform proposals and suggests measures with a view to achieving a working environment characterized more by cooperation than conflicts.

Keywords

Cadre Conflicts, Promotion Prospect, Career Planning, Power, Decentralization, Privatization, World Bank, Administrative Reform, Politics and Administration, Manager, Generalists and Specialists.

Rationale

Although there is a global thrust on reducing the size of governments, the experience of developed and developing countries suggests that dependence on the public sector is on the increase. On the other side of this dependence, one might be appalled to see the infighting of the government officials belonging to different discipline and cadres. This

scenario has retarding effect on the efficiency of the public sector in a country like Bangladesh. Hence, undertaking a research on the proposed conflict is not only relevant to the present context, it also appears to be an essential study. An individual or a group or an institute should undertake and find solutions to address the issues which have remained unresolved for decades.

The conflicts that make the core of the research is as old as the history of bureaucracy, but as days are passing by the intensity of conflict manifestation takes a serious turn, generates dysfunction and destabilizes the structure of management. It needs to be addressed with the available tools within an acceptable time frame. This kind of study must be challenging within a limited time frame and resource constraints. When cadre-bias rhetoric dominates literature, this objective research, it is expected would be able to focus on truth, not the whole truth of course. Discovery of the whole truth will be based on research by tomorrow's researchers.

Research Goal

The research goal in this case is attainable in the long run provided the recommendations this study is going to formulate at the end receive a fair treatment by the policy planners and development practitioners. Here the research goal is the attainment of peaceful working environment and promotion of efficiency in the public sector. Peaceful and productive working environment always demands more of cooperation than conflict.

Research Objective

The proposed research aims at achieving the following

- Examine the conflicting cadre issues in Bangladesh Civil Service
- Suggest means to resolve conflicts and suggest agreeable solutions.

Hypothesis

In order to shape the research and guide it towards a specific direction a social science research often needs a hypothesis either to be proved or disproved or to see it as an inconclusive proposition. The study, very much in line with social science research, with particular focus on public administration relies on the hypothesis that conflicts in

various forms and contents are existing within the cadres, while the wider power and authority of the BCS (Administration) officers remain at the core of conflict

Scope

The study does not encompass the analysis of all emerging issues within and beyond cadres. Any wider area of research, for a study like this diffuses the actual focus of the study. This study, however, narrows down its scope within the areas of conflicts relating to promotion and exercise of power. The study does not choose the secretariat to be its research venue, rather prefers to go to the field where conflicts are more exposed and tangible. The deputy commissioner, being a major target of attack by the members of other cadres has been given wide coverage in this study. Both *prokrichi* and cadres other than BCS (Administration) have many issues to raise against BCS (Administration) or against deputy commissioner. The study concentrates more on the *prokrichi* issues and their demands. The researchers draw opinion from the cadre and non-cadre officers and also from the members of the civil society

Methodology

It is relevant here to recognize that the research has suffered from the time and resource constraints. One might appreciate the methodological limits of such study proposed to be completed within three man-months. However, the study explores all available tools within its command to shape the research and provide it a representative character of social research. In order to achieve the stated goals the study relied on sources, both primary and secondary

Primary sources include data collected by researchers and their associates. Both overt and covert methods of observation, as applicable to the need and arising situation were used. Guided interview constituted a major ingredient of the research. The secondary source was based primarily on library and archive research. It may be mentioned that the huge size and large number of cadres do not always allow researchers a thorough and investigative study within a short span of time. While selecting cadres, it was appreciated that the criteria of selection would be questioned. The selection was not done on a random basis. The knowledge and sensitiveness of the researchers of the front-liners in the conflict and their relative significance were taken into account in

determining the cadres in this study. However, attention was paid so that cadre members working at the field level do not remain Unrepresented. The study has rightly conceived that the prevailing conflicts among cadres are best felt at the field level offices particularly at the districts. The conflicts are more focused around the power, function and authority of deputy commissioner.

The deputy commissioner as the center of administration has long been viewed and criticized for being a symbol of generalists' domination over other cadres particularly over those known to be specialists. The research has now narrowed its focus of conflict that emerges around the office of the deputy commissioner. With this end in view the study dissects the powers and functions of the deputy commissioner and identifies the areas where he appears to overlap or exercise more power and authority than he is expected to do.

The study administered two sets of questionnaires, one meant for the cadre and non-cadre officers, while the other for the members of the civil society. In the case of qualitative research, it is expected that validity of the questionnaires is judged putting them into a test. In this case the formulated questions were pre-tested in the field level. The district of Manikganj, because of its nearness to BPATC was selected for pre-testing the questionnaire. The pre-testing found the questionnaires valid with some structural adjustment and fine tuning. The experience of pre-testing of questionnaire proved to be highly useful during the field study.

Functional Definitions and Explanations

Cadre officer means an officer belonging to a particular service declared cadre by the competent authority i.e. the government. The officer might have been recruited through a process of nation-wide Bangladesh Civil Service examination Conducted by Public Service Commission or encadred at a particular point of his service. Currently the number of cadres is twenty eight. For the purpose of these study availability of officers of different cadres at the field level was considered and it was decided that twenty cadres having their offices and cadre officers at the district level would be considered. These civil service cadres are food, roads and highways, telecommunication, fisheries, agriculture, administration, information, customs and excise, health, public works

department, statistics, cooperatives, judiciary, ansar, family planning, police, livestock, general education, postal and public health

Those who claim to be specialists are the engineers, doctors and agriculturist. The members of BCS (Administration) also maintain that they are the specialists in administration and management. The researchers do not challenge their demand, but for the sake of the present study recognize the former to be specialist. The research recognized that a few cadre officers belonging to the above 20 cadres might not be available during the administration of questionnaire due to vacancy, leave, or business elsewhere. The study also assumed some degree of non-cooperation of the targeted respondents.

Non-cadre officers perform a range of activities both at the macro and micro levels. Although there is general tendency among the members belonging to different cadres to undermine non-cadre officers this study considers them no less important than those in cadres in the nation building work. They are first class officers. Non-cadre officers have grievances for not being declared cadre officers, while in some cases many officers inferior to them in respect of pay and status at the entry level have been encadred. The study on purpose has chosen officers of Water Development Board and Power Development Board, District Accounts Officers, District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer, Engineers of Local Government and Engineering Department, District officers of National Savings Bureau, and District Child Affairs Officer. The non-availability of some the non-cadre officers for various reasons were also duly recognized.

Members of Civil Society may be referred to the explanation of Gramsci. It is viewed as a driving force against social injustice. The study visualized a non-bureaucratic and non-military society which has a wider choice and is free to express its judgment. For the purpose of this study members of the bar and press, members of the district chamber of commerce and industries, politicians and retired civil servants were chosen. Some members of the researchers interviewed have involvement with NGOs. A separate questionnaire was administered for the members of the civil society.

Respondents in this study include members of the cadre services, non-cadre officers, and members of the civil society. Initially it was designed that 90 cadre officers, 30 non-cadre officers and 30 members of the civil society making a total of 150 respondents would be covered under the structured questionnaires. But when it was decided to conclude the field research a total of 125 respondents including 76 cadre officers, 22 non-cadre officers and 27 members of civil society came under a close examination of this study. Appropriate cautions were taken so that the respondents were not swayed by emotion or subjective judgment. Except for facilitating the process of response the researchers did not participate in formulating and drawing judgment from the respondents. The researchers themselves were cautious in their interactions so much so that their personal bias and prejudices do not surface at any point of research influence the respondents and thus impair the vision of the study. It is, however, wise to recognize human limits. The researchers in this study are not above such limits.

Unless specified study area means all or any of the six districts where the questionnaires were administered and field research undertaken. The research intended to cover six administrative divisions choosing one district from each. The selection of the districts were not done in a random fashion. Through personal initiatives of the researchers, information on access to offices as well as the probable availability of support were taken into consideration. Mymensingh was chosen from Dhaka division, Jhalakhati from Barisal, Magura from Khulna, Joypurhat from Rajshahi, Moulvibazar from Sylhet and Cox's Bazar from Chittagong division. Had it not been for time and resource constraints the study should have been extended to a few more districts and more of respondents were required to be captured for acquiring a near accuracy of the research. Two former PATC-officers, well acquainted with the research activities of the Centre were available in two study districts.

Research Period

Three man-months during early 1998 were spent on research and draft write-up of the paper. It was felt that the time span should have been longer, and the respondents should have been given a little longer time to think about the questions and reply. The researchers, however, were careful so that time and resource constraints should not stand on the way to completion of this project. Therefore, although done hurriedly the

research did not compromise with the quality it has expected and promised to produce while writing up the proposal

Structure of the Study

The study consists of over five chapters. The first being an introduction to the study elaborates the proposal, sets hypothesis and objectives and focuses on methodology. The second gives a background of the conflict. It contains an analysis of the seventeen point demands. It also examines the charter of duties of a deputy commissioner. The third Chapter has a focus on the contemporary reform issues in public administration in Bangladesh. The fourth explains and analyses data gathered from the primary sources. The fifth and the concluding Chapter highlights the findings, draws conclusions and formulates recommendations and suggests some areas which demand further investigation and research.

CHAPTER II

Areas of Discontent

The inter-cadre rivalry has been one major problem of Bangladesh public service system. The problem is largely rooted in a 'closed-entry' system where Class I level officers are recruited at entry level through competitive examination for 29 cadres, comprising functional and professional streams. All the cadres do not have the same chances for career mobility and job enrichment although they are all recruited at the same level. Admittedly, all the cadres have the possibility of promotion to important secretarial positions. But it is mostly found that generalist officers largely dominate those posts leaving the professional and technical cadres feel aggrieved.

The Financial Express, January 13, 1998

The Conflict as Reflected in the Seventeen Points Demands

It is wise to recognize that there are some inter and intra cadre conflicts which surface almost periodically with notifications of promotions of officers at any level above assistant secretaries. The conflicting issues are often raised by those who are comfortable to call themselves specialists. Without delving deep into the meaning of generalist and specialist the study, keeping in line with the aggrieved section i.e. the specialists sees the members of Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre as generalist. The generalist have, it is often said, inherited the legacy of colonial administration. After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the CSPs have retained and in cases enhanced the power that was vested in the members of Indian Civil Service. Despite repeated attempts to reform public administration in the post-independent Bangladesh the specialists argue that the members of BCS (administration) has unlawfully continued to subordinate the specialists. In the early days of Pakistan proposals were floated towards unification of all services and putting the specialist in the right place for effective contribution to the nation. In the post-Foulton era the voice of the specialist rose high for not being able to be integrated into the mainstream of development process. The specialists- *Prokricha* (an united forum for engineers, agriculturists and doctors), along with BCS Coordination Committee came up with seventeen points demands aiming at the reduction of generalist regime and promote

their cause. An examination of these demands is essential to put the conflicts at their right perspectives

One of the seventeen points refers to institutional transfer of power and authority to democratically elected persons at various tiers of administration. It is a welcome proposal. One even with serious generalist bias will at least theoretically subscribe to this view that establishment of democratic regime at various levels of administration would be a better choice. However, the prospect of such a broad-based democratic regime at all levels of administration often remains a wishful thinking.

The specialists show the government three different interventions the first suggesting a decomposition of the existing administrative divisions, the second asking the government to ensure peoples participation at different phases of development, and the third to vest the responsibility of control and coordination to the elected representatives. Point one and suggestions attached with it provide an excellent rhetoric often found in the preambles of national constitutions. Except for abolition of administrative divisions the others remain a vague proposition. Participation, for example, is an issue highly debated even in stable democratic states like the United Kingdom and the United States of America. If participation of people in its true sense is achieved, the specialists would require to cut many of their demands to size. Participation is a very normative concept, which often gets flowery elaboration in development literature, meaning very little, and having lesser pragmatic implication. However, there should not remain too many points of disagreement if the government can afford to implement them at any point of time.

Interestingly when a democratic institution like *upazila parishad* was abolished in 1991, the specialists did not lobby hard for the continuation or reformation of the *parishad*. The members of BCS (Administration) have reasons, from their point of view not to come forward to denounce this decision. Other professional groups remained almost silent. Local government in Bangladesh is yet to recover from the inflicted injuries of 1991.

The second demand which appears to be a demand for broad-based democracy seeks to see the minister as the chief executive of the ministry. It suggests amendments in the Rules of Business. There are pros and cons in a minister being the chief of ministry, but if it is meant for restoration and nurturing of democracy one should be tempted to endorse this demand of the specialists. The political changes in 1996 has brought about the desired change, but the functional importance of the secretary has not declined. Rather recent news clippings show that ministers are being more frequently overpowered by their permanent secretaries. What happened in the Ministry of Health the other day between the minister and the secretary is still fresh in readers' memory.

Point three appears to be more of a professional demand. It suggests that all officers starting from assistant secretary to secretary in a functional ministry should be manned by the members of respective functional cadre. Ali (1992) views in this demand a proposal of merger of policy functions and implementation functions. The efficiency that may be generated out of this merger has not been explained or substantiated. A thorough examination of this point would be an essential task for the public administration researchers in the years to come. Studies in this line is needed to show what benefit this merger might produce in the long run. If it is meant for creation of opportunities for promotion and mobility of the officers of functional cadres, proper attention should be directed to it. One cannot deny that the lesser scope for promotion and horizontal mobility for the specialist officers remain a major issue in the generation of conflicts.

The fourth demand explicitly seeks to create more of cadres for specialists who work in the ministry not under no any banner of cadre. While undertaking this field level study many officers belonging to the specialists' cadres maintained that prevalence of too many cadres remain a major cause of contention. The debate may revolve around the number of cadres. Should the number be increased or should there be a reduction in the number of existing cadres. But implicit within this *prokrochi* demand there is an urge to the creation of function based cadre leading to increase in the numbers of cadres.

The fifth and a very clear demand is to keep 95 per cent of posts at the Prime Minister's Office, Cabinet Division and Establishment Ministry reserved for the cadre

officers not belonging to BCS (Administration), and allocation of this position on the basis of proportionate representation to all other cadres, manning the office of Secretary to Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary, and Establishment Secretary by them. The logic and legitimacy of this demand needs examination. If the move is to drive BCS (Administration) away, it has one implication, but if it is directed to increased efficiency, more of output and welfare it has another. This demand needs to be further clarified as to how it might benefit the nation with the proposed changes in the higher position of bureaucracy.

In the sixth point the *prokrichi* asks the government to make heads of the departments and corporations directly responsible to the ministers and make them a direct partner in the process of policy formulation. They also demand for them the highest scale of pay. They, however, did not claim that these heads should belong to the profession of engineers, doctors or agriculturists, rather wanted to keep them open probably for all cadres.

