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Mr. Arifur Rahman
with all my
best compliments
Salaudin
May '1980

ROLE OF RURAL ELITE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF RURAL ELITE
IN IRRIGATION PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT IN
BIRULIA UNION




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2nd May, 1980

Dacca.

Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman
Lecturer
Department of Public Administration
University of Dacca
Dacca, Bangladesh

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On the basis of such findings and observations many observers accordingly advocate a redistribution of the increments of output toward the poor as the means of improving material well-being. Some other advocated for agrarian and similar other reforms. Others again go further and argue that only a redistribution of wealth, particularly of landed wealth, through drastic political measures can bring about rural uplift. But in reality nothing particular in the above line is yet undertaken in this part of Asia. What have been done was the creation and experimentation with certain models/approaches in the name of "green revolution", "grow more food campaign", "remove poverty", "self reliance", "rural reconstruction movement, "Saemaul Movement".³ During mid-sixties a new concept emerged in the name of "institution building".⁴ Institution building approach highlighted the necessity of environment linkages and their transactions with each other and the approach is considered to be a new and effective "change tactics".⁵

The first initiative on institution building emerged as agricultural development, community development model and later in the name of rural development. Rural development programmes are therefore the consequent result of the above development in socio-economic and institutional conditions of this part of Asia. More practically speaking with the rising rate of poverty line, these nations are characterized as the product of "culture

³ Inayatullah(ed.), Approaches to Rural Development: Some Asian Experiences (Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific Development Administration Centre, 1979) pp. 35 - 37

⁴ Bo Bengtsson(ed.), Rural Development Research - The Power Relations - SAREC Report R4 : 1979 (Sweden: Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, 1979), p. 10

⁵ Melton J. Elman, The Institution Building Concepts - An Interim Appraisal, (Washington D.C.: USAID, Paper FNAAD 226), pp. 29-40.

of poverty and politics of scarcity".⁶ With the changing dynamics of global economic order particularly in this part of Asia, rural development programmes and strategies have become a new "search for alternative future".⁷ Prior to that even in the post-war years when Asian Countries, including Japan, had just emerged from colonial past - there were no "viable" and "practically" alternatives for mass development.⁸

But Joel Bernstein identifies that the "problem area that deserves more intensive attention on a global basis is the very limited ability in the developing countries to devise rural development strategies that are effective in meeting their economic social and political needs".⁹

Concept of Rural Development:

In recent time much stress has been given on the operational definition of rural development because the objective strategy/strategies are based on the proper and exact understanding of the term and its immediate meaning.

There is a definite distinction between rural development and agricultural development. Agricultural development (AD) aims to increase growth in agricultural out-put and supplies. It is a non-value oriented approach concerned primarily with generating income, supply of enough food,

⁶ UNESCO UN Asian Development Institute, Asian Rethinking on Development (New Delhi : Abhigar Publications, 1977), p. 83.

⁷ R. S. McNamara, 'Address to the Board of Governors: Nairobi Address' Washington D.C. 1973.

⁸ UNESCO & UN Asian Development Institute, Ibid.

⁹ Dennis Zvinakis, Current Approaches to Integrated Rural Development (Washington D.C.: US AID, 1974), p. 1.

and food surplus and therefore traditionally has been approached in any one of the three ways: (a) production campaign; (b) establishment of commercial farms; and (c) socio-economic planning of family farm and rural communities.¹⁰ Whatever has been the approach, the aim was typically quantitative.

Though agricultural development is considered the backbone of any development scheme, the concept is limited and not all-inclusive for development. Montague Yudelman categorized some inclusive factors such as : income and employment, social overheads, and occupational criteria. Under the first categorization he specified that development includes the notion of widespread participation in the process of economic growth and a widespread distribution of the gains made from that growth. A first criterion of rural development is that it benefits the under-employed and the lower income groups in the rural areas. Under social overheads, rural development includes the provision of social services of the kind usually provided by the public sector to enhance the welfare of rural people, particularly the small farmers, agricultural labours and the landless. Again, the occupational criterion is the raising and better distribution of rural incomes and employment including agricultural incomes and employment.¹¹

The same idea is implicit in the definition given in the American Rural Development Act of 1972:

¹⁰ Raanan Weitz (ed), Rural Development in a Changing World (Massachusetts : MIT Press, 1971), p. 391.

¹¹ Montague Yudelman "The Concept of Rural Development" OECD Development Center (IBRD Seminar Papers, 1972), p. 2.

"The planning, financing and development of facilities and services in rural areas that contribute to making these areas desirable places in which to live the planning development and expansion of business and industry in rural areas to provide increased employment and income; the planning, development, conservation and use of land, water and other natural resources of rural areas to maintain or enhance the quality of the environment for people and business in rural areas; the processes and procedures that have said objectives as their major purposes".¹²

But the definition is not suitable and appropriate in the context of the developing countries. Perhaps a better definition for such countries would be the one quoted by Lunan from "Rural Development" report of a working group of the U.K. Ministry of Overseas Development.

"any series of integrative measures having as their purpose the improvement of the productive capacity and standard of life in its broad sense of these in developing societies who live outside the urban areas, and particularly of those people who depend directly or indirectly on the exploitation of soil. It will include those engaged in agricultural, forestry, fishery and related production, rural industries and handicrafts, trade and commerce and services in the rural areas. But whatever the specific measures adopted may be, the economic and social advancement of all sections of rural community must depend in the final analysis on the success or otherwise on the action taken to improve the productivity of agriculture."¹³

¹² James G. Maddox, "Towards a Rural Development Policy" National Planning Association, September 1973, p. 20.

¹³ "Planning for Rural Development" Munay Lunan - FAO Paper presented to the Third Session of the International Congress Institute of Research and Documentation on the Problems of the Third World-Rome, June '72, p.2

The Asian Centre for Development Administration (ACDA) gives a comprehensive definition of rural development in the Asian context. ACDA defines rural development as a process which leads to a rise in the capacity of rural people to control their environment accompanied by wider distribution of benefits resulting from such a control. ACDA further identifies seven indicators of rural development. These are as follows:¹⁴

- a. Changes in agricultural productivity;
- b. Changes in rural employment, unemployment and under-employment;
- c. Changes in the distribution of wealth and income to be determined in two ways: i) Changes in income of different income groups, ii) Changes in the ownership of land;
- d. Changes in distribution of power and influence and participation in decision making;
- e. Changes in the degree of mobility in the local class structure as reflected in the allocation of positions in prestige, status and power on the basis of achievement or ascription and in the removal of barriers to access to public facilities;
- f. Welfare indicators such as changes in literacy, schooling, mortality rate, life expectancy, rural roads, electrification and level of nutrition;
- g. Changes in values, beliefs and attitude of members of State Agencies.

Thus, rural development means that there must be an increase in productive capacity and three other changes must occur simultaneously.¹⁵

¹⁴ A.T. Mahinda Silva, "Role of Rural Organization in Rural Development" in Inayatullah (ed), Rural Organizations and Rural Development: Some Asian Experiences (Kuala Lumpur: Asian Centre for Development Administration, 1978), p. 45.

¹⁵ Dennis Zvinakis, Current Approaches to Integrated Rural Development: Notes, (Washington D.C.: US AID, 1971), p. 9.

1. Changes in attitudes, values of the rural population economically, socially and politically.

ii. Changes in material resources and technology.

iii. Changes in organization - ownership or control of resources with a concurrent integration of marginal groups into society.

But during the last few years there has been increasing discussion of integrated rural development as a possible approach to development problems and assistance. Dennis Zvinakis rightly observes that historically most approaches to rural development have been non-integrative, i.e. X particular constraints were identified in rural sector which ultimately cost energy and resources in the developing countries. The most useful typology of agricultural development, rural development and integrated rural development is given by A.T. Mosher in his tabular presentation. Mosher presents a list of the elements of the system of overall agricultural development (Col. A), Column B lists the kinds of activities included in one or another of most integrated agriculture or rural development projects and shows the relationship of these to the elements of the overall agricultural development system depicted in Column A. While Column C generalizes the nature of the development programmes.

A OVERALL AGRICUL- TURAL DEVELOPMENT	B PROJECT ACTIVITIES	C TYPES OF PROJECTS
I. Research	<u>Agricultural</u>	
II. Production & Import- ing Farm Inputs.	1. Market for Farm Products	1. Agricultural Development Projects (B 1-6)
III. Rural Agri-Support Activities.	2. Retail outlet for farm inputs.	
IV. Production Incen- tives.	3. Production Credit.	2. Rural Development Projects with an agricultural com- ponents (B 1-13)
V. Land Development.	4. Extension Education.	
VI. Training Agricul- tural Techniques.	5. Local Verification Trails.	
	6. Farm to Market Roads.	3. Rural Development Projects without agricultural com- ponents (i.e. B 7-13).
	<u>Non-Agricultural</u>	
	7. Rural Industries	
	8. Rural Public Works	
	9. Community Development	
	10. Group Activities - Recreational/Cultural.	
	11. Home Life Improvement	
	12. Health Facilities	
	13. Family Planning Programs	
	14. Schools	
	15. Local Government	
	16. Religious Activities	

Source: A.T. Mosher "Projects of IRE" Seminar Paper on Small Farmers
Development Strategies, Agricultural Development Council Inc.
Sept. 13 - 15, 1970.

Mosher's typology makes it possible to identify six major types of integrated projects, each type of which consists of different combinations of elements from A and B columns. Type I consists of projects which are aimed at changing the current land tenure system. It usually is necessary to include all agri-support activities. Type II consists of projects which introduce a new irrigation system (A-V). Other elements are selected from within the same range as type I. Type III consists of projects in which one element is the opening of new agricultural lands to settlement. Type IV consists of item B 1-4 and concentrates on agricultural development. Type V projects have, as their objective, rural development but with emphasis on raising personal incomes. And finally type VI consists of projects concentrating strictly on non-agricultural rural development (B 7 to 13 only).

Akhter Hamid Khan, one of the pioneering personalities in rural development in Bangladesh, views the scope and nature of development more in the light of the country's necessity. Akhter Hamid Khan observes -

"Rural development primarily consists in building strong institutions and securing responsibility and resources in these institution. The nature of these institution can be administrative, education or economic. The institutions have to be built at various levels. They have to be right at the village level; the village has to be bound together in institutions. There has to be a system of tiers, one above the other and one supporting the other, each encouraging and stimulating the others".¹⁶

¹⁶ Akhter Hamid Khan, "Community and Agricultural Development in Pakistan," (Michigan : East Lansing, MSU 1969), p. 24.

A New Quest for Evaluation:

With all the "so-called" promises X rural development programmes could not bring a significant change in the socio-political or economic life of the poverty stricken people. Intensive quaires have been raised from the cross section of intellectuals and social scientists. Bernstein opines -

"problem area that deserves more intensive attention on a global basis is very limited ability in the developing countries to devise rural development strategies that are effective in meeting their economic, social and political needs".¹⁷

The questions raised are: who receives benefits from rural development programmes; what these benefits are; and how he gets them.¹⁸

Time is perhaps ripe to evaluate and examine, the socio-political and economic implications of the rural development programmes undertaken during last two decades from different perspective.

In 1975 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a guideline to examine the social soundness of these development programmes from three basic issues:¹⁹

¹⁷ Quoted from Dennis Zvinakis, Op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁸ US AID, Research and Information Required to Support the Effect to Reach the Rural Poor (Michigan : AID - R & D, 1975), p. 14.,

¹⁹ US AID, Social Analysis of Development Projects : A Suggested Approach for Social Soundness Analysis (Michigan : US AID, R & D Center, 1977), p. 3.

I. Socio Cultural Compatibility

- Who are the intended beneficiaries of the programme ?
the possible victims ?
the possible benefactors ?
- how far the project is adaptable ?

II. Spread Effects : Diffusion of Innovation

- how likely are the project results to diffuse beyond the initial intended beneficiaries.
- How durable are the projects results to be: among the intended beneficiaries among wider population.

III. Social Impact : Equity

- How would the main benefits and burdens of the program be distributed among the type and strata of people
(i.e. rich and poor, farmers and landless)

The present study would therefore aim to follow ^{as} far/possible with available data information and related literature, the above framework for evaluation of the development programme and more specifically the Thana Irrigation Programme, in Bangladesh Villages.

Background of the Research:

In the overall development of rural areas and the rural people an institutional framework is essential which will ensure participation of people in the development process. Large number of small farmers, share croppers, landless labourers can participate in production and other developmental activities only through their own institutions. The Two Year Plan of Bangladesh makes the following observation on the importance of rural institutions in rural development:

"Successful rural development in Bangladesh critically hinges on the appropriate and effective rural institution".¹

Along with the local bodies cooperatives societies are said to be the most widespread rural institutions engaged in rural development of Bangladesh. And most of the cooperatives by now have engaged themselves with irrigation activities.

Thana Irrigation Programme (TIP) is perhaps the largest programme which is designed and managed by these rural institutions all over the country since the late-sixties.

The aim of the TIP is to

- i) provide water for irrigation;
- ii) provide essential supplies and services to facilitate use of irrigation water;

¹ Government of Bangladesh, The Two Year Plan 1978-80. p. 118

- iii) organize farmers for joint action essential for profitable use of water and other inputs; and
- iv) to consist farmers to organize to produce more for now and build up capital and skill to do better in future.

The Thana Irrigation Programme (TIP), designed basically to sponsor small scale irrigation projects during the winter season, has been planned to provide irrigation facilities and coordinated supplies and services from thana headquarters to farmers all over the country. Tailored into a package scheme, TIP aims at providing irrigation water plus other supportive facilities such as seeds, fertilizers, credit, insecticides and extension facilities.

The thana headquarter represents the operational base for this programme. The Thana Training and Development Centre (TTDC) provides the nucleus for promotion of various mutually supportive assistance designed to successfully implement the whole programme. Some rural farmers mostly the well-to-do farmers who can be termed as "rural elite farmers" are trained and motivated in a systematic training programme at TTDC. And these trained rural elite is supposed to act as the "change agent", "innovator" and "liaison" for agricultural development, or for that matter, rural development in Bangladesh.

TIP is an integrated multi-agency programme designed to pool together

- (i) the investment elements necessary for Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation's mechanized cultivation and tube well irrigation schemes,
- (ii) the capacities of Union Parisads, Thana Parisads, Thana Development

Committees, (iii) the physical and administrative infrastructure developed under rural works programme, (iv) the technical expertise of Water Development Board, (v) the policy making support from and skill of Ministry of Agriculture, Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, (vi) the administrative training and teaching of Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, (vii) the organization and supportive system of Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), (viii) the Coordination, Cooperation and Control of the Circle Office along with the TDC, Thana Irrigation Team (TIT), Thana Agricultural Development Committee (TADC), and (ix) the leadership, experience, energy of the rural elites as Chairman, Manager, model farmers of the irrigation groups.

Thana Irrigation Programme Schemes are categorized as indicated below:

Category A : Gravity flow schemes use natural water-flow requires construction of cross dams, sluice gates drains.

Category B : Single lifting schemes require pumps only.

Category C : Schemes require low lifting pumps and excavation or reexcavation of channels.

Category D : Schemes of double lifting by two pumps at two point.

Category E : Schemes using Deep Tube-Wells (DTW).

Category F : Schemes for utilizing Water Boards projects, requiring pumps.

The present study would focus upon Category E type schemes of the Thana Irrigation Programme.

The following table (1) shows the chronological development of distribution of deep tubewells and power-pumps. Both DTW and power pump comprizes the major aspect of the Thana Irrigation Programme. It reveals from the table that from the year 1972 to 1978 number of deep tube wells has increased almost seven time but command area of average deep tube well did not increase significantly, atleast the head of acreage coverage does not give any clear trend. In almost all these year the command area per deep tube well is below average.² Similar trend is also observed in other component of Thana Irrigation Scheme i.e. power pump.

Along with this if we make close observation to table II that also gives a trend which we may correlate with the findings of the table I. It is observed that during the period of 1972-78 per acreage yield of the different varieties of rice did not show any definite trend. Rather, there were gradual rise and fall of production but most marked is that the rice which is very much dependent upon irrigation, i.e. boro, showed persistent trend. It maintained a trend of fall during 1973-75 period and again in 75-76/77-78 period. It further showed its fall again in 1978-79. Similarly the aman crop had the same trend of downfall in its production process during the projected period. But it is interesting to note that the aus crop which is solely dependent upon natural support did not get disturbed,

² Average capacity of a deep tube well is considered as 45 acre. For detail methodological equires see. W.M.H. Jain and M.M. Rahman, "Relative Profitability of HYV Boro under different systems of tube well irrigation in an area of Bangladesh", The Bangladesh Journal Agricultural Economics, Vol. I, June 1978, No. 1, p. 57.

rather it maintained a continuous growth. Thus from these a hypothetical assumption can be made that the irrigation dependent crops got its rise and fall during the period discussed.

Table - I

Year	No. of DTW	Area Covered FT	Command Area/DTW	No. of Power pump fielded	Area covered	Command area/PT
1972-73	1237	37716	30.53	32917	1218766	37.02
1973-74	1494	61456	41.13	35343	1330810	37.65
1974-75	2699	117854	43.66	35534	1300507	36.59
1975-76	3828	153747	40.16	36382	1312577	36.07
1976-77	4455	161263	36.19	28224	1034000	36.63
1977-78	7453	331000	44.41	36735	1355000	36.88

Source : BADJ Basic Statistics, 1978.

Table - II

Per Acre Production of Rice in Bangladesh.

Crop	72-73	73-74	74-75	75-76	76-77	77-78	78-79
Boro	23.15	23.28	21.33	26.81	21.27	22.54	22.48
Aman	10.77	12.90	12.13	13.47	13.10	14.17	13.09
Aus	8.55	9.93	9.91	0.40	10.31	10.81	11.30

Source: Bangladesh Economic Survey, 1978-79.

The fall of production of the two major rice crops is very significant when there is a huge amount of food shortage and the government's expansion of its agricultural budget every year. Moreover, irrigational facilities have been increased and extension works have been carried out. Besides, the government is providing a huge amount of money as subsidies in the sector particularly in deep tube well,³ fertilizer etc. Table III shows the extent of subsidy provided by government in fertilizer distribution during the period 1973-78.

Table - III

Year	Amount in Taka (crore)	Consumption (in lakh ton)
1973-74	7.44	2.90
1974-75	20.54	2.82
1975-76	62.00	3.67
1976-77	67.96	5.13
1977-78	117.00	7.16

It is observed from the table that the subsidies in fertilizer increased tremendously during the last years and the increase in fertilizer use has shown a significant rise. During this period the government

³ In every deep tube well government provides subsidy about 77% of the total cost and subsidy in Taka per acre of irrigation which is perhaps the highest subsidy in irrigation. For detail see First Five Year Plan, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, p. 151.

has also supplied through BADC a considerable amount of High Yielding Variety (HYV) seeds and huge amount of insecticides. All these agricultural inputs are highly subsidized.

It is therefore necessary to find out the possible cause of this fluctuation of irrigation dependent crops in Bangladesh though it seems apparent that all the related agricultural inputs are quite supportive. The energy crisis which tremendously increased the price of fuel might possibly influence the deep tube irrigation in Bangladesh. But it is interesting to note that no significant change is marked in deep tube well command area per unit, which remained almost same during the last six to eight years. (Table I). Rough during the period 1972-78 there were some natural calamities that could disturb the deep tube well irrigation or irrigation dependent crop. The food crisis of 1974 was in other words a positive impetus for irrigation development. But the flood of that time period did not significantly disturb the irrigation supported crops.⁴

A Focus to Irrigation Management:

The First Five Year Plan of Bangladesh has outlined the strategy of irrigation development during the Plan period to permit the earliest and direct involvement of the farmers in the irrigation management through participation and responsibility sharing.⁵ The Two Year Plan identifies

⁴ For detail see, 'Damages of Crops due to the Flood' Basic Statistics of Agriculture (Dacca: Ministry of Agriculture, 1975), p. 117

⁵ Government of Bangladesh, The First Five Year Plan, (Dacca: Ministry of Planning, 1973), p. 147.

some policy measures to improve this present irrigation system, and one of the major policy measure suggested in the plan is to develop proper institutional measures for the formation of irrigation groups and streamlining the leadership, coordination and proper management of irrigation groups.⁶

Similar concern are reflected in the works of both local and international experts. "The major weakness in the irrigation sector is not technology nor lack of financial resources but a shortage of institutional and organizational arrangement by which human efforts, talents, skills can be matched optimally with other inputs".⁷

Hence it is important to note that the success of crop production target achievement or irrigation programme is not only dependent upon the persons who plan it at the thana headquarters or above but mostly upon the persons (the rural elite) who manage it and execute it at the grass root operational level. It is thus worthwhile to study and research how the rural elite as 'management variable' work in Bangladesh's current socio-economic and political condition, especially in a stage when the land poor and landless farms tend to have characterized the village economy. The researcher therefore puts the following hypothesis as his tool of investigation:

6
Planning, 1978), p. 118. The Two Year Plan (Dacca: Ministry of Takase Kanto, Irrigation Management as a Pivot of Agricultural Development in Asia, Manila: ADP 1976, p. 82.

"The present system of institutional irrigation is under the control and supervision of some influential village folks (rural elites) having higher political, economic, social background along with closer link with administrative authority or sources of power. These rural elites thus tend to exploit this situation by the way of arbitrarily managing group affairs, violating TIF rituals, especially converting the groups into their exclusive domain and this demotivates the ordinary farmer to participate and consequently it hampers the acreage coverage and production as a whole".

AGROMANAGERIAL DESPOT-ORIENTAL DESPOT:
A THEORETICAL POSTULATE:

Marx postulated the most important socio-economic and political features of the subcontinent by depicting the features of his "Asiatic Mode of Production". He identified that there was no private ownership of land in the village community. In the Asiatic form property existed "only as communal property". The despot may appear to be the proprietor of the soil and land occupied by the members of the Community as something coded by the despot.¹ But in fact the Community was the real proprietor beyond the distorting image of Asian society "Clan and Communal Property Exists in Fact" and communal property was always distinct from state property. In effect the individual was the property of the community and,

¹ Cited from Grundrisse by R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, "The Analysis of Pre-Colonial Social Formations of Asia in the Writing of Marx" The Indian Historical Review, Vol. II, No. 2, (Jan. 1966), p. 375.

consequently, of the despot. This kind of thought led Marx to the concept of "the general slavery of the orient". The "total unity" of village communities was represented by the despot who received from them a part of their surplus as tribute. Another part of the surplus took the form of communal labour which was used for economically necessary operations such as irrigation.³ Though these works were the products of communal labour these appeared to be the works of the despot. Marx traced the beginning of "lordly dominion" and feudalism in society to the need for organizing labour from communal projects, be it for war or the construction of public works.

Alternatively Wittfogel developed his thesis that the essence of which is that the totalitarian government arose as a result of the necessity of constructing and maintaining large-scale irrigation works.⁴

India is considered as one of the ancient member of hydraulic society. At the beginning of 1900 century only in Bengal 97 miles of large irrigation canal was boasted, 1298 embankments were built. Besides there were enormous flood control efforts.⁵ Wittfogel postulates "the effective management of these works involved organizational web ... In consequence those who control this network and uniquely prepared for supreme political

² Ibid, p. 379

³ M. Mufakharul Islam, "Marx on India and the Mode of Production. A General Survey", The Dacca University Studies, Vol. XX, Part A, June 1979, p. 81.

⁴ Kaul A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism - A Comparative Study of Total Power, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1957), p. 23.

⁵ Ibid, p. 24

IRRIGATION RESEARCH : A REVIEW OF
DIFFERENT STUDIES:

In recent years it has been observed that there has been a tremendous increase of interest of social science scholars of this part of Asia to carry out research investigation in the field of resource mobilization, distribution and its spread effect aimed to undertake rural development programmes. Studies that have been already made identifies the following major aspects of possible venue of research in the field of rural development. (a) Resource mobilization for agricultural/rural development, (b) Resource management for the same, (c) Component agents of development management at various levels of the society, (e) Change agents, (f) Structural arrangement of the distribution network.

The Section of the report aims to trace, identify, and examine some related studies in the light of the present research work. More specifically the section deals with irrigation studies detailing alternative strategies to develop irrigation infrastructure, alternative approaches to improve the operations and maintainance (O & M) of irrigation system, specific policy options made by different researchers.

Post-liberation Bangladesh saw several efforts in analysing and evaluating irrigation management in Bangladesh. In fact irrigation system has been examined from different socio-economic angles. Edward, in his study "Irrigation in Bangladesh - A Study of Past Government Policy and Contradiction between Land Tenure and Irrigation Technology"¹ suggests that

¹ C.B. Edwards, Irrigation in Bangladesh - A Study of Past Government Policies and Contradictions between Land Tenure and Irrigation Technology. (Norwich: School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, 1977).

development of irrigation is a precondition for a significant increase in agricultural output and employment. Since most of the Bangladeshi land is suitable for irrigation, the potential for substantial production increase is there, but the government and aid giving agencies' policies have encouraged neither the spread nor efficient use of irrigation. For example, government policy has encouraged lumpy capital-investment equipment, such as deep tube well. This technology is suitable, however, only under certain land holding and pricing conditions, and infact the utilization of such equipment has shown a poor performance while again in the other hand manual techniques, particularly hand tube well for irrigation, have been spreading rapidly. Thus, the basic conflict lumpy irrigation technology and fragmented landholding structure in Bangladesh has been exacerbated by official rules. While other work carried out by Hamid gives a comparative study of different types of irrigation comprising largest canal irrigation project, selected deep tube well and power pump as well as the traditional dry well techniques method of irrigation.² The study shows that only about 30% of the planned command area are actually irrigated. Causes for such shortfalls in capacity utilization are both technological and institutional. Nevertheless, the study identifies that irrigation has enabled production to increase substantially. Crop intensities have increased from 117% without irrigation to 154% with irrigation. The presence of irrigation, as the study reveals, has reduced income per acre disparities between large and small farmers but has widereed income per house hold disparities between large and small

² M.A. Hamid, A Study of Irrigation Techniques in Selected Areas of Bangladesh, (Rajshahi: Department of Economics, University of Rajshahi, 1977).

farmers. The gap between farm incomes on irrigation versus non-irrigated areas, has, of course increased over time. Rahman indicates that there has been a decline in the capacity utilization of deep tube well since last 10 years or so. Such a decline is a reality and is accounted for a number of institutional factors through which the programme is being channeled as well as by the pattern of landholding in the area.³

Islam, in his study, tries to examine the socio-economic factors that determine the efficiency of irrigation in Bangladesh.⁴ He identifies the role and importance of the group manager and opines that the manager is perhaps the main "social determinant" for the efficient irrigation system and infact he acts ^{as prime} the/variable which influences the success and failure of the irrigation group, its management and operations.

Some cross cultural studies have shown a similar trend on irrigation system, management. Robert Wade studies Indian Irrigation System concludes that the existing framework of governmental policy and the administrative framework is perhaps the main hinderance of under-utilization of irrigation facilities and "management input" is very significant in certain period of irrigation phases. he further argued that "much of the reason of poor performance has to do with the irrigation bureaucracy itself".⁵ Richard

³ M. Rahman, Efficiency of Resource Utilization: A Case Study of Deep Tube Well Irrigation in Savar Thana (Unpublished Master's Thesis & Department of Geography, Jahangirnagar University, 1978).

⁴ T.R. Islam, "Socio-Economic and Institutional Factors Determining the Efficiency of Low Lift Pump Irrigation in Bangladesh". The Journal of Management Business and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 3, July 1977.

⁵ Robert Wade, The Administration of Irrigation Canal in South India. Asian Regional Irrigational Communication Network, Newsletter No. 8, March 1979, p. 33.

Hutapea, studying Indonesian irrigation system, came to the conclusion that "influence of officials at all level effects decision or water distribution. As long as the integrity of officials are doubtful and social control is minimal no water regulation can work well".⁶

The Thana Irrigation Programme which infact mobilize all the resources of institutional irrigation system with its rapid expansion has enhanced the interest of some enlightened personalities in the villages. Alam observes: "With the expansion of the TII more and more educated persons at the village are taking leadership of the irrigation groups as managers, chairmen or model farmers with big landholding are enjoying the greater benefits of the programme and also play a major role over the entire management of the group."⁷ Jain and Rahman made a study on relative profitability of HYV Boro crops under different system of irrigation. They concluded that deep tube well is most suitable and participated by maximum number of peasants. But correspondingly deep tube well shows perhaps the lowest capacity utilization. The main causes of low per acre yield of the irrigation based Boro crop is resulted from organizational problems. The study further identifies that there is a very good relationship between the managers and members. The manager is all in all and is not practically accountable. Discrepancy of water distribution was also observed and the small farmers had to depend

⁶ Richard Hutapea, Institutional Aspects of Traditional Irrigation System, (Java: Research Institution of Social Science, Satya Wacana University, Salatiga, Central Java), 1988.