The seventh point suggests that the scale of pay should be the only indicator of rank and status and the government is asked to revise the warrant of precedence in line with scale of pay. Ali (1988) suggests that when scale of pay becomes the determinant of rank and status, airline pilots and captains of ships would take precedence over others. *Prokrichi* suggests that the conflicts are not with the pilots or captains but with the members of BCS (Administration). Hence the scale of pay is the one that applies to cadre members. The demand, although appears not to be adequately spelt out, needs more of meat for its justification. The eighth point suggests that there should not be any functional cadre except for the requirements of different ministries. This point goes on to suggest that the existing BCS (Administration) cadre should be bifurcated into two different cadres- BCS (Magistracy) and BCS (Land) and both to be placed under their functional ministries.

It has been pointed out in Ali (1992) that when constitutional requirement is that of separation of judiciary, and this being one of the major demands of *prokrichi*, creation of a BCS (Magistracy) cadre clearly contradicts their charter of demands. Enough thought should have been put in the formulation of demand like formation of magistracy cadre. Regarding the creation of land cadre questions might be raised why the

Assistant Directors of Local Government (they are so far invariably the members of BCS, administration cadre) should not form the core members of a cadre, let's call it BCS (Local Government) for that matter. Again where do we place the officer in the Collectorate who looks after the Total Literacy Movement of the government remains unresolved. Then how many cadres does the country require and afford to pay for?

Point nine is explicit and is probably the core demand from the perspective of field administration. It suggests that the coordinating functions of the deputy commissioner hinders the process of development, the epithet of *zila proshashak* instead of deputy commissioner creates confusion, and finally the deputy commissioner should be divested of his responsibility of coordination of all development activities. The job of coordination should go to elected representative. This idea has wider acceptance in civil societies. Although *zila shashak* in India is functioning well and has an appeal to some, a softer title of *zila proshashak* in Bangladesh annoys many. There is not much of disagreement in vesting the coordination task to the elected representatives.

Point ten demands merger of secretariat administration with field administration and seeks necessary amendments in the rules of Business of 1975 and the Secretariat Instruction of 1976. These Rules and Instruction have undergone some changes in recent times. The researchers are in total agreement with the proposition that with the changing mode of state functions over time, existing rules and regulations require to be reviewed, and rewritten when required.

Point eleven incorporates in it a set of demands:

1. establishment departments and corporations and give them total administrative and financial authority,
2. reduction of formal coordination of officers outside functional cadres and promotion of inter-ministerial coordination,
3. broaden the level of decision making and ensure effective participation of departmental heads,
4. give the project director total administrative and financial power,
5. adoption of appropriate methods of motivation to increase efficiency.

It is a set of proposals one would love to agree with. One, however, may like to ask whether the heads of departments or corporations should also come from a panel of elected public representatives? If they are from the civil service will this set of proposal not undermine the powers and authority of a minister who heads the ministry? The proposal of increasing efficiency will not be debated, but the demands in this cluster needs further examination

Point twelve relates to reduction/elimination of power of ministry in question of domination over departments and corporation. It also wants the government to ensure that members of other services or cadres do not occupy executive positions in the corporations. Point thirteen relates to creation of a ministry of professional civil service in place of Ministry of Establishment and setting up of a combined civil service college for the professional groups. The next point demands removal of disparity in the pay scale. This is a very legitimate demand. All regimes at one time or other have promised to address the issue, but very little was materialized.

The fifteenth point is about expansion of opportunities for promotion proportionate to the cadre strength. BCS (Administration) has a similar demand for strength based promotion opportunities. The next point suggests that the specialists must be restored with full honor and authority in line with the recommendations of various commissions and committees. Finally *Prokrichi* asks the government for the separation of judiciary. There is no new ground in debating the issue when separation of judiciary is constitutional commitment. A draft bill for separation of judiciary from the executive was also placed in the parliament years ago. Some of these demands were also put forward in the form recommendations in different studies.

The researchers also examined the 21 points demand of Bangladesh Medical Association (BMA). These include enhancement of budget in the health sector, construction of primary health care infrastructure for all at the union level by 2000, expansion of medical institutions and recruitment of medical personnel to ensure peoples access to medical care at all level, assurance of a symmetrical staffing pattern, equal opportunity in terms of promotion, and implementation of BMA's recommendations, solving the problems of doctor engaged in the health and family

planning sectors, upgrading of pay scale of Thana Health and Family Planning Officers, formulation of a rational recruitment and transfer policy and its implementation, establishment of medical universities and offer autonomy to the medical institutions, cancellation of the order to downgrade the pay scale of assistant surgeons and medical officers, award senior scale to the doctors who have passed the prescribed senior scale examination, filling of vacant higher posts in the health services by promotion

Other demands include, 25% of the teachers, professors and directors to be promoted to grade I scale with status, expansion of medical facilities to the industrial zone and recruitment of doctors, solve the problems of the doctors working at the private clinics, provide the doctors with drug license, withdrawal of duty on medical books and equipment's, and extend credit facilities, encadrement of the doctors serving with railways, police and T&T to those respective cadres, democratization of BMDC Ordinance and annulment of registration renewal fees, give the doctors facilities and status according to Warrant of Precedence, stop commercial exploitation with education at private medical colleges, and formulation of specific policy for awarding fellowship and scholarship

Finally doctors go back to the original 17 points demands of the *prokrichi*-BCS coalition. While analyzing the first 20 points it appears that in the interest of the overall development of the health sector one might not stand on the way to implementation of these points. Even those who seriously pursue the interest of BCS (Administration) would find very little to disagree with any of the first twenty points. Many of the demands have received due consideration by the government under HPSP (Health and Population Sector Programme). But as has been mentioned earlier there are some inherent contradiction within the seventeen point points demand which is projected as the last point of twenty one points demands of the doctors.

As stated earlier, for the purpose of this study, we have attached specific importance to deputy commissioner who remains at the pivot of debate at field administration

What does the deputy commissioner do?

A major focus of this study is the office of the deputy commissioner and deputy commissioner the person. The conflicts and debates at fields flow mostly around the office of the deputy commissioner. While portraying a deputy commissioner Muhiit (1968) writes that he is the pivot of the district administration. Stepping further he visualizes him to be a miniature governor of an American state, the deputy commissioner being an appointed civilian and the governor an elected one. He, however, does not go further to explain the nature and extent of accountability of these two positions.

Not going through the complex theoretical analysis of the powers and functions of a civilian in the district, the study has chosen a sample district for gaining a general idea of the of deputy commissioner's horizon of activities. The researchers have picked up from the office deputy commissioner the work distribution order (issued on 23.11.96 for internal use) which contains the explicit duties of the deputy commissioner, and that of his deputies and lieutenants. Interested readers may pay attention to the following range of functions a deputy commissioner is assigned to do or required to undertake during his assignment

- The first duty, although vaguely described suggests that a deputy commissioner is responsible for overall general functions of the districts. Critics maintain that under the coverage of 'overall general functions' he gets his way to the areas of specialists.
- The second one incorporates in it a wide area of general administration, land revenue administration, office management and overall responsibility in the matters of administration of criminal justice. Although land revenue and criminal justice administration are well defined and the role and functions of deputy commissioner are spelt out thoroughly, the meaning and extent of general administration are not well defined and thus it leaves room for his intervention in areas beyond his office.
- The third provides him with a huge power of the district magistrate and the authority to apply as and when required. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and its subsequent amendments vest in him adequate power and authority.

- The fourth assigns him with the financial responsibilities.
- The fifth relates to visit and inspection, control and coordination of different sections in the office of deputy commissioner and police stations. In matters of police station he applies his authority as district magistrate.
- The sixth is the coordination of development activities of the district. It involves other departments, mostly those of the specialists. It is probably the main reason that makes the specialists feel aggrieved.
- The seventh function relates to state secrecy and national security.
- The eighth is the authority to apply the Special Powers Act of 1974. Although this Act is under severe attack and observed by the members of the civil society as a black law, it has continued to be in operation as a law of convenience for the rulers-autocratic or democrat.
- The ninth is the organization, control and coordination of different sections (it slightly overlaps with the functions detailed in the fifth one).
- The tenth relates to functions related to police superintended of the district. Police regulation spell out the authority of district magistrate.
- The eleventh is about control of smuggling.
- The twelfth is about anti-corruption functions
- The thirteenth is the political and confidential functions assigned by the government. Why on earth the government of Bangladesh does not assign the specialists with such duties may call for another study.
- The fourteenth is arrangement of flag meeting and implementation of the decisions of the meeting.
- The fifteenth is about matters related to complaints and grievances of officers and staff.
- The sixteenth is about management of district administration.
- The seventeenth relates to control of firearms.
- The eighteenth relates to functions on treasury and stamp matters
- The nineteenth is the motivational responsibility to involve people in national programmes and development works.
- The twentieth is the issuance of licenses and certificates.

- The twenty-first is the supervision of management of *wakf* and *dewottor* property and governance of public trusts.
- The twenty second is the regulation of press and publication within the district.
- The twenty third is land acquisition. Agencies manned by specialists as well generalists require land for a range of reasons starting from construction of dams and reservoirs to building of offices and rest-houses. The deputy commissioner is simply inescapable in matters of land acquisition.
- The twenty fourth is that of conducting election.
- The twenty fifth relates to functions population census.
- The twenty sixth is that of relief and rehabilitation.
- The twenty seventh relates to food matters in the district.
- The twenty eighth is on the regulation of Ansars an Village Defense Parties.
- The twenty ninth is related to civil defense.
- The thirtieth is about labor (the function has not been defined).
- The thirty first relates to social welfare.
- The thirty second is about family planning and birth control.
- The thirty third is about pension and related issues.
- The thirty forth is protocol.
- The thirty fifth relates to vehicles and traffic.
- The thirty sixth is the maintenance of district transport pool.
- The thirty seventh is education and administration of public examination.
- The thirty eighth is recreation and sports activities in the district.
- The thirty ninth relates to issues on minorities.
- The fortieth is inter-departmental issue.
- The forty first is that of local government. Question arises if his hands of control on local governments are not meant to centralize a decentralized public institution.
- The forty first is undefined and includes miscellaneous activities.

The deputy commissioner emerges in trinity: COLLECTOR for administration and management of land and revenue matters, DISTRICT MAGISTRATE for administration criminal justice, and DEPUTY COMMISSIONER for development and numerous other defined and undefined functions. It is true that acts, rules, regulations,

administrative orders and various formal and quasi-formal instructions of the government empower the deputy commissioner to intervene into the areas thought to be that of the specialists. This study has provided a check list of forty one tasks drawing from a district. But there are many non-itemized functions which sometime surface over all others. One has the very legitimate right to question if the deputy commissioner is efficient enough to undertake the load of such a huge variety of tasks?

The Deputy Commissioner, one might like it or not, is said to represent the Government in the district. During the study the researchers were interested as to how he makes easy access to the Government. The executive offices of the government are that of the Offices of the President and Prime Minister. The deputy commissioners are in close touch with the Prime Minister's Office. The researchers have been told by one deputy commissioner that on the rumor of non-availability of locally produced salt, the Prime Minister herself phoned him to express her concern about salt crisis and asked him to take immediate action. The deputy commissioner in no time took a stock of the salt in stores and at salt beds spread over the coastal areas of the district, invited the salt producers and crushers in an emergency meeting and reached a conclusion that the crisis was artificial and accordingly informed and assured the Prime Minister. The whole exercise took him less than 10 hours. Another deputy commissioner was phoned by the President to inform him of the flood situation and erosion of river in the district.

These examples are given to explain that neither salt cultivation nor river erosion are deputy commissioners' exclusive area. But the Prime Minister and the President were sure that a first hand information would be available with the deputy commissioner and he might also be able to mobilize local resources to confront odds that might generate out of the salt crisis rumor or flood. The Cabinet Division being the direct controller of the deputy commissioner is also in close touch. Unless it is for some directives the President's Office does not have any significant business with the deputy commissioner. The regulatory ministries/divisions are that of Establishment, Finance, Internal Resources, Local Government, Commerce, Home Affairs, Justice, Civil Aviation and Tourism, Shipping, Lands and Election Commission, Establishment, Local

Government, Lands, Election Commission and Home have regular and routine business with the deputy commissioner. He again gets involved with the other ministries/divisions for example, in the process of land acquisition for airport expansion, or negotiation with the striking dock workers.

Service oriented and welfare ministries and divisions include Disaster Management and Relief, Special Affairs, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Railways, Post and Telecommunications, Social Welfare, Women's Affairs, Food, and Labor and Manpower. Except for Labor and Manpower, Post and Telecommunication, Railways and Special Affairs Divisions all others have regular correspondence with the deputy commissioner.

Promotional ministries/divisions include Environment and Forest, Primary Mass education, Education, Science Technology, Information, Cultural Affairs, Youths and Sports and Religious Affairs are also linked to the deputy commissioner. Total Literacy Movement of the government is entrusted with the deputy commissioner, observance of science week or national mourning day and that of Miladun-nabi also come within his routine duties. Development ministries and divisions viz. Agriculture, Rural development and Cooperatives, Irrigation, Water Resources and Flood Control, Roads, Industries, Power, Energy and Mineral resources, Works, Fisheries and Livestock, Jute and Textile have one or many functions with the deputy commissioner. Advisory divisions and ministries (Armed Forces, Planning, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and Parliament), research divisions like Statistical, and IMED, dealing with international affairs like Foreign Affairs and External Resources Division) may have occasional correspondence with the deputy commissioner. He is the lone officer in the district who has access to many higher offices of the government.

CHAPTER III

Reforming Administration

Government from time to time appoints committees and commissions with such terms of reference that cover certain aspects of public administration. Whenever certain incidents shake the public and develop into a public uproar, government goes through the ritual motion of appointing a commission. In a recent interview Justice Aminul Rahman who headed the Police Commission of 1988 lamented over the non-consideration of his report by the government. Many other chairmen of other commissions and committees will painfully share his disappointment. Good deal of time, efforts and public money are spent in the preparation of their reports, and then the government keeps sitting on them. (Chowdhury 1998)

Contemporary Reform Proposals: the Case of Bangladesh

Irrespective of cadres there is a general feeling that Bangladesh is a country where government does not work properly and that it needs an overhauling, greasing and some reforms to activate the wheels of development administration. Administrative reform to increase efficiency, capacity and output is often a deliberate change attempt that brings about new values and technologies on an existing administrative system (Caiden 1969). It has also been seen as an artificial inducement of administrative transformation against institutional resistance (ibid). The study does not go for detailing the theoretical perspective on administrative reforms but reviews contemporary reform studies undertaken in Bangladesh.