⁷ Manjurul Alam, Ameerul Huq(ed.), "The Beneficiaries of HYV and TIF in Bangladesh" in G.D. Wood and Ameerul Huq (ed) The Socio-Economic Implications of Introducing HYV in Bangladesh (Comilla: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1975), p. 71.

on the mercy of the manager for water. A low command area is resulted because of poor planning and wrong site selection of the deeptube well.⁸ Negative role of the group managers and the managerial members have been further supported by the studies undertaken by Motin⁹, Jabbar and Alam.¹⁰ Ferdouse Alam points out that the agricultural inputs and irrigational facilities could never reach the managerial to landpoor farmers in exact scale due to process of distribution mechanism and the reverse role of the determinating members.¹¹ Nazmunessa Mahtab in her study points out that several KSS are found to be inactive or partly inactive due to the conflict regard to the site selection of the pump, distribution of water.¹² Baqui Khalily has found in his study that at three different level of agricultural production of HYV of IRRI paddy about 95.39% of the total results from human failure and social period while Khalily further identifies "social structure" is one of the basic components of social peril.¹³ It is further important to note the rate of loss is significantly marked at such stages when irrigation and other institutional agricultural credit is definitely important.

⁸ W.M.H. Jain and M.M.Rahman, "Relative Profitability of HYV Boro under different System of Tube Well Irrigation in an area of Bangladesh" The Bangladesh Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. I, No.1, June 78, p.57

⁹ Abdul Matin, Problems of Mechanized Cultivation: A Study of Socio-Economic Problems of Irrigation in Bangladesh, (U. G. C. Sponsored research).

¹⁰ A Jabbar, and Alam, Economic Studies Fertilizer Distribution and Utilization in Selected Area of Mymensingh District - UGC Sponsored research, Dacca: University Grants Commission 1977.

¹¹ Ferdous Alam, Financing Agriculture, U.G.C. Sponsored Research, (Dacca: University Grants Commission, 1977).

¹² Nazmun Nessa Mahtab, Institution Building for Rural Development: A Case Study of Joydeb ur Thana KSS. (Dacca: University Grants Commission, 1978), p. 44

¹³ Baqui Khalily, "Elements of Risk in Agricultural Productivity" The Dacca University Studies, Vol. XXIX, Part A, p. 140.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:

Rural development has become a primary focus of all our development plans, programmes and priorities and perhaps irrigation is one of the most significant and important components of the rural development activities in Bangladesh.

The present study basically aims to examine the irrigation system, particularly the deep tube well irrigation, in a selected Union of Dacca district with a particular view to identify, examine and analyse the irrigation management with special reference to the managerial elite of the irrigation group. More specifically the study aims:

1. To review generally the present social structure in the rural areas from the view point of the requirements of development and to assess the position of the elite in the structure compared to other groups and classes.
2. To determine the role of rural elite in
 - a. Irrigation project proposal initiation
 - b. Processing of the proposal
 - c. Approval of the proposal
 - d. Site selection of the deep tube well
 - e. Election of the Management Committee of the irrigation group.
 - f. General operation of the irrigation group.
3. To analyse the mechanism adopted by the elite in playing their present role in the village community in general and in the irrigation programme in particular.
4. To evaluate the impact of the role of rural elite in the performance of the irrigation group.

Justification of the Study:

The present study would be of importance since no such study has been undertaken to examine and evaluate the rural development programmes particularly the irrigation programme taking rural elite leaders i.e. the "management variable" as the prime focus. In fact, studies that have been undertaken are mostly evaluative in nature.

Moreover, the present government, on principle is encouraging rural leadership and decentralization of power and authority. In the light of this policy the trend, behaviour, nature aptitude and attitude of the rural elite towards development process, like irrigation programme, is an important venue for study and research.

Success of a irrigation project depends ultimately on its social acceptability and farmer's involvement. Detailed knowledge of social structure, cultural attributes, values and leadership pattern is essential for appropriate planning and designing and the present study would focus primarily on these aspects thus it is expected that the findings of the study will enable the planners in framing future policy on irrigation and the supply of other agricultural inputs. It is also expected that the proposed study would be sort of a "management audit" and therefore this will further identify the drawbacks, loopholes of the existing system of communication and delivery and thereby enable BADC, IRDI, Agriculture Department, Cooperative Department and other local agencies to develop and recognize their respective policies/plans in the light of the findings. Finally the findings may also help the concerned agencies to develop and modify the TIP manual in the light of existing reality.

METHODOLOGY:

Over the past decade there has been a significant increase in the number of social science scholars engaged in research on various aspects of the organization of irrigation system. In general, work during the last decade has suffered tremendously from methodological dilemma. Most scholars were unaware of the previous macro theories of Steward, Wittfogel and others, which are in fact basic stand for understanding the organized irrigation system in this part of Asia.¹ With this bearing in mind the researcher tried to design his methodology of the present research work.

In fact no single method of research in social science is absolutely complete by itself. Therefore, for a better and assured result there is a special need to consider the various research approach that are being used in the study of irrigation organization.

Four different research method have been followed in the present work almost simultaneously in studying the social organization of the irrigation groups, these are participant-observation, survey research, documentary research and also comparative analysis.

By participant-observation approach the researcher and his team associates gathered information from individuals as they go about their daily activities, by attending group meetings, informal social meetings, occasional interviews, by "hanging around" where things are happening, asking people about events and their meanings and keenly observing behaviour in its natural setting.

¹ E. Walter Coward Jr., Research Methodology in the Study of Irrigation: A Review of Approaches and Applications - ADC Seminar Report No. 18 (New York : Agricultural Development Council, 1978), p. 1.

Through survey method a questionnaire was administered to the target population of a sample size of about 238. Some common quantitative and qualitative information was collected through the questionnaire.

Documentary method of the present study refers to gathering information from published and unpublished written sources. Different types of documents have been used like government notification, census report, agency reports, tax record, poll-election return, annual plans, five year plans, approach plans, annual development programmes, etc. record file, account book, meeting minutes, proposals of the irrigation groups were the valuable sources of documents.

Besides these approaches yet another approach, which was quite supportive to the researcher for his own understanding and clarification, was Comparative Studies. Some related studies were consulted, analysed and examined to understand and interpret the collected data. The researcher also tried to examine the relationship, in a few case, by comprising the data of different places.

Sample Design:

Birulia Union Parishad of the Savar Police Station of the District of Dacca was taken as the study area of the present study. There are 15 deep tube wells in this Union of which one deep tube well was found to be out of order and therefore the study covered the rest 14 deep tube wells of the Union. The following table gives the identification of the study units with Mouja and JL number.

Name of the Village/Project	Mouja No/JL No.
Jinjira	625/136
Buttapara	622/ 1
Furba Samair	677/108
Kalia Koir	673/ 21
Akran I	624/ 83
Akran II	624/ 36
Khagan	629/ 74
Kamlapur I	690/ 86
Kamlapur II	670/131
Kamlapur III	690/171
Mai-stapara	687/ 28
Kumar Khoda	688/ 52
Sarulia	680/ 52
Bagnibari	676/ 65

Sample Respondents:

The very objectives of the study is to tap the role of the irrigation group with special focus to the managerial numbers. Three questionnaire were administered for the purpose. Questionnaire I was designed for the managerial members (chairman, manager of the group, members of the Managing Committee) while questionnaire II was meant for general member of the irrigation group again questionnaire III was specially designed for the non-members of the irrigation group.

The following table shows the sample size of the three different respondent groups:

	Target Respondent	Actually Surveyed
Questionnaire Set I		
Chairman	14	14
Manager	14	14
Managing Committee Members	84	70
Questionnaire Set II		
General Members	70	70
Questionnaire Set III		
Non-Members	70	70
	252	238

14 deep tube well irrigation group was the total target and in each case it was planned to interview the chairman, the manager, 6 Managing Committee Members, 5 general members and 5 other farmers within the command area of the irrigation scheme who is not a member of the irrigation group. All together from each group we planned to interview 18 respondent and all together from 14 groups 252 was the target respondent. But unfortunately some managing committee managers were not available during period of the field work and hence the actual number of respondents stands at 238, which is about 94% of the expected respondent.

Nature of the Questionnaire:

There were three sets of questionnaire for the present study and was designed to secure information to validate the hypotheses of the study. Questionnaire set I which was prepared for the chairman, manager and the managing committee members. It has several sections aimed to identify the socio-economic political background of the respondents, their link and relationship with external and internal sources, agencies, forces etc., their role and function in mobilizing the irrigation group and management of the same, their perception, aptitude about rural institutions etc.

Questionnaire set II designed for general members deals with almost the same having a minor change in some critical questions/quaries regarding the managing committee member and managing elite like chairman and manager.

Questionnaire Set III was administered among the non-members of the irrigation group in a village within the command area of a deep tube well. It deals primarily with those quires of why they did not turn up. Questionnaire also dealt with socio-economic and political background of the respondents.

All the three sets of questionnaire were composed of both open and close questions and was printed in Bengali. A pretest was taken to modify and change the content, sequence and language of the questionnaire.

Study Area:

Birulia Union of Savar Police Station of Dacca District was taken as the study area of the present study. The study area is about 9 miles from the thana headquarters towards east and located on longitude 90.15 east and latitude 23.50 North. There are about 24 villages in the Union having a total population of 11,956 and most of them are muslim having few Christian para/villages. Total number of house hold is 1925. Demographic features shows that there is a very high Crude Birth Rate in this area CBR is 39.77 with a considerable low Crude Death rate 3.30 with a gross fertility rate of 3.30.

The physiographic condition and geographic environment of the area is farmable for agriculture and the inhabitant of the area. The land is either chala (highland) or the baidis or shallow depressions or elongated lowlands, which intersect the chala lands. The chala land is good for Jack fruit cultivation and for homestead. Post monsoon cultivation of vegetables is an extra source of income of most of the people in this area. The most important thing is that there are a significant number of people in this Union those who have migrated to this place from Rupganj, Tongi, Ghorashal and Norsindi. These migrant people are locally known as Boura (outsider). Most of the migrations have taken place during the mid fifties and before. The genuinely local people are known as Tongoira (those who live in chala land). In fact there is a cold war between the Boura people and Tongoira people mostly during the election of the Union Farisad, anytime when a socio-political decision is taken by the individual or group as a whole.

Recently some outsiders from Dacca, most of whom are top bureaucrats, are purchasing land in this union with the hope of future residential use. A local rural development organization Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee has also established a training centre, a poultry farm, and a demonstration farm in this Union during the year 1977-78.

Communication network with Birulia during the dry is quite good. A broad earth road starting from the Savar Bazar and crossing the Birulia Union and going upto the Asulia Bazar and from there to Tongi. The road is easy moving during the dry seasons even with light vehicles. During the wet season Birulia is more accessible towards Dacca through country boats. It is easy to reach Birulia from Mirpur Section No. 12 with a journey of one and half hour by boat and in the dry season some people make a cross field walk to reach the market place at Mirpur Section No. 11.

The Birulia Union Parishad office is situated at the village of the Union named Samair, which is in the South-Eastern part of the Union.

Survey Experience:

A team of 15 graduate students and the Project Director himself was involved in the data collection phase at the field. The team stayed at the field for twenty days continuously. Prior to that the Project Director in three different occasions (June, July and September, 1979) made some reconnaissance survey and initial base work for the field study.

Prior to the field work data collectors were trained with a short course on different aspects of data collection and socio-psychological techniques to be used.

The field work stated therefore started on September 23rd and continued upto October 15th 1979. In most cases the respondents were interviewed after the magrib prayer and also in some case in the afternoon.

The respondents could be classified into certain types. There were a few who were extremely self-conscious. They were very evasive in their answers. Sometimes they resorted to a simple device to discourage the interviewer by not keeping the appointment. These respondents can be termed as "self conscious evasive" types. While again some other respondents felt obliged to spare their busy time for the study. They could be considered as "self-conscious obliging". But quite a good number of respondents could be characterized by their criterionity complex. But they were anxious to be interviewed and perhaps the validity of their response is also very high, and these respondents are named as "ignorant - anxious". Some other respondents pretended in a manner that giving time for interview was a sheer waste of his time and seemed to hurry. They can be termed as "hasty-arrogant" respondents. It is also hopeful that there were also a good number respondents who cooperated and assisted the research team with all open heart and make the field work lively and successful. They are perhaps the "ideal respondents".

Data Validity:

Data and information that have been collected from the field have been scrutinized by the Project Director personally. In some cases over and under recording of the respondents were collected in consultation with dependable rural personalities keeping in view that this might not be a biased report. The project director made some critical investigation of 5% of the total questionnaire and tested the respond validity on the spot. It was tried to collect, and examine the respond validity of the "self conscious evasive" respondents by following a sort of participation and observation method.

Over and above the present study claims a high rate of respondent validity because possible alternative checks and balances were maintained to get the higher degree of accuracy of data.

PART - II

EVOLUTION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH:

The country of Bangladesh, its people and government, are in no way new comer or novices in rural development. On the contrary, they have inherited more than fifty years of rich experience.¹ "It dates from the early period of Hindu Rule in the territory which is now Bangladesh",² Rural development has been a constant concern of governments, politicians, social personalities, and planners since the beginnings of the current century but in many names, shapes and dimensions.³ Programmes, projects and different efforts and initiatives have been undertaken by different outstanding personalities both within and outside the government to bring and sustain change and development of the rural people.⁴ Anisuzzaman identifies the following agencies in the field of rural development since the beginnings of the present centuries. These are - a. land lords, b. private individuals, c. private organizations, d. political leaders, e. public servants, f. public bodies.⁵ Besides these, some other programmes were sponsored by the government of Bengal during the 30's and 40's of the present century. The most significant efforts, perhaps political economic and social, were the expansion of local government bodies at village level with popular

¹ Akhter Hamid Khan, Framework on Rural Development in Bangladesh (Mimeo) Bogra: Rural Development Academy 1979, p. 1.

² A.M. Anisuzzaman, 'Historical Background and Current Objectives and Strategies for Rural Development in Bangladesh' Seminar Paper present at National Seminar on Rural Development in Bangladesh, March 27-31, 1979. Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

³ Ghanshyam Shah, "The Gandhian Approach to Rural Development" Ideas and Action, Rome: Bulletin 125, No. 6, p. 3.

⁴ M. Nurul Haq, 'Pioneers of Rural Development in Bangladesh: Their Programmes and Writings', (Mimeo) Bogra: Rural Development Academy 1978, p. 1.

⁵ A. M. Anisuzzaman, op. cit.

political representation which allowed the rural people to think about themselves. Besides, the control of rural indebtedness through the Money Lender Act and Debt Settlement Boards were significant efforts for the uplift of the poorer rural mass. And during the period after the great depression, the credit cooperatives have been revived. A tenancy reform approach was also carried out during this period which was again accompanied by a populist rural welfare palli mangal movement.

For our discussion we would discuss the evolution in two sections. Firstly, focus would be given upon the contributions of official and unofficial personalities and, secondly, we would make a review of some institutional efforts in the early times. Nurul Hoo distinguishes the following personalities: He categorises Rabindranath Tagore and A.K. Fazlul Hoo as non-officials pioneering personalities while Guru Sadaya Dutta, N.M. Khan, T.I.M. Nurunnabi Chowdhury, H.S.M. Ishacue as the official personalities devoted toward the development of rural Bengal.

Rabindra Nath Tagore: A humanist poet and the Zamindar came to rural Bengal sometime in 1890 to manage his ancestral properties and saw the lives and aspirations of the rural people for the first time from a close perspective. He was moved with the sub human conditions of the villages. He made a modest beginning in rural reconstruction work at Shilaidah. He tried to organize the villagers into cooperatives. But his work could not go far as he had to return to Shantineketan in 1901. But he was deeply motivated to make experiments in rural reconstruction. His ideas were further articulated by his visit to Europe and United States and he was

particularly impressed and influenced by Dr. Leonard Elmhirt, an agricultural economist he met in United States, who later joined Tagore's Shantineketan in 1922. This was perhaps the exact beginning of his experimentation with rural affairs. Three villages were selected for experimentation.⁶

Tagore instructed his workers that they must make such efforts that "the villagers have faith in their own capacity and the capacity of their cooperative efforts".⁷ Tagore believed in the philosophy of self help and self reliance, He wrote: "from the inception I have kept this in mind that any effort to enrich a village from outside is artificial. If we merely offer them help from outside it would be harmful to them". He further said: "Welfare of the village community is a combination of many components. They are intimately linked up with one another. If any of them is kept separate, we miss the result". Tagore was much more pragmatic and therefore believed that economic factors were of utmost importance in the development of the socio economic life of the villages. He developed a working force with relative training in agricultural science, social conservation, plantation, poultry farming etc. and employed them in the experimental villages.

In fact the programme undertaken at Shantineketan was perhaps the first serious experiment on rural development in Bengal.

The major programmes that have been carried out were Palli Mangal Sanity (Village Development Council), Health Cooperative, Adult Education

⁶ Nurul Hoo, *op. cit.*, p. 3

⁷ Sugata Das Gupta, *A Foot and a Plan*, Calcutta: Thacker Spink & Co. nd., p. 18

⁸ Akhter Hamid Khan, *op. cit.* p. 1.

Centre, Circulatory Library. The poet also emphasized folk cultural programmes for better and understandable communication for rural reconstruction movement. He, therefore, patronized habigans and Jatra. Some other programmes were specially designed to bring certain economic change in the form of festivals. These were Brikharapon (tree plantation ceremony). Shilpatsava (inauguration of small/cottage industries). Not only that, in 1922 an institute of Rural Reconstruction was established in Sriniketan of Santineketan with a research and cooperative industries section.⁹

Sher-e-Bangla A.k. Fazlul Hoq: He is one of the outstanding Muslim political personalities Bengal ever produced. Fazlul Hoq is considered to be the only politician of his period who really worked with all sincere feelings for poorer section of the village community. In fact he initiated all those progressive efforts and enactment to save the decline of the village poor in Bengal. All these legal enactments had far reaching impact on socio-political and economic life of the Bengal villages.

His contributions to rural development can be recokened in a series of legislations which he piloted and processed into laws for the benefit of the people of rural Bengal. These were:

Bengal Agricultural Debtor Act 1935

Primary Education Bill of 1938

Bengal Tenancy Act 1938

Land Revenue Commission of 1938

⁹ H.S.M. Ishaque, ABC of Rural Reconstruction, Dacca: The Directorate of Public Relations, Government of East Pakistan 1959, p. 10.

Tank Improvement Act of 1938

Establishment of Rural Reconstruction Department in 1938

Bengal Cooperative Societies Act 1948

Bengal Money Lenders Act 1940.

Bengal Agricultural Debt Act of 1935: In absence of the institutional credit the poor farmers had to borrow from the Mahajans (Money Lenders) and rich farmers. They had nothing but the land was the only collateral they could offer. Hundreds of mortgage deeds were executed in favour of the money lenders and thousands of peasants were getting landless in a tremendous rate. The Act made a definite contribution to stop the rate of land transfer with the provision that the mortgaged land should be returned to the original owners even after a maximum period of 12 years. Some of the mortgagors could get back their land earlier on payment of residual value of the rights of the mortgages.

Bengal Tenancy Act of 1938: The tenancy acts of 1885, 1929 and 1938 are all amending Acts of the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. The chief provisions of these acts related to the rights of raiyats (tenants), under-raiyats and occupancy-raiyats. The significant provisions were:

- a. Occupancy-raiyats are exempted from payments of a transfer fee. Holdings whether in part or whole could be freely transferred. The landlord was bound to recognize all transfers.
- b. The right of pre-exemption was taken away from the landlord and given to the co-shareer tenants.
- c. All provisions relating to rent increase were suspended for a period of ten years.

Besides these with the enactment of Primary Education Bill of 1938, he initiated the expansion of the primary schools at rural areas. Perhaps illiteracy was one of the primary reasons, he identified, as the cause of socio-political backwardness of the rural people.

The most noteworthy contribution of A.K. Fazlul Hoc in terms of institution building for rural development was the establishment of Rural Reconstruction Department in 1938. Moreover, with his esteem, initiated two important acts were passed which kept a very significant impact upon the economic life of the villages of Bengal. These were Cooperative Act 1940, which provided credit during postwar depressionary period to the villagers and the Bengal Money Lenders Act 1940 which curtailed the powers of the money lenders of the rural Bengal.

Sir Daniel Hamilton: Sir Daniel Hamilton a Scotsman would be known in the history of rural reconstruction of Bengal for his glorious cooperative movement at Gosaba, the Sundarbans. By his own initiative he established a Cooperative Bank, a cooperative paddy husking machine, a sale and supply society, credit societies and primary schools. In every villages, the dispensaries and rural reconstruction institute. Daniel Hamilton has also given a practical demonstration of a new theory of money. In fact Sir Hamilton tried to set an example for the then Zamindars to follow a definite code of socio-economic behaviour so that the tenants could live in peace and happiness.¹⁰

¹⁰ H.S.M. Ishaque, Op. cit., p. 11

OFFICIAL PERSONALITIES:

Along with the unofficial/political personalities there were some devoted officials of the civil service making very significant contribution for the development of the socio-economic life the village people of Bengal. They were - 1. G.S.Dutta, 2. N.M. Khan, 3. T.I.M. Nurunnabi Chowdhury, 4. H.S.M. Ishacue.

G.S. Dutta: The first serious attempt to mobilize rural people and their resources for their development was made by Mr. G.S. Dutta, who was an ICS Officer, G.S.Dutta in 1916 started experimenting in the district of Birbhum and Mymensingh to organize a number of youth organization for voluntary works for the development of common masses of the rural areas. His programme contained a number of items but it seems that the practical work confined to mostly to fungie and water hijacint clearance. He introduced a code of behavior for young generation at the rural level and gradually his work assumed the character of a youth movement named Bratachari movement and the practical side of rural reconstruction receded very much into the background.¹¹

N.M. Khan: Mr. N. M. Khan was also an ICS Officer. While during 1935-39 he was Sub-Divisional Officer of Brahmanbaria he took several efforts to mobilize local efforts for self development. He took effort in eradicating water hyacinth and reexcavation of the Sir Anderson canal. The canal was vital for communication and flood control. The entire work was done through voluntary labour, mostly by landless labours.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 14

Mr. Khan's achievement created a sensation and showed what could be done by voluntary efforts and there is no doubt that it was Khan's work which though temporarily, gave a fillings to the movement. Mr. Khan's emphasis was on the voluntary labour and particularly upon the landless and poor farmers, this could not create any further impulse out side Brahmanbaria, since unemployment of the labourers was itself a great problem and to mobilize then as a force for voluntary work was next to impossible. Nevertheless, Mr. Khan is still known for his approach of voluntary labour for self development.

T.I.M. Nurunnabi Chowdhury: Mr. T.I.M. Nurunnabi Chowdhury, a prominent ICS officer took a different approach than that of the other two forebearers of his cadre. His basic philosophy was to organize the people from below. He therefore, encouraged people to organize Pally Mangal Samity (Village Development Societies), use improved seeds, build village community centre, night schools. Because of his extraordinary interest in rural development activities he was made the first Director of the newly created Department of Rural Reconstruction in 1938. On assumption of office as the first Director of the Rural Reconstruction Department he submitted a comprehensive scheme for rural reconstruction and development in the light of his approach. But the scheme did not get approval and this devoted personality carried out his efforts without any fund and also without any field staff of his own. The basic principles of his approach were:

- a. Organization of self help for the rural population.
- b. Coordination of the rural activities of various agencies - official, semi-official and non-official.

c. Utilization of all available agencies to the fullest extent for rural welfare.

d. Training and employment of the staff of all agencies in the work of rural reconstruction, official, semi-official and non-official also training of educational institutions, pensioners, etc.

e. Education and propaganda through different methods, including adult education, bulletin, cinema, radio etc.

Mr. Chowdhury emphasized on the "orientational change" of the civil servants and for that he organized a special programme of training on rural reconstruction for the civil servants. In 1940 about 59 Bengal Junior Civil Service (officers) joined the training. For his movement he desired a comprehensive programme comprising 48 items such as formation of village community, village survey of household and needs, agriculture, drainage, seed stores, cattle improvement, kitchen gardening, tree plantation, village nursery, village hall, library, night school, sanitation, drinking water, disposal of night soil, jungle clearing, vaccination, roads and bridges, cottage industries, pisciculture, bee keeping, tile making, hat training, water-nity, village defence party, postal savings etc.

H.S.M. Ishaque: Mr. Ishaque was the Sub-Divisional Officer at Sirajganj in the year 1936 and was the front rank working Lieutenant of Mr. Chowdhury. But his mobilization was different than that of his pioneers. He took "the first serious efforts both intensive and extensively to organize and mobilize the rural masses systematically and to preach the gospel of cooperation and self-help."¹²

¹² H.M.S. Ishaque, Op. cit. p. 13.

In his approach to development, Ishaque was cautious not to allow the movement "to become one man's show". And therefore great stress was laid on the improvement of the mind and outlook of the masses as against the attainment of mere tangible results. Ishaque's movement from the very outset planned to grow and develop as the "combined will and effort". An extensive village survey was done to identify the need and requirement of the villages. A tentative proposal was made after the thorough consultation and threadbare discussion with the leading rural personalities and a general and absolute consensus of the plan. proposal was made in each case for a long and short-term basis. This created a sound foundation of a spirit of discipline and organization of selfhelp and self reliance, of dogged determination and perseverance, of sacrifice and social service among the masses. Thus the slogan of the Siranganj programme were "better homes and better villages" spread out with the spirit of selfhelp to the greater bulk of the rural people of Bengal under the leadership of Mr. Ishaque.

Rural Reconstruction Department:

Various development projects began to spring up in the 1920's and 1930's at the initiative of interested individuals like F.L. Brayne and Spencer Hatch. Bengal government entered the field in 1935 with a grant of Rupees One Crore from the Central Government to match the need of the poverty stricken rural people.¹⁴ The central government, of course, provided a policy outline for the programme.¹⁵ These were -

- a. Improvement of the rural water supply
- b. Provision of playing grounds for villages and village schools.
- c. Improvement of village communications and water ways.
- d. Improvement of rural sanitation.

To meet this, government of Bengal established a new department named Rural Reconstruction Department in 1938. Mr. Nurunnabi Chowdhury a renowned and devoted I.C.S. was made its first Director.

The basic object of the newly created Rural Reconstruction Development was to give the masses a new consciousness, to awake their sense of self-respect, self-reliance and self-help, to educate and organize them in active cooperation and voluntary joint efforts, to create the sense of good citizenship, to build better homes, better villages and in general, to promote the physical, social, moral and material advancement of the

¹⁴ Elliot Tepper, Changing Pattern of Administration in Rural East Pakistan Asian Studies Center Occasional Paper No. 5. New York: Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1966. p. 103.

¹⁵ H.S.M. Ishaque, op. cit., p. 16.

rural communities as a whole. The Rural Reconstruction Movement, therefore followed a 20 point principles. These were -

- a. The people matter most, b. People's outlook must be changed,
- c. Self-help and self-effort to be the basis, d. Formation of organization,
- e. People's participation is essential, f. participation to be voluntary,
- g. Build leadership, h. Self-determination, i. No plans to be imposed,
- j. Survey of facts and informations, k. Help people see real needs,
- l. Prepare a gross root plan, m. Mobilization of own resources,
- n. No hasty decision, o. Equitable credit facilities, p. Friendly and missionary approach to all,
- q. Government people close link, r. Coordination of agencies at all level,
- s. Faith on god.

Rural Reconstruction Movement therefore stressed upon building of institutions at grass root level in the line of these said principles. The Palli Mangal Samiti was formed as a new and innovative rural institution for self development in most of the villages covered under the programme. Each samity was composed of an executive committee consisting of not less than 9 and not more than 12 members, each member representing approximately 10 or 12 adjacent houses and elected by the showing of hands or ballots in a general meeting specially convened for the purpose. The Committee on principle tried to represent all sections of the village community, and as far as possible, had a majority of enlightened youngmen that included active, intelligent and social service minded persons.

Each Committee was composed of some office bearers, elected preferably in the general meeting held for the constitution of the Committee. The office bearers were - a. One Provident, b. One or two Vice-President, c. One Secretary, d. One Joint or Assistant Secretary, e. One Treasurer with two Securities, f. One Auditor.

Each Samiti also had a corp of 15 - 25 young and enthusiastic volunteers elected in a general meeting in the same manner as the Executive Committee, each volunteer representing 5 to 6 houses. They may select 3 or 4 Squadmasters one for each group of volunteers of 5 to 8. The corps function was under direct supervision and guidance of Secretary and other executive personality of the Palli Mangal Samity. But later during the year 1944-45 as per recommendation of the Rowlands Committee the Department was disbanded. The Committee recommended:

"Rural Reconstruction is not to our mind, as separate activity of Government. It is the function...or the end result of the activities of the several nation building departments. In our judgement it is unsound to have a Director of Rural Reconstruction, with a separate staff parallel to, but with no control over the representatives of the technical departments, and indeed, almost wholly independent of the District Officer. With such a setup there have been, as there was bound to be, friction and conflict of jurisdiction and action".¹⁶

¹⁶ Government of Bengal, Report of the Bengal Administration Inquiry Committee, 1944-45. (Bengal Government Press, Alipore, 1945) Reprinted by National Institute of Public Administration, Dacca, 1962, p. 7.

Village Agriculture - Industrial Development
Programme (Village AID):

Village AID Programme was a lineal descendent of the former Department of Rural Reconstruction and was initiated in 1954. The Village AID Programme again stressed the need for rural reconstruction in the name of community development.¹⁷ The first five year plan of Pakistan identified the following inadequacies of the previous programmes of rural development and advocated for the new Village AID Programme. The past efforts have achieved limited success because of -

a. inadequate range of the efforts, b. too restricted an approach to the problems, c. an attitude that endangered hostility or indifference on part of villagers, d. failure to consult the villagers and to maintain continuous contact with them, e. meagre resources allocated to the effort, f. above all, the main above all, the main content as well as the objective of their policies and programme.

The First Five Year Plan of Pakistan therefore stressed the Village AID Programme with the following objectives in end.¹⁸

- i) to raise the output and income of the villagers through better method of farming and the expansion of cottage industries.
- ii) to create a spirit of self-help, initiative and cooperative among the villagers - a spirit that can be the basis for continuing economic social and political progress.

¹⁷ Akhter Hamid Khan, "Comilla Revisited" Journal of Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Vol. VII, No. 2, Jan. 1978, p. 3.

¹⁸ H.S.M. Ishaque, op. cit. p. 16

- iii) to multiply the community services available in rural areas, such as schools, health centres, pure water supplies etc.
- iv) to increase conditions for a richer and higher life through social activities including recreation for men and women.

The objectives of the Village AID Programme was further depicted in five year plan of the programmes itself. The programmes aimed "to solve the problems of the villages by helping the villagers to help themselves individually and as communities. It is an attempt to look at the villages as a whole through the eyes of its people and in the light of their vast store of accumulated knowledge and wisdom. It uses the principles of community organization and development which are based on human experience and thus avoids the mistakes of the past efforts at community development. It aims at coordinating the total resources of the government and the people for a concerned and determined effort to reconstruct village life".¹⁹ The basic unit of Village AID Programme was a development area which included normally about 150 to 200 villages with a population of 100000. The Staff of Village AID for the development area was - a. Development Officer, b. Supervisor, c. Village workers and some specialist of various departments concerned development activities. Each Village Worker was assigned to look after 5 to 7 villages and his duty was to maintain continuous contacts with line villagers and stimulate and guide selfhelp organization in planning and developing their activities. The Departmental Specialists were supposed to advise and assist the village workers in the following areas:

¹⁹ Government of Pakistan, Village AID and Five Year Plan 1955-56 to 1957-60, Karachi: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Government Press, 1956, pp. 2-3.

a. farm management, b. animal husbandry, c. cooperation and marketing, d. health and sanitation, e. work supervision and design, f. social education etc. The Specialist Officers were assigned to work under operational control of the Development Officer.

The First Five Year Plan estimated that during the plan period the development area of Village AID Programme would stand around 79 in the then East Pakistan.

Comilla Experimentation and BARD Models:

Like all other experimentations on rural reconstruction and community development, Village AID faded out in course of time and ultimately during the late fifties it was completely dropped. Meanwhile, somewhat independently, under official cover, material and personal support and with a considerable degree of functional autonomy, Akhter Hamid Khan's, who was also an ex-ICS, Comilla experimentation emerged gradually as an outstanding effort at building an institutional infrastructure for sustained agricultural growth and rural development.²⁰

Comilla Rural Development Programmes are a strategy for the involvement of all the people in an area. They provide a way in which farmers and others can gain increasing access to meaningful economic, political and social activities.²¹ All the models developed by Comilla experiment in

²⁰ Wahidul Haque, Niranjana Mehta & Others, Towards a Theory of Rural Development (Mimeo) Bangkok: United Nations Asian Development Institute, December 1975, p. 31.

²¹ Robert Stevens, Comilla Rural Development Programs: Result from East Pakistan for International Testing, Columbus: The Ohio State University, Sept. 1971, p. 3

the Bangladesh Rural Development Academy (the then Pakistan Academy for Rural Development) was based on experimental pilot activities at their social laboratory of Kotwali thana.

During the sixties four models of rural development enunciated by the Comilla Academy were accepted by the government as a national programme. These are -

- a. Establishment of a training and development centre (TTDC) in every thana.
- b. A road drainage embankment works programme in Rural Works Programme (RWP) in every thana.
- c. A decentralized, small scale irrigation programme (TI) in every thana.
- d. A two tier cooperative system in every thana. Thana Central Cooperative Association.

These four are well integrated with each other and collectively called Comilla approach.

Thana Training and Development Centre (TTDC): TTDC is an improved and expanded system of rural administration, which promoted interdepartmental coordination, as well as coordination between the departments and local political representatives, and which made combined services supplies and training easily accessible to all villagers in the thana.

Rural Works Programme (RWP): Through RWP drainage, embankment are planned and implemented by the local Union Parishad, which simultaneously built essential infrastructures, generated employment to the landless, and introduced management skills and strengthened the involvement of rural institution on development.

Thana Irrigation Programme (TIP): TIP is harnessing the organizing ability of thousands of Union Parishads members and supporting it from Thana Centre's workshop with engineering advice and services, made possible the utmost utilization of the surface and ground water available in the thana, and put into operation, neither a few years, thousands of low lift pump and tube wells through out the country.

Two-Tier Cooperative (TTC): Comilla experiment proposed a two tier cooperative in each thana and in every village a cooperative society consisting of 40 to 50 land owners, which through the "Gaeffeisein" method of pooling thrift deposits, and plans to collect large volume of equity capital by creating blocks of 50 to 100 acres of land. The cooperatives would provide and facilitate the economic adoption of irrigation, institutional credit and improved farming. Such cooperative, further plans, to overcome the handicaps of small and fragmented holdings; and build up, over the years, self supporting institutions of cooperative banking and marketing. The cooperative societies could also, through group based and group oriented extension education, spread equitely, cheaply and widely, more productive method of farming. Thus they, as per Comilla experiment

expectation, could accelerate the accumulation of both capital and skill, and further more, retard the abuse which may result from unadulterated rural capitalism.

To ensure the effective extension of the Comilla approach. It was taken as a national programme through a decision of Executive Committee of National Economic Council of Pakistan in 1970. Consequently Comilla programme has compiled into an integrated approach through the emergence of "Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP)" in 1970. By now IRDP has covered 200 thana and has formed the same number of TOGA with 26443 affiliated Krishak Samabai Sanity (KSS) and at present their number stands at 799387. This number meanwhile have accumulated about Tk. 498.10 lakh as shares and savings deposit.²²

²² Hadayet Ahmed, "Rural Development in Bangladesh" in a special Supplement or Intensive Multisector Area Development Projects of IRDP. The Bangladesh Times, June 30, 1978.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL
PROGRAMMES AND PRIORITIES:

In Bangladesh, the basic objective of a strategy for rural development is a productive programme against poverty. It assumes that a reservoir of creativity exists among the rural poor and their increased participation in day to day decision making in all phases of local economic and social activities will provide them with the awareness and willingness to channel their energy most effectively. In other words, the emphasis is on increasing the largely untapped productive capability of the majority of the population in the rural areas.¹

Rural development strategy, therefore, emphasized increasing agricultural production along with creation of employment opportunities. In participation of the rural poor and at time stress that the existing opportunities need to be reallocated and redistributed through strengthening the rural institutions. The strategy also lays emphasis on integrated approach towards development. Keeping these into consideration, a poverty oriented rural development strategy has been designed with five major objectives,²

- i) Increase of agricultural production at an accelerated pace.
- ii) Creation of new employment opportunities for the rural poor.
- iii) More broad-based spread incremental benefits.

¹ A.Z.M. Obaidullah Khan and Shahed Latif, "Rural Development in Bangladesh. A County Status Report" Seminar paper presented at National Seminar on Rural Development in Bangladesh, March 27-31, 1979.

² Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Rural Development Expansion Programme in Bangladesh, Dacca: Planning Division, IRDP on Behalf of Ministry of Land Administration, Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, 1974, pp. 2-3.

iv) Strengthening rural institutions for effective delivery of development services supplies to all, irrespective of their present economic and social status.

i) Improvement of rural infrastructure.

To ensure the attainment of these objectives, the government adopted the following measures:

- a. Rapid expansion and diffusion of the seed based (irrigation, fertilizer and HYV) technology.
- b. Changes in the cropping pattern along with increased application of labour intensive technologies.
- c. Emphasis on nutrition oriented production of oil seeds, fish and livestock.
- d. Development of rural institutions with direct involvement of small and marginal farmers and landless labourers not only as a receiving mechanism of development services but also an effective tool of ensuring equity in the distribution of income.
- e. Before intensified rural works programme to build rural physical infrastructure which would provide risk free agricultural production and employment.
- f. Location-specific concentrated efforts towards rural development in a much more comprehensive manner.
- g. Delegation of increasing responsibilities to the local bodies as a step towards decentralization and people's participation.
- h. Undertaking some target group oriented programmes for benefiting the small and landless farmers through deployment in productive activities.

- i. Promotion of non-farm activities including rural industries for diversification of employment opportunities, and
- j. Ensuing effective coordination from the national down to the local level.

Since the problem of rural development in Bangladesh are so varied and complex in nature that extreme short-term solutions are very ambitious and on the other hand deferment of some well defined programmes on long term perspective is untenable. Therefore considering the need for accelerating agricultural modernization, generation of non-farm employment and the development of rural institutions - a medium term strategy for rural development have been developed.

At present these are the following programme that have been carried out by the government or by other national or international agencies for rural development in Bangladesh:

1. Integrated Rural Development/Area Development Programmes.
2. Swanirvar Movement - Gram Sarker.
3. Ulshi Strategy
4. Own Village Development (OVD)
5. Total Village Development (TVD)
6. Food for Works Programme (FWP)
7. Programmes of National and International Voluntary Agencies.

1. Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP):

This is basically a comprehensive Comilla model having four components:

- i. Thana Training and Development Centre (TTDC); ii. Two Tier Cooperatives;
- iii. Thana Irrigation Programme (TIP), iv. Rural Works Programme (RWP).

Table - I

Expenditure in Different Component Programme for
Integrated Rural Development

	1962 - 71	1971 - 79	Total
TIDC	12,62,28,643	8,48,48,100	21,10,76,743
RWT	108,11,91,104	82,65,63,700	190,77,54,804
TIF	5,97,91,021	37,67,74,204	43,65,65,225
Training and Adm. of these programmes.	2,51,28,889	16,48,81,105	19,00,09,994
Total:	129,23,39,657	145,30,67,109	274,54,06,766

Table - II

Achievement Through Two Major Components of
IRDI During 1962-1979

	1962 - 71	In Taka 1971 - 79
<u>Rural Works Programme Achievements:</u>		
Amount Spend	Rs. 108,11,91,104	Tk. 82,65,63,700
No. of Project	20,328	16,044
No. of Trained Village Cadre	60,984	48,132
<u>T.I.I. Achievements (upto 1977)</u>		
Amount Spent	Rk. 5,97,91,021	Tk. 37,67,74,204
No. of Irrigation Group	24,483	36,382
No. of Trained Village Cadre	97,933	1,45,518

Table - III

Growth of IRDI Cooperatives Since 1971

Years	No. of Thana	No. of Cooperative Societies	Cooperative Members	Capital Formation (in lakh)	Loan Issued (in lakh)
1971-72	33	5,680	1,36,316	110.43	118.52
1972-73	87	10,171	2,61,193	167.56	208.41
1973-74	152	14,690	3,87,290	229.14	241.41
1974-75	161	17,691	4,80,474	284.62	317.68
1975-76	162	18,975	5,25,640	333.69	503.17
1976-77	200	21,874	6,49,088	401.78	750.97
1977-78	250	27,548	8,44,407	543.31	1281.75

Table I reveals that about 274 crore taka have been spend in these sectors of IRDI and of which the major portion i.e. about 69% have been spent in rural works programme. While 15.69% of the total allocation have been spent for T.I.I. again table II gives a comparative picture of rural works programme during the Pakistani period and Bangladesh period and it is seen that the allocation for such sector shows a decline. But allocation for TIF have been increased and also number of groups and the number of managing committees at rural level increased during the post liberation period. Table III shows the growth trend of IRDI cooperatives during the period of 1971-78 and also the transaction credit and accumulation of savings.

Area Development Programme:

IRDF, in collaboration with some aid giving international agencies has taken up some intensive Area Development Programme.³ These includes:

- a. Rural Development - I Project
- b. Sirajganj Integrated Rural Development Programme (SIRDF)
- c. Noakhali Integrated Rural Development Programme (NIRDF)

Rural Development - I Project (RD-I): This project was undertaken during 1975-76 comprising 4 thana from Bogra District and 3 thana from Mymensingh District. Total amount for this project earmarked Tk. 37 crore and of that 67% of the allocation would be provided by World Bank. The major components of the programme are - i) Rural Works Programme, ii) Development of Thana Headquarters, iii) TTCA and extension and development of RSS, iv) Extension of rural credit, v) Irrigation development, vi) Fisheries development, vii) Livestock development, viii) Horticulture development etc.

Sirajganj Integrated Rural Development Programme (SIRDF): The area development programme was initiated from 1st July 1977 in 4 thanas of Sirajganj Sub-Division of Fapna district. The project will cost an amount of Tk. 72.48 crore. The major share of the programme i.e. 60% and would be funded by Asian Development Bank (ADB) and rest would be funded by Government of Bangladesh, UNICEF and UNDI. Component programmes of SIRDF

³ Md. Habibur Rahman, Intensive Rural Development: A New Strategy for Rural Development in Bangladesh (Mimeo) (Dacca: IRDF, July, 1978).

are almost alike to the programmes of IRD - I project but STDP further includes - i) flood control and drainage, ii) Deep tube well and irrigation through small pumps, iii) rural industries, iv) health and family planning.

Noakhali Integrated Rural Development Programme (NIRD): This programme is taken by a grant from Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) at 3 thana of Noakhali District and was initiated from July 1978. Total target of amount to be spend in the project is Tk. 23.70 crore and the total amount is a DANIDA grant. The components of this programme are almost alike to the IRD-I, and STDP. But NIRD shows significant importance to education and health sector.

Youth Programme: IRDI has also initiated programmes for youth development since 1977. Main focus of this programme is to develop the youth as a productive resource of the country. The programme was initiated on pilot basis in 4 thanas and till April 1979, 72 Youth Cooperatives have been formed with about 3131 youth members in those thana. It is now planned that all the thana's would be covered under this programme in near future and a comprehensive programme of Tk. 1310.50 lakh has been designed for that purpose.

2. SHAWNIRVAR MOVEMENT:

[The word 'Shawnirvar' means self-reliant or dependent on one's own self. In its broadest sense, it means self-sufficiency in income on the part of the nation as a whole, as well as self-sufficiency at each level

of society starting from home base to the national level. The programme thus stands to make each family, each village, each union, each thana, each sub-division, each district and the nation self-sufficient. In view of the constraints, the initial aim of Shownirvar Movement was to achieve self-sufficiency in food by increasing production while at the same time reducing population growth. The central focus of Shownirvar is on the rural sector and the initial thrust was to create an awareness amongst the rural people about the development possibilities of these individual rural area on the basis of their own resources, supplemented by proper utilization of under-utilised or unutilised resources - physical and human, official and non-official. It attempts to reduce wastage of such resources through a committed co-ordination mechanism of officials and non-officials at different levels. Objectives of the Shownirvar Programme are :

- i) To arouse consciousness about one's nationhood and a sense of pride in one's community.
- ii) To initiate a village organisation for channeling this spirit towards self-reliant local development.
- iii) To organise institutions, like co-operatives and clubs, to cover all families in each interest group in the village, namely, the women, youth, farmers, landless labourers and members of other profession and then to bring all these institutions into an integrative functioning under the auspices of an over-all village committee where all interest groups are to be duly represented;

iv) To provide a local planning machinery for identification and utilisation of unused, underused and illused local resources (both physical and human official and non-official);

v) To develop a group of workers specialised in undertaking development tasks through a system of sub-committees charged with responsibilities for implementing decisions of the village committees. To develop a co-ordination machinery from village to national level through Shasthitar Committee consisting of officials and non-officials at all levels above the village.

vi) To introduce a matching principle in development financing between the people and the government. To emphasise the role of officials as partner in development and their additional responsibility as 'committee citizens' of the country.

ix) To develop better rapport between officials and the people through work camps.

x) To develop a local security system and justice system through village defence committees and justice committees respectively.

xi) To develop, in due course, a model of decentralized and democratic administration and of village self-government through full participation of all groups of people in their own development.

xii) To ensure through this process, the attainment of self reliance for all from the family level to the national level.

4 Nahub Alam Chashi, "Community Self-help for Economic and Social Development: A Case Study of Swasthitar Movement in Bangladesh", Paper presented at the Fourth Commonwealth Conference on Human Ecology and Development, Accra, December 15th, 1976.

✓ Performance/Achievement of Shownirvar
Movement Since its Inception:

The Shownirvar format was adopted for nation-wise replication in September 1975. It functions through various groups in various Shownirvar Committees. It also provides assistance for development of separate organisation for each group under the umbrella of co-operative or social welfare. It has two main groups such as, economic and social group. The economic group consists of (a) farmers, and landless farmers and social group consists of (a) Women and (b) Youth. On the basis of this format, the target of shownirvar in 1976 was to encourage formation of at least one shownirvar village in each thana. In 1977, one shownirvar village was established in each union. In 1978, an attempt was made to reach the message to all villages of Bangladesh. The most significant modification came after the election of the union parishad held in December, 1976. The innovation led to the conversion of these union parishads into what is now known as 'Union Sarker'. In this union sarker each one of the eleven union parishad members are known in some areas as Ministers'. The Ministers were assigned portfolios as his or her specific responsibility following the practice adopted by the government at the national level. The portfolios generally assigned were as follows:

- i) Land and order
- ii) Finance, revenue and land administration
- iii) Planning, communication and works programme
- iv) Agriculture and forestry
- v) Livestock
- vi) Fishery

- vii) Education and culture
- viii) Social welfare and cottage industry
- ix) Health and public health
- x) Family planning and women.

Each member of the Union Sarker organized a village government known as "Gram Tarised" a Gram Sarkar.⁵⁾

3. Ulshi - A Mass Mobilisation Strategy:

Another significant break-through of Shannirvar movement in the field of self-reliance during this period has been the emergence of a mass mobilisation strategy in rural works.

The now famous Ulshi area (of Jessore district) triggered off this thrust during November, 1976 to April, 1977. Here a combination of local efforts, administrative guidance, and presidential encouragement led to the excavation of a much needed 2.65 mile long canal to drain off to 28.5 sq. miles of water-logged area. Some 17,041 farmer families and 1080 landless families got the direct benefit of the programme.⁶ It involved 185 lakh cft. of earth work undertaken wholly on self-help basis and with a token amount of Tk. 66,27,169.00.⁷ A principle of cost sharing by the beneficiaries was also introduced in this project. Ulashi fired the

⁵ Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Economic Survey 1977-78, Dacca: Economic Adviser's Wing, Ministry of Finance.

⁶ Bangladesh Jatio Sangshad, "Parliamentary Questions and Answers" Question No. 48 (B,C) dated 25th May, 1979.

⁷ Ibid, Question No. 49 (L) dated 25th May, 1979.

religious leaders and rich and poor alike. In the actual implementation of the ideas it was however, considered desirable to leave them to the choice of the villagers themselves. To begin with, it was planned that activities would be started centering round the existing KSS in the villages to see whether all could be included, under one organisation. The option given to the villagers, however, resulted in some amount of variation in their choice of the forms of organization. In one of the 5 villages under TWI the farmers, the landless, the youth and the women all have been included in one society. In other villages there are separate groups of the youths and landless.

Recently, however, in a few joint meetings of the representatives of the different groups of these 5 villages, the performances and approaches of Kashinathpur and Balarampur Deedar Sanity were appreciated by all, and all the other villages expected that in future they would also be able to come under one organisation. And, for this they needed honest, dedicated, sincere and sympathetic leadership. The experiment is going on and we have not yet reached a final model.¹³

✓ 6. Food for Works Programme (FWP):

The concept of relief operation in Bangladesh underwent a radical change after the flood of 1974. Instead of traditional handouts and doling of food to the distressed, the relief mechanism was designed to initiate "Food For Works Programme". In fact during recent years it is seen a huge

¹³ Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Thirteenth Annual Plan 1979-80, Comilla: BARD 1979, p. 113.

rise in unemployment and under employment along with a tremendous decrease in agricultural wages. Consequence of both are sometimes unmanageable and alarming. It is estimated that about 18 million people remain either unemployed or underemployed round the year.

Conscious of the glut of unutilized manpower, their basic survival needs and country's acute food gap, Government, in December 1974, decided to distribute relief food in exchange of labour put into agro-based schemes fitted within the framework of food for works programme. The programme has the following objectives to meet:

- a. To create employment opportunities for unutilized labour force being turned into destitutes;
- b. to undertake grow more food oriented and agro-based Test Relief Programme like excavation/reexcavation of drainage canal, construction of embankments and tanks to make the country self-sufficient in food;
- c. to develop a sense of self respect, self reliance and to reduce the dependence on charity and doles which have in the past adversely affected the morals and social attitude; and
- d. to stabilize prices of food grains and check inflation.

The Food for Works Programme was initiated and sponsored initially by the Government of Bangladesh in 1974 and an amount of 48939 Metric tons of food grain was allotted for that year. In the consequent year, the success of the programme drew the attention of World Food Programme (WFP), USAID, CARI and some other donor agencies. Normally the projects of this

programme are sponsored by the following ministries of the Government of Bangladesh:

- a. Ministry of Flood Control and Water Resources,
- b. Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives;
- c. Ministry of Forest, Fisheries and Livestock;
- d. Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation.

During the year 1975-76 about 1.8 million mandays were utilized and about 1.9 million acre of arable land got direct and indirect benefit of the programme.¹⁴ Following table shows the year wise achievement of the programme.

Year	Excavation and reexcavation of canals/river (in miles)	Flood Control Embankments (in miles)	Construction of Kuccha road (no)	Excavation of Tanks (no)	Food Grain distributed (in metric tons)
1976-77	1674	1906	1076	326	222,557.01
1977-78	2261	2300	1470	198	275,400.22
1978-79	2594	2780	2487	317	300,792.64
	6529	6986	5033	841	808,750.07

Source: Bangladesh Economic Survey 1978-79.

¹⁴ Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Economic Survey 1975-76, Dacca: Economic Adviser's Wing, Ministry of Finance, 1976, pp. 283 - 284.

7. Programmes Undertaken by International and Local Voluntary Organization:

Along with all these institutional efforts quite a good number of national and international voluntary agencies are now engaged in rural development activities. It is identified about 65 such organisations are working in Bangladesh in different aspects of rural/community development. Following are the general programmes that have been carried by these agencies -

- a. Target group development (landless and disadvantaged).
- b. Community health and medicine and family planning.
- c. Population education.
- d. Water supply
- e. Conscientisation through Adult and functional education.
- f. Child development.
- g. Food for works programme.
- h. Irrigation development and support.
- i. Women development
- j. Intensive cultivation training.
- k. Fisheries and Livestocks.
- l. Craft training
- m. Community/collective farming
- n. Manpower development etc.

It is observed that during the fiscal year of 1977-78 an amount of Tk. 5.44 crore have been spend by 44 of these organizations to carry out their programmes in Bangladesh.¹⁵

¹⁵ Agricultural Development Agencies in Bangladesh, ADAB-VOLAG Directory, Dacca: Agricultural and Development Agencies in Bangladesh, January, 1979.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN RURAL SECTOR :
A TREND ANALYSIS:

This section of the report aims to assess and examine the different development plans of the Pakistan and Bangladesh and to draw a trend analysis of developmental strategy and nature of investment in the different subsectors of rural development. In this case rural development as subsector includes those planned allocated amount aimed to be used at rural level. In some cases in rural part of some major integrated allocations have been made hypothetically. But it can be safely conclude that these hypothetical allocations would definitely be much more in reality and would perhaps not be less than that. For the purpose of the present section of the study the following developmental plans have been taken for scrutiny.¹ a. The First Five Year Plan of Pakistan (1955-60), b. The Second Five Year Plan of Pakistan (1960-65), c. Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), d. The First Five Year Plan of Bangladesh (1973-78), e. The Two Year Plan of Bangladesh (1978-80).

During the last quarter century the governments have taken several measures for developing several areas. The close scrutiny of the First Five Year Plan, 2nd Five Year Plan, 3rd Five Year Plan of Pakistan along with both the First Five Year Plan and Two Year Plan of Bangladesh shows that allocations have been made in different subsectors related to the development of rural areas within the following heads of development allocations. These are -

¹ The Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75) could not be implemented in Bangladesh, due to emergence as a new independent nation. Consequently, in 1973 the First Five Year Plan was published.

- a. Agriculture, b. Village/Rural Institutions, c. Water and Power,
d. Labour & Employment, i. Social Welfare, Housing and Settlements.

Identification of the Major Sectors
of Rural Development:

The major programmes for upliftment of rural areas are broadly divided into two sections for our projective study. One is pre-Bangladesh period and the other is Bangladesh Period. This is done because the nature of programmes in these has some difference in content and trends.

By examining the development plans of Pakistan period i.e. from 1953 to 1970 it is seen, efforts have been made here to distinguish rural investment from that of the total national allocation. In fact in some particular development allocation there was no separate allocation earmarked for rural areas. But after a through study of the plan documents and nature of the allocation, the following sectors and subsectors in the said three Five Year Plan of Pakistan, have been identified as rural:

- a. Village AID (completely rural),
- b. Agriculture (completely rural),
- c. Water Resources (partly rural),
- d. Industries (partially rural - cottage and small industries),
- e. Housing and Settlement (partially rural - rural housing),
- f. Education and training (partially rural - primary education),
- g. Health (partially rural - rural health centre/ complex.),
- h. Special area development/tribal territories (mainly rural),
- i. Works programme (mainly rural).

The First Five Year Plan and the Two Year Plan of Bangladesh, in fact encompasses almost all these sectors/subsectors of developmental allocation.

Village AID: Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (Village

AID) as an agency for uplifting and developing the rural community started working in 1952. The basic concept of the Village AID Programme was to provide means by which technical and financial assistance from the government can be used to draw forth the resources of skill, energy and money which exist in the villages, to channel them into productive uses, and to create means by which they can be progressively enlarged. Following are the main components of the Village AID Programme where specialist services were offered:

- a. Farm management, b. Animal husbandry, c. Cooperative and marketing, d. Health and Sanitation, e. Work supervision, f. Social education, g. Cottage and small industries,
1. Fisheries & Forestry.

2. Agricultural/Rural Institutions:

Agriculture along with animal husbandry, forestry, fisheries and horticulture was perhaps the largest segment of the national economy of the then Pakistan and also of Bangladesh. About 60% of the total national income is generated from this sector and about 75% of the labour force is engaged in this sector while 90% or more people are living in the villages dependent directly or indirectly on agriculture. Hence any investment in this sector is considered as rural. During Bangladesh Plan period allocations of rural institutions have been incorporated with these broad sector. Rural institutions specially includes here IIRI, Cooperatives etc.

Water/Power Development: The programmes of water and power development is a complex sector. But in our analysis only the partial allocation for water development have been incorporated. By thorough investigation of the developmental plan, the capital investment for rural/^{area}during the plan period have been identified.

Rural Industries: There was a small allocation for rural cottage industries within the broad allocation of industries. By studying the descriptive part of the respective plans, the rural sector is differentiated in approximation.

Housing and Settlement: Housing and Settlement plans are seldom operated in rural areas. But allocations on rural housing, rural water supply and sanitation have been covered in this subsector.