The Public Administration Efficiency Study undertaken in 1989 was aimed at developing recommendations related to i) higher standards in the administrative performance, ii) sound policy analysis, iii) implementation of policy, iv) delegation of authority, v) procedures for staffing, and vi) training for development administration. Based on a detailed survey the study identified five major areas of intervention viz. diluted accountability, over-centralization, complex operating procedures and weak support systems, and inadequate human resources. Recommended actions in the area of diluted accountability include strengthening audit system, strengthening supervision through training and management support, improve management information and monitoring systems and introduction of hire and fire system in the public corporations.

Overcentralization has to be overcome by delegation of routine personnel and financial matters to subordinate offices, departments and corporations, further delegation of project approval authority to ministries and implementing agencies, and conversion of manufacturing sector corporation into holding company. Interventions required to reduce the complex operating procedures include reduction of layers in decision making and promotion of horizontal communication between officers and organizations, increase productivity of decision making meetings, simplification of procurement and contracting procedures, enhancement of O&M capacity to improve work procedures and organizational effectiveness. Acceptance of computer-based management information system and modernization of office equipment and paperwork systems have been suggested to encounter the prevailing weak and inefficient support systems.

Another major area of intervention i.e. inadequate human resources has been proposed to be addressed with introduction of a two tier career system to raise the quality of senior civil service, use merit as the criteria of promotion and supply of graduated incentives for high performance, make provisions for appropriate compensation structure for public sector corporations, expansion of pragmatic training based on actual organizational needs, and provide scope for lucrative opportunities for quality trainers.

The study goes deep into the areas of dysfunction and maladministration. But it does not have a focus on the conflicting areas where public sectors professionals, particularly the specialists confront the generalists. This does not, however, mean that the conflict does not deserve an immediate attention.

Four secretaries report named *Towards Better Government in Bangladesh* published in 1993 comes up with a number of recommendations towards good governance. Two of the four secretaries known widely for their progressive stance must have stamped their views in the recommendations. The study has identified a number of areas demanding immediate intervention. There is a major thrust on the formation of a multi-based public service. It suggests that various form of quota system in line with the recommendation of the Public Service Commission should be rationalized. In the question of quota reservation system for secretariat posts of and above the rank of

deputy secretary the entry point should be restricted to the level of deputy secretary, while an appropriate examination system was considered in matters of choosing deputy secretaries

The study maintains that gender dimension in the public service should be adequately recognized and the quota reallocation for women, as recommended by the Public Service Commission in 1991 should be accepted. The study provided guidelines for promotion and made some special provisions for giving merit its due. It has also suggested a productive incentive structure for core government system.

Suggestions also include new incentives for performance standard. Financial management system was brought to the forefront by the study team. Like other studies the question of accountability and transparency in administration was highly emphasized. The area of human resources development was examined and both intensive and extensive training at home and abroad was included in the recommendations. Combating corruption drew much attention. An overhauling of anti-corruption office and updating of anti-corruption laws were also suggested. The suggested big thrust was on modernization of offices.

Delegation of administrative and financial authority closer to the point of delivery of public services was recommended. The study insists on a result oriented rather than a rules and procedure based approach in the public sector. This study has specific recommendation on the establishment of multi-based service structure, but the question of quota allocation for secretariat posts it does not recommend any egalitarian or ratio-based quota rather determines an entry point and asks the aspirants irrespective of cadres for higher offices at the secretariat to sit for proper examination.

Public Administration Branch of the United Nations Department of Development Support and Management Services undertook The Public Administration Sector Study in 1993. The areas this study covered include: i) organization and structure, ii) civil service management, iii) decision-making issues, iv) performance and accountability, v) human resource development, education and training, vi) the role and the status of women in public service, administrative culture and norms, vii) policy development and

analysis capacity, viii) administrative challenge arising from the evolving context of government, and x) reform implementation, strategies, approaches and institutions

The team envisions that Bangladesh needs to organize an efficient and democratic administrative system with emphasis on performance, efficiency, transparency and accountability. It suggests a pro-active development policy balancing the interests of security, growth and human development. The report notes that performance and accountability instead of patronage and rent-seeking should be the determinant criteria for action for the public official in running the affairs of the public sector, while it considers merit, equity, and fairness to be the guiding principles in the treatment of public servants. In each area of intervention the report suggests one set of consolidation and another set of reform proposals. The proposals that came up in this studies may be considered. It suggests establishment of result oriented management system, strengthening collective decision making in the framework of corporate planning, rationalization of government structure, ensure independence of judiciary, progressive placement of local administration and locally posted officer under the control of elected local governments.

One important recommendation is that of progressively removing distinction between cadres, by combining similar number of cadres into smaller number of cadres to provide for more of promotional prospect based on merit and harmonization of pay structure and service conditions. Professionalization of the civil service was the other important aspect of the reform proposals. The report, recognizes that there are inter-service tension and growing generalist-specialist debate that need to handled properly. Yet it does not suggest that induction of more of specialist in high offices of the secretariat would mitigate tension or produce more welfare. It also appears from the report that existence of a number of cadres in the civil service itself generates conflicts and contradictions. Reports and reform proposals that came to light during the last few decades do not make specific recommendation as to how to address the conflict that exists between BCS (Administration) and *Prokrichi* or BCS Central Action Committee (a forum for non-Administration members).

The last report in this line is that of World Bank's *Government that Works. Reforming the Public Sector* (1996). It is implicit in the title that government does not work

efficiently. It views the government from below as "preoccupied with process, too pervasive, highly centralized, overly bureaucratic, too discretionary in governance, unaccountable and unresponsive, and wasteful" (World Bank 1996 \v) Major areas identified in this study are that of redefining the frontiers of public sector, enhancing the level and nature of accountability and responsiveness, streamlining the regulations, laws and processes, overhauling the rules and processes by which government conducts its policy and decision making, maintaining an efficient, committed and professional public servant Major issues demanding immediate attention are rightsizing and downsizing government, enhancing the role of NGOs, nurturing local governments, and promoting the private sector.

Particular attention may be given to recommendation on improving human resources in government and professional skill development. It suggests financial awards for meritorious public service, asks for introducing special qualification supplements, and establishing cost reduction awards In order to bring about qualitative changes in the professional standards the report focuses on establishing specialized functional group. It suggests the establishment of Specialized Senior Staffing Pool (SSSP). Deputy - secretary rank officers from all cadres would be eligible to join any of SSSP groups based on their interest, track record and the result of competitive Masters-level tailor made examination. Once a person is selected for any of the SSSP groups, he would stay within the relevant ministry/agency for remainder of his career, becoming Agency Heads/Secretaries, in due course, if performance is satisfactory (World Bank 1996). In the question of rising to the position of secretary it is understood that this system does not give any preferential treatment to any particular service. The periodic movement of the *Prokrichi* may find an answer to this proposal

All these reports paved with good intention shows scores of ways to reform administration. But they do not delve deep into the political economy of politico-bureaucratic entente which serves as the most powerful driving force in retaining the old administrative order.

CHAPTER IV

Research Findings

Distribution of Respondents

This Chapter gives a rolling description of the research based on questionnaire 1 and 2 which were administered to capture the opinion cadre and non-cadre officials, as well as the members of the civil society. Table 1a shows types and distribution of respondents in the selected districts. As mentioned earlier, the districts were chosen from six administrative divisions. These districts are Mymensingh, Jhalakathi, Magura, Joypurhat, Moulavibazar, and Cox's Bazar. Of a total of 76 respondent cadre officers, 15 officers are from Mymensingh, 11 each from Jhalakathi, Magura, and Joypurhat, 15 from Moulavi Bazar and 13 from Cox's Bazar. Officers from agriculture, administration, public works department, police, and general education responded enthusiastically to questionnaire, while response was low for officers from information and statistics. Members of the civil society also participated with enthusiasm. Among the members of civil society, response was high for lawyers and businessmen, and response of the other members of civil society was also quite encouraging. From among the non-cadre officers District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer (DRRO), and Executive Engineers of LGED were highly responsive. Officers and members of the civil society appeared to be quite aware of the nature of the conflict.

Cluster Distribution of Respondents

For convenience of this study the researchers have put cadre officers into following clusters.

- Administration (we have knowingly kept it as a separate entity because of the relative importance of this cadre in the issues of conflict).
- Engineering (includes PWD, R&H, PH&E, Telecommunication). Agriculture (Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock)
- Health (Health and Family Planning)
- Judiciary (constitutional requirement suggests that the judiciary should be independent, we also found it convenient not to bracket judiciary with any other cadre)
- Law Enforcing Agencies (Police and Ansar)

- General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Custom, Statistics, and Cooperatives)
- Education [Education has the largest number of cadre members, and it is viewed by many as a specialist cadre. In this study the researchers have approached to Education (General) cadre members only].
- The study also considered it convenient to form two clusters with the non-cadre officers, one being general (DRRO, District Accounts Officer, District Youth Development Officer, District Child Affairs Officer, and Assistant Director Savings) and the technical (LGED, PDB, WDB).
- The study has put the members of the civil society in a single cluster (Elected representatives/politician, businessmen, lawyers, journalists, and retired civil servants).

Table 1b shows that out of 76 cadre respondents 36 (47.4 per cent), are engineers, doctors and agriculturist (*prokrichi*), while 6 (7.9 per cent) are from Administration. Of 22 non-cadre respondents 45.5 per cent are engineers.

Entrance to Cadre Services

Table 2 suggests that out of 76 cadre officers 60 (79%) were directly recruited to the cadre and the rest 16 (21 %) were encadred at one point of service of the officials. In the administration and engineering clusters, all respondents were direct recruit, while there was encadrement in other clusters with majority of the health-cluster respondents being in this category. More than 50 per cent of the respondents in the general services cluster were encadred officers.

Length of Service of the Respondents

Table 3 shows the length of service of the respondents. Out of 98 cadre and non-cadre respondents length of service for 10 (10.2%) was below five years, while for eight respondents it was more than 25 years. Respondents in the 11-15 and 21-25 years service length groups accommodated the highest number of respondents (27.5%). Among 76 cadre officers 24 (31.6%) are within the 21-24 years of service length group and 18 (23.7%) in the 11-15 years of service length group. It may be recorded that on completion of 25 years of service one may opt for retirement with full pension benefits. In this study 8 (8.2%) respondents out of 76 cadre officers have already

crossed the service length of 25 years. It may also be mentioned that all the BCS (Administration) members are within the 11-15 years of service length group

Range of Pay-Scale and Status

The present pay structure is as below:

- Grade 1: Taka 15000 (fixed)
- Grade 2: Taka 12900-14300
- Grade 3: Taka 11700-13500
- Grade 4: Taka 10700-13100
- Grade 5: Taka 9500-12100
- Grade 6: Taka 7200-10840
- Grade 7: Taka 6150-9750
- Grade 8: Taka 4800-8160
- Grade 9: Taka 4300-7740

Table 4 suggests that 19.4 % respondents are in the pay scale of Taka 4300-7740 group, while only one respondent is in the Taka 11700-13500 group. Taka 9500-12100 group accommodate the highest number of respondents (35.7%) The one in the Taka 11700-13500 group is a member of BCS (Judicial) service. In terms of scale of pay/position occupied one respondent falls in the category of joint secretary or equivalent status, 37 (37.76%) in deputy secretary or equivalent, 32 in senior assistant secretary or equivalent, and 28 (28.6%) in assistant secretary and equivalent status (See Table 5).

The First and Second Promotions

Table 6 gives a picture of span of time of 1st and 2nd promotions. Of a total of 98 cadre and non-cadre respondents 20.4% officers are yet to be fit for 1st promotion, 14.3% have fulfilled the preconditions of promotion but have not yet been promoted, 38 officers (38.8%) have had their first promotion within 5-9 years of service, 14 officers within 10-14 years, 7 officers within 15-19 years, and 5 officers within 20-24 years.

The first promotion appeared quicker in case of BCS (Administration) cadre. Five out of six (83.3%) respondents got their first promotion within 5-9 years of their service. Seven out of 13 (53.8%) engineers got their first promotion during this span of service, while only 2 out of 8 (25.0%) doctors availed this opportunity. For the second promotion, all 5 BCS (Administration) officers, who got their first promotion, have fulfilled all pre-conditions and are yet to be promoted, while there is none in this category for engineers. More than 34 per cent of the qualified respondents are waiting for the second promotion.

Choice of Service/Cadre

Multiple responses were recorded in the question of choice of service/cadre (see Table 7). 51 (52.1%) of 98 respondents can relate their academic background to their service. Eight (0.9%) chose their respective services because of higher promotion prospects. Seven (0.7%) preferred their service as it ensures power and authority. 24.5% was drawn to the service/cadre because of reputation and relative importance of the service/cadre. For 18.4% respondents, the choice was simply imposed by the family. Five officers (5.1%) suggested that they could not qualify for their preferred cadres.

On Job Satisfaction

Table 8 suggests that 42.9 per cent respondents are satisfied with their present job. The majority recorded their dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction remains as high as 66.7 per cent respondents in the BCS (Administration), 75 per cent of doctors, and 84.6 of cadre engineers. The number of satisfied respondents is higher for judiciary, agriculture, law enforcing agencies and non-cadre engineers. The research notes it with interest that dissatisfaction is remarkably higher for cadre engineers and lower for non-cadre engineers.

Why Dissatisfaction?

Multiple responses have been recorded for Table 9. Lack of promotion scope is the reason for 76.9 per cent, laborious and risky nature of job for 3.56 per cent, deteriorating status and declining attraction of the cadre/service for 7.1 per cent, negative working environment for 24.4 per cent, lack of residential facilities and

logistics for 8.9 per cent, inequality in pay scale for 12.5 per cent and pay scale not in conformity with market for 7.1 per cent. The other causes include jealousy of other cadres, no relation to academic attainment, centralization of authority, tarnished image of civil service, lateral entry, problems of transfer, absence of inter-department coordination, excessive power and authority of BCS (Administration). The engineers, doctors and agriculturists focused mainly on the inadequacy of scope for promotion.

Is Coordination Needed in the District?

Table 10 suggests that 84.7 per cent respondents feel the need for coordination with other cadres. 83.3 per cent of BCS (Administration), 84.6 per cent of cadre engineers, 93.3 per cent of agriculturists, 87.5 per cent of doctors and 66.7 per cent of judicial service respondents emphasize on coordination. Table-11 views that, in question of degrees of coordination (viz. sufficient, moderate and low) BCS (Administration) suggests that sufficient coordination does not exist among cadres, while a significant percentage of engineers, agriculturists, doctors and police feel that there exists sufficient coordination with BCS (Administration). Ninety per cent non-cadre (general) respondents consider that they have sufficient coordination with BCS (Administration).