Education: Education is broad sector and comprises both urban and rural jurisdiction. But for this study we considered primary education mainly as rural allocation.

Health: It is comprehensive national programme. The rural proportion in this area can be differentiated by identifying rural health centre/clinic/complex or alike.

Social Welfare: Social welfare is also a broad national service programme. In analysis the contribution for rural communities have been considered. But during the Third Five Year Plan period such allocations have been placed under works programme schemes.

Special Area Development/Tribal Territories: This sector is considered totally as non-urban by nature. So the total allocation of this head is being considered as rural.

Works Programme: The Works Programme is a unique experimentation in grass-root level planning and mobilization of energies of the people for projects of local importance and under the guidance of the grass-root level political institutions like Union Council/Parisad. This special programme for developing the rural areas of the country was initiated from the Third Five Year Plan of Pakistan.

Allocation of Resources - 1935-1980:

First Five Year Plan (1955-60): This plan earmarked Rs. 3,520 million for the then East Pakistan in public sector and of which about Rs. 904.67 million was earmarked for different programmes at rural level or its tertiary areas. The allocation stands about 25.70% of the total.

The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65): The Second Five Year Plan shows the total public resource allocation for the then East Pakistan as Rs. 5,284 million. The planned allocation for the rural and its related sectors in that plan period is assumed to be Rs. 1,548.20 million which is around 29.29% of the total outlay of the public sector allocation for development.

The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70): During the Third Five Year Plan of Pakistan public resource allocation for erstwhile East Pakistan was Rs. 16,000 million and the expected allocation of rural and allied sectors which was about 39.58% of the total allocation which stands around 6392.50 million rupees.

The First Five Year Plan of Bangladesh (1973-78): This plan earmarked Tk. 39,520 million in public sector for the development and of which Tk. 12,481.01 million had been placed in or associated with rural sector and that allocation stands at 31.58% of the total development outlay.

Two Year Plan (1978-80): During this plan period Tk. 32,610 million has been earmarked for the different developmental sectors and 32.64% of that allocation has again been placed in rural or its associated sectors/ subsectors and the planned allocated amount is Tk. 10,646.21 million.

Table - I

CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN RURAL BANGLADESH: SECTION I

Sectoral Resource Allocation in Public Sectors in the First Second and Third Five Year Plans of Pakistan: The Resource which were Allocated Specially for Developing the Rural Areas of the East Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Sectors	Resource Allocation of FFYI		Second Five Year Plan of Pakistan		Third Five Year Plan of Pakistan		Total
	Million	Million	Rs.	US \$	Rs.	US \$	
	Ts.	US \$					US \$
Village Aid	93.90	19.73	236.60	49.71	-	-	69.44
Development out side village aid areas.	50.00	10.50	-	-	-	-	10.50
Agriculture	357.49	75.10	547.00	114.91	1192.10	481.53	671.54
Rural Cottage & Small Inds.	1.00	0.21	-	-	-	-	-
Rural water development.	237.00	49.79	614.20	129.03	2077.32	436.41	615.23

Contd...

Sectors	Resource Alloc. (FYF of Pakistan)		Second Five Year Plan of Pakistan		Third Five Year Plan of Pakistan		Total US \$
	Million	Million	Rs.	US \$	Rs.	US \$	
	Ts.	US \$					
Rural Housing & Settlement/rural water supply.	56.50	11.87	55.00	11.55	40.00	8.40	31.82
Rural primary edu.	51.66 ¹	10.85	70.00	14.71	320.00	67.23	92.79
Rural health programme	-	-	25.40	5.34	123.00	25.84	31.18
Works programme	-	-	-	-	1500.00	315.13	315.13
Co-operative/ rural credit and marketing.	57.12	12.00	-	-	*** ²	-	12.00
Family planning	-	-	-	-	40.00 ^{*3}	8.40	8.40
Total:	904.67	190.05	1548.20	325.25	6392.42	1342.94	1858.03

1. Primary education is totally assumed as rural sector.
2. The allocation was found to be incorporated with agriculture.
3. By through literature study it can be guessed that 50% of the total national allocation had been invested in rural areas.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN RURAL BANGLADESH: SECTION II

Sectoral Resource Allocation in Public Sectors:
The resource which were allocated specially for developing the rural communities are noted here to examine and analyse the trend or public capital investment in rural Bangladesh.

Table - II

Sectors	Resource Allocation		First 5 Yr. Plan of B. desh		Two Year Plan	
	Take in	Value in	Take in	Value in	Take in	Value in
	Million	US \$	Million	US \$	Million	US \$
Agricultural water resource and rural development.	10410.90	1285.29	8980.00	591.56		
Rural cottage and small industries.	40.00	4.94	118.20	7.79		
Physical planning and housing.	439.89	54.31	-	-		
Primary education.	577.22	74.26	223.20	14.70		
Rural health	654.00	80.74	744.209	49.02		
Rural social services	9.00	1.11	20.60	1.36		
Rural planning (rural)	350.00	43.21	500.00	32.94		
Development Boards and other programmes.	-	-	60.00	3.96		
Totals:	12481.01	1540.86	10646.209	701.33		

The following table shows the planned allocation in the public sector of the plan period of 1955 to 1980 and there corresponding allocation in the rural sector. It is seen that in total during the plan period of 25 year US \$ 122.38 billion is allocated in the public sector of which 32.98% which is around US \$ 41 billion earmarked for the upliftment of the rural areas/rural economy and thereby the national economy.

Table - III

Allocation of resource at rural sector with corresponding total national allocation for the period of 1955-1980. In the public sector for Bangladesh.

Plan Period	Total Allocation (in million Rs./Tk. Million U.S. \$	Rural Sector (in million Rs./Tk. Million U.S. \$	Percentage of Allocation
1st Five Year Plan 1955-60	3520 = 739.50	904.67 = 190.06	25.70
2nd Five Year Plan 1960-65	5284 = 1110.08	1548.20 = 325.25	29.30
3rd Five Year Plan 1965-70	16000 = 3361.34	6392.42 = 1343.94	39.95
1st Five Year Plan 1973-78	39520 = 4879.01	12481.01 = 1540.86	31.58
Two Year Plan 1978-80	32610 = 2148.22	10646.21 = 701.33	32.65
Total:	96934.=12238.15	31972.51 = 4100.44	32.98

The following table shows the general trends of the planned allocation of resources projected to be used in the rural areas during the plan period of 1955 to 1980 in the then East Pakistan. It is seen that during Pakistani period Village Aid, agriculture, water development and education were perhaps the major sectors where significant portion of resources allocated for rural areas have been earmarked. The highest percentage of the total allocation in such areas were found to have maintained a similarity in all the three plans in Pakistan and that sector was agriculture. The percentage distribution was 39.50%, 35.83% for the First, Second and Third Five Year

Plans of Pakistan respectively. Almost a balanced trend was found in Village AID allocation till the programme was dropped in during the Third Five Year Plan. Development of water resources shows a trend of increase in percentage of allocation during the planned period of 1955 to 1965 while in the third five year plan a fall is observed. The percentage distribution was 26.19 in the first plan while in the second plan it increased to 39.67 and again it shows a fall in third plan and the percentage was 32.49.

Table - IV

Percentage Distribution of allocation of resources in different major subsectors for the development of rural areas in Bangladesh.

	First Five Year Plan	Second Five Year Plan	Third Five Year Plan
<u>Pakistan Period:</u>			
Village AID	15.90	15.28	-
Agriculture	39.50	35.83	35.85
Water development	26.19	39.67	32.49
Education	5.71	4.52	5.00
<u>Bangladesh Period:</u>			
	First Five Year Plan	Two Year Plan	
Agriculture/Water Resources/ and rural institutions.	83.41	84.34	
Rural health	5.29	6.99	
Education	4.62	2.09	
Cottage industries	0.32	1.11	
Family planning	2.80	4.69	

Similarly there were also a shift in the allocation for the education sector to be spent at rural level. The percentage distribution was 5.71 in First Year Plan and that was 4.52 and 5.00 percent in the Second and Third Five Year Plan respectively.

Major sectors of allocations to be spent in rural areas during the Bangladesh period are agriculture, water resources and rural institutions, rural health, education, cottage industries, family planning etc. It is observed that the agriculture, water resource development, and rural institution sectors encompass about 83.41% of the rural investment of the First Five Year Plan. The percentage of the same sector within the broad allocation for rural sector in the two year plan is 84.34%. More over the proportion of the allocation in the rural health sector within the total allocation of rural sector has increased for 5.29% to 6.99% in the first five year and two year plan of Bangladesh respectively. Similar shift is marked in family planning and cottage industries; in both the case the percentage has increased. Contribution of cottage industries went up for 1.11% in the two year plan, while the percentage was only 0.32% in the five year plan. In case of family planning a considerable increase in percentage is marked. It increased 4.69% in the two year plan while the contribution was 2.80 in the first five year plan in Bangladesh.

It therefore can be concluded that a definite trend is marked both in Pakistan and Bangladesh in terms of investment in rural sector particularly in agricultural sector. During the last 25 year almost a balanced trend is seen with a minor fall during the mid-sixties. Water development shows the similar trend with a slight fall during the seventies. But in terms of education a fluctuation is observed and no consistent trend is seen. It showed a decline in mid sixties and again a rise in seventies with again decline in mid seventies and further fall in early eighties. But significant stress is marked in family planning sector where positive stress is given in early seventies and a further drive in late seventies.

1955 - 1975 :

TWO DECADES OF DEVELOPMENT OR DECAY

Starting from mid fifties and onward, Asian countries particularly the South East Asian countries undertook several experiments in rural development in particular and national development in general.¹ The focus was definitely the rural areas since this part of Asia is better known for the villages and its rural population.² In spite of all the "promising efforts" of rural/national development, poverty and inequality persist in various forms in many countries of this region. Bangladesh is perhaps the typical representation of poverty and inequality in this region. A careful observation shows that "the great majority of the population suffer from a deep sense of insecurity - a direct result of working class forces (e.g. feudal, semi-feudal, colonial, semi-colonial capitalistic exploration) in a historical perspective, which continuously threatens the very existence of these people. At each historical epoch of the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Sub-continent, the dominant classes impoverished the rest of the population. While some among the dominated groups managed to survive at the bare subsistence level, the burden of suffering has fallen disproportionately upon the relatively weak sections of the population."³

¹ Inayatullah (ed), Approaches to Rural Development: Some Asian Experiences (Kuala Lumpur: Asian and Pacific Development Administration Centre, 1979, pp. 5-6.

² World Bank Staff Working Paper, Small Farmers and Landless in South Asia, Working Paper No. 320, Washington DC: World Bank, 1979, p. 1.

³ Mohiuddin Alamgir, Bangladesh - A Case Study of Below Poverty Level Equilibrium Trap, Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Dacca, 1978, p. 1.

From the First Five Year Plan of Pakistan down to the Two Year Plan of the Bangladesh many efforts in the name of Village AID, Community Development, Rural Reconstruction, Rural Development, Agricultural Extension, Agricultural Development, Grow More Food, Swanirvar, Ulashi Strategy, Comilla Cooperative or IDDP. But none of these could bring any significant change in socio-political and economic life of the bulk of the population. Judged by any criterion it is sure that the process of impoverishment has gone too far in Bangladesh. A large section of the population has gone under the poverty line and also around and under the "famine level". Over the last two decades or so famine and eui-famine situations have prevailed in this country. Bangladesh is caught in what may be called the Below Poverty Level Equilibrium Trap".⁴

But it would be very significant if we make a close observation to the previous plans programmes or development strategy of the then Pakistan or Bangladesh, it is very obvious that much stress have been given for the development of the poverty stricken masses particularly rural masses so far planned allocation is concerned it is roughly estimated that about US \$ 42 billion have been spent or planned to spend for the development of the rural sector.⁵ Not only that, about 122 Billion projected in public sector to ensure the "just and equitable" growth of the economy for the greater benefit of the common mass. The same "stress" have been maintainedⁱⁿ all the Plans of the period of 1955 to 1980. Despite all, no notable change occurred

⁴ Ibid, p. 2

⁵ For detail Plans see the resource allocation section of the report.

to the common people rather the situation aggravated tremendously. Perhaps the social structure characterized by exploitation production relations leading to class configurations tend to sustain and aggravate the process of under-development of the society and economy. On the one hand, the productive machinery is underdeveloped and operates at low level. On the other a significant proportion of the total output is expropriated by a relatively small minority in the form of unearned surplus which does not find its way back to productive investment. Consequently a sharp fall in real wage and income employment is marked.⁶

It is observed that the potential for rural development in Bangladesh, however, has lain dormant. Instead of growing prosperity for those most in need there has been increasing poverty for many. In Bangladesh output per head fail to rise during the last 13 years. Till 1960 GDI per capita in Bangladesh declined 0.7% a year. While this is the period considered to the "boost period" of rural development in the then Pakistan and now Bangladesh. Not only that, during this period Bangladesh shows the lowest percentage of annual rate of growth of agricultural output which is only 1.7% similarly the percentage annual rate of growth of agricultural output per capita (GDI) during (1960-1973) stands at 1.1%.⁷ Bangladesh has shown a rapid rate of decline. The point to note in this case, however, is that aggregate per capita income has been declining in Bangladesh, not just

⁶ B.K. Jahangir, Differentiation Polarization and Confrontation in Rural Bangladesh, (Dacca: Centre for Social Studies, 1979), pp. 239.

⁷ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Tables 1976 Washington DC, IBRD 1976.

agricultural production per head. That stagnation in agriculture is the part of a process of over all "stagnation" and "decline".⁸

In most rural areas of the third world particularly in the Asian regions, poverty is intimately related to the degree of land concentration.⁹ It is now apparent that land concentration in Bangladesh is taking particular trend and two things seem to be happening simultaneously, first the proportion of the rural population that is without land is rising rapidly i.e. small farmers and tenants are being transformed into landless labour force, secondly, inequality in the distribution of land among those who have^{not} access to it, is increasing more often than those who have not. Distribution of land as measured by Gini coefficient seem to be substantially more unequal in Bangladesh in comparison to any other Asian country. During 1960 the coefficient was 0.47 while it turned to 0.57 in 1974.¹⁰

⁸ Keith Griffin, "Growth and Impoverishment in the Rural Areas of Asia" World Development, Vol. VII, p. 365.

⁹ Keith Griffin, "Land Concentration and Rural Poverty", London: Macmillan 1976, p. 71.

¹⁰ Azizur Rahman Khan, "The Comilla Model and the Integrated Rural Development Programme of Bangladesh: An Experiment in Cooperative Capitalism" World Development, Vol. VII, p. 416.

The Distribution of Landholding in
Rural Bangladesh in 1967-68 and 1977

Size	The Distribution of Operational Holdings in 1967-68			The Distribution of Ownership in 1977		
	% of landholding households	% of land	Average size of holdings (acre)	% of landholding households	% of land	Average size of ownership (acre)
Up to 1 acre	25.0	4.3	0.53	53.4	9.3	0.23
1 - 3 acre	39.2	23.8	1.90	28.5	27.6	1.78
3 - 5 acre	18.7	23.3	3.91	9.6	10.1	3.84
5 - 12.5 "	14.4	33.3	7.24	7.1	28.1	7.27
Above 12.5 acre	2.7	15.5	18.58	1.3	14.9	19.62

Source: Master Survey of Agriculture 1967-68.
Land Occupancy Survey 1977.

The above table shows the distribution of operational landholdings in 1967-68 and the distribution of land ownership in 1977. The two are not comparable; in general the ownership distribution is likely to be unequal. However, 1967-68 the lowest 56.6% of the land holding households had 21.4% of the land while in 1977 the bottom 53.4% of the landowning households had only 9.3%. Again in 1967-68, the top 7.9% of the land holding households had 31% of the land while in 1977 the 8% have 43%. In 1967-68, the upper end of the distribution 20% land was held by 4% of the biggest landholders. In 1977 the same proportion of land was owned by 2.2% of the richest households. A part of the difference probably is explained by the fact that the ownership distribution is more unequal than the distribution of operational holdings. But it is also highly probable that the distribution itself has worsened. The

inequality is further revealed by the 1977 Land Occupancy Survey data where it is seen the top 10% probably own close to 50% of the land. The bottom 50% of the household own less than 9% of the land. The average ownership of the top 8.4% was 40 times the average ownership of the bottom 53.4%.¹¹

The survey on land sales conducted by the Agro-Economic Section of the Ministry of Agriculture shows similar trend.

Sale of Land by Various Size Groups

Household Size Group in Ascending Order	Average Amount of Land Owned (acres)	% of Owned land hold in 1969-70	% of Owned landhold in 1972-73
1	0.53	53	60
2	1.66	16	18
3	3.48	14	16
4	7.46	7	8
5	19.58	4	4

Source: Land Sales Survey, Agro-Economic Research Section, Ministry of Agriculture, 1974.

The table reveals the process of increasing transfer of land and vice-versa landlessness in rural Bangladesh. Those who own less than 1 acre sold well over half of their remaining land in each year. The big farmer in contrast, sold progressively less and the rate remaining same.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 412

The Land Occupancy Survey of 1977 identifies the intensity of landlessness in rural Bangladesh.

Landlessness in Rural Bangladesh 1977**

Categories	Member of Household	Percentage of Total	Number of Household	Percentage of Total
Landless I	13,11,570	11.07	58,84,927	8.13
Landless II	14,76,003	12.46	11,88,644	1.72
Landless III	38,85,733	32.79	187,03,472	27.10
Landless IV	18,11,276	15.29	95,38,436	13.82

Source: Summary Report of the Land Occupancy Survey of Rural Bangladesh 1977. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1977.

The tables reveals that the number of landless has increased in an alarming number. The increase has been particularly rapid in the last two decade. Some recent survey¹² shows that 22.54% have lost their land in his own life, 58.55% have lost them during his fathers time and about 50% of the landless are under age of 32.

**Landless I - Household that claims ownership of no land either homestead land or other land.

Landless II - Household that does not claim ownership of homestead land, but which may or may not claim ownership of land other than homestead land.

Landless III - Household that does not claim ownership of any land other than homestead land.

Landless IV - household that claims ownership of some land other than homestead land, but not more than 0.5 acre of land other than the homestead.

¹² M.A. Manna, "A Survey of Landless and Destitutes of Comilla District 1977. Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1977, p. 11 - 12.

Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Landless in Rural Society: A Study of Comilla Kotwali, Comilla: BARD, 1977, pp. 11

The following table shows the increasing trend of landlessness in rural Bangladesh since 1950's. It is observed that the number has been increasing in absolute number as a proportion of rural households:

Landless in Rural Bangladesh

Year	Landless labourers as a % of total farming labour force.	No. of Landless agricultural labourers in millions	Percentage of rural household which are completely landless
1951	14.3	1.51	-
1961	17.5	2.47	-
1963-64	17.8	2.71	-
1964-65	17.5	2.75	-
1966	-	-	6.97
1967-68	19.8	3.40	-
1977	26.1	4.54	11.07

The landless labourer as percentage of total farming labour has increased almost double during the last two decade while absolute number of landless labourers in agriculture has increased four times during the same period. During last decade the percentage of rural household which are completely landless has gone to the double of its base figure in 1966.

The distribution of money income in rural areas is broadly consistent with that of land distribution. It is observed that the Gini coefficient household income in rural Bangladesh was 0.35 in 1963-64 and that went to 0.33 in 1966-67. It is obvious that it declined further in the consequent year.¹³

Not only that this decline has shown a persistent trend since the early 1950's. Following table shows the declining agricultural wages in Bangladesh;

Agricultural Wages in Bangladesh
(Tk. per person per day)

Year	Money Wage	Index of Cost of Living (1963-64=100)	Real Wage
1949	1.92	81.4	2.36
1953	1.38	80.0	1.71
1959	1.85	95.5	1.94
1964	2.65	99.7	2.66
1966	2.40	126.1	1.90
1968	2.75	134.6	2.04
1969	3.12	140.3	2.22
1972	3.93	246.4	1.60
1973	5.59	351.5	1.59
1974	8.04	565.2	1.42
1975	9.43	735.6	1.28

¹³ Shail Jain, Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data. (Washington DC: World Bank, 1975), p. 19.

It reveals from the table that during the late 1940's and early 1950's real wage declined sharply and for about a decade thereafter there was a steady rise but after 1964 real wages started to decline again. Since 1964, despite some short-term fluctuation, there has been a pronounced downward trend. In the early 1970's the rate of decline accelerated sharply and real wages reached a lower level in 1975 than in any period during the preceding two decades.

Again it is also mentioned that poverty and absolute impoverishment have significantly characterized the socio-economic and political life of rural Bangladesh. Incidence of poverty is distinctly revealed in the following table:

Incidence of Poverty in Rural Bangladesh
(In Percentage)

Year	Absolutely Poor		Extremely Poor	
	Household	Population	Household	Population
1963-64	51.7	40.2	9.8	5.2
1968-69	84.1	76.0	34.6	25.1
1973-74	86.7	78.5	54.1	42.1
1975-	70.3	61.8	50.5	41.0

The poverty line used in this case was Tk. 23.61 per capita per month in 1963-64 prices. This corresponds to a level of income sufficient to yield food consumption satisfying 90% of the estimated caloric

requirement. The proportion of the rural population in poverty was 40% in the initial year, rising to a peak to 79% in 1973-74 and then falling somewhat to 62% in 1975. But the incidence of poverty, however, was more than 50% of greater at the end of the period than at the beginning.¹⁴

The recent Nutrition Survey of Bangladesh 1975-76 shows, in comparison to the study of 1962-64, that the average dietary intake decreased from 885.9 gm to 807.3 gm that is by 9%. Consumption of animal food decreased about 22%. Sweet and white potato consumption declined from 76.9 to 38.6 gm that is half of its former level of 1964. Fish intake decreased from 27.7 to 22.3 gm that is 20% less than that of the former intake. Calorie intake decreased from 2301 to 2094 i.e. by 9% and average intake is 93% of the requirement but 59% of the household are deficient.

It is also observed that 70% of our population are anemic while 82% of children below 5 years do not have the minimum acceptable level of haemoglobin in blood. Average intake of all families having less than 3 acre of land is deficient in calorie, calcium, vitamin A, riboflavin and vitamin C. All these are the general integrated national picture. Malnutrition and rate of under feed is much more vivid in rural Bangladesh.¹⁵

¹⁴ A.R. Khan, "Poverty and Inequality in Rural Bangladesh" in ILO Publication MLP. Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Area, (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1978, p. 147).

¹⁵ Food and Nutrition Survey Report 1962 and 1979: A Note for detail see appendix table No. 33; 34.

It is note worthy that the rate of subsidized food rationing system shows a distinct urban-rural disparity. Following table shows the distribution of food stuff and their corresponding subsidies during the year 1978-79.¹⁶

	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>L. Oil</u>	<u>Sugar</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Total Sub.</u> <u>(in tk.in crore)</u>
Urban Areas	245740	171409	24836	47530	14885	20.80
Rural Areas	222383	581716	3705	12675	13585	19.23

It is surprizing to note that the amount of subsidies given for food stuff is even lesser in the village s corresponding to the urban areas, where about 95% of the total population resides most of them are under feed and living quite below the poverty line.

With the alarming rise of poverty unemployment, malnutrition the general law and order situation also shows a miracle rise during the last eight years particularly after the independence. Though we can not conclude that crime rate is the absolute product of the rise of poverty but it is true that there is a significant correlation between the two. Total crime that have been reported to the Police was 89,887 in 1972 and it shows a fall in 1973 where the number was 70,401 again there was a rise in 1974 - the year when absolute poverty went up to the highest, was 80,717. Till 1975 to 1979 the crime rate is maintaining a balanced trend between 64,000 to 70,000.¹⁷

¹⁶ Bangladesh Jatiya Sangshad, "Parliamentary Questions" Question No. 476 (C & D). date 11th March, 1980.

¹⁷ M. Azizul Haq, "Bangladesh Police - Its Organizational Pattern and Emerging Role in the Society" Administrative Science Review, Vol. IX, No. 3, Sept. 1979, p. 110.

Griffin, identifies that like many other poor Asian countries Bangladesh is passing through a tense period of "rural crisis" associated with severe "agrarian crisis". These are - a. random shocks of food crisis, b. high population density with poor economic growth rate, c. stagnation of agricultural production, d. alarming increase of relative, inequality and e. absolute impoverishment. Not only that Griffin further concludes with the present socio-economic structure there is a little chance that poverty will diminish significantly merely by accelerating the growth of production.¹⁸

Mohiuddin Alangir¹⁹ further draws out a schema of class analysis and the severe trend of social polarization process in Bangladesh from a historical perspective.


From a Marxist conceptual background, Mohiuddin Alangir identifies four historical epochs each representing a particular social formation. These are - i) primitive communal, ii) feudal, iii) colonial, iv) semi feudal and colonial within each epoch three different social groups are identified. These groups are composed of various classes which are the product of the prevailing mode(s) of production. Group A represent the classes whose members are able to obtain a sustained increase in their level of well being in absolute a relative sense within the given epoch. The Group B compared of classes whose members are unable to maintain their position in the Welfare scale and experience a decline in their position. It is this group that merits particular attention in terms of analysis of the "Below Poverty level Equilibrium Trap". Finally the third group, which

¹⁸ Keith Griffin, op. cit. p. 361

¹⁹ Mohiuddin Alangir, op. cit. p. 86

is a hybrid group between the first and the second consists of the classes whose members do not demonstrate any consistent upward or downward trend in the welfare scale over a sustained period of time. This group is identified as group C. They may very well be indentified as the dominant, dominated and the middle groups within each epoch.

Mohiuddin Alamgir identifies present Bangladesh class analysis as "semi feudal/semi colonial" where Group A includes the semi-colonial forces, the bourgeoisie (national and comprador) including commercial, agricultural, industrial and financial elements and the upper crust of professional and civil bureaucracy. Group B includes poor peasants, agricultural labourers, the proletariat, the lumpen proleteriat, petty professionals and low paid fixed income group. Group C includes the petty bourgeoisie.



In the above Diagram, as presented by Mohiuddin Alamgir, time is represented along the horizontal axis and per capita income or some other indicator of social welfare is shown along the vertical axis. F represents poverty line and F represents the famine line. The vertical lines decide the time horizon into relevant historical epochs. Curve A, B and C represents the historical trend of the identified groups. C maintaining a "somehow" balance with the poverty line while B struggles for its existence standing from below poverty, to almost famine in the historical context of Bangladesh. While it is markable A getting a confident and gradual rise with the span of time and thereby the gap between A and C is widening with days and shows an indication of the growing antagonism between the members of A and C and also sharpening the underlying contradictions between them.²⁰

²⁰ Ibid, p. 89

RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES AND ITS
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICA-
TIONS : A REVIEW:

This section of the report aims to assess some of the on-going rural development programmes in the light of their achievements during last few years. Particular focus has been given on socio-economic and structural impact of those programme. For this purpose some selected programmes have been taken for review and this includes Rural Works Programme (RWT), Thana Irrigation Programme (TI), Accelerated Crop Production Programme (ACPP), Agricultural Extension use of HYV, Comilla Cooperative etc. It is also reviewed how these programmes have brought change in socio-economic and political life of the rural mass in the poverty stricken country of Bangladesh. This section also aims to analyse the impact of these programmes in formation and development of elite and power structure in rural Bangladesh.

Rural Works Programme (RWT): The objectives of rural works programme of 1960's as enunciated by national authority apparently had elements of employment creation, income generation, asset creation, popular participation, development of local sponsoring and leadership; and the early experiment, to a certain extent, demonstrated that the villagers and their leaders were able to identify their problems in the field of rural development, for priorities, mobilize resources and labour and procure materials for implementation of their plans. This is not to blue the fact that both in early and later years, fixation of project priorities reflected very closely the

interest of village power elite groups.¹ It was also clear that not much concern, more appropriately no concern was marked for income distribution. Hence, in the absence of any attempt to redistribute productive assets in rural areas, pursuances of productivity raising activities under the RWT implied and objective of raising the income of asset owning households more than that of nonowning households. The political objectives of the programme was even more subtle. In fact efforts were made through this programme to shift the power base from the urban to rural areas. The concerned regime looked upon the RWT as an instrument for strengthening its hold on the working of the basic democracy system and later the converted version of the Basic Democracy System² in the rural Bangladesh it ensured complete alligience of the rural power personalities. The RWT inevitably pumped the resources into the hands of these rural power personalities. To meet the consequent change in land holding pattern in the villages the land ceiling was raised from 33 acres to 125 acres. Rashiduzzaman and Rehman Sobhan aptly shows the development and growth of newly emerging "surplus farmers" who constitute a distinct economic class in the social framework of the rural areas and who are directly or indirectly the organizers or beneficiaries of the Rural Works Programme.³

¹ Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programme and Rural Development in East Pakistan, Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 74.

² During the new regime (1975 and onward) the local govt. ordinance 1978 was passed. Which changed the prior ordinance of 1973. Infact the 1976 ordinance was almost the true copy of Basic Democracy Ordinance of 1960.

³ M. Rashiduzzaman, Village Government in East Pakistan, Dacca: Bureau of National Reconstruction 1968, p. 97.

There is a little concern for cost efficiency of the programme and the project priorities and decisions are frequently prepared even to tolerate low social returns where private return is higher. Moreover it is also observed that since the payment of the programme are mostly in kind i.e. wheat there is a considerable scope of misappropriation of resources too.⁴

The experiences have resulted in the growing concern that different programmes, particularly on rural works programme which is a major component of the rural development programme in Bangladesh, are deliberately aimed at improving the condition of the poor majority, could indirectly have the opposite result. As the major powerful demands whether the rural communities monopoly the additional income streams accruing from investments and irrigation infrastructure and the provision of inputs usually on a highly subsidized basis.⁵ Consequently the rural society of Bangladesh shows a growing polarization process.⁶ Though there is a limited data and information is available on transaction of land even it gives clear indication that the beneficiaries of the imported technology of agriculture and newly developed physical infrastructure are using their higher incomes to consolidate their position, buying out marginal farmers, and, sometimes forced sales of land in periods of natural disaster along with their

⁴ A.Z.M. Obidullah Khan and Shahed Latif, "Rural Development in Bangladesh: A Country Status Report" paper for the National Seminar on Rural Development in Bangladesh". March 27 - 31, 1979, p. 14.

⁵ Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, "Who Gets What and Why: Revenue Allocation in a Bangladesh Village, Dacca: BRAC, nd. pp. 183-85.

⁶ Borhanuddin Khan Jahangir, Differentiation Polarization and Confrontation in Rural Bangladesh, Dacca: Center for Social Studies 1979, pp. 167-68.

informal institution of credit and debts. The weak position of the tenants in a land hungry society, the problems of giving access to credit and fertilizer to those without any form of collateral, and the disincentive consequences of the sharecropper being obliged to hand over half or more of the product.⁷

Since 1974 the activities of rural works programme further supplement with a few programme named Food for Works Programme.

RWP and FWP differ in the method of approval of projects and also the composition of committees at various levels are different. Donor agencies are much more closely involved in the process of programme administration of the 'Food for Work' programme. That has even been the case in the past with the rural works programme. The structure of organization and planning in both the RWP and 'FWP' programme theoretically leaves a great deal of flexibility at the local level and there is a little scope for local level desires to be reflected in the process of decision making. At this level however village social and political structure exerts considerable influence. Kinships, factional and class based groupings interact with one another in the process of decision making at the local level. Whatever may be the over-riding considerations, the will of the dominant class prevails. Other members of the society receives benefits either through kinship and factional lineages or through spread effects of the projects.⁸

⁷ Mohiuddin Alamgir, The Experience of Rural Works Programme in Bangladesh, Bangkok: UN ESCAP, 1977, p. 15

⁸ Swapan Adnan, "Social Structure and Implication for Resources Allocation in a Chittagong Village". Paper presented in the Integrated Rural Development, Nov. 29 - Dec. 3, 1975, at Institute of Engineers.

At the local level (union), only the members of the project committees, more specifically the Chairman and secretary are involved in vital decisions regarding project preparation, selection and implementation. Through their close link with the thana level officials they are also able to influence the decision of the project approving authority. However, this is more true of the RWP than the 'FWT' programme although in the case of the latter it is conceivable that the local dominant groups will not promote projects that do not serve their interest directly.⁹

Roads benefits which is perhaps the major contribution of RWP were largely reaped by surplus farmers to the extent they were able to avoid sacrifice of land for the purpose of road construction. By and large, given a very skewed distribution of landholding, it was only natural that the distribution of private benefits from the Works Programme projects was unequal. In this sense during its peak years the RWP has probably laid the foundation for increasing income inequality in later years. Rural income inequality (measured by Gini-coefficient) declined between 1963/64 and 1968/69 but increased substantially by 1973/74. The improvement of the first period may have been associated with increase wage income in rural areas attributable directly and indirectly to the TWT. The distribution of landholding did not change during this period but deteriorated sharply in the latter period. Among others, RWP projects increased land value which hurt the interest of small farmers as they become increasingly alienated from landholdings. Along with this the newly emerged landowners,

⁹ M. Alangir, Ibid., pp. 38-39.

who also started gaining control and local political institutions were becoming more powerful force in local, regional and national politics.¹⁰

In fact, total neglect of the distributional consideration is clearly inconsistent with the objective of mobilising masses through RWF. The majority can be mobilised only to the extent that RWF provides new outlet for employment, anything beyond this is unlikely to be achieved under the present socio-economic environment. Actually, people are quite suspicious and given their historical experience they have every reason not to be

motivated by the local and national leadership behind such a new programme or idea. Their reaction is quite rational in that they are reluctant to put anything at stake (including labour contribution) unless they are assured of the return. The organisers of the RWF failed to appreciate this point and therefore, the broad objectives never reflected equity considerations adequately.

Comilla Cooperatives:

The Comilla programme of rural development and administration grew out of an examination of past failure in rural development. The Union Multipurpose Cooperative Societies (MPCS) failed due to weak organizational structure and internal discipline. Rather than generating sufficient internal capital to become self-reliant, the MPCS followed the path of the former cooperatives and became government channels for subsidised credit. Akhter Hamid Khan, the Director of the new Academy of rural development, defined the task ahead in the following terms:

¹⁰ Steve Jones, "An Evaluation of Rural Development Programmes in Bangladesh" The Journal of Social Studies, No. 6, Dec. 1979, p. 63.

"Economically the village is explosive, for socially the old leadership and the old institution are now completely helpless. In some cases they have totally disappeared. Introducing new skills and new implements and new methods will require a complete reorganization of the social and economic structure of the village,"¹¹ and the device chosen to carry out this heavy burden is a network of cooperatives. The Comilla cooperatives, in fact, were designated to avoid the weaknesses of the previous organizational attempts.¹²

The organization of the Comilla Cooperatives consists of a two-tier structure: (a) the village based primary cooperatives called KSS (Krishi Samabaya Samity or the Agricultural Cooperative Association) and (b) their federation at the thana level called the Thana Central Cooperative Association (TCCA).

The basic philosophy behind the approach was a commitment to individual farming based on the private ownership and operation of land and other means of production. As A.H. Khan, the man who conceived and led the programme during its first decade of development, put it in a recent appraisal:

"There was no intention of putting an end to private possession. On the one hand we cherished the qualities of family farming. We admired the

¹¹ A.H. Khan, "The Basic Principles of the Comilla Programme" A Speech given at the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development on 13th Feb. 1963.

¹² A. Abdullah ed. al.; "Agrarian Structure and IRDI Preliminary Consideration; The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. IV, April 1976, No. 2 pp. 221 - 222.

the Japanese family more than the dispossessed commune workers.¹³ Virtually the programme took the existing distribution of landownership as given and made no attempt to bring about any change in it.¹⁴

The fundamental weakness of the Comilla approach is that it does nothing directly for the small or landless farmer. Membership is restricted in practice to farmers operating at least half an acre of land. Clearly the landless would in any case have no interest in joining, since they need neither tubewells nor improved seeds, and are not likely to be good credit users, or to have any productive use of credit.¹⁵

To summarize, the vision of those who conceived and launched the Comilla experiment was one of protecting and developing the small and middle peasants who owned and rented the land. The programme recognized that the bigger landowners would not be excluded from its benefits which consisted of credit and material inputs supplied at prices lower than would have to be paid otherwise. The originators of the programme recognized that "they were the servants of a conservative government whose political, economic or administrative orientation we could scarcely change".¹⁶

¹³ A.H. Khan, "The Comilla Projects - A Personal Account" Paper present at the Workshop Development from Below, Addis Ababa, October, 1973.

¹⁴ A.R. Khan, "The Comilla Model and the Integrated Rural Development Programme of Bangladesh: An Experiment in Cooperative Capitalism", World Development, Vol. 7, 1979, pp. 397-398.

¹⁵ Abu Abdullah ed al. Ibid, p. 225

¹⁶ A. R. Khan, *ibid.* pp. 398

Various studies which evaluated the achievements of the Comilla cooperatives in relation to the stated objectives, presents a mixed picture. It should be noted that Comilla involved a large investment of human and financial capital which is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere although one hopes that beyond the experimental stage similar results can be obtained at a much lower marginal costs. This puts a big question mark on the prospect of a broad based agricultural and rural development in Bangladesh through the Comilla Model of Cooperatives. On the basis of available evidence the achievements and failures of the Comilla cooperatives can be summarised as follows:¹⁷

(a) On the production front it is observed that rice output increased significantly between 1960-61 and 1971-72. Rate of growth of output during post HYV period was higher than pre-HYV period, both again higher than national average. This was brought about by a combination of shift in cropping pattern (in favour of HYV boro), increase in irrigation acreage, increased availability and application of modern inputs (fertilizers). It may be added that "input surplus" also increased significantly between 1961 and 1972.

(b) Members of cooperatives inclined to non-members and among members the greatest beneficiary was the large farmer group (owing above 3.33 acres). This can be attributed directly to the differences in the degree of access to HYV technology (seed, fertilizer, water) and credit.

¹⁷ M. Alamgir, "Some Aspects of Bangladesh Agriculture: Review of Performance and Policies" Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. III, July 1975, No. 3, p. 292 - 293.

(c) Because of structural reasons, the Comilla Cooperatives were unable to help the landless labourers and small farmers. Movement in money wage rate in Comilla area does not indicate a significant trend upward as compared with other areas, neither is there any evidence of lowering of seasonal variations in money wages.

(d) The record of capital accumulation and repayment has been very poor. The achievement of the objectives of self-reliance has remained a far cry.

(e) Within the cooperative membership, small farmers are apparently under represented.

(f) Cooperative leadership has been dominated by medium sized better off farmers. Besides in recent years there has been infiltration of some part-time farmers, e.g. traders, businessmen and contractors.

(g) Credit operation was found to be dominated (in terms of percentage of total loan taken by any group) by the members of the managing committee who were in turn found to be ^{the} largest defaulters.

Performance in terms of output can be judged reasonably accurately by examining the trends of production and yield per acre of rice which covers well over 90% of cropped area. The annual average rate of growth over the decade ending in 1973-74 was nearly 8%, well over twice the rate of growth for the country as a whole. By 1973-74 the yield per acre was 1.17 metric tons, i.e. 144% above the average of 0.48 tons for the country

as a whole. Even in the early 1960's the yield of rice was higher in Comilla than the average for the country. But the difference was of the order of 20%. In 1973-74 the yield per acre in Comilla Thana was nearly three quarters of that in Japan and below the national average of only Japan, Korea, and Taiwan of all the Asian countries .¹⁸

The reason behind the success of the Comilla experiment, was firstly the charismatic leadership of founder director, Khan a hard driving and dynamic personality who continuously infused his own enthusiasm into the project and at the same time had the right combination of diplomacy and tenacity - to obtain funding for the Academy internally and externally (particularly from the Ford Foundation) and the later to defend his programme from bureaucratic jealousies and manouvers at other echleons of government. Secondly, there has been a continuous focus on self-criticism from within. Despite the usual bureaucratic pressure to report only achievement and progress to higher levels, and perhaps even greater pressure to report success to the Ford Foundation and to development oriented circles abroad, Khan adamantly insisted on rigorous self criticism. Accordingly, the published reports and studies made by Academy personnel of all aspects of the experiment have been full of self-examination, criticism and questioning. Along with this self-examination existed an equally strong willingness to change and modify virtually anything to make it better, a distinct difference from the rigidities that characterize South Asian bureaucracies generally, as well as those elsewhere.¹⁹

¹⁹ A. R. Khan, Ibid., p. 399

²⁰ Harry W. Blan "Rural Development, Class Structure and Bureaucracy" World Development 1978, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 66-67.

Since growth was not common to both the members and the non-members of the cooperatives and, perhaps, higher for the later and we must look for an explanation into factors common to both groups and, additionally, determine why the effect of such factors was somewhat lower in the case of the general members. Such factors must be found in the extremely rapid expansion in the supply of inputs associated with the high yielding variety of rice at a price that reflected very high subsidy by the government. With the setting up of the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development in Comilla and the emergence of a powerful lobby in support of channelling resources into the rural areas, Comilla thana was able to attract a disproportionate amount of tube wells, pumps, tractors and other inputs to which both the members and the non-members had access. Indeed, the irrigation and related programmes elsewhere in Bangladesh had been going on without the framework of the Comilla type of Cooperatives. The eagerness of the government and of the dynamic leadership of the movement to turn Comilla into a "showpiece" result^{ed} in an abundant supply of the underpriced inputs in the command area of the experiment. It is in this abundance of crucial inputs, rather than in any intrinsic ability of the cooperatives to mobilize the latest resources of the members, that one must seek an explanation for remarkably rapid growth in production.²⁰ (A.R. Khan, *ibid*, p. 402).

One of the main reason for choosing the 'Comilla Cooperative' as the model for rural development in Bangladesh was that it was seen as probably the most effective and politically least difficult way of strengthening

²⁰ A. R. Khan, *Ibid*, p. 402

the position of small farmers. Small and medium farmers were thought to share an identity of interest opposed to that of the bigger landlords, traders and moneylenders who control the rural economy and, it was hoped, it would be able to bypass these larger farmers and cooperative together to increase agricultural production. This optimism proved unfounded. Large landowners have come to dominate the cooperatives, a process which cooperation between small and medium farmers has been unable to check.

By the early 1970's medium and large farmers attracted by the high profits to be made from HYV cultivation and the increased amount of credit variable came to dominate the KSS/TCCA system throughout the country with the large farmers in nearly all the important management positions. In Natore and Gaibanda TCCAs in 1973 for instance the average landholding for KSS managers (Chairmen, managers and model farmers) was 6.16 acres compared to 4.20 for KSS members and 2.83 for non-member. 78% of managers owned more than 2.5 acres compared with only 35% of the general population. A similar picture has been found in Gomilla Kotwali Thana and in a twenty thana study conducted by IRDI. The cooperatives had become in the words of the planning commission 'Closed Club of Kulaks'.

The domination of large farmers is even more marked at the Thana Central Cooperative Associations that allocate credit and other inputs between KSS, and are the UKKs between the primary societies and national funds. The boards of the TCCAs are elected by the village level KSSs and invariably comprise large and powerful farmers. In Savar Thana, Dacca District where the researcher did the fieldwork, all the TCCA directors

came from the 2% of households owning more than 8 acres of land. The situation is even more marked outside the Dacca, Comilla minifundist belt. Where, in areas such as Dinajpur, Rangpur and Rajshahi the distribution of landholdings is far more unequal and very large farmers owning upwards of 15 acres dominate the cooperatives.²¹

A study of 32 managers of village cooperatives, as reported by Mannan²² shows that 17 of them hold more than 5 acres of land, another 8 held between 3 and 5 acres, while only 7 held between 1 and 3 acres of land. (None held less than one acre or more than 9 acres.) The average size of their holdings was 5.06, whereas the average size of holdings in Comilla Thana is 1.86 acres. In a study of four successive managing committee of the ACF, it was found that, of 12 elected members in each committee, the number having farming as their only occupation fell gradually. It was 8 in the first committee, 5 in the second committee, 3 in the third committee and 2 in the fourth. Those who were farmers as well as contractor on the other hand, had no representation in the first committee, but they were in a simple (though not absolute) majority in the last committee, with 5 members. It should be mentioned that contracting is a full time job, and if these people were farmers they must have been very casual ones.

²¹ Steve Jones, "An Evaluation of Rural Development Programme in Bangladesh" The Journal of Social Studies, Vol. 6, Dec. 1979, p. 64-67.

²² M.A. Mannan, "A Survey of Landless and Destitute in Comilla District, Comilla: BARD, pp. 11-12.

In a study of societies which had defaulted on loan repayment it was found that 47.42 percent of the loans were utilized to release mortgaged land, 8.07 percent for buying land, and another 36.7 percent for leasing land. It was found that managing committee members were getting an inordinate share of total loans. Of 30 members who responded to a questionnaire, 11 were managing committee members, and they consumed 65 percent of loans issued to this 30. Sixty seven percent of the overdue loans were defaulted by Directors of Managing Committees.

Since none of the managing committee members mentioned earlier had more than 9 acres of land in their possession, it would clearly be misleading to say that the surplus farmers are taking over the cooperatives. What we seem to be witnessing is a further differentiation among the middle (self sufficient, not surplus) farmers, thus time with respect to function rather than landed wealth. Perhaps the surplus farmer does not yet feel threatened, as he might if the Comilla experiment really were to be replicated nationwide. Again A.H. Khan's diagnosis and warning should be kept in mind:

"Neither were we surprised when the bigger capitalist - the large proprietors, money lenders and traders - tried to capture this potentially dangerous movement. Initially we worked quietly round them, suggesting not that they should be excluded from the new cooperatives, but that they should not be allowed to dominate, as they had dominated the old cooperatives. It was no easy job. The rural elite, hand in glove with the urban elite, wielded greater economic and

political power. It was going to use that power to defend its privileged position". The time may soon come when "working quietly round them" will no longer be possible".²³

It was these middle peasants, a 'Kulak Class',²⁴ one might say, that gained control of the cooperatives in Kotwali Thana. These larger farmers have also been better able to avoid repaying their loans, a pattern that confirms the widespread evidence showing that the big farmers are generally in the third world also the big defaulters. A academy study of 1969 shows, of 30 defaulting cooperatives in Kotwali thana found that 54% of the overdue loans were for less than Tk. 500/- comprising 15% of the total undue money, while 6% of the overdue loanees were in the taka 250 + bracket, with 28% of the overdue money. Along another dimension the author of the study found that the per capita overdue loan for the members of the managing committees of these coops. was Tk. 1534, but for ordinary members it was only tk. 93. A later study of a sample of individual defaulters in Kotwali thana conducted in 1975 founded on landholding size and found that 15% of the defaulters owned one acre or less of land, compared with 52% of the all rural families in the thana, while 49% of the defaulters held over 2 acres of land as against only 22% of rural families overall. What happened in Kotwali thana was that the larger farmers had taken over control of the credit societies in the rapid expansion of the programme during the latter 1960's. The Comilla Cooperatives then began to resemble

²³ A.H. Khan quoted from Abu Abdullah et al. op. cit. pp. 230-231.

²⁴ F.J. Bertocci Elusive Village: Social Structure and Community Organization in Rural East Pakistan, Michigan!, M.S.U., 1970).

those elsewhere in South Asia, in that these large farmers were able to still the loans to themselves and were able to get away, will defaulting on those loans. That they were able to do this was a function of their position in the rural economy as surplus farmers, as money lenders and as patrons in the patron client system.²⁵

The management of the cooperatives was formulated by farmers who, by Comilla standard were large. The benefits were largely concentrated in the hands of the rich and the powerful. The 'medium' farmers also appear to have made some gains'. But relatively little gain accrued to the small peasants and none directly to the landless. The naive view, that benefits would trickle down to the poorest does not seem to have been correct. The course of real wages was no different from what it was elsewhere in Bangladesh.

The cooperatives failed to distribute the subsidized resources efficiently. Although the efficiency of utilizing the pumps and tube wells was greater than elsewhere in Bangladesh, one could not claim that a desirable absolute standard was achieved. The credit programme virtually broke down by the middle of the 1973 as a result of default mainly on the part of the rich and the powerful. The cooperatives not only failed to present this background but, being controlled by those who were powerful enough to get away with non-repayment, actually brought about such a breakdown.

²⁵ Harry W. Blair, op. cit. p.69.

The whole exercise constitutes a lesson in the fertility of 'cooperation' in a situation of inequality. The programme accepted the unequal distribution of land as an initial condition and hoped to work around the big farmers not by arranging that 'they should be excluded from the cooperatives', but by hoping that they would 'not be allowed to dominate. The lesson of the Comilla experiment is that it is impossible to prevent the big farmers from dominating cooperatives if they are allowed to enter them. In fact is impossible to prevent them from dominating if they are allowed to exist.²⁶

THANA IRRIGATION PROGRAMME (TIP):

In the early 1960s, various efforts were mounted to utilize low lift pumps during the dry boro season (that would pump water from rivers and streams into adjacent fields). In the 1967-68 year these efforts were consolidated into the TIP, and the number of pumps and tube well increased from less than 4000 to well over 32,000 six years later. The idea behind the TIP was that farmers in a village with the potential for boro crop irrigation would come together, form a group, elect a managing committee, and apply for a pump tube well. If the group was lucky, the government would grant a pump tube well (the capital cost of which was completely subsidized) along with substantial subsidies for operating it. Once it was in operation, the government would try to convince the group to turn itself into a cooperative on the Comilla model with regular savings, weekly meetings, training and credit.²⁷

²⁶ A. R. Khan, op. cit. p. 414

²⁷ Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Manual on Thana Irrigation Programme, (Dacca: Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives, 1972), pp 18.

The Comilla academy has conducted extensive surveys and studies of the TIP over the years and some of their findings bear brief examination. The members of the 398 groups surveyed in the Academy's 1974-75 study owned an average of 18.26 acre each, while group managers held on the average over 6 acres. About two-thirds of the group converted into co-operatives, but within them only 46% of the members had joined the co-operatives, meaning that only these farmers were eligible for loans. The scheduled weekly meetings were in fact held in over 70% of the groups only monthly, or in 65% of the groups less often for the managing committees of the groups, meetings were held with about the same frequency. Efficiency in terms of land irrigated was at least rather modest; whereas the low lift pumps had been watering 35-38 acres per cusec at the beginning of the 1960s, the average in 1973-74 was less than 21 acres per cusec, while the average was much more worse in 1974-75 when the acreage fell to 18.26 acres only.²⁸

What happened to the pump groups was that the larger farmers had taken them over as Chairmen, Managers and Members of the Managing Committees and had directed most of the loans and also possibly most of the water to themselves. It is hard to understand why less than half of the group members would have joined a cooperative in which a few taka in share deposits would get them five to ten times that amount in loans unless, as one study on the TIP identifies that some of the groups are composed

²⁸ Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Evaluation of Thana Irrigation Programme in Bangladesh 1974-75, Comilla: BARD, 1977.

of farmers in a quasi tenant, debtor relationship to the group manager.²⁹ Similarly, there would be little reason to have regular meetings in groups where participation was substantially less than equal. One finds in the TIP a sizeable patronage operation for distributing funds to rural rich, though different types of subsidies and credit.³⁰

A deep tube well cost US \$ 5,000 irrigates 30 to 100 acres the ownership, organization and the control of water is much with the same rural elites. Only rich landlords can afford to buy and install a deep tube well. However, even the few who could afford such an investment so far have very seldom made it, since the government heavily subsidizes the deep tubewells.³¹ In a report to the Bangladesh Government, Per Arne Stroberg shows, on the basis of his research work in North-Western Bangladesh, how a few rural elite persons can use, control and manipulate a deep tube well co-operative group for their own interest and business.³² It is observed that the key persons in a co-operative are the Chairman, the Manager and the owner of the land where the deep tube well is sunk. In many areas one person can combine two or three of these positions. Generally these persons are the biggest landowners in the area to be irrigated. The social political, economic and administrative power of these control one or a few persons can have personalities can be understood from the procedures and ways the deep tube well is obtained.

³⁰ Betsy Hartman and James Boyce, "Bangladesh: Aid to the Needy", International Policy Report, Vol. IV, No. 1, May 1978, p. 6.

³¹ Ibid, p. 7.

³² Per Arne Stroberg, Water and Development - Organizational Aspect on a Tube Well Irrigation Project in Bangladesh, 1977.

Normally there is a great demand for deep tube wells in an area. The people in government at control and local levels are well aware of the situation and exploit it to their advantage. It is not unusual that a large amount of bribes will have to be paid to them by the rich people who start the cooperative. If a rich farmer realizes through his control with government people that, there is a chance for getting a deep tube well, he will collect the necessary number of signatures of the 'cooperative members' and start what after is a cumbersome bribing process. Many of the co-operative members may be uninformed about their membership and sometimes the servants and members of the rich farming family are registered as separate members with their own plots of land under the area to be irrigated. One important consequence of this way for acquiring a deep tube well is that linkages between urban and rural elite are strengthened, and that the resources produced in the rural areas are transferred, in the form of bribes to the government officials in the urban areas. The rich farmers who have had the expenses for the bribes inform the members of the co-operative of this, and demand compensation for providing water to the others. A normal way was to collect payment from the members is to demand 150 to 300 tk. for irrigating one bigha of land, or to ask for a certain percentage of the crop; 15 to 25% is common. In this way the rich farmer(s) can recover their expenses in a multiplied percentage and the water from the deep tube well becomes a major source of incomes i.e. they start a new platform of business. It is difficult for members to protest against the payment for water. Judicial powers and government officials in urban areas cannot effectively be called upon to enforce that, the

cooperative should run according to cooperative principles. The rich farmer(s) who control the cooperative and the deep tube well not only has a source of income; the deep tubewell also functions as a means to control who will get water. In this way water becomes a "resource" which the farmers who control the deep tubewell can refuse to persons who they wish to damage even if the persons have land which is close to the pump tube well, the operator of the tubewell can be instructed not to allocate water to these plots. A physical characteristic of the deep tubewell is that water can be distributed well or poorly to different plots through technical manipulation. It is an easy observable fact that among plots which are equally accessible to irrigation water, some are green with rice while others are brown and barren. This can be because payment has not been made at a rate what the managers/chairman expected, or may be the payment is not regular or partial. There may be many supportive reasons for the controllers of a deep tubewell to give water, even if the owner of the plot is willing to pay. The person may be a rival or an 'enemy'; also the controllers may refuse irrigation water to an owner of land in order to impoverish an already poor man, and through this method eventually buy up his land. A patron-client type of relationship can often develop between the controllers and users of the water, where the user not only pay an economic compensation for the use of water, but also have to show loyalty in other fields, for instance, to give political support in a village and union affairs. The more support shown, the more certain the client can be

to receive other famous, adequate water supply, fertilizers and pesticides; goods which for poor people can be obtained only on the black market at high prices.³³

ACIP (Accelerated Crop Production Programme):

The ACIP originally aimed at self sufficiency in rice in the end of the first five year plan period (1973-78) by introduction of HYVs for all three crop, aman, aus and boro. In contrast to other rural development programmes, the organizational and disciplinary principles of cooperative and group efforts are given less weight in the ACIP.

The major problem with the ACIP is that it threaten to create (contribute to a growing) inequality of wealth and opportunity in the rural areas and by the basis for polarisation of the landed and the landless, or at least surplus and marginal farmers. This possibility arises from three factors:

- a) There is no built in protection mechanism against speculation and land acquisition that arises from early success.
- b) The crop production programme gives primary opportunity to the farmers who already have cash and/or relatively less in need of credit.

³³ Eirik G. Jansen, "Choice of Irrigation Technology in Bangladesh: Implication for Dependency Relationship Between Rich and Poor Farmers", The Journal of Social Studies, Vol. 5, 1979, pp. 73-75.

(c) Its coverage is found by the high cost of and lower impetus for spreading similiar programmes to all farmers.³⁴

It is also observed that preferential access to irrigation and credit persist significantly and a new class of "waterlords" have emerged through this programme who monopolize their control over pumps and tubewells and holds influence over the associated distributory mechanism.

Again, government launched the Tk. One Hundred Crore credit programme in February 1979 to accelerate its different agricultural programmes. A sample survey conducted the total amount of institutional agricultural credit disbursed has increased from tk. 295 million in 1973-74 to 870.8 million during 1976-77, an increase of around 350%. But the increase has substantially and primarily benefited the large and medium farmers. The cost and return studies (1976-77) indicate that small farmers and share-croppers entirely depend on non-institutional sources where the interest rate varies from 80 to 100 percent against 10% for institutional credit. The two basic components of the ACPF are the irrigation groups i.e. the institution enable small farmers to manage, collect and share the cost of water and the credit programme which provides low cost funds for initial investment. But factual both the components are highly been manipulated and a distinct domination by the larger landowners are marked. The subsidized credit programme functional^{ly} speaking generates a complicated process and place the money lender in a very advantageous position bear

³⁴ A.Z.M. Obaidullah Khan and Shahed Latif, "Rural Development in Bangladesh: A Country Status Report", paper presented in the National Seminar on Rural Development in Bangladesh, March 27-31, 1979.

the programme need of the or ACCF. It is therefore, assumed that ACCF would be preferred firstly by the farmers having adequate surplus, and marginal farmers who depend on the non-institutional credit and thus the consequence would be same like many other previous experimentation. More specifically we can't expect something radical or different in ACCF so far its operational performance is concerned.