The Case of Interference

Table 12 suggests that interference in the jurisdiction of both cadre and non-cadre officers is a common phenomenon. Only the members of BCS (Judicial) in the study rejected the idea of interference. The study however treats this opinion with caution when the head of the state and a former chief justice of the country is highly critical of their performance. 56.6 per cent cadre officers agree that interference occurs. Interference is high for BCS (Administration), agriculture, and education, while it is low for doctors and non-cadre engineers.

Nature of Interference

Political elites and high officials put pressure to release vested property. Political interference is high in matters of recruitment, posting and transfer of employees, planning and implementation of development works. Politicians influence law and order, investigation of police cases, and selection of food dealers. Interference of the

office of the deputy commissioner is high in requisition of transport, and preparation and approval of progress report of development works. The deputy commissioner takes an upper hand in coordination meetings (some do not want the deputy commissioner to chair such meetings, see Table-14), distribution of election duties, and inquiries against other officers. Political interference is also revealed in inappropriate use of police forces, distribution of relief goods, agricultural rehabilitation programmes, non-realization of land development tax and bank credits, and eviction of illegal occupants from public land (see Table 13)

Deputy Commissioner's Responsibility

The most justified functions of deputy commissioner as shown in Table 14 include management of land revenue, recovery of public demand, management of *wakf* and *dewottor* estates and public trusts, and matters related to treasury and stamps. The second set of functions as justified by the respondents include administration of criminal justice, supervision of police action, and management of matters related to jail, firearms, poison and explosives. The least supported function include matters related to forest, fisheries and livestock (see Table 14 for detail)

Is a Coordinator Needed?

Table 15 sums up the response as to whether there is a need for a coordinator in the district? If so, who should be the coordinator? All the members of judiciary, law enforcing agency, education, and non-cadre technical officers consider that there should be a district coordinator. 93.9 per cent respondents want a coordinator, while the rest 6.1 per cent do not see the need to have someone to coordinate. In question of who should be district coordinator the questionnaire offered three different choices- Deputy Commissioner, an officer not belonging to BCS (Administration), and elected representative. 31.5 per cent voted for deputy commissioner, 3.3 per cent for officer other than BCS (Administration), and 56.2 per cent for elected representative. It is also interesting to note that all the non-cadre (general) officers voted for deputy commissioner, while 16.7 per cent cadre engineers and 28.6 per cent doctors like to see the deputy commissioner in coordination. The overall mandate however is in favor of elected representatives.

Table 16 gives wider choice to determine as to who should be the secretary to the elected representative. 40.0 per cent want the deputy commissioner. 31.7 per cent the present secretary, 1.7 per cent a senior officer of the district, 3.3 per cent the Additional Deputy Commissioner (General), 3.3 per cent an elected representative, 6.7 per cent look for someone selected by the government, 8.3 per cent any officer from other Administration cadre (see Table 16).

Degree of Deputy Commissioner's Power

Table 17 is about the opinion on the degree of power vested in the deputy commissioner. 30.6 per cent consider his power to be appropriate, 61.2 per cent to be excess, while in question of degree of exercise of power 39.8 per cent consider that exercise of power is appropriate and 54.1 per cent think it to be excess. Table 18 helps understand the opinion of the respondents who consider that deputy commissioner applies excess of his power.

How Does Deputy Commissioner Overdo?

The following are the major responses

- The deputy commissioner has an imposing attitude as a coordinator.
- He thrusts his opinion without having proper grounding in many issues.
- He attempts to control areas where he is not comfortable because of lack of specialized knowledge and training.
- He has a tendency to overdo as a coordinator.
- He presides over more meetings than he really needs to do.
- He interferes into the work of other departments.
Many of his interference are not necessary.
- He requisitions transports without prior intimation.
- He behaves as an administrator, rather than a development manager.
- He does not cooperate in the completion of ongoing projects.
- He considers all other officers subordinate to him.

(See Table 18 for detail)

Looking at the Roots of Conflicts

Table 19 gives an insight into the reasons that generate and fuel existing conflicts. The following are the reasons organized on the basis of higher to lower response.

1. Disparity in promotion.
2. Difference in the scale of pay.
3. Vesting of power and authority in BCS (Administration) as representative of the government.
4. Inequality in the length of service in same status among different cadres.
5. Psychological complexity of more meritorious officer enjoying same rank and status with an inferior one.
6. Inequality in authority in similar status.
7. Inequality in line promotion.
8. Interference of other cadre officers in development projects.
9. Variation in the significance of functions performed by officers of similar rank status
10. Weakness in the selection procedure of Public Service Commission in the post-independent Bangladesh.
11. Slack chain of command in cadre services.
12. Political instability
13. Corruption in the civil administration.
14. Role of controlling authority outside cadre
15. Existence of too many cadres.
16. Instigation of political parties.
17. Indirect military-bureaucratic interference

Does Conflict Generate Problems?

Table 20 suggests that according to 57.1 per cent respondents conflict among cadres generates problem. Table 21 lists the following problems based on their response.

- Delay in the implementation of development projects because of non-cooperation.
- Delay in promotion.
- Lack of interest in assigned work.
- Lack of coordination
- Deterioration in working environment
- Decline in mutual respect
- Slowing of ongoing development programmes
- Deterioration of law and order

The other problems include resistance in institutional management, decline in efficiency, absenteeism, lack of transparency and accountability

On Promotion

Respondents opined that BCS (Administration), Police, Foreign Affairs, Audit and Accounts, Taxation and Judicial cadre people are in advantageous position (see Table 22) Members of BCS (Administration) however argue that considering their cadre strength they have very little prospect of promotion to high offices. In question of promotion criteria the highest response was in favor of seniority cum merit plus score of Annual Confidential Report (ACR). The second went to merit cum seniority plus results of PSC's examination third to results of examination conducted by PSC and the fourth to merit cum seniority plus results of examination and score of ACR (see Table 23)

Addressing Cadre Conflicts: Respondents' Recommendations

The following are recommendations made by cadre and non-cadre officers as reflected in Table 24.

1. To take necessary steps to eliminate inequality in the scale of pay among officers of equal status
2. To ensure promotion of officers at appropriate time.
3. To compensate officers financially when promotion is delayed due to administrative reasons.
4. To ensure check and balance in the functions of various cadres
5. To ensure leadership of the concerned officers in their subject related meetings.

6. To ensure inter-department coordination under the leadership of elected local government / public representatives.
- 7 To abolish associations / organizations of all cadres.
8. To impose restriction on engineers, doctors and agriculturists in seeking access to general cadres.
- 9 To ensure the presence of department heads in the district development coordination meeting headed by deputy commissioner.
- 10 To ensure the presence of deputy commissioner as a member in sectoral meetings organized by various departments.
11. To reduce the number of cadres into two- general and technical
- 12 To abolish the cadre system

Profile of Members of Civil Society

Of a total 27 respondents 12 (44.4%) higher academic attainment with Masters and or above degrees. 11 (40.7%) have graduation, 3 (11.1%) passed higher secondary and 1 (3.7%) school final. In question of having the knowledge and awareness of the issues of conflict prevailing among cadres only 1 (3.7%) admitted to have not been much informed, while 23 (85.2%) respondents have moderate information and 3 (11.1%) claimed to have been adequately aware and informed (Table CS1). The researchers suggest that the conflicting conditions and their socio-economic effects have not remained unrecognized by the members of the public.

Roots of Conflicts

Based on the response of the members of civil society following are the reasons that help cause/harness conflicts in the civil service. The order is based on higher to lower response. The ranking is calculated from the suggested marking of the respondents with 6 for the highest and 1 for the lowest, with six grading between these number.

1. Inequality in question of promotion opportunities among different cadres.
2. Corruption in the civil administration.
3. Responsibility and power vested in the BCS (Administration) cadre as representative of the government.
4. Interference on development activities by the members of cadres not relevant to the development initiative.

5. Differentiation in the administration of authority among the officers of similar status.
6. Psychological complexity of more meritorious officer enjoying same rank and status with an inferior one.
7. Slackness in the chain of command in the civil service
8. Heterogeneous and weak recruitment system in the civil service in the post independent Bangladesh.
9. Differentiation in the scale of pay in the similar rank and status
10. Increasing number of cadres
11. Differentiation in the length of service in same status.
12. Role of controlling authority outside cadre
13. Political instability
14. Purposeful instigation from the political parties
15. Differentiation in the importance of work for posts of similar status.
16. Discrimination among cadres in the field level line postings.
17. Military-bureaucracy interference

Nature of problems generated out of conflicts

Multiple responses have been recorded in drawing opinion of the respondents (Table CS3) The following are the problems identified.

1. Delay in project implementation resulting in inadequate delivery of services
2. Increased sufferings of the commoners.
3. Decreased output in terms of both quality and quantity
4. Delay in the delivery of justice.
5. Deterioration of law and order situation.
6. Negative attitude of officials, feeling of detachment, political exploitation and problems in identification of authority

Promotion criteria

The response gives the following suggestions

1. Merit-cum seniority plus results of written and oral examination conducted by PSC
2. Merit-cum seniority and results of written and oral examination conducted by PSC plus review of ACR
3. Seniority-cum merit plus results of examination conducted by PSC

On Coordination

Table CS5 suggests that 96.3 per cent respondents want a district coordinator. 23.1 per cent vote for deputy commissioner to the office of district coordinator, while 76.9 per cent want an elected representative. Sixty per cent of those who voted for elected representative want deputy commissioner to the secretary of zila parishad (see Table- CS5 for other responses)

Deputy Commissioner's Functions and Powers

The most justified functions of deputy commissioner as shown in Table CS6 include management of land revenue, recovery of public demand, management of *wakf* and *dewottor* estates and public trusts, and matters related to treasury and stamps. The second set of functions as justified by the respondents include acquisition of land and eviction of illegal occupant from public land. The least supported function include matters related to high courts and civil courts and appointment of government pleaders.

According to 63.0 per cent respondents deputy commissioner enjoys too much of power, 29.6 per cent consider it to be appropriate, while 7.4 per cent maintain that the power vested in him is still inadequate (see Table CS7 for the degree of power vested and CS8 for the degree of power exercised). Excessive use of power according to these respondents is reflected in the following.

1. Application of magisterial power
2. Influencing subordinate magistrates in bail matters.
3. Misuse of Special Power Act of 1974
4. Interference in the areas of other cadres
5. Recommendation of examination centers
6. Influencing recruitment
7. Transport requisition, issuance of driving license

Preferred Cadre

Which cadre do the members of the civil society prefer for their sons and daughters? Table CS9 shows that 37.0 per cent chose BCS (Administration), per cent Education,

22.2 per cent Foreign Affairs, 7.4 per cent Health, 7.4 per cent Engineering. 60 per cent of the politicians, and 50 per cent of lawyers voted for BCS (Administration). There was no choice for police, custom and tax cadres. Table-CS10 tells that Administration remains the highly favored cadre because of power, authority, opportunity and scope to become head of the district. 3.7 per cent do not prefer any of the cadres because of corrupt practices in bureaucracy.

Addressing the Conflict

The research sought their opinion in addressing the prevailing conflicts. The following are the suggestions arranged in descending order of responses as reflected in Table-CS11:

1. To eliminate disparity in promotion
2. To eliminate inequality in the scale of pay.
3. To ensure coordination under the leadership of elected local government/public representative
4. To impose restriction on specialists on their attempt to gain access to general cadres.
5. To abolish associations/ organizations of all cadres
6. To ensure check and balance in the functions of different cadres
7. Ensure the presence of department heads in the coordination meeting with the deputy commissioner in the chair.
8. To ensure leadership of the concerned cadre officer in their subject specific meetings.
9. To reduce numbers of cadres into two- general and technical.
10. To compensate officers financially when promotion is delayed.
11. To ensure presence of deputy commissioner in sectoral meetings
12. To abolish cadre system.

CHAPTER V

Conclusions

The following is a news item extracted from the Bangladesh Observer, October 24, 1993 is as below:

"A joint meeting of Prokrichi-BCS Central Action Committee on Saturday protested the demand of BCS (Administration) Association and demanded public trial of members of BCS (Administration) for collaborating in imposing autocratic rule. It also urged the government to remove members of the BCS (Administration) from the top position of the government administration. The meeting observed that the members of BCS (Administration) Association could conspire to create chaos and division in the administration to impose autocratic rule by destroying the present democratic system. It may be mentioned that BCS (Administration) Association on Friday urged the government to declare all the activities of the Prokrichi-BCS Central Action Committee as illegal. The meeting urged the Government to curb what it called discourteous, authoritarian and colonial behavior of the high officials belonged to the BCS (Administration) Association "

The conflict if not violent, is clear and contains grains of animosity. Faaland and Parkinson (1976) have described Bangladesh as a catalogue of woe, embodying chronic food crises, persistent malnutrition, recurrent famine, corruption, malfunctioning of economy and a dismal administration. Other developing countries are not immune from similar crises. Following a perennial failure of state-sponsored development programmes in the developing countries the issue of management of development and reform has come to the forefront, with maladministration and organisational incapacity and dysfunction identified as among the worst impediments to achieving the goals of development (Blunt et al 1989). Inter and intra cadre conflicts contributed more to the process of dysfunction. An important aspect of the administrative reform has to be mitigation of conflict and animosity. Drawing attention back to the hypothesis of the study the researchers found that all categories of respondents recognized that there exists conflicts among different cadres resulting in spread of venom in the civil service and generation of administrative and development problems. The field study also confirmed that the conflict is essentially with the BCS

(Administration) cadre, and the conflict is best reflected around the deputy commissioner. Respondents finger at his power and authority, where the seeds of discontent of *prokrichi* lie. The study confirms that inequality in scale of pay and promotion remain another important issue contributing to growing conflict. The findings of the research thus validate the hypothesis of the study.

Finally the research recommends the following.

- Recommendations of four studies (Public Administration Efficiency Study, Four Secretaries report called Towards Better Government in Bangladesh, Public Administration Sector Study, and World Bank's Government that Works: Reforming the Public Sector) should be reexamined and a set of pragmatic recommendation should be identified for early implementation.
- Inequality in promotion and scale of pay among the members of different cadre should be removed.
- Representative local government should be established and an elected representative should be placed as the district coordinator.
- Number of cadres in the civil service is exceedingly high. Based on functional similarities the number of cadres should be brought down to a maximum of ten.
- Cadre rivalry should be contained by limiting the areas of intervention of the cadre service associations.
- The role and functions of deputy commissioner should be redefined and clearly spelt out, and he should be relieved of development functions in the district.
- A limited pro-active lateral entry policy should be formulated to intake merit that remains outside cadre.
- Wide areas should be opened up for generalist-specialist interaction.
- The process of privatization should be geared up so that private sector can absorb some shocks of conflict that prevails in the public sector.