Existing Agrarian Structure and
High Yielding Variety (HYV):

With the existing structure the attempts towards agricultural modernization brought little or no success, as land is cultivated basically in small peasant holdings, most of the cultivators have little surplus to invest in agriculture. Finance from outside sources are very expensive, and is risky in times of crop failures. Most cultivators are averse to the application of modern inputs mainly because of two reasons. (i) The return on investment of these inputs with non-institutional credit does not match the expectation of the farmers, rather they face recurring loss, (ii) it is risky to cultivate with modern inputs as the input supply is outside the control of the cultivator. It is again observed that fertilizer application is very low in traditional crops, which seemed to be apparently economic to the farmers. Fertilizer application is high in High Yielding Varieties (HYVs), mainly because HYVs require high dose or application and so once one adopts HYV he is compelled to use fertilizer in high doses.

35 Mahbub Hossain, "Present Agrarian Structure and Agricultural Growth in the Post-Partition Period" in Studies in Rural History, Dacca: Bangladesh Itihas Samity, 1979, p. 128.

Thus, the adoption of HYVs marked to be limited due the present agrarian structure. HYVs are more profitable than the traditional crop varieties but the former require substantially higher application of each inputs than the latter. It was observed in a study in 1974 that the same cultivator spent on an acre of land taka 330/- for material inputs and 324/- for hired labour for growing IR-8, in comparison with tk. 139/- and 228/- respectively for local aus. It is obvious that only the surplus farmers and those who have adequate access to modern credit mechanism can afford to adopt and yield the HYVs. BIDS Survey 1974 found that small owners and tenants having holdings upto 3.5 acres could utilise only about 20% of the irrigation facilities. But the rate of utilisation was almost 100 per cent for big land-holdings farmers. Further the proportion of irrigated land used for growing HYVs shows a distinct difference i.e. 41 per cent of owner farmers and 18 percent of tenant farmers reported to have used irrigation facilities. All these, therefore, generate considerable doubt about the possibility of spread and expansion of HYV in Bangladesh in the context of present agrarian structure.

One can argue further that the use of modern inputs can be increased by earning a high price of agricultural products i.e. by giving price incentive. But this may not work with the present structure, since a large majority of cultivators are, deficit farmers who actually buy a few months family needs from the open market buy selling their labour and

³⁶ Mahbub Hossain, Agrarian Structure and Land Productivity in Bangladesh, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, May 1977, p. 28.

during the price hike period these cultivators have to spend a considerable proportion of their non-farm income for purchasing foodgrains for their subsistence, and this cuts into their surplus cash to procure and purchase water, fertilizer and new seeds. High agricultural prices will no doubt give incentives to surplus farmers, who are in fact, the minority in Bangladesh, to increase investment and produce more, but the deficit farmers who are the majority will reduce their investment. The net effect may not be favourable rather this will have an adverse effect on total income distribution in rural Bangladesh.

Again there are strong dis-incentives towards organisation of production on capitalist lines. Land holdings in Bangladesh are excessively fragmented and scattered over a wide area. This is true not only for small holding but also for bigger ones. In 1960 about 75% of holding over 12.5 acre size were fragmented in two or more plots.¹ Thus private initiative and investment in tubewells or powerpumps did not make significant economic impact because the services of tube well/power pump could not reach the adjoining cultivators who basically belong to a subsistence level. Thus the spread and market of these services remained limited and uncertain. Moreover, during monsoon a large proportion of land remain waterlogged, they could be utilised only for a part of the year, which further reduces the profitability of such investment. This compares unfavourably with the expected high returns from purchasing land and renting it to a sharecropper, and giving consumption loans to deficit cultivators.

³⁷ Government of Pakistan, Census of Agriculture 1960. Vol. I, East Pakistan, Dacca: 1960.

³⁸ Mahbub Hossain, op. cit. p. 130

One need to take note of the fact that introduction of HYV has not made any significant impact on the real wages of agricultural labourers and it seems to have been accompanied by a period of increasing inequality in rural income and landholding and also of increasing incidence of poverty. Available evidence for Bangladesh is inadequate to make any definitive statement regarding the distributional implication of HYV technology. Although there is some scope for debate the balance of evidence seems to indicate an inverse relationship between farm size and rate of adoption of HYV technology measured by the proportion of land devoted to HYV which is a more meaningful indicator in terms of assessing the impact of the new technology on output and employment. When this is combined with the other finding from the BIDS survey that the percentage of farmers adopting HYV is highest among owner-cum-tenants (63% as opposed to 48% for owners and 25% for pure tenants), one gets an explanation of the above finding. This is so because largest concentration of the owner-cum-tenant group occurs in the 0.5 to 5.0 acres range (69%) and also because they are able to distribute a part of the risk associated with the adoption of HYV to the landlord. However, since tenant operated area accounts for only about 18% of the total cultivated area, it is not surprising that the overall expansion of the HYV acreage has been rather limited.

M. Alamgir; 'Some Aspects of Bangladesh Agriculture: Review of Performance and Evaluation of Policies'. Bangladesh Development Studies; Vol. III; July 1975, No. 3, p. 275-6.

Again the loss of production of local transplanted Aman (T. Aman) is much less than that of any of the HYVs and the total cost borne by a farmer producing local T. Aman is roughly around tk. 442 per acre. Again the market price for Aman crops is also higher than that of a crop of HYV.

Thus, from the very rough ideas of cost and benefits it can be safely deduced that if all the disguised costs like those on labour, plough bullocks, etc. that are domestically supplied, are calculated then the net gains from or employment of resources on the local crops are expected to be higher than those from a similar employment of resources on HYVs. A farmer whose resources are small and limited would, therefore, be rational enough to show his choice in favour of the production of crops of local varieties. It is only if he is endowed with additional resources that he may go in for a sound choice in the form of the production of HYVs fed on irrigation water specially in the boro or aus season.

Hence we can conclude that the new production programmes with HYV have a definite rich farmer bias. It can also be concluded that the big farmers will not be interested to produce a second crop if they are to bear the full cost of production rather they will find it more profitable to continue with their feudal practices of lending out land, money and crops to the rural poor, and will extract as much surplus as possible in return.

M.A. Hamid et al. Impact of Irrigation Projects on Agricultural Productivity and Income Distribution in Bangladesh: Some Preliminary Findings, Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. I, 1977. p. 35.

PART - III

AGRO-MANAGERIAL ELITE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
A CASE STUDY OF BIRULIA UNION

ELITE IN RURAL BANGLADESH: AN OVERVIEW

Study of Elite formation and development in the context of a country like Bangladesh is significantly important. The systematic study of the formation and dynamics of the rural elite would be much more interesting, stimulating and thought provoking in the current socio-economic and political milieu of Bangladesh.¹ It is also true that studying elite formation and behaviour has become the centrifugal tendency of the recent studies of political science and sociology both in occidental and oriental societies.²

An indepth study of the elite reflects more or less the changing dynamics of the societies, its "consistencies and inconsistencies", its social stratification, the nature and extent of representativeness and correspondingly its characteristics, type and nature of socio-political affiliation, commitment and roles.³

Elites, particularly the rural elites are dual personality in a country like ours and they monopolize power both in the political and social institutions.⁴ Elites are in fact, the "power pools" in the

¹ Abu Mahmood, "Begetting a new "middle class ruling elite" Holiday November 25, 1979.

² Harold Laswell, et al. Comparative Studies of Elites, (Standord: University Press, 1952), p. 17.

³ Robert S. Robins, "Political Elite Formation in Rural India: The Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Election, 1949, 1956 and 1961". The Journal of Politics, No. 4, Vol. 29, No. 1967, p. 839.

⁴ Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton: Mifflin Company, 1964), p. 126.

rural areas, who control and monopolize political, economic and social power and is also better known as "vote banks" in the rural habitat.⁵ The systematic analysis of elites and elite formation may also be used to clarify the structural problem of the degree and nature of elite integration within a country. Moreover a rural elite is considered to be the "change agent" and "innovator" of modern appliances particularly in agriculture.⁶ During recent years elites in the transitional society are emerging from the different functional deffracted structures of the developmental programmes which Riggs called "Deffracted Elites" and their recruitment is perhaps on the basis of their "achievement".⁷ Therefore, in a developing country, which is to say transitional society, there is a variety of elites.⁸ They handle administrative, political, social and economic authority almost simultaneously.⁹

Though the twentieth century has been very much the century of the common men still societies posses a special group of poeple of uncommon men who are small in number, but highly influencial as personality and

⁵ V.M. Sirsēkar, The Rural Elite in a Developing Society: A Study of Political Sociology, (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1970), p. 4.

⁶ Kirsten Westgaard, "Mode of Production in Bangladesh", The Journal of Social Studies, Vol. II, Aug. 1978, p. 27.

⁷ Fred W. Riggs, *op. cit.*, p. 126

⁸ K.R. Silvert, "Leaders, Followers and Modernization in Latin America" in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (ed) Comperative Politics, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1964, pp. 649-658.

⁹ Santiago S. Simpas, "The Role of Local Elites: The Philippine Experience" in B. Abben Rahim Mokhzani (ed) Rural Development in South East Asia, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1977, p. 107.

change agents and are technically termed as elite.¹⁰ The elite is the relatively small, advantageously organized group, which, legitimately or not, exercises authority, lays claim to exercise it, or believes it should exercise authority over the other group which it maintains on relationship, usually of a political, cultural, and economic by nature. In fact the notion of elite, suggest something of feudalism, something of aristrocrate pretensions, something of the claim of a few to be better than other people. They are the "floating cream in a can of milk." But this social supremacy may have different sources of base; these include tradition, heritage, economic status, social right, cultural-political linkage and background, technical competence, education and religious commitment and affiliation.¹¹

Elite in a developing country normally lead and facilitate change or oppose and hinder new developments which disturbs their vested interest. But their talents and initiative are crucial in getting new ideas accepted in the society. But interesting they also try to maintain a continuity with the past and to preserve the social integration and also acts for change and development.¹² They are in fact, mediators, communicators, interest articulators, creators and disseminators of culture, preserver, of values and standard makers of the general population.¹³

¹⁰ H.E. Stenfort Kroese, The Elite in the Welfare State (Cambridge, Man, Schenkman Publishing Co. Inc., 1965), p. 24.

¹¹ F. Bachrach, Theory of Democratic Llitism, London: London University Press Ltd., 1969, p. 82.

¹² H. E. Stenfort Kroese, op. cit. p. 155

¹³ M.A. Mannan, Communication and Flanned Change in Rural Bangladesh, Comilla: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, pp. 22-30.

It is a general characteristic of the elite that its supremacy, in any terms, imposes some tasks upon it. These tasks either right or as a duty, include those of determining the density of others. By accepting these tasks every elite takes upon himself a certain burden of social responsibility.¹⁴

But the present section of this study the definition of "elite" would albiet different from the above discussion. Here the term elite encompasses a new set of personalities who are innovators, change agents and extension workers for agricultural development. They are of course in most cases belong to landed gentrybut at the moment they emerged as a new "functional personalities", they are the Chairmen, Directors, Model farmers, Executive Members and General Members of the irrigation groups in rural Bangladesh. They are the office bearers of the village based cooperative group known as Krishak Samabai Samity (KSS) and are considered to be the "Elite" for the next few sections of these study.

But prior to the indepth role study of these functional "elite" it would be more interesting and worthy if we make a short review of the existing social stratification in rural Bangladesh and the corresponding class position of the traditional elites and these "functional elites".

¹⁴ H. E. Sterfert Kroese, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

The sources of power in rural Bangladesh are twofold, internal and external and the politics in the villages are therefore influenced by both internal and external forces.¹⁵ The internal sources of power in

rural Bangladesh are the ownership and control over land, high status, physical and intellectual capabilities of the individuals, social service, agencies of the distribution of agricultural inputs and relief, contact with high administrative and police officials, and such other factors which are responsible in giving one the base of power from outside the village. In fact the village politics or the distribution of power in rural Bangladesh is "partly regulated by, and partly independent of, larger excapsulae ting political structure".¹⁶

In other words, it is the control over human and material resources which help one to accumulate power in the Bangladesh village. Nicholas¹⁷ identifies the bases for political action are of two kinds, material and human. Material resources are the economic factors machines, foods, lands that an individual can use in social action to help bring about the outcome he desires, while a human resources is a man, some aspects of whose behaviour is under the control of the resource holder.

- 15 Anwaruliah Chowdhury, "Emerging Leadership Pattern in Rural Bangladesh" paper presented in a seminar held on 7th May, 1979, under the auspices of the Department of Government and Politics, Jahangirnagar University, Dacca.
- 16 F.G. Bailey, "Para-political System" in Marc J. Swarts (ed) Local Level Politics, London: University of London Press, 1963, p. 181.
- 17 R.W. Nicholas, Rules, Resources and Political Activity" in Marc J. Swarts (ed) Local Level Politics, London: University of London Press, 1969, pp. 300-301.

The material resources in rural Bangladesh are land and money. Through control over land and money, and control over men, using manipulative skill one acquires and maintains power in the villages. Perhaps the irrigation elite (i.e. the Chairman, Manager, Model Farmers, Executive Members) possess in most cases both the control instruments particularly the latter.

In most Bangladesh villages power is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals who may be termed as power-elite or power wielders. These handful of individuals are politically dominant exercising political control and influence over the rest. The rest of the villagers remain outside the domain of power and politics. Almost all the power elite enjoy the highest status in the villages and belong to the khandan category of Muslims. They maintain social distance from other low status groups like Girhastas, Kamlas, etc. Khandans still now kept their monopoly over the socio-political and economic institutions at the village level. But very recently, particularly, after the liberation of Bangladesh. A few Girhastas has also emerged into the power group in rural Bangladesh.¹⁸

The power wielders again belong to the landowning class and lease out their lands to the sharecroppers. There is no power-elite from among the sharecroppers and landless labour class. The landownership of the

18 Robert Stevens, Gonilla Rural Development Programmes - Results from East Pakistan for International Testing, (Michigan: Michigan State University, 1971), p. 45.

Girhasta power-wielder is recent. This emerging girhastas elite managed landed property in the village in the course of last two, three decades. These girhastas has posed a challenge to the traditional leaders particularly after the liberation struggle. They have emerged as the alternative personalities. When villagers want to get things done, they go to the these village Cooperative Managers, or Chairman or any other executives instead of the traditional leaders or the elected political personalities.¹⁹ The co-operative institution, therefore, gave birth of a new kind of leadership in the villages.²⁰ Not only that these agro-elites used to manipulate local established power structure and managed to get considerable concessions in socio-political and economic issues.²¹

This newly emerged girhastas are the product of the "cooperative capitalism" of Akhter Hamid Khans Comilla Academy and its different models of mid 60's.²² These girhastas are now in many occasions sharing the village power and authority with the traditional elites. Mannan identifies "due to many internal and external factors the influence of the traditional leaders is gradually wanning and many of their functions are being taken over by the emerging leaders".²³ This idea is also

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 49.

²⁰ Md. Manjurul Alam, Rural Power Structure and Cooperatives in Relation to Modernization of Agriculture - A Cooperative Case Study of Five Villages, in M. Ameerul Haq (ed), Exploitation and Rural Poor - An Working Paper on Rural Power Structure in Bangladesh (Comilla: BARD, 1976) p. 221.

²¹ Ali Haidar, Strengthening Financial Base of Grass Root Government in Bangladesh: A Case Study of Birulia Union Parishad - A U.G.C. sponsored research (Dacca: University Grants Commission, 1980), pp. 26-29.

²² Azizur Rahman Khan, op. cit., p. 397

²³ M. A. Mannan, op. cit., p. 39

supplemented by Anwarullah's recent work where he points out that the rural social and political institution has undergone a drastic transformation" and the old political set has been replaced by a new political setup after the emergence of Bangladesh. Anwarullah further identifies the characteristics of these elite and writes "the new rural elite, emerged mostly from girhasta people nourished, matured by corruption, favouritism and nepotism and thrived in the exploitation of the rural masses".²⁴ They are mostly uneducated and many of them are village touts. One can easily get their favour by showing mere allegiance to them.²⁵ Reorganization of local government acts, rules etc. permitted this newly emerged elites, having a link with the party in power, to compete for local government institutions at grass root level,²⁶ and many of them returned in the Union Parishad poll of 1974 and also in 1977.²⁷ But the dominance of the traditional elites could not be wiped out due to their socio-economic status in a "semi-feudal" society of village Bangladesh.²⁸ This condition in the rural society of Bangladesh is perhaps well analysed by F.W. Riggs when he writes about the feature

²⁴ Anwarullah Chowdhury, op.cit., p. 109.

²⁵ Shapan Adnan, "Social Structure and Implication in Resource Allocation in a Chittagong Village". Seminar Paper presented on Integrated Rural Development Seminar, Institute of Engineers, Nov. 29 - Dec. 3, 1975.

²⁶ Just after the liberation of Bangladesh a Collaborators Acts was passed which barred the traditional leaders, who are traditionally the supporters of Muslim League - the party which was supporter of Pakistan Occupation Army, to participate any political activities.

²⁷ A.H.M. Aminur Rahman, "Adequacy of the Union Parishad in the Fulfilment of Its Role", The Dacca University Studies, Vol. XXIX (Part A) 1978, pp. 71-72.

²⁸ Abdun Noor, "Pattern of Rural Leadership in Bangladesh", Bangladesh Political Studies, Vol. I, 1978, p. 73.

characteristics of the prismatic societies. Riggs comments, "it appears to be a chaotic and continually changing system of overlapping communities and strata, based on contradictory norms, which may be called 'kaleidoscopic stratification'".²⁹ And this contradictory structure of the society and the consideration of economic necessity seemed to have made factional and kinship loyalties and perhaps such resulted in impediments to an egalitarian and just distribution of resources which have been offered by the government in the name of rural/agricultural development.³⁰ Consequently both the apparatus of state and the system of localized authority and norms have demonstrated remarkable helplessness to face the blunt misappropriation of assets and resources.³¹

Social power balance process now in rural Bangladesh is in a strain and a competition between the landholding tradition elites and the growing landed elites is more visible.³² Adnan in his study shows the basis of social allegiance. About 25.9% of the villagers show their allegiance due to the kinship affiliation while about 23.5% have their allegiance due to the economic dependency. Hence, if we examine the power parameter from social allegiance, it reveals that there is no significant variation in between the traditional elites and newly emerged landed elites who provide

- 29 F.W. Riggs, op. cit. p. 187
- 30 John F. Thorp, Power Among the Farmers of Daripalle: A Bangladesh Village Study, (Dacca: Caritas, Bangladesh 1978) p. 102.
- 31 Mosharrat Hossain, "Nature of State Power in Bangladesh", The Journal of Social Studies, Vol. V, Oct. 1979, p. 35.
- 32 Geoffrey D. Wood "Class Differentiation and Power in Bondokgram: The Minutist Case" in M. Anwarul Haq (ed), op. cit., p. 133.

the economic dependency. The bases of economic loyalty to some extent is the unscrupulous abuse of power and to some extent on various forms of economic dependence which includes - a. the provision of loan in cash, kind or both, b. provision of the factors of production such as land, cattle, implements, c. distribution of relief, d. distribution of commodities on the basis of licence and permits, e. distribution of HYV inputs, location of deep tubewell, distribution and share of irrigation water supply of seeds, cooperative loans, supply of fertilizer and insecticide etc.³³

These newly emerged agro-elites along with the traditional elite maintain a better link with the higher political personalities those are in power and also tactfully manages two way operational link with local bureaucracy. Blair points out that since the bureaucracy has an ensured and dependable linkage with both "macro level class structure" and "micro level class structure" it would inevitable work in favour of the big farmers and socially dominant agro-elites.³⁴ Hence a safe conclusion can be drawn that the agro-elites from many perspective, a decisive and influencing variable for examining and understanding the rural the rural dynamics of Bangladesh.

³³ Shapan Adnan, op. cit.

³⁴ Herry W. Blair, "Rural Development, Class Structure and Bureaucracy in Bangladesh, World Development, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 78.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AGRO-MANAGERIAL ELITE IN BIRMIYA UNION:

The agro-based cooperative executive can also be termed as Agro-Managerial elite, because they not only manage the irrigation matters but also they play vital role in resource distribution like loan distribution, fertilizer distribution, HV distribution and other economic activities in the village. They play, in most cases, very significant role in village economy as shop keeper, fertilizer distributor. Besides these agro-managerial elites are also important members of village social institutions like primary school committee, Masjid Committee, Madrasa Committee, Many of these elites are also involved in different side business and have positive linkage with the urban merchants. The Agro-Managerial elites are now-a-days playing important role in the salishi and in the "Village Court".

They also act as important source of credit and financial support to the village during the recent years. The Agro-Managerial elite normally maintains very positive link with local bureaucracy and works as a local extension worker under the guidance and blessings of the thana based officers. They act as local expert on technical issues. Not only that many of the villagers have reported in many occasions that these agro-managers are the disseminator of new ideas on agricultural development. Since these elites are modernely educated and are mostly politically conscious and have frequent communications with urban

Salishi - Village bench of social judgement.

places they have a sharp idea about both local and national issues. They can charm the local hat's Char Dokan (Tea Stall) with their very nascent and lucrative information regarding national politics and he emphatically outlines possible consequence over the issue and its impact upon common villagers. In many occasion they work as "hidden consultant" of the local pahl i.e. the U.P. Pahl. Moreover, they maintain a definite link with their urban relatives and friends. In most cases they act as the local guardian of the properties of their urban relatives. Villagers take their advice help and advise about their land dispute land record problem, rental problem etc. The elite, mostly the Managers, helps the common villagers to solve their land problems in the kachari, and for that matter he collects a good amount of Salani, Cha Panir-Khorach, Ghoosh etc. He is expensive for services, but he does not deprive the common villagers. The elite is a regular visitor to the Thana. He knows the Boro Daroga, Choto Daroga, Subedar pretty well and in many cases by name. They normally, use the elite as a local informer. The elite can play a very important role as a bail man. The thana officials/^{have}faith upon some selected agro elite.

Besides the round police who move from village to village used to stay at their residence in many occasions. The elite, in most cases, is the founder organizers, of the Gram Rakhi Dal (Village Defence Party)

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- Salani - a fees/amount illegally offered to some one for any work.
Cha Panir Khorach - an amount spent for tea and snaks.
Ghoosh - Bribe.
Boro Daroga - C. C. of the Thana
Thana - Local Police Station.
Choto Daroga - Second in Command of the Thana.
Subedar - Non-Commissioned Police Officer.

which is formed under the auspices of local thans and looks after the law and order situation of the village.

The elite is an outstanding personality of his locality and maintains proper channel and linkage with the local Member of Parliament (MP) and such linkage is stronger normally when the MP belongs to the party in position. They play a definite role during the political campaign. It is interesting that, prior to election they keep balance relationship with all the contestants. Since the elite is a polished and to some extent a sophisticated person and also moderately educated (most of them can go through or normally can read the Dainik Ittefaq (a national Bengali daily news paper in the local hat). They keep a very humble and faithful relationship with the influential personalities of the village who are residing in the town either as businessmen, politician or member of the bureaucracy. Agro-Managers use these persons as his power booties and usually take maximum concession, facilities, support, help, cooperation from them in all possible matters.

The Agro-Manerial elite is a solvent and an enlightened personality in his habitat. In most cases it is observed that they have a subsidiary profession other than agriculture. Mostly they used to act as broker of land, middlemen of any financial/property transaction. Some of them have shops in his own house, or in the village bazar or in the local hat, few of them are engaged in seasonal business, some others have extra income from rickshaw, baby taxi etc.

The subsidiary profession also includes, in some cases, his consultancy service on manla-mokoddama. Moreover, there is no proper record of the cost on fuel, and maintenance, the profit and balance of the irrigation group accounts are nicely manipulated by the agro-elites which also provide a noteworthy margin of income.

All most all these agro-managerial elites are surplus farmers and during the recent years they have started shifting their resources from land to some other sectors. Since there is a fear among them that there might be a chance of nationalization of land, or people may snatch out their land or any political unrest among the landless labourers might affect their property, some of them therefore, investing in some consuming sectors like building brick houses, educating sons and daughters keeping in the urban places, purchasing cycle and motor cycles, keeping a Dokan/Chala Ghor in the thana bazar or local hat, purchasing rickshaw, baby taxi, tempo and also in some cases truck and buses.

These agro-managerial elites are intelligent and smart. They can impress any person and can speak impressively in any occasion with any personality. Apparently they are quite concerned about the welfare betterment of the common people. Interestingly the common villagers find him more accessible, acceptable and intimate to him. The elite keeps good link

Manla-Mokaddama - Civil/Criminal Suits.

Chala Ghor - A Tin roof shop

Dokan - A shop

with different relief organization, and used to manage relief goods for his locality in collaboration with the Union Parishad. But in most cases the Agro-elite normally takes the total initiative to get those relief goods. And virtually he takes the credit of his achievement showing the villages his range of capacity in bringing the relief goods which the U.P. could not manage without his initiative. These extra ordinary activities give him a "Charisma" in his sarrounding and perhaps for that matter the elite expects to get formal social recognition and authority. It is therefore, observed that many of these elite took part in the last U. P. election and many more were potential contestant of the election. It is also true many of them are at present potential for the next election. One of the Agro-Managerial elite comments "I am working, investing, and waiting for the next election" The other comments "obviously the next turn is my turn, Soburcy Meoa Foley (waiting gives reward).

AGROMANAGERIAL ELITE AND THEIR ROLE IN
IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT IN BIRULIA UNION:

This section of the report deals with the empirical findings of the field work undertaken at the Birulia Union of Saver Thana of the District of Dacca. The findings are based on the data collected from 14 Deep Tube Well irrigation group at that Union. In each irrigation group some selected respondents were interviewed through a designed questionnaire (for detail see the methodology and sampling section of Part I). The respondents were the Managers, Chairmen, Model Farmers, Managing Committee

Members, General Members. Besides these members of the irrigation group, some non-members those who have arable lands within the command area of the Deep Tube Well were also interviewed in a separate schedule.

This section of the report has six sub-sections and these are arranged in such a sequence that the role and function of the elites in managing rural development activities particularly the management of irrigation affairs is revealed vividly. Section one deals with the socio-economic and political background of the respondent elites, section two describes some relevant informations about the irrigation groups, its membership, command area, its composition and development. The detail information regarding the initiation, project preparation, administrative procedures of the project initiation is discussed in section three, while section four evaluates the general management of the group and a critical assessment is also made in the same section. Section five narrates the economics and expansion of the irrigation management and correspondingly the final and concluding section six details the internal politics and dynamics of irrigation management. All these sections are fed with statistical data and information, so far possible, and a focus was maintained to stand with logic, information and relevant data in favour of the hypothesis of the study.

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE AGRO-MANAGERIAL ELITE IN BIRULIA UNION:

It is obvious that the human behaviour and function are the product of his socio-economic and political background and his immediate environment. Age is a significant variable and that contributes significantly in manipulating human function, roles and involvement. It is observed in the study, that relatively younger people have occupied the key position of the irrigation group. The following table I shows the age distribution of the Irrigation Group executives, general member and some other persons who have arable land within the command area of the Deep tube well.

Table - I

Age Structure of the Irrigation Group Members
and Non-Members within the Command Area.

Age Group	Chairman	Managers	Managing Committee Members	General Members	Non-Members
Less than 30 years	-	7.14 (1)	5.72 (4)	4.28 (3)	12.86 (9)
30 - 35	-	21.94 (3)	14.28 (10)	17.14 (12)	27.14 (19)
35 - 40	-	50.00 (7)	12.86 (9)	25.72 (18)	22.86 (16)
40 - 45	14.29 (2)	14.28 (2)	30.00 (21)	31.43 (22)	25.72 (18)
45 - 50	21.43 (3)	7.14 (1)	14.28 (10)	15.72 (11)	5.71 (4)
50 & above	64.28 (9)	-	22.86 (16)	5.71 (4)	5.71 (4)
Total:	100.00 (14)	100.00 (14)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)

The table reveals that the chair person of the irrigation group are mostly aged personalities. There is a definite concentration of age i.e. about 65% of them are found to be above 50 years of age. It is also observed with none of the Chairman reported to be less than 40 years of age. It therefore, concludes that aged persons are preferred to be the Chairman of the group. Moreover, it is also seen these aged personalities mostly belong to the traditional families having huge landed property. He acts simply as a "gravity person" and functionally these Chairmen has no assigned responsibility other than presiding the irrigation group meeting which is very much informal by nature and also very infrequent. But the most important personality of the group is the Manager. It is observed that about 78% of the managers are under the age of 40 i.e. comparatively younger people are holding the post of managership of the group. Not only that a significant number of the managers i.e. 28% of them are under the age of 35 only.