Grey Areas

The research suggests the following grey areas which need thorough investigation:

- Comparative study of promotion prospects of different cadres.
- Differentiation in the scale of pay and the discontent among cadre officers.

- Commitment of the government in administrative reform.
- Privatization and the future of cadre services.
- Administration and management: studying the areas of new managers
- Is *Prokrichi* a united platform? An investigation into the coalition of engineers doctors and agriculturists.
- BCS (Administration) and politicians' relationship- a marriage of convenience

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Table-1a : Type & Districtwise Distribution of Respondents (Cadre/Non-Cadre/Civil Society)

Type of Respondents	No. of Respondents according to selected districts						
	Mymensingh	Jhalokhati	Magura	Jaypurhat	Maulovibazar	Cox's Bazar	Total
A) Cadre Officers	(15)	(11)	(11)	(11)	(15)	(13)	(76)
1 BCS (Food)	-	-	1	1	1	1	4
2 BCS (R&H)	1	-	1	-	1	-	3
3 BCS (Telecom)	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
4 BCS (Fishes)	-	1	1	1	-	1	4
5 BCS (Agriculture)	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
6 BCS (Administration)	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
7 BCS (Information)	-	1	-	-	1	1	3
8 BCS (Customs & Excise)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
9 BCS (Health)	1	1	-	1	1	1	5
10 BCS (PWD)	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
11 BCS (Statistics)	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
12 BCS (Co-operative)	1	-	1	-	1	-	3
13 BCS (Judiciary)	1	-	-	-	1	1	3
14 BCS (Anwar)	1	1	-	1	1	1	5
15 BCS (Family Planning)	-	1	1	-	1	-	3
16 BCS (Police)	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
17 BCS (Livestock)	1	1	1	1	1	-	5
18 BCS (General Education)	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
19 BCS (Postal)	1	-	-	-	1	-	2
20 BCS (Public Health)	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
B) Non-Cadre Officers	(4)	(4)	(4)	(1)	(4)	(5)	(22)
1 Power Development Board	-	1	1	-	1	-	3
2 District Accounts Officer	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
3 Dist. Youth Dev. Officer	1	-	1	-	1	1	4
4 Water Development Board	1	1	-	-	-	-	2
5 DRRO	1	1	1	-	1	1	5
6 LGED	1	-	1	1	1	1	5
7 National Savings Bureau	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
8 Dist. Child Affairs Officer	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
C) Civil Society	(4)	(5)	(5)	(3)	(5)	(5)	(27)
1 Rt. Civil Servant	1	1	1	-	1	1	5
2 Lawyer	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
3 Journalist	1	1	1	-	1	1	5
4 Businessman	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
5 Chairman (Municipality)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4
6 Politician	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Total No. of Sample	23	20	20	15	24	23	125

Table-1b : Types & Districtwise Distribution of Respondents (Cadre/Non-Cadre/Civil Society)

Type of Respondents	No. of Respondents & selected districts						
	Mymensingh	Jhalokhati	Magura	Jaypurhat	Maulovibazar	Cox's Bazar	Total
1. Administration	1	1	1	1	1	1	6 (7.90)
2. Engineering (PWD,R&I,PH&E,LT&I,etc)	3	1	2	2	2	3	13 (17.11)
3. Agriculture (Ag, Fisheries, Livestock)	2	3	3	3	2	2	15 (19.74)
4. Health (Health & Family Planning)	1	2	1	1	2	1	8 (10.52)
5. Judiciary	1				1	1	3 (3.94)
6. Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	2	2	1	2	2	2	11 (14.17)
7. General Services (Food, Information, Postal Customs, Statistics Co- operative)	4	1	2	1	1	2	14 (18.42)
8. Education	1	1	1	1	1	1	6 (7.90)
Sub Total	15	11	11	11	15	13	76 (100.00) (60.8)
1. Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DSO)	2	2	2		2	4	12 (54.55)
2. Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WDB)	2	2	2	1	2	1	10 (45.45)
Sub Total	4	4	4	1	4	5	22(100.00) (17.6)
1. Civil Society (Rt Civil Servant, Lawyer, Journalist, Businessman, Chairman (Municipality), Politician)	4	5	5	3	5	5	27 (21.6)
Grand Total No. of Respondents	23	20	20	15	24	23	125 (100.00)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-2 : Types of Induction into Cadre Service

Type of Respondents	Types of Induction		Total
	Cadre	Encadred	
1. Administration	6 (10)	-	6 (7.89)
2. Engineering (PWD,R&H,PH&E,Telecom)	13 (21.67)	-	13 (17.11)
3. Agriculture (Ag, Fisheries, Livestock)	13 (21.67)	2 (12.5)	15 (19.74)
4. Health (Health & Family Planning)	3 (5)	5 (31.25)	8 (10.52)
5. Judiciary	2 (3.33)	1 (6.25)	3 (3.95)
6. Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	10 (16.67)	1 (6.25)	11 (14.47)
7. General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co-operative)	9 (15)	5 (31.25)	14 (18.42)
8. Education	4 (6.67)	2 (12.5)	6 (7.89)
Total	60 (100.00) (78.95)	15 (100.00) (21.05)	76 (100.00) (100.00)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-3 : Length of Service of the Respondents

Types of Respondents		Length of Services (Years)						Total
		1-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	25+	
1.	Administration	-	-	6	-	-	-	6
2.	Engineering (PWD,R&H,PH&E,Telecom)	1	-	1	2	8	1	13
3.	Agriculture (Ag, Fisheries, Livestock)	-	-	-	3	10	2	15
4.	Health (Health & Family Planning)	1	-	1	2	2	2	8
5.	Judiciary	-	-	2	-	1	-	3
6.	Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	-	5	4	1	1	-	11
7.	General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co- operative)	5	4	4	1	-	-	14
8.	Education	-	-	-	1	2	3	6
Sub Total		7 (9.21)	9 (11.84)	18 (23.68)	10 (13.16)	24 (31.58)	8 (10.53)	76 (77.55) (100.00)
1.	Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DSO)	3	2	5	1	1	-	12
2.	Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WADB)	-	1	4	3	2	-	10
Sub Total		3 (13.64)	3 (13.64)	9 (40.90)	4 (18.18)	3 (13.64)	-	22 (22.45) (100.00)
Grand Total		10 (10.20)	12 (12.24)	27 (27.56)	14 (14.29)	27 (27.55)	8 (8.16)	98 (100.00) (100.00)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-4 Distribution of Pay Scales among the Respondents

Types of Respondents		Pay Scales,1991						Total (28)
		Tk. 4300- 7740	Tk. 6150- 9750	Tk. 7200- 10810	Tk. 9500- 12100	Tk. 10700- 13100	Tk. 11700- 13500	
1.	Administration	-	1	1	4	-	-	6
2.	Engineering (PWD,R&H PH&E, Telecom)	1	1	5	5	1	-	13
3.	Agriculture (Ag., Fisheries, Livestock)	-	-	3	12	-	-	15
4.	Health (Health & Family Planning)	-	1	3	4	-	-	8
5.	Judiciary	-	-	-	2	-	1	3
6.	Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	1	1	8	1	-	-	11
7.	General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co operative)	10	1	3	-	-	-	14
8.	Education	-	-	1	2	3	-	6
Sub Total		12 (15.80)	5 (6.58)	24 (31.58)	30 (39.47)	4 (5.26)	1 (1.31)	76 (100)
1	Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DS O)	5	5	2	-	-	-	12
2.	Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WADB)	2	1	2	5	-	-	10
Sub Total		7 (31.82)	6 (27.27)	4 (18.18)	5 (22.73)	-	-	22 (100)
Grand Total		19 (19.40)	11 (11.22)	28 (28.57)	35 (35.71)	4 (4.08)	1 (1.02)	95 (100)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-5 :Present status of the posts of the Respondents

Types of Respondents		Present status				Total
		Asstt. Secretary or equivalent	Sr. Asstt. Secretary or equivalent	Deputy Secretary or equivalent	Joint Secretary or equivalent	
1.	Administration	1	5	-	-	6
2.	Engineering (PWD,R&H,PH&E,Telecom)	1	2	10	-	13
3.	Agriculture (Ag, Fisheries, Livestock)	-	5	10	-	15
4.	Health (Health & Family Planning)	1	3	4	-	8
5.	Judiciary	-	-	2	1	3
6.	Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	1	9	1	-	11
7.	General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co-operative)	11	3		-	14
8.	Education	-	1	5	-	6
Sub Total		15 (19.74)	28 (36.84)	32 (42.11)	1 (1.31)	76 (100)
1.	Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DSO)	10	2	-	-	12
2.	Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WADB)	3	2	5	-	10
Sub Total		13 (59.09)	4 (18.18)	5 (22.73)	-	22 (100)
Grand Total		28 (28.57)	32 (32.65)	37 (37.76)	1 (1.02)	98 (100)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-6 : Length of Service on First and Second promotion

Total	Getting 1st Promotion after joining the service (Years)						Cadre Distribution of Respondents	Getting 2nd Promotion after 1st Promotion (Years)						Total
	NA	precondition fulfilled but yet to be promoted	20-24	15-19	10-14	5-9		5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	precondition fulfilled but yet to be promoted	NA	
6	-	1 (16.67)	-	-	-	5 (83.33)	Adm.	-	-	-	-	5 (100)	-	5
13	1 (7.69)	2 (15.38)	2 (15.38)	1 (7.69)	-	7 (53.85)	Engineering	1 (10)	4 (40)	1 (10)	1 (10)	-	3 (30)	10
15	-	1 (6.67)	-	5 (33.33)	1 (6.67)	8 (53.33)	Agriculture	1 (7.14)	5 (35.71)	-	-	7 (50)	1 (7.14)	14
8	-	2 (25)	2 (25)	1 (12.5)	1 (12.5)	2 (25)	Health	1 (16.67)	1 (16.67)	-	-	2 (33.33)	2 (33.33)	6
3	-	-	-	-	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	Judiciary	3 (100)	-	-	-	-	-	3
11	1 (9.09)	1 (9.09)	-	-	-	9 (81.82)	Law En. A.	1 (11.11)	-	-	-	2 (22.22)	6 (66.67)	9
14	8 (57.14)	3 (21.43)	-	-	1 (7.14)	2 (14.29)	Gen. Service	-	-	-	-	1 (33.33)	2 (66.67)	3
6	-	-	-	-	4 (66.67)	2 (33.33)	Education	3 (50)	2 (33.33)	-	-	1 (16.67)	-	6
76	10 (13.16)	10 (13.16)	4 (5.26)	7 (9.21)	9 (11.84)	36 (47.37)	Sub-total	10 (17.86)	12 (21.42)	1 (1.79)	1 (1.79)	18 (32.14)	14 (25)	56
12	9 (75)	2 (16.67)	-	-	1 (8.33)	-	N.C. (Gen.)	-	-	-	-	-	1 (100)	1
10	1 (10)	2 (20)	1 (10)	-	4 (40)	2 (20)	N.C. (Tech.)	-	-	-	-	4 (57.14)	3 (42.86)	7
22	10 (45.45)	4 (18.18)	1 (4.55)	-	5 (22.73)	2 (9.09)	Sub-total	-	-	-	-	4 (50)	4 (50)	8
98	20 (20.40)	14 (14.29)	5 (5.10)	7 (7.14)	14 (14.29)	38 (38.78)	Grand Total	10 (15.63)	12 (18.75)	1 (1.56)	1 (1.56)	22 (34.36)	18 (28.14)	64

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-7 : Reasons for choosing the present cadre/service

Causes	Type of respondents##										
	Adm. (6)	Eng (13)	Ag (15)	Health (8)	Judiciary (3)	Law Enforcing Agencies (11)	General Services (14)	Ed (6)	Non- cadre. Gen. (12)	Non- cadre: Tech (10)	Total (98)
1. Related to academic background	1	11	15	5	3	-	2	4	-	10	51 (52.04)
2. Promotion scope is higher		-	1	-	-	4	2	-	-	1	8 (8.16)
3. Power/ Authority	2		-	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	7 (7.14)
4. Reputation	4	3	3	-	2	2	3	3	2	2	24 (24.49)
5. Advised by family	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	18 (18.37)
6. Could not qualify for other cadre/service	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	-	1	-	5 (5.10)
7. For not having any other option	-	-	1	-	-	3	5	-	4	1	13 (13.26)
8. Others#	-	1	-	3	-	1	4	1	4	1	15 (15.31)

Multiple response recorded. (Parenthesis represents percentage)

Opportunity to stay in the city; Less hazardous, Scope for contribution to the development of the country; Interest in cultural activities specially for children and in writing in national dailies and magazines; Scope of help the unemployed youth of the country; Responsibility to the society, country and nation; Ignorance about cadre service; According to the merit list; No opportunity of corruption, Challenging job; Scope for private practice; Curiosity; Satisfy Allah, Central service; Higher opportunities for foreign and in-country training;

Table-8 : Opinion on satisfaction with present job

Type of Respondents	Are you satisfy with your present job		Total
	Yes	No	
1. Administration	2 (33.33)	4 (66.67)	6
2. Engineering (PWD,R&H,PH&I,Telecom)	2 (15.38)	11 (84.62)	13
3. Agriculture (Ag, Fisheries, Livestock)	8 (53.33)	7 (46.67)	15
4. Health (Health & Family Planning)	2 (25)	6 (75)	8
5. Judiciary	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	3
6. Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	6 (54.55)	5 (45.45)	11
7. General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co-operative)	7 (50)	7 (50)	14
8. Education	3 (50)	3 (50)	6
Sub Total	32 (42.11)	44 (57.89)	76
1. Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DSO)	4 (33.33)	8 (66.67)	12
2. Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WADB)	6 (60)	4 (40)	10
Sub Total	10 (45.45)	12 (54.55)	22
Grand Total	42 (42.86)	50 (57.14)	98

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-9 . Causes for Dissatisfaction with present job