Hence it is obvious from the table that the management maneuverity of the irrigation system requires the skill, devotion and active participation of the younger people. While again in case of membership of the executive committee there is almost an even distribution of age but the concentration is shown in the age group of 40-45. A significant percentage i.e. 22.86% of the members of Management Committee belong to the higher age group i.e. above 50 years. More comprehensively we see that about 67% of the Executive Members belong to the age group of 40 years or above. It, therefore, reveals that comparatively senior

and aged village personalities opted for the executive membership of the irrigation group. There is no definite age concentration among the general members of the irrigation group but like other numbers here too, we observe that mid age farmer are more participative. About the non-member farmers, those who have land with the command area of the scheme, it is observed that most of them are relatively younger. About 61% of them are under the age of 40 years and a very few farmers are there who belong to the age group of 45 and above who did not join the group.

Education:

Most of the irrigation group members are illiterate and of them it is significant that irrigation group manager in some cases found to be more enlightened in comparison to other co-members. It is observed in the study area that the significant majority of the irrigation group Chairman are illiterate and the same trend is also observed in all other categories of membership excepting the managers where only a few are found to be illiterate. It is markable that about 71% of them atleast have primary or secondary education. Also few of them are Matriculate and College final degree holder. But in case of those non-member the rate of illiteracy is not that sharp and of them about 47% have either primary or secondary education. (for detail see table 2 in the Appendix).

The following table shows further, the land ownership distribution of the executive members of the irrigation group along with the ordinary members. Besides, it also reveals the ownership pattern of some selected non-members of the group with a comparative corresponding national distribution.

Table - 2

Distribution of Landholding of the Irrigation Group Executives and members and selected non-members with corresponding national land holding distribution.

Acre	Chair- man	Manager	Managing Committee Members	General Member	Non- Member	National Distribu- tion*
Less than 1 acre	-	7.44 (1)	7.14 (5)	11.43 (8)	15.71 (11)	53.4
1 acre to 3 acre	-	21.43 (3)	22.86 (16)	44.29 (31)	54.28 (38)	28.5
3 acre to 5 acre	14.28 (2)	28.57 (4)	42.86 (30)	38.57 (27)	18.57 (13)	9.6
5 acre to 12.5 "	57.14 (8)	42.86 (6)	20.00 (14)	4.29 (3)	5.71 (4)	7.1
12.5 acre and above	28-58 (4)	-	7.14 (5)	1.42 (1)	5.71 (4)	1.3

* Data taken from the Land Occupancy Survey of 1977.

It is clearly revealed from the above table that the Chairman are the mostly landed gentry and corresponding the managers stands to second. While the managing committee members clustered around the landholding bracket of 3 to 5 acre. The land holding distribution of the general

member shows that relatively they are land poor. It is also significant that a good number of non-members i.e. about 30% of them have more than 3 acres of land, but they are outside the irrigation group and consequently from all the facilities. The table gives a comparative picture of national landholding pattern and the landholding in the study area. It is observed that the concentration of landholding is much higher in the study area in comparison to national average. But in case of big farm size of 5 acre to 12.5 acre the distribution of study area particularly for the general members and non-members shows a lesser percentage. But again in case of 12.5 acre and above the percentage distribution is pretty high corresponding to the national average. On an average the table shows that the study area in general is rich in terms of land holdings. Only a few hold less than 1 acre of land while the national average figure is alarmingly high.

Annual Income:

It is also observed that the annual income of the Chairman and managers are found to be significantly different from the rest of the group members. The Chairman are mostly the big farmers and belongs to higher income bracket. None of them have their annual income less than taka 20,000. In case of the managers the distribution of annual income clusters around in between Tk. 10,000 to Tk. 30,000. About 71.42% of the managers belong to this income bracket. Similarly the income distribution of the Managing Committee members show that majority of them

(i.e. 70%) belong to the same income bracket like the managers. It is interesting to note that the non-members are comparatively richer in comparison to general members of the group. Not only that some of the non-members reported to have higher income than that of the managers and managing committee members. But surprising enough that they are kept out of the irrigation group. (For detail see table 4 in the appendix).

Professional/Occupation Background:

The irrigation management elite are mostly big farmers having large farm land. The Chairmen are exclusively big land holders and mostly have no other side profession where he directly participates but in many cases he has an extra source of income from the local bazar, rental of the rickshaw, baby taxi and truck and buses (in one case). He normally manages this either by his sons, close relatives or any local pet persons. The managers are almost in all cases had dual profession. Agricultural activities are his side profession while he is mostly engaged in some other non-agricultural professions. He may be a local school teacher, a supplier of vegetables to the big markets, contractor of UNICEF Tube Well digging programme, local fertilizer distributor, Deed writer, petty businessman in the local hat or thana headquarter, a shop keeper in his locality, land broker, family planning worker, relief worker of the international relief agencies. A few managers (two in number) found self-employed through managing their own country boat, rickshaw, and baby taxi at Savar bazar. Besides these it is also observed that managers are engaged in the

side business of jack fruit trade and hording and whole sale traders of vegetables, which is one of the important cash cultivation of the study area. The Managing Committee members and general members of the group are genuine farmers and excepting a few none have any other sources of income other than agriculture. The non-members are too, primarily marginal farmers but quite a good number of them reported to have reasonably land holdings, and some of them are engaged in small trades like timber sawing, timber auction, managers of khash fallow land for fishing, brick field, and also none of them found be the broker of land and work as the local executives of the newly developed housing societies nearly Savar proper.

Family Size and Nature:

It is observed from the empirical survey that the concept of joint family relationship is not that significant in todays Bangladesh. About 90% of the respondent, excepting the Chairman, show that they belong to single family while, it is noteable that a few number of Chairmen who constitutes about 28.57% of them still have joint family. We can correlate such finding with the traditional back ground of the Chairmen in the rural habitat. (For detail see table V in the appendix).

The following table shows the family size of the irrigation group management and members. The table illustrate that the norm of small family is yet to be popular in the rural Bangladesh. The Chairman and the Managing Committee Members usually have a big family in comparison

to other. This may be due to their richness both in land ownership and annual income. Also it is marked that the non-member respondent have big families like the Chairman and Managing Committee members.

Table - 4

Distribution of family size of the executive members and General Members of the Irrigation Group and the selected non-members.

No. of Family Members	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member	Non-Member
Less than 4	-	14.18 (2)	19.43 (8)	5.71 (4)	11.43 (8)
5 to 7	21.43 (3)	35.71 (5)	30.00 (21)	41.43 (29)	15.72 (11)
7 to 9	42.86 (6)	28.58 (4)	44.28 (31)	27.14 (19)	48.57 (34)
9 & above	35.71 (5)	21.43 (3)	14.28 (10)	25.42 (18)	24.18 (17)
	100.00 (14)	100.00 (14)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)

Mode of Production and Use of Agricultural Labour:

Family members and seasonally hired agricultural labour is the modal practice among the significant majority of the farmers. 61.43% of the Managing Committee Members deploy his own labour, or his own labour along with family members or both aided with seasonally hired labour, while such percentage for the general members is 85.71% and for the nonmembers is 82.91%.

Table - 7

Mode of Production and Use of Agricultural Labour.

	Chairman	Member	Managing Committee Members	General Member	Non Member
Self	-	-	10.00 (7)	22.86 (16)	17.18 (12)
Self and Family members.	7.14 (1)	7.14 (1)	20.00 (14)	28.57 (20)	24.29 (19)
Self, family members and labour.	7.14 (1)	14.29 (2)	31.43 (22)	34.28 (24)	31.43 (22)
Self and labour	14.29 (2)	14.29 (2)	22.86 (16)	12.86 (9)	18.57 (13)
Family member and labour	30.00 (7)	57.14 (8)	11.43 (8)	1.43 (1)	4.28 (3)
Labour	21.43 (3)	7.14 (1)	4.28 (3)	-	4.28 (3)
	100.00 (14)	100.00 (14)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)

It is remarkable that the non-members are comparatively much more dependent upon hired labours corresponding to the general members. It seems that they are by no means disadvantaged farmers to accept the irrigation group membership and other facilities if we accept the capacity of hired labour use as a parameter again if we examine the following table we will find the practice of pattani is quite popular in the study area. 14.28% of the Managers, 25.71% of the Managing Committee Members about 30.00% of the general members have taken lands from others as pattani while of them, 28.57%, 7.14%, 4.28% respectively leased out land to other as pattani. But the Chairmen normally do not take rather give pattani to others.

Table - 8

Pattani/Barga given/taken by the Irrigation group members and selected non-members.

	Chairman	Member	Managing Committee Member	General Member	Non Member
Pattani (+)	-	14.28 (2)	25.71 (18)	30.00 (21)	8.57 (6)
Pattani (-)	28.57 (4)	28.57 (4)	7.14 (5)	4.28 (3)	15.71 (11)
Barga (+)	-	7.14 (1)	5.71 (4)	15.71 (11)	41.42 (29)
Barga (-)	50.00 (7)	42.85 (5)	30.00 (21)	1.42 (1)	10.00 (7)

Similarly the Chairman in majority lease out their land as Barga. Such percentage is also reasonable higher for the managers. It therefore, reveals both of them either by pattani or barga are quite segregated from direct production process. It is observed that about 30% of the Managing Committee Member, 45% of the general members and 50% of the non-member have taken land from other either as barga or pattani or/both.

Consumption of Credit:

Table 10 (see the appendix) shows that the general irrigators are still now dependent on non-institutional credit. While it is seen dependence on non-institutional sources of credit for the Chairman and Managers are insignificant. Correspondingly it is observed that about 35% of the managers are getting the benefit of institutional credit while such

percentage for Chairman is 14.28%. It is also interesting to note that both the Managing Committee members and the selected non-members show a consistency in terms of percentage of institutional credit consumption (i.e. in both cases such percentage is 5.71). It is also markable that 35.71% non-members are dependent on non-institutional credit which is perhaps the highest. The next dependent on non-institutional credit are the general member (i.e. 25.71%). It is also revealed from the table 11 (see appendix) that 14.28% of the Chairman, 57.14% of the Managers, 39.14% Managing Committee Members, 22.85% of the general members and 12.86% of the non-members have future plan to take institutional credit from any possible formal sources. Besides, excepting the Chairman, all the respondent expressed their option that if need arise they would like credit/loan from all possible non-institutional sources.

Accumulation of Properties
during the last Five Years:

At one phase in our questionnaire we tried to collect some information regarding respondents nature and volume of transaction of both moveable and immovable properties during the last five years. Last five years is taken simply because we intend to see whether there is any significant change in the economic behaviour of the respondent during that period. It may be mentioned here that most of the deep tubewell are installed during the last ten years time. It is observed that the irrigation group members particularly majority of the Chairmen and managers have purchased cultivable land in that period and such percentage is 64.28 and 71.42%

respectively for Chairman and managers. It is marked that the manager shows a higher percentage. The percentage of such purchase for Managing Committee is comparatively lesser to the Chairman and manager but that is significantly high in comparison to the general member and non-members. It is also observed the next highest use of resources is made purchasing agricultural appliances and also for purchasing some other consumers goods/appliances like radio transistor, bicycle, motor cycle, rickshaw etc. It was also noticed that two of the Chairman and one manager of these group have also purchased truck and buses now plying at Dece City and such purchase was made during the last 5 years. One of the manager is planning to install a rice mill soon in his locality. (for detail see table 9 in the appendix). Almost all the Chairman and managers have savings account in the local banks (which is about eight miles from their villages). Banking behavior is not that significant among the other respondents of the irrigation group. Also among the non-members only twelve found to have bank accounts.

Goshti/Bangsha Linkage and Irrigation Group:

The study shows that the Chairman of the irrigation group normally represent a big family group based on Goshti or Bangsha. While such trend is also true in case of the Managing Committee Members. The following table show the distribution of member of family belonged to same Goshti or Bangsha of the respective irrigation group members. For comparative analysis of such distribution of the non-members has also been shown below. The table 12 shows that there is a significant relationship between the member of families in each kin group and their position in

Table - 12

No. of family in Goshti of the members of the Irrigation group and some selected non-members.

	1 - 3	4 - 6	7 - 9	10 - 12	13 & above
Chairman	-	14.28 (2)	21.43 (3)	35.72 (5)	28.59 (4)
Manager	7.14 (1)	42.86 (6)	28.58 (4)	14.28 (2)	7.14 (1)
Managing Committee Members.	4.28 (3)	14.29 (10)	34.29 (24)	30.00 (21)	12.00 (17.14)
General Members	7.14 (5)	54.29 (38)	30.00 (21)	5.71 (4)	2.85 (2)
Non-Members	8.57 (6)	40.00 (28)	39.14 (26)	11.42 (8)	4.28 (3)

the irrigation group management. But it is also true that such trend is not that significant in case of the managers, perhaps in this case some other effective attributes are required. The table reveals that the non-members markedly belongs to small kind groups. This might be a case with many other, which helped the irrigation group initiators to keep them out of the group. Since these non-members obviously have no effective social, power, control and effective say over the activities of the irrigation group initiators.

This is further supplemented with the findings of table 13 where it is seen the Chairmen still considered to be the key person in the village salishi bench. Correspondingly a significant percentage of the managers are reported as important and key variables in such salishi bench. Managing Committee members show more or less same degree of effective participation as the Managers. Since they have equally the big bangsha/goshti linkage it is seen in general that they have shown moderately high degree of interest and participation corresponding to the general members. There is no markable variation among the general members and the non-members in their role and participation in village salishi, but even the general members seem to be much more associated and affiliated with the salishi institution.

Table - 13

Role of the Irrigators and Selected Non-Members in the Village Salishi Bench.

Nature of Role	Chairman	Managers	Managing Committee Member	General Member	Non Member
Very significant role.	64.29 (9)	21.42 (3)	17.14 (12)	7.15 (5)	2.86 (2)
Significant role	14.26 (2)	21.42 (3)	24.29 (17)	15.71 (11)	2.86 (2)
Moderate role	7.14 (1)	35.73 (5)	41.43 (29)	32.86 (23)	34.28 (24)
Participative role	14.28 (2)	14.28 (2)	8.57 (6)	28.57 (20)	37.14 (26)
No role	-	7.14 (1)	8.57 (6)	15.71 (11)	22.86 (16)

Traditional Lower Structure
and Irrigation Elite:

The following table 14 shows an interesting finding. It reveals that in most cases i.e. in the all three wards, excepting one for special reason, the matbars, khandans gets the maximum benefit. In Birulia Union Ward No. 1 there are ⁹ projects and it was reported (from the local sources) there are 21 socially accepted Matbars and all of them belong to Khandan, and 90.47% of them are (i.e. 19 out of 21) associated with the irrigation group either as Chairman, manager, managing committee member or general members. Same is reflected in Ward No. II where such percentage is 79.31%.

Table - 14

Traditional Lower Structure and Irrigation Elite :
A Comparative Table.

Union Ward	No. of Irriga- tion group	No. of Matbar in each Ward	Link in Irrigation Group				% of Matbar Associate with Irriga- tion Group
			Chairman	Managers	Managing Committee Member	General Member	
I	9	21	28.57 (6)	4.76 (1)	42.85 (9)	14.28 (3)	90.47 (19)
II	3	29	10.34	-	37.93 (11)	31.03 (9)	79.31 (23)
III	2	25	8.00 (2)	-	-	24.00 (6)	32.00 (8)
Total:	14	75	11	1	20	18	66.66

But Ward III gives a different picture. It is observed and recorded that there are about 25 socially accepted Matbar and Khandan people in this ward. There are 2 deep tube well in this ward. But both the deep tube well management are being monopolized by a single family. The existing U.T. Chairman and his close relative dominate and dictate the membership, membership of the group. Hence, obviously, the other matbars do not get adequate access to this two schemes. The table show that 2 matbars are holding the post of Chairman of those two groups but both of them belong the U.T. Chairman's direct kin and factional bracket. It is found that none of those Matbars were even taken in the Managing Committee but only 8 of them are accepted to be the ordinary general members. Thus the participation of Matbars in this Ward stand to 32% of the total i.e. 8 matbar out of 25 got chance to get into the group again of them 2 belong to the same faction of the U.T. Chairman. Over and above it is, therefore, clear that the matbars still dominate through their effective participation the organization and management of the irrigation group. But it is also to be marked that except one none of the matbars were found to be interested to work as managers in all these three of the Birulia Union. It therefore, reveals that Managerships need some of those qualities, attributes, devotion and tact which the matbars and Khandan do not have.

II. AGRO-MANAGERS: THE UNCHALLENGED DESPOT:

It is considered, so far the Thana Irrigation Programme manual is concerned, that the manager of the each group would act as the Secretary, Accountant and Teacher-Motivator; a representative and a good farmer. The T.I.P. manual therefore out lined his duties and functions as:

- i) The Manager is the Chief Executive of the group and works under the direction of the Managing Committee to implement the decisions of the committee and general meeting. He remains responsible to the Managing Committee as well as to the group for all his actions;
- ii) He, on behalf of the Managing Committee, produces water distribution plans, estimates the costs and places before the general meeting for approval;
- iii) He collects the charges from members, secures the oil and fuel and other supplies and services for the group members. He fixes water turns, and supervise water distribution, make payment to different authorities, all these he does as the "Chief Executive" of the group;
- iv) As the group teacher he attends the weekly meeting and classes at the TTDC and act as the main channel for the flow of technical information about cooperative organization and water management from the TTDC to the group. He

helps the group members in adopting improved practices, use credit properly and follow production plans and reports deviation to the group meeting for correction;

- v) The Manager is the main link between the TTDC and the group members in respect of necessary supplies and services. He reports problem faced by the group to the experts at the TTDC and bring back the suggested remedies to the groups. He uses the weekly meeting to explain the measures to be taken.
- vi) The Manager, as the group accountant, keeps accounts of all receipts from the group members and of expenditure made on behalf of the group. He issues receipts for all amounts received by him;
- vii) He keeps the proceeding of the weekly and Managing Committee meetings, maintains other registers and records as required by TTP manual.
- viii) He prepares necessary reports for the group and keeps the group informed of all such reports.
- ix) He supervises the work of the pump driver.
- x) As the elected leader of the group, he keeps the group fully informed of his activities and carries out group decision and be bound to vacate his office when the group withdraw their confidence in him;

- xi) The manager may also act as the agent for sale of seeds, and fertilizer in his individual capacity.

Hence it appears, for the list of the roles and functions as per the TIF manual, that the managers seemed to be very important and key personality in organizing, designing the irrigation group activities. His performance seems to be very significant and crucial. His very assignment gives him a dominant status and in reality it is observed that he, in most cases, does not follow any of the rules and rituals of TIF. Moreover in many cases it is reported that he misuses his power and capacity, he does some extra legal activities what the TIF manual do not permit him. Normally he takes the decisions in some cases in consultation with the Chairman, and in most cases by himself. He does not feel to be accountable to the general members or even to the Managing Committee Members. He is blamed by most of the members for his arbitrary management. Though the manager is supposed to keep all the records of the irrigation group, it is seen in reality none of those are kept exactly and accurately. He does not feel to keep the meeting minutes even of the annual meeting. Since he is the manager-cum-accountant, he is supposed to keep all accounts clear and the account book upto date and readily available for all members. But almost all cases it was observed that the cash book or account registers are not properly maintained or the general member can not get them for their own review. In some cases the managers are blamed for gross mis appropriation" of group fund and some of the members favoured the immediate removal of the manager. Though it is prescribed in the TIF manual that the managers would be removed if a no

confidence proposal or specific complaint is launched against him. But the practice is reverse. In our study of Birulia it is also seen the driver is helping the managers to continue his corrupt practice. It is also been mentioned by some of the group members that there is a "sharing of profits" between them. It is interesting to note further that in some cases it is observed that the manager himself acts as the Janichal (pump driver) and this dual role gives him an extra privilege to monopolize the functional/operation control over the ordinary members. Therefore, it reveals from these facts that the managers in some cases individually and again in some case with the support of the Chairman, have become an unchallenged "despot" in the rural Bangladesh. It is supplemented with the fact that not a single manager were replaced in the irrigation groups in Birulia by the common will of the members, rather by the conflict with the Chairman or with influential managing committee member or if the manager himself willingly declined from the post. In Birulia we found only two such cases, in one case the manager was replaced due to the conflict with the Chairman of the Union and in the other case the manager himself declined to continue the post due to his other business preoccupation. The managers normally used to maintain definite link and balance of privilege with the Chairman, Managing Committee members or with some "problem maker" and Azla Hossain (unwanted leader) of the general members. The manager normally selects the Janichal (Deep Tube Well Driver) and gets his decision or choice endorsed by the Chairman and some effective members. In fact the Janichal is functionally the important man next to the manager in a group. He maintains a close

supportive and subordinate relationship with the manager. The joint collaboration of the manager and driver is marked to be very much significant and the driver acts as the best and dependable lieutenant of the managers.

Though the TIP manual dictates the provision of annual meeting and general election at the fag end of the year but no such election do normally held. It is assumed by the members that the manager is not replaceable so long the Chairman and Managing Committee members approve and support him.

It is observed that most of the managers are considered to be a chalak (cunning) and budhiman (intelligent) by the villagers and they are also selected on the basis of their degree of dependence, linkage and subordination to the khandan people and his khamata (ability) to influence them. Normally he is able to read and write, he has in many cases powerful friends and knows the tactics better, in comparison to others, how to proceed through the government bureaucracy. It is also seen some times, the selection of managers are also influenced by kutumb (relatives by marriage). No matter what is the basis, he in no cases acts or reacts against the borelok (rich) peasants and tactfully manages his side and role in local daladali (factionalism).

Management and Performance of the Irrigation Group : The Role of Agro - Managers:

In Birulia Union there are 14 Deep tube well now in operation. Of them 9 are in Ward No. 1, 3 at Ward No. II and rest 2 at Ward No. III. It is seen that all together there are 84 executive members and about 232 general members in these irrigation group. The following table shows the detail breakdown. It appears that on an average the number of members in such irrigation group stands to 22.59 person and it does not exceed more than average of 25 person per group.

Table - 24

Number of Member/Executive Members of Irrigation Group in Birulia Union.

	No. of Group	No. of Executive Member	General Member	Average Member/Group
Ward I	9	54	146	22.22
Ward II	3	18	48	22.00
Ward III	2	12	38	25.00
Total:	14	84	232	22.57

It was planned to get an inventory about the operational efficiency and standard of performance of the irrigation group and particularly the role of the managers. Table 25 below shows the level of satisfaction of the general members and managing committee members on the overall performance of the irrigation group. It appears from the table that the managing

Table - 25

Evaluation of the Performance of the Irrigation Group.

Level of Satisfaction	Managing Committee Member	General Members
Highly Satisfactory	17.14 (12)	7.14 (5)
Satisfactory	25.71 (18)	10.00 (7)
Some how satisfactory	34.29 (24)	37.14 (26)
Not Satisfactory	22.86 (16)	45.72 (32)

Committee members and the general members are not happy with the performance of the group management and operational efficiency. Again such dissatisfaction is markable more vividly among the general members who are relatively under privileged in the group. It is observed about 45.72% of the general members are dissatisfied with the performance while such sentiment is almost half among the Managing Committee members. Again it is seen that the Chairmen are particularly satisfied with the role and function of the managers. Table 26 shows that 64% of the Chairman is highly satisfied with performance of the managers and 21.43% opined that they are satisfied and about 7.41% are somehow satisfied and only 7.14% remained silent in passing comment over the performance of the Irrigation group managers. Even if we consider it negatively, we find that the Chairmen are quite considerable happy with the performance of the managers. It

appears that the relationship between the chairmen and manager is very good and dependable to each other. But the level of satisfaction of the performance, among the Managing Committee members and the general members

Table - 26

Evaluation of the Performance of Managers by the Irrigation Group Members.

	Chairman	Managing Committee Members	General Members	General Evaluation
Highly Satisfactory	64.29 (9)	11.43 (8)	2.86 (2)	12.34 (19)
Satisfactory	21.43 (3)	32.86 (23)	11.43 (8)	22.08 (34)
Somehow satisfactory	7.14 (1)	28.57 (20)	41.43 (29)	32.47 (50)
Not satisfactory	-	20.00 (14)	34.28 (34)	24.67 (38)
No comment	7.14 (1)	7.14 (5)	10.00 (5)	8.44 (13)
Total:	14	70	70	

give a reverse picture. Though the Managing Committee members are moderately happy and satisfied with the performance of the managers but the general members are very critical to the managers and of them 75% are some how satisfied rather dissatisfied with the performance of the managers and 10.00% kept their opinion reserve and it may also be treated as negative view on the performance of the managers. On an average it appears

that about 56% of the members, including the Chairman are somehow satisfied or relatively dissatisfied with the managers while about 34% of them are satisfied or highly satisfied over the performance of the managers.

At one stage the study aimed to bring out the nature of political interest and participation of the agro elites in the Birulia Union. And such interest and participation was measured by the number of the last UP election contestee and their corresponding linkage with the irrigation group. The following table No. 15 shows that in Ward I of the Union there were 9 contestee for the 3 post of U.P. Member. It is observed of them 7 i.e. about 78% are associated with the irrigation group either as Chairmen, Managers, Managing Committee members or general member. Similarly in Ward No. II out of 11 contestant 10 are associated with irrigation

Table - 15

Election Contestee for the last U.P. Election among the Irrigation Group Members.

Union Ward	Total No. of Candi- date in the Union	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member	No. of Can- didate among group candi- date.
I	9	11.11 (1)	22.22 (2)	33.33 (3)	11.11 (1)	77.77
II	11	18.18 (2)	9.09 (1)	54.54 (6)	9.09 (1)	90.90
III	9	22.22 (2)	11.11 (1)	22.22 (2)	11.11 (1)	66.66
Total:	100.00 (29)	17.24 (5)	13.79 (4)	37.93 (11)	10.34 (3)	79.31 (23)

Table - 15.a

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member
	(14)	(14)	(70)	(70)
Percentage of total respondent who con- tested the UP election	35.71 (5)	28.57 (4)	15.71 (11)	4.28 (3)

group i.e. about 91% are irrigation group members. Ward III shows such percentage as 67%. On an aggregate it is seen out of 29 candidates appeared for U.P. poll 23 of them are associated with irrigation groups and the such percentage stands to 79.31%. Of all the contestant 17.24% are irrigation group Chairmen, 13.79% are managers, 37.93% are managing committee members. Again from among the total respondent i.e. 5 out of 14 chairmen appeared to be interested in the last U.P. pole and 35.71% of the chairmen contested in last election. While 28.57% of the respondent managers, 15.71% of the Managing Committee members and only 4.28% of the general members were found to be interested in. U.P. Pole. It, therefore, reveals that other than the Chairmen, the managers seemed to be more interested to attain political power in rural Bangladesh in the recent years.

Not only that table 16 shows (see the appendix) about 43% of the managers have the future hope to participate in the local bodies election while such percentage for the Irrigation Group Chairman stands to

28.57% and 27.14% for the managing committee members but reversely the general member are least interest about the political participation and only 7.15% expect to appearⁱⁿ any future election at local level.

The election result of the last U.P. election also gives an detail idea about the relationship of the political elite and agro managerial elite in Birulia Union Parisad. Table 17 in the appendix shows that in Ward I out of the 3 elected Union Parisad members all of them belong to irrigation group as managing committee members. Same is the case with Ward II where out of 3 U.P. member elected one is associated with irrigation group as manager and two other as managing committee members here to, the participation is cent percent, again in Ward No. III, where we find four election returned one is the Chairmen of the Union Parisad and three other the Ward Member of the U.P. It is observed of these 4 elected 2 are the Chairmen of irrigation groups and 2 are members of the managing committee. That is all the politically elected personalities are associated in different capacities, with the irrigation groups. It, can therefore, be concluded that the power of the village political institutions are in the hand of these agro-managerial elites, Not only that it is also observed that significant number of close relatives of these agro-managerial elites have participated during the last election. Hence, we observe in current Bangladesh political power is being shared by the tradition^{al} power structure with some emerging elites. (see table 18 in the appendix).