Causes	Type of respondents										
	Adm n(1)	Eng (11)	Ag (7)	Health (6)	Judiciary (1)	Law Enforcing Agencies (5)	General Services (7)	Ed (3)	Non- cadre Gen (8)	Non- cadre Tech (4)	Total (56)
1 Less Promotion Scope	4	7	5	4	-	5	6	1	8	3	43 (76.79)
2 Laborious/ Risk y	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2 (3.57)
3 Status & Attraction Deteriorating	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	4 (7.14)
4 Negative Working Environment	1	1	1	-	-	1	3	1	1	-	12 (21.43)
5 Less Opportunity for Foreign Training	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2 (3.57)
6 Jealousy of other cadres	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
7 Difficulties in providing service for people	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
8 Job nature is less suitable for academic background	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
9 Not properly evaluated like developed countries	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2 (3.57)
10 Insecurity	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
11 Pay structure is not fit to market	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	4 (7.14)
12 Power/ authority of Adm. Cadre	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
13 Honour according to status is absent	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	3 (5.36)
14 Lack of residential facilities/ logistics support	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	5 (8.93)
15 Conflict with other cadres	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 (3.57)
16 Centralisation of authority	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
17 less administrative power	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 (3.57)
18 Lack of personnel strength	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 (3.57)
19 Lack of proper planning	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
20 Absence of inter-departmental co-ordination	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
21 Absence of Warrant of Precedence	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
22 Unequal Pay scale among the same status of posts	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	7 (12.5)
23 Priority is not given to dev. administration (technocrat)	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
24 Difficult to manage administration with honesty	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
25 Bad impact of the job to people	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
26 Higher positions occupied by outsiders	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
27 posted as health administrator was not desired	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1.79)
28 Multiple authority	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1 (1.79)
29 Hazards of transfer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1 (1.79)
30 Limited power	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1 (1.79)
31 Lack of honour	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1 (1.79)
32 Not being encadred	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-10 : Co-ordination with other cadres

Type of Respondents	Do you need co-ordination with other cadres		Total
	Yes	No	
1. Administration	5 (83.33)	1 (16.67)	6
2. Engineering (PWD,R&H,FH&E,Telecom)	11 (81.62)	2 (15.38)	13
3. Agriculture (Ag, Fisheries, Livestock)	14 (93.33)	1 (6.67)	15
4. Health (Health & Family Planning)	7 (84.50)	1 (12.50)	8
5. Judiciary	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	3
6. Law Enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	10 (90.90)	1 (9.09)	11
7. General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co-operative)	13 (92.86)	1 (7.14)	14
8. Education	4 (66.67)	2 (33.33)	6
Sub Total	66 (86.84)	10 (13.16)	76
1. Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DSO)	9 (75)	3 (25)	12
2. Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WADD)	8 (80)	2 (20)	10
Sub Total	17 (77.27)	5 (22.73)	22
Grand Total	83 (84.69)	15 (15.31)	98

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-11 : Degree of co-ordination with different cadres

	Degree of coordination	Types of Respondents								
		Adm.	Eng	Ag	Health	Judiciary	Law En. A	Gen Service	Ed.	Non-C (tech.)
Adm.. (5)	Sufficient			-	-		-	-	-	-
	Moderate	-	1	-	-	2	2	-	-	-
	low	-	1	2	1	-	2	-	1	-
	Total	-	2	2	1	2	4	-	1	-
Eng. (11)	Sufficient	5		-	1	-	3	-	-	1
	Moderate	5	1	1	3	2	4	-	-	-
	low	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Total	10	3	1	4	2	7	-	-	2
Ag. (14)	Sufficient	3	1	10	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Moderate	7		4	-	-	1	-	-	-
	low	4		-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Total	14	1	14	-	-	3	-	-	2
Health (7)	Sufficient	2		1	2	1	-	2	-	-
	Moderate	4	-	-	1	1	-	3	-	1
	low	1		-	1	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	7	-	1	4	2	-	5	-	1
Judiciary (2)	Sufficient	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Moderate	2	2	-	1	-	2	-	-	-
	low	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	2	2	-	1	-	2	-	-	-
Law En Agencies (10)	Sufficient	3			1	1	1	-	-	-
	Moderate	5	2	-	3	2	4	-	-	-
	low	1			-	-	-	1	1	-
	Total	9	2	-	4	3	5	1	1	-
General Services (13)	Sufficient	5	1	5	1	-	2	1	-	-
	Moderate	4	1	2	-	-	1	1	-	-
	low	3			-	-	1	2	-	-
	Total	12	2	7	1	-	4	4	-	-
Education (4)	Sufficient	-		-	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Moderate	3		-	-	-	1	-	-	-
	low	1			1	-	2	-	-	-
	Total	4	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	-
Sub Total (Cadre) (66)	Sufficient	18	2	16	5	2	8	3	-	2
	Moderate	30	7	7	8	7	15	4	-	1
	low	10	3	2	3	-	6	3	2	2
	Total	58	12	25	16	9	29	10	2	5
Non-Cadre (General) (9)	Sufficient	9	-	2	1	1	1	1	-	-
	Moderate	-	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	1
	low	1	1		-	-	1	-	-	-
	Total	10	1	4	1	1	3	2	-	1
Non-Cadre (Technical) (8)	Sufficient	4	1	2	1	-	3	1	1	-
	Moderate	4	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	1
	low	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	8	1	3	2	-	4	1	1	1
Non-Cadre-Sub Total (17)	Sufficient	13	1	4	2	1	4	2	1	-
	Moderate	4	-	3	1	-	2	1	-	2
	low	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Total	18	2	7	3	1	7	3	1	2
Grand Total (83)	Sufficient	31	3	20	7	3	12	5	1	2
	Moderate	34	7	10	9	7	17	5	-	3
	low	11	4	2	3	-	7	3	2	2
	Total	76	14	32	19	10	36	13	3	7

Table-12 : Interference by other cadres/local authorities

Type of Respondents	Interference occurred		Total
	Yes	No	
1. Administration	4 (66.67)	2 (33.33)	6
2. Engineering (PWD,R&H,PH&F,Telecom)	8 (61.54)	5 (38.46)	13
3. Agriculture (Ag, Fisheries, Livestock)	10 (66.67)	5 (33.33)	15
4. Health (Health & Family Planning)	3 (37.50)	5 (62.50)	8
5. Judiciary	-	3 (100)	3
6. Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	6 (54.55)	5 (45.45)	11
7. General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co-operative)	8 (57.14)	6 (42.86)	14
8. Education	4 (66.67)	2 (33.33)	6
Sub Total	43 (56.58)	33 (43.42)	76
1. Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DSO)	5 (41.67)	7 (58.33)	12
2. Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WADB)	2 (20)	8 (80)	10
Sub Total	7 (31.82)	15 (68.18)	22
Grand Total	50 (51.02)	48 (48.98)	98

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-13 : Interfering authorities & types of Interference

(N=50)

Types of Interference	Interfering authorities		
	Political	Dist. Adm.	Others (High govt officials, journalists, concerned organisation, audit & accounts dept)
1. Release of vested property	2	-	1
2. Recruitment, transfer & posting of employees	5	1	1
3. Transport requisition	-	7	-
4. Progress report of departmental works	-	3	-
5. Planning & implementation of development works	8	3	1
6. Co-ordination meeting	-	5	-
7. Influencing law & order	2	1	1
8. Distribution of fertiliser & seed/ procurement of food	2	3	-
9. Management of education & examination	2	2	-
10. Selection of food dealers	2	1	1
11. Case investigation	2	-	-
12. Influencing law & order	2	1	1
13. Distribution of election duty	-	2	-
14. Harassment through inquiry	-	2	-
15. Others (getting illegal benefits by using police, distribution of relief materials/medicine for farmers, bailout out the accused from thana, publicity, Ag rehab program, formation of different committees, land dev tax, eviction, supervision	8	4	1

Multiple response recorded

Table-14: Justification of Responsibilities given to Deputy Commissioner

Responsibilities of Deputy Commissioner	Degree of Opinion by the respondents													
	Adm (6)	Eng (13)	Ag (15)	Health (8)	Judiciary (3)	Law Enforcing Agencies (11)	General Services (14)	Ed. (6)	Sub- Total (76)	Sub-total Excluding Adm Cadre (70)	Non- cadre Gen (12)	Non- cadre Tech. (10)	Sub- Total (22)	Total (98)
1 Revenue administration, recovery of public demand, matters related to treasury and stamps, management of <i>chowk</i> and <i>dewottor</i> estates and public trusts	36	67	66	44	11	36	68	2 ^a	370	334	66	55	121	491
2 Eviction and land acquisition	36	55	67	36	7	32	77	26	356	320	65	51	116	472
3 Criminal justice, supervision of police action, management of matter related to jail firearms, poison and explosives	33	37	32	23	4	28	57	24	255	222	56	25	81	336
4 Regulation of press & publications, recreation & sports	27	40	32	21	5	46	47	20	244	217	51	32	83	327
5 Public security and law and order situation, protection from social injustice, social welfare, and monitoring the functions of Ansar & Village Defense Parties	36	45	41	27	10	25	62	2 ^a	273	239	64	37	101	376
6 State secrecy and national security, and political functions assigned by the government	29	52	39	21	10	33	67	24	273	246	56	35	91	366
7 Functions related to High Court & Civil Court, and appointment of GP & PP	23	28	34	17	3	22	53	11	191	168	34	13	47	238
8 Function relates vehicles and traffic, and the issuance of licenses & certificates	30	33	37	25	8	20	47	19	219	189	38	35	73	292
9 Matters related to local government	28	38	46	29	11	44	57	21	274	246	49	29	78	352
10 Education, educational development works, and administration of public examinations	32	36	42	23	9	37	48	20	247	215	58	28	86	333
11 Conducting election matters	35	51	44	35	12	37	59	25	296	263	60	39	99	395
12 Relief & rehabilitation programmes	34	38	49	12	7	10	60	21	291	257	59	37	96	387
13 Function relates to food matters	27	22	32	18	7	28	42	16	192	165	48	29	77	269
14 Matters related to forest, fisheries & livestock	17	27	24	15	3	21	30	13	150	133	38	18	56	206
15 Monitoring & coordination of development activities of the districts	35	39	32	27	10	26	61	23	253	218	64	27	91	344
16 Functions related to NGOs activities	33	37	41	25	4	42	70	20	272	239	61	38	99	371

Table -15 : Opinion on District Co-ordinator

Types of Respondents	Do you need a Dist Co-ordinator		Who will be the Dist Co-ordinator			
	No	Yes	DC	Officer except Adm cadre	Elected Public Representatives	Total
1. <i>Adm.. (6)</i>	1 (16.67)	5 (83.33)	5 (100)		-	5
2. <i>Engineering (13)</i>	1 (7.69)	12 (92.31)	2 (16.67)	-	10 (83.33)	12
3. <i>Agriculture (15)</i>	1 (6.67)	14 (93.33)	-	1 (7.14)	13 (92.86)	14
4. <i>Health (8)</i>	1 (12.50)	7 (87.50)	2 (28.57)	1 (11.28)	4 (57.14)	7
5. <i>Judiciary (3)</i>		3 (100)	-		3 (100)	3
6. <i>Law En. Agencies (11)</i>		11 (100)	4 (36.36)		7 (63.64)	11
7. <i>General (14)</i>	1 (7.14)	13 (92.86)	5 (38.46)		8 (61.54)	13
8. <i>Education (6)</i>	-	6 (100)		1 (16.67)	5 (83.33)	6
Cadre-Total (76)	5 (6.58)	71 (93.42)	18 (25.35)	3 (4.23)	50 (70.42)	71
1. <i>Non- Cadre (General -12)</i>	1 (8.33)	11 (91.67)	11 (100)			11
2. <i>Non- Cadre (Technical 10)</i>	-	10 (100)	-		10 (100)	10
Non-Cadre Total (22)	1 (4.55)	21 (95.45)	11 (52.38)		10 (47.62)	21
Grand Total (98)	6 (6.12)	92 (93.88)	29 (31.52)	3 (3.26)	60 (65.22)	92

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table -16 : Opinion regarding Secretary for Elected Public Representatives

Types of Respondents	Secretary for Elected Public Representatives								
	DC	Sr. Officer of the district	ADC (General)	Secretary Zila Parishad	Elected Representatives	Selected by the Govt.	Not neces sary	Officer except Adm cadre	No respo nse
1. Adm . (0)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2. Engineering (10)	5 (50)	-	1 (10)	3 (30)	-	-	-	-	1 (10)
3 Agriculture (13)	4 (30.77)	-	-	5 (38.46)	2 (15.38)	-	1 (7.69)	1 (7.69)	-
4. Health (4)	2 (50)	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 (50)	-
5. Judiciary (3)	2 (66.67)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (33.33)	-
6. Law En. Agencies (7)	1 (57.14)	-	-	1 (14.29)	-	1 (14.29)	-	1 (14.29)	-
7. General (8)	5 (62.5)	-	-	2 (25)	-	1 (12.5)	-	-	-
8 Education (5)	1 (20)	-	1 (20)	2 (40)	-	1 (20)	-	-	-
Cadre-Total (50)	23 (46)	-	2 (4)	13 (26)	2 (4)	3 (6)	1 (2)	5 (10)	1 (2)
1 Non- Cadre (General -0)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2 Non- Cadre (Technical -10)	1 (10)	1 (10)	-	6 (60)	-	1 (10)	-	-	1 (10)
Non-Cadre Total (10)	1 (10)	1 (10)	-	6 (60)	-	1 (10)	-	-	1 (10)
Grand Total (60)	24 (40)	1 (1.67)	2 (3.33)	19 (31.67)	2 (3.33)	4 (6.67)	1 (1.67)	5 (8.33)	2 (3.33)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table -17: Degree of power given to DC and degree of exercise of the power

Degree of power given				Types of Respondents	degree of exercise Of the power			
No response	Inadequate	Excess	Appropriate		Approp rate	Excess	low/ minimum	No response
-	4 (66.67)	-	2 (33.33)	1 Adm (6)	4 (66.67)	-	2 (33.33)	-
1 (7.69)	1 (7.69)	9 (69.23)	2 (15.38)	2 Engineering (13)	3 (23.08)	8 (61.54)	1 (7.69)	1 (7.69)
-	-	13 (86.67)	2 (13.33)	3. Agriculture (15)	2 (13.33)	13 (86.67)	-	-
-	-	7 (87.50)	1 (12.50)	4 Health (8)	2 (25)	6 (75)	-	-
1 (33.33)	-	1 (33.33)	1 (33.33)	5 Judiciary (3)	1 (33.33)	1 (33.33)	-	1 (33.33)
-	-	7 (63.64)	4 (36.36)	6 Law En Agencies (11)	4 (36.36)	7 (63.64)	-	-
-	-	10 (71.43)	4 (28.57)	7 General (14)	8 (57.14)	6 (42.86)	-	-
-	-	5 (83.33)	1 (16.67)	8 Education (6)	1 (16.67)	5 (83.33)	-	-
2 (2.63)	5 (6.58)	52 (68.42)	17 (22.37)	Cadre-Total (76)		25 (32.89)	46 (60.53)	3 (3.98)
-	1 (8.33)	1 (8.33)	10 (83.33)	1 Non- Cadre (General -12)	10 (83.33)	1 (8.33)	1 (8.33)	-
-	-	7 (70)	3 (30)	2. Non- Cadre (Technical - 10)	4 (40)	6 (60)	-	-
-	1 (4.55)	8 (36.36)	13 (59.09)	Non-Cadre Total (22)		14 (63.64)	7 (31.82)	1 (4.55)
2 (2.04)	6 (6.12)	60 (91.72)	30 (30.61)	Grand Total (98)		39 (39.80)	53 (51.08)	4 (4.08)
								2 (2.04)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-18 : Reasons for considering the excess use of power

Reasons for considering the excess use of power	Types of respondents											
	Eng (8)	Ag (13)	Health (8)	Judiciary (1)	Law Enforcing Agencies (7)	Gen Services (6)	Ed (5)	Sub-Total (46)	Non-cadre Gen (1)	Non-cadre Tech (6)	Sub-Total (7)	Total (53)
1. Imposing attitude in the name of co-ordination	1	-	-	1	-				-	-	-	-
2. Impose opinion without having proper knowledge	1	-	-	-	1			-	-	1	-	-
3. Attitude to control issues having shallow knowledge	1	1	1	-	1	-		-	-	-		-
4. Over doing as coordinator	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
5. Presiding over more of meeting causes problem	1	-	1	-	-	-			-	-	-	-
6. Interference in the works of other's departments	2	5	2	-	2	4	4	-	-	2	-	-
7. Unnecessary interference in development works	1	-	-	-	-1	-	-		1	-	-	-
8. Requisition the transport without prior information	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-1	1	-	-	-
9. Interference in the judicial system	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-		-	-	-
10. Behave as administrator rather than development manager	-	2	1	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
11. Noncooperation for on going project	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12. Considered other officers as subordinate	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13. Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely	-	-	-	1	-	-		-		-	-	-
14. Others (consider himself most powerful man in the district, recruit employees of other's depts, apply diplomatic role when loose own interest, try to influence the OC of thana, without monitoring close the on going project, harass other cadre officers, influencing through Elected Representatives, excess supervision, priority is given on formality instead of better output, attitude to dominate Engage the subordinate of other's dept without prior information	1	4	5	-	1	-	1					

Table-19: Issues Generating Cadre Conflicts

Issues	Degree of Opinion by the respondents													Total (98)
	Adm (6)	Eng (13)	Ag (15)	Health (8)	Judiciary (3)	Law Enforcement Agencies (11)	General Services (14)	Police (6)	Sub-Total (76)	Sub-Total Excluding Adm Cadre (70)	Non-cadre Gen. (12)	Non-cadre Tech (10)	Sub-Total (22)	
1 Existence of too many cadres	31	23	45	22	5	41	34	16	242	211	62	39	101	343
2 Instigation of political parties	21	33	29	28	9	31	31	19	201	189	52	20	72	273
3 Indirect military-bureaucratic interference	23	28	39	26	10	33	24	16	199	176	36	22	58	257
4 Psychological complexity of more meritorious officer enjoying same rank and status with an inferior one	17	61	68	37	15	50	56	32	336	319	65	47	112	448
5 Difference in scale of pay	24	60	85	43	13	47	71	25	376	352	65	32	117	493
6 Inequality in the length of service in same status among different cadres	25	61	81	43	15	45	64	25	359	334	55	35	90	419
7 Role of controlling authority outside cadre	7	61	64	33	13	31	40	23	275	268	47	38	85	360
8 Disparity in promotion	25	69	85	46	14	57	82	33	411	386	69	51	120	531
9 Variation in the significance of functions performed by officers of similar rank status	15	54	60	37	14	44	60	24	308	293	58	41	99	407
10 Interference of other cadre officers in development projects	10	56	74	38	15	48	42	29	312	302	50	48	98	410
11 Inequality in authority in similar status	13	58	73	40	12	49	64	31	340	327	61	47	108	448
12 Vesting of power and authority in BCS (Administration) as representative of the government	19	53	85	47	14	56	60	32	369	350	60	58	118	487
13 Corruption in the civil administration	14	35	67	35	13	43	49	32	287	252	28	80	273	367
14 Political instability	26	40	56	36	14	38	47	33	290	264	50	38	88	378
15 Slack chain of command in cadre services	29	45	58	33	9	42	56	28	300	271	54	27	81	381

Table-19: Issues Generating Cadre Conflicts

Issues	Degree of Opinion by the respondents													
	Adm. (6)	Eng (1)	Ag (15)	Health (8)	Judicial (3)	Law Enforcin g Agencies (11)	General Services (14)	Ed (6)	Sub- Total (76)	Sub-Total Excluding Adm Cadre (70)	Non- cadre Gen (12)	Non- cadre Tech (10)	Sub- Total (22)	Total (98)
1 Existence of too many cadres	31	28	45	22	5	41	54	16	242	211	62	39	101	343
2 Instigation of political parties	21	33	29	28	9	31	31	19	201	180	52	20	72	273
3 Indirect military-bureaucratic interference	23	23	9	26	10	33	24	16	199	176	36	22	58	257
4 Psychological complexity of more meritorious officers enjoying same rank and status with an inferior one	17	61	68	37	15	50	56	32	356	319	65	47	112	448
5 Difference in scale of pay	24	60	83	43	13	47	71	33	376	332	65	52	117	493
6 Inequality in the length of service in same status among different cadres	25	61	81	43	17	45	64	25	339	334	55	35	90	449
7 Role of controlling authority outside cadre	7	61	64	3	13	34	10	23	273	268	47	38	85	361
8 Disparity in promotion	25	69	85	16	14	57	82	33	411	386	69	51	120	531
9 Variation in the significance of functions performed by officers of similar rank status	15	51	60	37	14	41	60	24	308	293	58	41	99	407
10 Interference of other cadre officers in development projects	10	56	74	38	15	48	42	29	312	302	50	48	98	410
11 Inequality in authority in similar status	13	58	73	40	12	49	67	31	340	327	61	47	108	448
12 Vesting of power and authority in BCS (Administration) as representative of the government	19	53	85	47	14	59	60	32	369	350	60	58	118	487
13 Corruption in the civil administration	14	35	67	35	13	43	49	32	287	51	28	80	273	367
14 Political instability	26	40	56	36	14	38	47	33	290	264	50	38	88	378
15 Slack chain of command in cadre services	29	45	58	33	9	42	55	28	300	271	51	27	81	381
16 Weakness in the selection procedure of PSC in the post-independent Bangladesh	21	53	61	44	7	40	59	30	323	302	47	31	78	401
17 Inequality in line post	22	55	68	33	13	48	64	28	331	309	52	43	95	426

Table-20 : Opinion on generation of problems caused by cadre conflict

Type of Respondents	Opinion		Total
	Yes	No	
1. Administration	5 (83.33)	1 (16.67)	6
2. Engineering (PWD,R&H,PH&E,Telecom)	9 (69.23)	4 (30.77)	13
3. Agriculture (Ag., Fisheries, Livestock)	9 (60)	6 (40)	15
4. Health (Health & Family Planning)	4 (50)	4 (50)	8
5. Judiciary	1 (33.33)	2 (66.67)	3
6. Law enforcing Agencies (Police & Ansar)	6 (54.55)	5 (45.45)	11
7. General Services (Food, Information, Postal, Customs, Statistics, Co-operative)	10 (71.43)	4 (28.57)	14
8. Education	3 (50)	3 (50)	6
Sub Total	47 (61.84)	29 (38.16)	76
1. Non-Cadre (General) (DRRO,DAO,DYO,DCO,DSO)	5 (41.67)	7 (58.33)	12
2. Non-Cadre (Technical) (LGED,PDB,WADB)	4 (40)	6 (60)	10
Sub Total	9 (40.91)	13 (59.09)	22
Grand Total	56 (57.14)	42 (42.86)	98

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-21 : List of problems caused by the cadre conflict

List of problems	Types of respondents												Total (56)
	Adm (5)	Eng (9)	Ag (9)	Health (4)	Judiciary (1)	Law Enforcing Agencies (6)	General Services (10)	Ed (3)	Sub-Total (47)	Non-cadre Gen (5)	Non-cadre Tech (4)	Sub-Total (9)	
1 Delay in the implementation of development project because of noncooperation	2	1	8	2	-	1	3	-	20	-	4	4	24
2 Deterioration of the law & order situation	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
3 Delay in promotion	2	2	-	1	-	-	3	2	10	1	-	1	11
4 Deterioration in working environment	-	2	1	-	-	1	1	2	7	2	-	2	9
5 Lack of interests in assigned work	-	3	2	2	-	1	2	1	11	-	-	-	11
6 Lack of co-ordination	-	4	-	1	-	1	2	-	8	1	1	2	10
7 Decline in mutual respect	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	1	5	-	-	-	5
8 Slowing of on going development programmes	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	2	-	2	4
9 Others (Hamper the proper institutional management, deterioration of efficiency, hamper the revenue collection, Regular absenteeism in the different committee meeting, Can not maintain quality of life, Hamper the marketing of rice & banana, Lack of transparency & accountability in development administration cannot maintain official security	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	3	9	1	1	2	11

Table-22 : Opinion regarding promotional scope among the cadres

Distribution of promotional scope	Types of respondents												
	Adm (6)	Eng (13)	Ag (15)	Health (8)	Judicial y (3)	Law Enforcing Agencies (11)	General Service s (14)	Ed (6)	Sub- Total (76)	Non- cadre Gen. (12)	Non- cadre Tech. (10)	Sub- Total (22)	Total (98)
1. Audit & Accounts	8	6	-	-	-	8	9	-	31	5	-	5	36
2. Taxation	4	-	2	-	-	8	10	-	24	4	2	6	30
3. Police	9	12	6	5	2	7	17	5	63	5	8	13	76
4. Foreign Affairs	9	6	12	4	-	11	11	-	53	7	-	7	60
5. Customs & Excise	5	2	8	-	1	8	-	-	24	-	1	1	25
6. Administration	-	32	38	1	3	7	27	16	140	20	15	35	175
7. Economic	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
8. Information	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
9. Agriculture	-	1	5	-	-	-	1	-	7	4	-	4	11
10. Judiciary	-	3	4	4	-	-	-	4	15	2	1	3	18
11. Telecom	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
12. Education	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	1	5	2	-	2	7
13. Railway	-	-	1	1	-	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
14. Postal	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
15. Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	2
Total	36	72	84	42	6	54	84	36	414	66	36	102	516
No response	-	1	1	1	2	2	-	-	7	1	4	5	12

Table-23 : Opinion regarding the criteria of promotion in all level of civil service

Criteria of promotion	Types of respondents												
	Adm (6)	Eng (13)	Ag (15)	Health (8)	Judicial y (3)	Law Enforcing Agencies (11)	Genera l Service s (14)	Ed (6)	Sub- Total (76)	Non- cadre Gen. (12)	Non- cadre Tech (10)	Sub- Total (22)	Total (98)
1 Seniority cum merit	-	2	1	-	-	3	2	-	6	-	-	-	8
2 Merit cum seniority	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	2	1	3	7
3. According to results of the written exam. & viva voce conducted by the PSC	-	7	-	1	-	1	-	3	12	-	-	-	12
4 Review of the ACR	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
5 Seniority cum merit + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	-	2	5
6 Seniority cum merit + Review of the ACR	1	2	5	2	-	2	1	1	14	1	4	5	19
7. Merit cum seniority + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC	-	-	4	3	1	1	5	-	14	1	1	2	16
8 Merit cum seniority + Review of the ACR	-	1	1	2	1	-	1	-	6	1	1	2	8
9 results of the written exam. & viva voce conducted by the PSC + Review of the ACR	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
10 Seniority cum merit + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC + Review of the ACR	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	3	3	2	5	8
11 Merit cum seniority + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC + Review of the ACR	1	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	8	2	1	3	11

Table-24 : Recommendations by the respondent for the solution of cadre conflict

Recommendations	Types of respondents													
	Adm (6)	Eng (15)	Ag (15)	Health (8)	Judicial (3)	Law Enforcin g Agencies (11)	General Services (14)	Ed (6)	Sub- Total (76)	Sub-Total Excluding Adm. Cadre (70)	Non- cadre Gen. (12)	Non- cadre Tech (10)	Sub- Total (22)	Total (98)
1 To abolish the cadre system	8	38	29	24	3	24	37	10	171	163	32	31	63	234
2 To reduce the number of cadres in to two-general & technical	14	15	34	26	8	32	53	18	230	216	52	29	81	311
3 To ensure promotion of officers at appropriate time	36	76	83	48	19	58	83	35	437	401	67	57	124	561
4 To take necessary steps to eliminate inequity in the scale of pay among officers of equal status	30	78	88	46	18	65	85	36	448	418	65	59	124	572
5 To compensate officers financially when promotion is delayed due to administrative reasons	36	67	87	46	16	64	68	32	416	380	68	59	127	543
6 To ensure check & balance in the functions of various cadres	34	61	76	42	18	52	73	35	391	357	63	51	114	505
7 To abolish associations/organizations of all cadres	35	48	35	35	9	43	58	22	285	250	49	38	87	372
8 To impose restriction on engineers, doctors & agriculturists in seeking access to general cadres	25	29	33	27	9	43	57	28	251	226	54	32	86	337
9 To ensure leadership of the concerned officers in their subject related meetings	22	61	89	48	13	64	61	28	386	364	59	53	112	498
10 To ensure the presence of deputy commissioner as a member in sectoral meetings organized by various departments	23	37	32	40	-	34	40	15	228	205	55	32	87	315
11 To ensure the presence of department heads in the district development coordination meeting headed by deputy commissioner	29	27	46	26	5	25	55	14	227	198	65	29	94	321
12 To ensure inter-department coordination under the leadership of elected local government/public representatives	18	65	86	46	16	51	51	30	363	345	45	52	97	460
13 Total	36	78	90	48	18	66	84	36	456	420	72	60	132	588

Table -CS1: Distribution of Education, Length of occupation & degree of having information of cadre conflict

Types of respondents	Education					Length of occupation (Years)					Degree of information on cadre conflict			
	SSC	HSC	Degree	Masters & above	Total	>10	10-20	20-30	30-40	Total	Sufficient	Moderate	Not so much	Total
1 Elected Representatives/ Politician (5)	1 (20)	1 (20)	1 (20)	2 (40)	5	-	4 (80)	-	1 (20)	5	1 (20)	4 (80)	-	5
2 Business man (6)	-	2 (33.33)	4 (66.67)	-	6	-	1 (16.67)	2 (33.33)	3 (50)	6	-	6 (100)	-	6
3. Lawyer (6)	-	-	2 (33.33)	4 (66.67)	6	1 (16.67)	1 (16.67)	2 (33.33)	2 (33.33)	6	1 (16.67)	4 (66.67)	1 (16.67)	6
4. Journalist (5)	-	-	3 (60)	2 (40)	5	-	3 (60)	1 (20)	1 (20)	5	-	5 (100)	-	5
5 Retired civil servant (5)	-	-	1 (20)	4 (80)	5	3 (60)	2 (40)	-	-	5	1 (20)	4 (80)	-	5
Total (27)	1 (3.70)	3 (11.11)	11 (40.74)	12 (44.44)	27	4 (14.81)	11 (40.74)	5 (18.52)	7 (25.93)	27	3 (11.11)	23 (85.19)	1 (3.70)	27

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-CS2 : Issues Generating Cadre Conflicts

Issues	Degree of Opinion by the respondents						
	Elected Representatives / politician (5)	Business man (6)	Lawyer (6)	Journalist (5)	Rt. civil servant (5)	Total (27)	Average
1 Existence of too many cadres	21	28	26	20	14	109	4.04
2 Instigation of political parties	18	18	21	19	16	92	3.41
3 Indirect military-bureaucratic interference	13	11	12	11	11	58	2.15
4 Psychological complexity of more meritorious officer enjoying same rank and status with an inferior one	23	31	23	21	20	118	4.37
5 Difference in scale of pay	16	31	22	16	25	110	4.07
6 Inequality in the length of service in same status among different cadres	21	25	20	19	20	105	3.89
7 Role of controlling authority outside cadre	23	24	14	21	18	100	3.70
8 Disparity in promotion	23	31	28	24	25	131	4.85
9 Variation in the significance of functions performed by officers of similar rank status	23	27	14	13	15	92	3.41
10 Interference of other cadre officers in development projects	23	33	20	22	21	119	4.41
11 Inequality in authority in similar status	23	30	23	25	17	118	4.37
12 Vesting of power and authority in BCS (Administration) as representative of the government	18	32	26	18	26	120	4.44
13 Corruption in the civil administration	24	33	25	23	23	128	4.74
14 Political instability	16	23	18	20	19	96	3.55
15 Slack chain of command in cadre services	19	26	21	23	24	116	4.30
16 Weakness in the selection procedure of PSC in the post-independent Bangladesh	19	28	22	20	27	116	4.30
17 Inequality in line post	23	21	12	16	17	89	3.30
18 Total	30	36	36	30	30	162	6.00

Table -CS3 : Nature of Problems Generated out of conflicts

Problems	Types of Respondents#					
	Elected Representatives / Politician (5)	Business man (6)	Lawyer (6)	Journalist (5)	Rt civil servants (5)	Total (27)
1 Increasing sufferings to their daily lives	2 (18.18)	6 (54.55)	2 (18.18)	-	1 (9.09)	11 (40.74)
2 Delay in implementation of development works caused the getting of desired service	4 (18.18)	6 (27.27)	5 (22.73)	3 (13.64)	4 (18.18)	22 (81.48)
3 Justice delayed by cadre conflict	2 (28.57)	3 (42.86)	1 (14.29)	-	1 (14.29)	7 (25.93)
4 People deprived from the desired service both qualitative & quantitative	3 (42.86)	4 (57.14)	-	-	-	7 (25.93)
5 Deteriorating the law & order situation	2 (50)	-	1 (25)	1 (25)	-	4 (14.81)
6 Deteriorate the standard of development works	-	-	1 (50)	-	1 (50)	2 (7.41)
7 Others (Officials-lever/negative attitudes towards govt officials increases among the people/people feel detached from govt, problem of identify the proper authority, political parties take advantage from it, CC cause the decadence of moral values of the society, confidence on govt decreases	1 (12.5)	1 (12.5)	2 (25)	2 (25)	2 (25)	8 (29.63)

Multiple response recorded.

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table -CS 4 : Opinion regarding the criteria of promotion in all level of civil service

Criteria of promotion	Types of Respondents					
	Elected Representatives / Politician (5)	Business man (6)	Lawyer (6)	Journalist (5)	Rt civil servants (5)	Total (27)
1 Seniority cum merit	-	-	-	-	1 (20)	1 (3.70)
2 Merit cum seniority	-	-	-	1 (20)	-	1 (3.70)
3 According to results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC	-	-	1 (16.67)	1 (20)	-	2 (7.41)
4 Review of the ACR	-	-	-	-	1 (20)	1 (3.70)
5 Seniority cum merit + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC	1 (20)	2 (33.33)	-	1 (20)	1 (20)	5 (18.52)
6 Seniority cum merit + Review of the ACR	-	-	-	-	1 (20)	1 (3.70)
7 Merit cum seniority + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC	1 (20)	2 (33.33)	3 (50)	-	1 (20)	7 (25.93)
8 Merit cum seniority + Review of the ACR	-	1 (16.67)	-	-	-	1 (3.70)
9 results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC + Review of the ACR	-	-	1 (16.67)	-	-	1 (3.70)
10 Seniority cum merit + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC + Review of the ACR	-	1 (16.67)	-	-	-	1 (3.70)
11 Merit cum seniority + results of the written exam & viva voce conducted by the PSC + Review of the ACR	3 (60)	-	1 (16.67)	2 (40)	-	6 (22.22)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table -CS5 : Opinion for a qualified District Co-ordinator and Secretary for Elected Representatives

Types of Respondents	Do you need a Dist. Co-ordinator		Who will be the Dist. Co-ordinator			Secretary for Elected Representatives						Total (20)
	Yes	No	DC	Elected Public Representatives	Total	ADC/ Officer equivalent to ADC	Secretary Zila Parishad	Class-1 officer of Ed. Cadre	DC	Special appointment by GOB	Officer equivalent to Dy Sec	
1. Elected Representatives/ Politician (5)	5 (100)	-	2 (40)	3 (60)	5 (14.23)	-	1 (33.33)	-	2 (66.67)	-	-	3 (15)
2. Business man (6)	6 (100)	-	-	6 (100)	6 (23.07)	1 (16.67)	-	-	4 (66.67)	-	1 (16.67)	6 (30)
3. Lawyer (6)	5 (83.33)	1 (16.67)	-	5 (100)	5 (19.23)	-	1 (20)	-	4 (80)	-	-	5 (25)
4. Journalist (5)	5 (100)	-	2 (40)	3 (60)	5 (19.23)	-	-	-	2 (66.67)	1 (33.33)	-	3 (15)
5. Retired civil servant (5)	5 (100)	-	2 (40)	3 (60)	5 (19.23)	1 (33.33)	1 (33.33)	1 (33.33)	-	-	-	3 (15)
Total (27)	26 (96.30)	1 (3.70)	6 (23.08)	20 (76.92)	26 (100)	2 (10)	3 (15)	1 (5)	12 (60)	1 (5)	1 (5)	20 (100)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-CS6:Opinion about the justification of Functions & Power given to Deputy Commissioner by the government

Functions of Deputy Commissioner	Degree of Opinion by the respondents						Average
	Elected Representatives / politician (5)	Business man (6)	Lawyer (6)	Journalist (5)	Rtd. civil servant (5)	Total (27)	
1 Revenue administration, recovery, of public demand, matters related to treasury and stamps, management of <i>wakf</i> and <i>deceased</i> estates and public trusts	28	35	25	20	25	133	4.92
2 Eviction and land acquisition	26	33	31	13	28	131	4.85
3 Criminal justice, supervision of police action, management of matter related to jail, firearms, poison and explosives	19	21	23	15	14	92	2.41
4 Regulation of press & publications, recreation & sports	24	26	20	12	14	96	3.55
5 Public security and law and order situation, protection from social injustice, social welfare, and monitoring the functions of Ansar & Village Defense Parties	27	28	22	21	16	114	4.22
6 State secrecy and national security, and political functions assigned by the government	21	33	20	24	16	114	4.22
7 Functions related to High Court & Civil Court, and appointment of GP &PP	16	12	14	7	10	59	2.18
8 Function relates vehicles and traffic, and the issuance of licenses & certificates	21	19	22	13	12	87	3.22
9 Matters related to local government	22	26	17	19	17	101	3.74
10 Education, educational development works, and administration of public examinations	26	27	19	16	20	108	4.00
11 Conducting election matters	18	26	24	22	11	103	3.81
12 Relief & rehabilitation programmes	21	29	31	16	25	122	4.52
13 Function relates to food matters	21	27	23	27	12	100	3.70
14 Matters related to forest, fisheries & livestock	21	13	16	8	7	65	2.41
15 Monitoring & coordination of development activities of the districts	23	25	31	25	16	120	4.44
16 Functions related to NGOs activities	23	24	24	19	20	110	4.07
Total score	30	36	36	30	30	162	6.00

Table -CS7 : Degree of power given to DC and degree of exercise the power

Degree of power given			Types of Respondents	degree of exercise the power		
Inadequate	Excess	Appropriate		Appropriate	Excess	low/minimum
2 (40)	1 (20)	2 (40)	1. Elected Representatives/ Politician (5)	2 (40)	1 (20)	2 (40)
-	4 (66.67)	2 (33.33)	2. Business man (6)	1 (16.67)	3 (50)	2 (33.33)
-	5 (83.33)	1 (16.67)	3. Lawyer (6)	2 (33.33)	4 (66.67)	-
-	3 (60)	2 (40)	4. Journalist (5)	2 (40)	3 (60)	-
-	4 (80)	1 (20)	5. Retired civil servant (5)	4 (80)	-	1 (20)
2(7.41)	17(62.96)	8(29.63)	Total (27)	11(40.70)	11(40.74)	5(18.52)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table -CS8 : Reasons for considering the excess use of power

Degree of power given		Types of Respondents#				
		Elected Representatives/ Politician (1)	Business man (3)	Lawyer (4)	Journalist (3)	Total (11)
1	Interference to works of other cadres	-	-	1 (100)	-	1(9.09)
2	Recommend for exam centre which is not necessary	-	1 (100)	-	-	1(9.09)
3	Misuse of Special Power Act	-	-	2 (100)	-	2(18.18)
4	Influence recruitment	-	1 (100)	-	-	1(9.09)
5	Influencing the concerned Magistrate for granting Bail	-	-	1 (50)	1 (50)	2(18.18)
6	Excess use of magistrial power	1 (25)	1 (25)	-	2 (50)	4(36.36)
7	Use excess power on issuing driving licence/transport requisition/road permit	1 (100)	-	-	-	1(9.09)
8	Others (delay in giving decision, Give final decision without properly informed, proper respect is not given Public Representatives in observing national program, apply excessive power on food/ fisheries/ forestry & livestock, use excess power on the basis of personal prejudice	1 (25)	2 (50)	-	1 (25)	4(36.36)

Multiple response recorded (Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-CS9 : Preference of cadre for own generation

Selected Cadre	Types of Respondents					Total (27)
	Elected Representative s/ politician (5)	Businessmen (6)	Lawyer (6)	Journalist (5)	Rtd civil servant (5)	
Administration	3 (60)	1 (16.67)	3 (50)	2 (40)	1 (20)	10 (37.04)
Education	1 (20)	2 (33.33)	1 (16.67)	1 (20)	1 (20)	6 (22.22)
F. Affairs	-	-	-	-	2 (40)	2 (7.41)
Judiciary	-	1 (16.67)	1 (16.67)	-	-	2 (7.41)
Health	-	-	1 (16.67)	-	-	1 (3.70)
Engineering	1 (20)	1 (16.67)	-	-	-	2 (7.41)
Agriculture	-	1 (16.67)	-	-	-	1 (3.70)
Any one he likes	-	-	-	1 (20)	1 (20)	2 (7.41)
none	-	-	-	1 (20)	-	1 (3.70)

(Parenthesis represents percentage)

Table-CS10 : Reasons behind Recommendation for joining selected cadre

Selected Cadre	Reasons behind Recommendation
Administration (10)	power, authority, dignity, reputation & wealth, promotion scope; to see as key person/head of the district, all facilities belongs to BCS (Administration cadre); 7(70%)
	recognition/demand for merit, being honest, scope for contribute for the development of the country, for peaceful life, 3 (30%)
Education (6)	education is the main factor for development, 3 (50%)
	to maintain family tradition; less anxiety & opportunity for honest and peaceful life; respectable job; 3 (50%)
Foreign Affairs (2)	scope for uphold the nation abroad; 2 (100%)
Judiciary (2)	scope for ensuring justice scope for no interference, 2 (100%)
Health (1)	serve for humanity/human being; 1 (100%)
Engineering (2)	scope for active involment in development of the country, 2 (100%)
Agriculture (1)	scope for applying modern & appropriate technology on agriculture sector, 1 (100%)
Any one he likes (1)	depends on their choice; 2 (100%)
none (1)	because of corrupt bureaucracy; 1 (100%)

Table-CS11 : Recommendations by the respondent for the solution of cadre conflict

Recommendations	Degree of Opinion by the respondents						
	Elected Representatives / politician (5)	Business man (6)	Lawyer (6)	Journalist (5)	Rtd. civil servant (5)	Total (27)	Average
1 To abolish the cadre system	10	13	19	7	6	66	2.44
2 To reduce the number of cadres in to two-general & technical	26	34	27	18	22	127	4.70
3 To ensure promotion of officers at appropriate time	26	36	33	30	27	152	5.63
4 To take necessary steps to eliminate inequality in the scale of pay among officers of equal status	24	34	35	30	28	148	5.48
5 To compensate officers financially when promotion is delayed due to administrative reasons	24	28	20	25	26	121	4.48
6 To ensure check & balance in the functions of various cadres	27	27	27	27	29	137	5.07
7 To abolish associations/organizations of all cadres	27	33	27	29	24	142	5.28
8 To impose restriction on engineers, doctors & agriculturists in seeking access to general cadres	25	33	37	29	19	145	5.37
9 To ensure leadership of the concerned officers in their subject related meetings	19	34	27	21	27	128	4.74
10 To ensure the presence of deputy commissioner as a member in sectoral meetings organized by various departments	16	27	27	16	16	102	3.78
11 To ensure the presence of department heads in the district development coordination meeting headed by deputy commissioner	21	34	28	30	22	137	5.07
12 To ensure inter-department coordination under the leadership of elected local government/public representatives	29	32	32	28	26	147	5.44
13 Total	30	36	36	30	30	162	6.00