Disputes regarding land, land related issues, distribution of family properties, court cases on Batwara namla, false victimization, cases on wrong demarcation and recording etc. are most common features in rural Bangladesh. It is observed in Birulia that quite a good number of physical collision took place due to daladali in terms of water distribution. The nature of involvement in court cases and many other disputes show one's socio-political status and stature in a village habitat. It is observed that in Birulia Union among the irrigation group members 14.28% of the Chairman, 35.71% of the managers, 31.72% of the managing committee members and 27.14% of the general members are in this way or that involved in such cases. (see table 19 in the appendix). It is significant the managers are holding the majority who are involved in cases. Most of their cases are related to Batowara and ejmali cases related to land matters. It is seen the managers who have purchased land during the last few years from the other marginal farmers and that sales was challenged by the relatives of the farmers demanding their right and share over the land and put a Batowara or ejmali namla. This is also partially true for the managing committee members. But in case of the chairmen, cases relating to land matters is not that significant, most of the cases are faujdari by nature. This might have occurred from factional conflict over the control of a land, conflict occurred over the ownership of ejara, khass land etc.

Batowara - distribution of joint family property.
Daladali - factionalism
ejmali - joint family property

It is interesting to note further that managers of the irrigation group are seemed to be most dependable and confident consultant to the villagers on legal issues. About 71.42% the managers found to be reported that they are provide consultancy/advice to the villagers on legal issues, disputes of land, problems relating land records, problem relating preparing the Parcha. (In detail see table 20 in the appendix). In many cases it is observed the managers all the responsibility of the villagers to work for their manla mokoddama in the Sadar and for that matter they used to charge considerable good amount from the villagers.

Gram Rakhi Bahini and Irrigation Elite:

Gram Rakhi Bahini (Village Defence Party) was initiated by the government during the mid seventies to make it possible for the farmers "to sleep without fear of robbers and thieves". The Circle Officer appoints in consultation with the local U.P. Chairman, and O/C of the thana few influential and prominent farmers to form groups of 15 members or more from each villages through out the Union and ^{vice-} versa the thana. Here it is observed that the irrigation group members play a dominant role. Table 21 shows below that the role of the managers is relatively much more significant in comparison to others.

faujdari	-	criminal
ejara	-	lease
khas	-	government owned
parcha	-	land record map

Table - 21

Role of the irrigation group members in forming the village defence party (gram rakhi dal)

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Members
Initiative role	21.43 (3)	28.57 (4)	7.14 (5)	4.29 (3)
Consultative "	35.71 (5)	28.57 (4)	21.44 (15)	14.29 (10)
Supportive and participative role	14.28 (2)	21.43 (3)	27.14 (19)	40.00 (28)
No role	14.28 (3)	21.43 (3)	44.28 (31)	41.42 (29)

It is revealed from the table that 57.14% of the managers took active initiative in organizing the Gram Rakhi Dal and such percentage for the Chairman stands to 56.04%. Hence it is observed that the managers, in the issue where the approach is initiated from outside the village particularly from the bureaucracy gets upper hand corresponding to the other personalities. Through the Gram Rakhi Dal the managers get a extra social prestige and he can also extend and exercise his extra legal administrative power to the villagers. Moreover the Gram Rakhi Dal works under the direct supervision of the round police of the thana and it is also seen the managers have definite link with the local thana in many cases through the Rakhi Dal. In fact the managers of the group in many occasion are preferred by the local administrative authority to undertake local initiatives apart from the Union Parishad authorities.

The competence and effectivity of the agro-managers particularly the extension group managers is marked by their degree of acquaintance with the thana level government officials (TIO's) who are particularly attached with extension works in agricultural and developmental matters. The following table shows the level of acquaintance of the irrigation group members with the respective TIO's. Acquaintance in this case have been preferred to more knowing the officer or his representatives and understanding the functions of the officer and their operative role for the village development or upliftment. It is observed that the managers are mostly acquainted with all important TIO's in some cases such percentages is cent percent

Table - 22

Acquaintance of the Irrigation Group Managers with thana level government officials.

C. O. (Dev.)	Sections Officer	BADC Inspector	BADC Fertilizer	A.T.O.	Thana Co-op. Inspector	Thana dar	Thana Police O.C.
Chairman	21.43 (3)	42.85 (6)	64.28 (9)	28.57 (4)	35.71 (5)	100.00 (14)	21.42 (3)
Manager	57.14 (8)	100.00 (14)	100.00 (14)	85.71 (12)	85.71 (12)	100.00 (14)	35.71 (5)
M. C. Member	14.29 (10)	18.57 (13)	31.43 (22)	14.29 (10)	15.71 (11)	87.14 (61)	14.28 (10)
General Member	5.71 (4)	8.59 (6)	28.57 (20)	8.57 (6)	5.71 (4)	84.48 (59)	4.28 (3)

The managers from the very functional causes have to come across these TLO's. Next to the manager the level of acquaintancy is moderately reasonable in case of the Chairmen, while the general members are not significantly acquainted with the TLO's. It is therefore, reasonably true that by dint of their functional relationship and acquaintancy with the TLO's the Managers used to get extra advantage and privilege what the other members do get at that rate and dimension what the managers got. Moreover such link of the managers made him more effective in his performance corresponding to the ignorance or apathy regarding the TLO's among the common villages give him an extra chance to show his "extra ordinary" capability, and Khamata to achieve and attain the different needs of the group particularly the agricultural inputs and supports. Besides these administrative linkage the managers in many cases maintain a social, political and informal relationship with the local Member of Parliament. Such relationship is also maintained by the Chairman i.e. 64.29% of the manager used to maintain social, political or informal link either with the present M.P. or the previous M.P. while exactly 50% of respondent irrigation group Chairman maintains such relationship. It thus appears that the managers are more active in perspective of maintaining political linkage with higher political authority in comparison to other members of the irrigation group. (For detail see table 23 in the appendix).

We tried to examine and assess the extent of social and organizational accountability of the irrigation group management for its operational maintenance and extension function. It is revealed (see table 24 in the appendix) that about 21.43% of the Chairmen feel that they are little bit accountable while 57.14% opined they are not at all accountable to the general members for any matter. But the managers are technically aware, since they are well informed about TIP manual and rituals, and 42.85% opined that they are little bit accountable to common member, the sense and degree of accountability is not that significant among the common members, they (92.86%) opined that the Managers or Managing Committee is not accountable to them to a reasonable extent. It therefore reveals that the management of the irrigation group is mostly run by the collaborative participation and arbitrary role of the joint partnership of Chairman and Managers where the managers are executors and chairman are the supportive personality.

Panichalak (Driver): The Lieutenant
of the Agro-Managers:

The Panichalak is the operational assistant to the managers. He helps the managers in all respect. He is supposed to maintain, of course under the guidance of the manager, the tools and the log book. He makes entries of the hours of operation daily, the fuel consumption record, water turn list etc. He also reports any loss or damages of the tube well. Hence the responsibility of the Panichalak is very important. He is perhaps the person who is normally the favoured person and under the good

book of the managers. He is the key person of irrigation cost and economy. But he works very closely under the supervision and guidance of the manager. It is observed because of his important role, he is normally selected from among the close and known persons whom the managers and the Chairman and also some Managing Committee Member seem to be faithful supportive and reliable to them. That is the driver must be a person of their choice. It is observed in Birmita, out of 14 Panchhalak 7 i.e. about 50% are selected as they are close relatives of the influential members, (4 of them are found to be the brother, son-in-law and nephew of the managers, while 2 of them are nephew of the Chairman and of the rest, one was the younger brother of Managing Committee Member). Only in three of the irrigation group it was found that the driver was selected from among the BADC trained persons and by the general meeting, while it was found that in four projects the manager himself is the driver of the deep tube well.

III. PROJECT PREPARATION: THE TIP
RITUALS AND THE REALITY:

The Thana Irrigation Programme under which the tube wells operate requires that Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation is to sink, commission operate and maintain the tube well. The management and utilization of tube well water and procurement of oil and fuels rests with the irrigation groups who pay rental charges as per order of Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Cooperative. The Thana Agriculture Officers are to organize the farmers into Irrigation Groups and ensure digging of main and distribution channels and effective utilization and management of irrigation water and for new cropping pattern. It should be seen that all farmers in an irrigation group get equal share of water and proper water utilization programme to reach all fields is made.

As soon as the tube wells are commissioned, the Union Parisads with the assistance of the thana agriculture office and thana cooperative officer will form irrigation-cum-cooperative group keeping in view the tube well command area. They will inspire the groups to dig main channel prepare a roster for distribution of water to all the field, collect fund or obtain cooperative loan for procurement of oil and fuel.

The site selection of the deep tube well are made as per certain criteria they includes - a) soil conditions, b) distance from permanent river, c) topography and depth of flooding, d) maximum command area coverage, (e) better access through road or canals, f) high site etc.

The final selection of the site for deep tube well, as per TIP manual, is made by a high power committee composed of Executive Engineer (BADC), District Agriculture Officer, Assistant Registrar Cooperatives and some other officers at district level all of them belong to District Agricultural Development Committee. This site selection committee operate through the team of field staff of these organizations stationed at thana level. In fact the real site selection is made by the Thana Agricultural Development Committee. The Thana Committee submits its proposal to the District for approval.

It is interesting to note that all these prescribed procedure were not practically followed in project preparation or selection of the site. It is observed that in most of the cases the deep tube well is sunk nearer the land of the Chairman, Manager of any of the influential members of the group disregarding the criteria of site selection. For obvious reason it caused the command area. Not only that almost none of the common members are consulted prior to fixing the site of the deep tube well. (see table 25 in the appendix). One of the irrigation group member reports "one fine morning I found some jeep with quite a good number of technical appliance came to our village, there were some smartly dressed officer like people, they had tea and smoke with Reazuddin Master (a manager) in the residence of matbar, from that evening we found a terrible mamouth machine is digging the earth and later we came to know this will give us both drinking and irrigation water".

The following table 26 shows the distribution of the site of the deep tube well and it is observed that most of the well are sunk in the lands of the Chairmen and Managing Committee Members and Managers i.e. 13 deep tube well out of 14 were sunk in their land and in every cases it is observed people raised the question of the site selection of the tube

Table - 26

Distance of the Deep Tube Well from the Farm
Land of the Irrigation Group Members.

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member
On own land	42.86 (6)	21.42 (3)	5.71 (4)	1.43 (1)
10 - 30 yds	21.43 (3)	14.29 (2)	4.29 (3)	18.57 (13)
30 - 60 yds	14.29 (2)	28.59 (4)	5.71 (4)	27.14 (19)
60 - 100 yds	7.14 (1)	14.29 (2)	30.00 (21)	20.00 (14)
100 - 200 yds	7.14 (1)	14.29 (2)	24.29 (17)	12.86 (9)
200 - 400 yds	-	7.14 (1)	17.14 (12)	14.29 (10)
400 above yds	7.14 (1)	-	12.86 (9)	5.71 (4)

well. The table shows that about 78.57% of the chairman have their land within only 60 yds of the deep tube well, while 64.29% of the managers have their land within such distance. In case of the Managing Committee

Members 44% of them have their land within 100 yds from the base of the deep tube well. Reversely 51% of the general members have their land outside 100 yds of the tube well. It therefore reveals from the table that selection of the site is influenced by the khamata (ability) and samajik marjada (social status) of the Managers and Chairmen. It is also supported by the following table where the general members shows their resentment about the site of the tube well.

Table - 27

Site Selection of the Deep Tube Well and the Opinion of the Irrigation Group Members.

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member
D.T.W. Site is Perfect	78.57 (11)	71.43 (10)	65.72 (46)	38.57 (27)
Site is not proper	14.29 (2)	21.43 (3)	22.85 (16)	42.85 (30)
No Comment	7.14 (1)	7.14 (1)	11.43 (8)	18.58 (13)
	100.00 (14)			

It is observed that the Chairmen, Managers and the majority of the Managing Committee Members are satisfied is the site of the deep tube well but in case of the general members it is seen that about 43% of them seem to be dissatisfied with the site while of them 18.58% made no comment and this seems to be a negative view, and if that is counted the percentage

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member
D.T.W. Site is Perfect	78.57 (11)	71.43 (10)	65.72 (46)	38.57 (27)

of resentment goes to about 60%. Hence this wrong site selection, which was done basically safeguarding the interest of the elite farmers has also consequently affected the coverage of acreage and also quite a good number of potential irrigation farmers are deceived out of this wrong or biased site selection.

IV. DYNAMICS OF THE PROJECT PREPARATION:

THE BEHIND STORY:

The rules and criteria as have been fixed in the T.I.F. manual is not followed exactly in reality. In all those 14 deep tube well no such scientific land and site survey was actually carried. In fact during the late 1960's there was a public meeting sponsored by the then Muslim League and was addressed with many others the then Governor of the Province Mr. Monem Khan. He cleared the government decision to sink deep tube well in the high land of Savar.¹ Prior to that there were a few deep tube well in the Agricultural Development Estate (ADE) at Kashimpur. The then Governor asked the local farmers to initiate proposal and scheme to collect deep tube well from the BADG.

This was perhaps the first policy initiative. All the big farmers along the Union Parishad executives started exploring the chance for getting a deep tube well in their respective area. They started manipulating the thana level officer (TLO's) both in cash and kind.² The local elite farmers

¹ This information was collected from Mr. Mujibur Rahman, Chairman, Birulia U.F. It should be noted that Savar holds the higher number of deep tube well in a thana all over Bangladesh.

² Stated by Mr. Akua Mondal, ex-Chairman.

also started tatbir at the Sub-Divisional Assistant Engineer of BADC, and also the proper executive persons of the District Approval Committee. The agro elites started influencing their urban relatives, friends to influence and expedite the sanction of the deep tube wells. It was found through our discussion with the irrigation group initiators that one of them influenced one high level police officer who had a vast barren land in that area, the other reported that they took the help of a Deputy Commissioner who has a baganbari in that area. Besides some of the big officials like one Executive Engineer of the BADC, an established businessman, a lawyer of Supreme Court helped them in many ways through their tadbir in achieving the deep tube well.

At the thana level, where the real site decision was made, the agro-managers used to spent quite a sound figure of many as Salami to the appropriate thana level officials. Besides this to expedite the process of well digging they also approached the engineering firm (i.e. the Mibners Engineer) and in some cases as they reported, they have to bribe them too.

In almost all cases the initial group was composed strictly of family members and some very close family friends, kin groups and subordinate fellow farmers. The composition of the Managing Committee was exclusively from the family.

Table - 28

Kinship Linkage of the general members with Executive Members (Chairmen, Manager, Managing Committee Members) of the Irrigation Group.

Close relatives.	22.86	(6)
Distant relatives.	15.71	(11)
Social linkage/close neighbour linkage.	25.71	(18)
	64.28	(45)

Such dominance of family members and pet clients is still there in

those irrigation group. Table 28 shows that 45 general members out of

70 interviewed i.e. 64.28% of the general members are this way or that

linked with the executive members of the irrigation group. It is observed

in case of this patronage distribution kinship is significantly more

while social and neighbour linkage is also considerably high.

V. CATALYTIC EFFECT OF THE IRRIGATION GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF IRRIGATION WITH CLIENTS:

It is surprising to note that all of the deep tube wells are running

far behind its capacity level. It is seen the highest capacity utilization

by irrigation group stands to 67% only. When the deep tube well is under-

cially used and some non-members are allowed to get irrigation water on

Salami - but in local style.

cash payment basis (number of which is almost double in comparison to the group members) the rate of capacity utilization shows a slight improvement but even, including their non-group members who get the irrigation water unofficially on cash payment, the capacity utilization of these DTW never exceed 73%. Not only that it is also marked that in one case it is surprising marked such capacity utilization is only 36% and including non-member that stands to 46%. The table 27 shows the distribution of rate of capacity utilization of the deep tube well in Birulia Union.

Table - 27

	Acre Irrigated actually	% of Capacity Utilization	Irrigation facilities given to the non-members	% of capacity utilization for both members and non-members
Dalta para	40 acres	66	4 acre	73
Kaliakoir	35 acres	58	3 acre	63
Jinjira	22 acres	36	5 acre	46
Kamlapur I	35 acres	58	5 acre	66
Kamlapur II	30 acres	50	7 acre	61
Kamlapur III	37 acres	61	5 acre	70
Bagnibari	30 acres	50	4 acre	56
Kumarkhoda	35 acres	58	3 acre	63
Akrar I	40 acres	67	2 acre	70
Akrar II	25 acres	41	5 acre	50
Samair	30 acres	50	4 acre	56
Kha gan	25 acres	41	4 acre	48
Maistrpara	30 acres	50	-	-
Sarulia	35 acres	58	5 acre	66

Note: At present the DTW at Miastapara is not in operation due to some managerial and operational problem.

But it is observed during the study that in almost every cases we found there are quite a good number of farmers who are the potential irrigation water users are not taken into the group and perhaps being avoided from the group membership. Though a significant percentage of the managers agreed, (i.e. 57.14%) that the number of members in their respective group can be increased, so far the capacity of the deep tube well permits, but even they did not extent the number of group member. Primarily because if they are given membership that would definitely effect him or the influential managing committee member or the concern prevelaged members. They can charge the non-numbers in a higher rate and sometimes the rate is very arbitrary, particularly when one delivery is made and the second delivery is due. Since it is obvious and definite that the farmers who have once taken the first irrigation for their crop they would definitely take the second and consequent delivery what ever the cost is. This is referred as "Julum and baimani of the managers and his associates" by some of the non-members who take irrigation water from the group on cash contact basis.

The managers were also inquired why did not they increase the number of member in their respective irrigation group. They identified the following causes:

- a. The increase in number of general members will create management problems, indiscipline.
- b. This will create malcoordinat ion and water turn conflict.

Julum - despotie fashion
baimani - deception and mistrust

- c. There would be some agla matbar who would not listen to or obey any authority.
- d. This will further increase daladali, which is already a factor.
- e. Increase in number will bring increase in problem maker.
- f. Some people are challenging and have less faith on us.

It therefore, appears from the above statements of the managers that they kept some potential irrigator members out the group just because of their own problem. They could not stand with any valid logic or argument. In fact the excluded members are kept outside cautiously and they are considered potentially a threat to their vested interest.

The non-members are sufferer of the arbitrary role of the managers and his lieutenant, the driver. They complain against the high water rate and also they have specific complain against the managers regarding the water turn system. But above all they have to rely upon the charity of the managers and this negative behaviour of the managers frustating the non-member irrigators, who may be small in land holding but they are significantly large in number and percentage. But the complain of high water rate is not only among the non-members, quite a good number of general members have also shown their resentment against the managers. The following table shows the degree of resentment.

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Table - 28

Comments on Water Rate.

	Managing Committee Members	General Members	Non Members
Water rate is satisfactory in comparison to cost.	25.72 (18)	12.86 (9)	-
Water rate is somehow satisfactory in comparison to cost.	34.28 (24)	28.57 (26)	12.86 (9)
Water rate is extremely high in comparison to cost.	32.86 (23)	41.43 (29)	74.28 (52)
No Comment	7.14 (5)	17.14 (12)	12.86 (9)

It is observed that about 33% of the Managing Committee Members, 41.43% of the general members and 75% of the non-members reported to be dissatisfied with the water rate fixed by the management. Also some of the respondent kept silent in this regard, this may be due to their fear about the possible consequence of the statement. It appears that the management, particularly, the manager who normally fixes the rate, is blamed for its rating by the majority of the group members including the managing committee. The response of the non-members is significant that they may not turn in the next time for irrigation since they are paying almost double in an arbitrary rate and without consideration, if no concessions are made, this would definitely demotivate them further. Hence the managers role particularly in irrigation cost and economics is tremendously effecting the agricultural economy and expansion in a negative manner.

Again the managers are supposed to maintain some records, registers of the irrigation group. These include:

a. Membership register that contain names of members, dates of admission, signature and names of their nominees with full address.

b. Cash book - all cash transaction of a group are to be recorded in this book.

c. Share ledger - It contains the separate accounts of share capital held by each member along with number of share (if the group is registered cooperative).

d. Loan ledger - It maintains the separate accounts of loan received and repaid by each member.

e. Deposit ledger - It is a ledger for maintaining accounts of deposit made by individual members.

f. Minute book of M. C. - The proceedings of meetings of Managing Committee is recorded in this book.

g. Minute Book A.G.M. - The proceedings of annual general meetings are recorded in this book.

h. Inspection Book - This book is maintained for recording inspection notes of inspecting officer.

i. Besides all these every manager is supposed to maintain the following registers/books.

a. Log book, b. water turn register, c. fuel/oil register, d. fertilizer register, e. cost-analysis register.

It has already been discussed in the earlier sections that some of the general farmers who have arable land within the command area of the deep tube well are kept outside the irrigation group by not giving them the membership but these ill-fated farmers used to take irrigation water through contact basis. Also there were the some farmers who willingly did not join the group as members. To identify and tap the reasons of their non-membership we interviewed 5 non-members from the command area of each deep tube well. The following table shows the causes why those farmers did not join the group:

VI. POLITICS OF IRRIGATION: NON-MEMBERS VIEW:

It was surprising to note that not a single irrigation group have all these registers or books. (Only the list of the members are maintained to collect the rental fees. But even that membership register was not duly maintained by the manager. In most cases the managers gave us the name and address out of his memory. Hence, it appears that the manager and his management is run on free principle what he has established to watch his performance. Since the manager maintains a positive liaison with the local BADC officials and cooperative inspector, he faces no problem. It is also interesting and surprising that some of the manager not even heard the name of some of those registers.

Table - 29

Causes of Non-Membership of Few Selected Farmer
Within the Common Area of the DTW.

Refused by the irrigation group initiators/management.	30.00 (21)
Personal conflict with manager/ chairman/M.C. members.	15.72 (11)
High water rate/food distribution.	27.14 (19)
Wrong site selection/high farm land	20.00 (14)
Poorness	7.14 (1)
	100.00 (70)

It is therefore observed from the above table that most of the farmers were refused to be a member by the irrigation group initiators and not only that some of them could not join due to their personal conflict and rivalry with the managers. Chairmen and Managing Committee Members, Again 20.60% of the non-members could not join the group due to the improper site selection and they have their land comparatively in the higher plane. While a significant percentage of farmers reported to have discontinued their membership from the group due to the high water rate and poor distribution. It is really alarming, since all most all of the DTW are operating in a severe under utilization stage such decline of membership would further decline the capacity utilization. This decline is nothing

Hence it is observed about 70% of the Harber did not get the chance to get in the irrigation group due to their interpersonal contradiction, factional conflict with the management. This shows a clear picture on the village inter-kin group contradiction and conflicts. These refused members

Causes of Non-Membership of Some Selected Harbers.	
Refused by the Irrigation group institutions/managements.	40.00 (8)
Personal conflict with managers/ chairmen/M. C. Members.	30.00 (6)
Wrong site selection.	20.00 (4)
High water rate/poor & unjust distribution.	10.00 (2)

Table - 30

but the product of the ill performance and malpractice, corruption and nepotism of the management, particularly of the manager and driver. Again the deliberate refusal not only effected the common farmers of the locality. Some harber are also been refused or avoided to get the membership. Out of 70 non-members interviewed there were 20 harbers too. These harbers, are head of a small samaj comprising 4 to 6 households but have sufficient arable landholding within the command area. The following table show the causes and reasons of their non-membership.

obviously discouraged many other farmers who are potential irrigators to get in the group. Hence the very contradiction of the big farmers indirectly hampers the choice and fortune of some fellow farmers.

All the non-member interviewed in general opined that some special attributes and qualities are essential to be a member of an irrigation group. We put a question to them which asked "On what capacity you feel the membership of irrigation group are distributed?". The responses are shown in the following table:

Table - 31

Attributes/Capacities to be a member of irrigation group - The Non-Members Opinion.

Economic capacity	65.71 (46)
Social status and strength	48.57 (34)
Kinship linkage	52.86 (37)

It therefore revealed from the above table that the distribution of patronage, and support in rural areas is dominated by economic capacity and dependency. While kinship linkage is still not significant but not as such as the economic capacity.

The non-members opined that Berolok Girhasta (rich farmers), Kutumb (relatives through marriage), Doler Lok (fellow faction men), Khamataban (powerful) and Apanlok (own and believed persons). Nij Goshti (self family member), Chaala (fellow and obedient person) are considered by the managers, chairmen and managing committee members in the recruitment of group membership.

At one stage of the study we were interested to know whether the non-members are interested to get the group membership or not. And it is observed that 62.85% of them opined in affirmative while 37.15% have a negative view. Those who still do not want to be a member were further asked "Why don't you want to join the group". In reply to this question following were the answers:

- It is a prestige case, since I was refused I can't approach any more.	30.76% (8)
- Since I have conflict with managers. I can't join	46.15 (12)
- Irrigation is costly	15.38 (4)
- No need to be a member of the group	7.69 (2)
	100.00 (26)

The above statements shows a psychological barrier, which is the product of ill management, have demotivated the potential farmers to be member of irrigation groups.

The non-member almost in majority hold the view that the managers and the executive members have converted the irrigation groups into their private property and a source business and income through exploitation and misappropriate group affairs, particularly fixing an arbitrary water rate, and unjust water turn etc. The table 32 shows the distribution of the opinion of the non-members in this regard.

Table - 32

Distribution of the Opinion Regarding the
Status of the Irrigation Group.

Question: Do you think that the Irrigation Project has
become the private property of the some influ-
ential members.

	Managing Committee Meeting	General Members	Non Members
Agree fully	15.71 (11)	55.71 (39)	48.57 (34)
Partially agree	20.00 (14)	27.14 (19)	24.29 (17)
Dis agree	95.72 (32)	14.29 (10)	4.28 (3)
No response	18.57 (13)	2.86 (2)	22.86 (16)

It is observed that the general members and non-members are convinced with the statement. It is markable that the general members agreed sharply with the statement. Thus it stands that the managers and the executive members have really become so arbitrary, absolute and partial in their role and performance the members are losing their faith and confidence upon them. These would definitely, again cause the under utilization of the DTW and effective water turn to the common farmers, which would also result as a demotivating factor for agricultural and irrigation extension in rural Bangladesh.

Epilogue

Bangladesh is one of the poorest among the third world countries. A significant majority of her population is living under the "below poverty line". The country is basically agricultural with 90% of her population engaged in agricultural activities. Again, the ratio of population to land is very high and increasing at a fast rate. Approximately half of all the rural households is functionally landless and again employment and income generating opportunities outside agriculture are scanty and severely limited. Tenancy arrangements are not only scattered but also unfavourable for tenants and for agricultural development in general. Again, farms are severely fragmented, the average plot size being about one-third of an acre. Patron-client relationship which characterize village life exacerbate the unevenness of income distribution and underlie the inevitable access to crucial inputs and public services. Literacy is extremely low and correlated with income levels and farm size. These factors, combined with the severe vulnerability to adverse weather, the extremely narrow margin on which most Bangladesh farmers operate, and the high propensity to minimize risks under these conditions, act as serious constraints to rapid agricultural in particular and rural development in general.

Efforts to bring change and development in the agricultural and rural sectors were incorporated in all the previous plans, programmes and projects in Bengal, Pakistan and now Bangladesh. Quite a good number

of "models" "approaches" and "programmes" were launched and tested along with a huge capital investment particularly during the past quarter century. But all these "promoting" efforts could not bring the desired qualitative or quantitative change to the poverty stricken rural population of this gigantic delta.

The past efforts in rural development in this part of the sub-continent can be traced and characterised basically from their subjective content, i.e., those initiatives were virtually individual and educative by their nature objectives and content and those which were factually the motivational impulse of some of the enthusiastic civil servants and non-officials and was the manifestation of their strong sense of duty and responsibility which led them to take personal drive, leadership and supervision of their own "model" of rural development or upliftment. They were successful only to that extent, where these ideas, either through persuasion personality manipulation, strong report and confidence, got the acceptance of the society. But with gradual process those could not work due to the inadequacies of the programmes to meet the need and expectation of the society.

Again with the necessary and gradual process of institutionalization the pressed models had to face the challenge of the changed reality and objectives condition which had its own time context and propensity and dynamism. This dynamism in course of time absorbed these subjective and normative approaches of the energetic civil servants and some political and non-political personalities.

But further analysis of the past approaches also reveals the fact that except A.K. Fazlul Haq others implicitly accepted the existing infra-structural and institutional framework as their working base. Fazlul Haq was exceptional due to the fact that his approach was rather a political one, which was possibly due to his intimate political understanding and link with the rural mass. Other approaches were the modified version of the western models either experimented in Europe or were in experimental stage in any under developed country. Virtually, these experimentation were later exported with the financial and institutional support of the Technical Aid Programme of the developed countries to the third world nation.

All the past planning including the five year plans, approach plans, target plans show a normative narrowness and are mostly based on unrealistic concept of development and developmental strategies and approaches. This can be justified by a thorough examination of the index of success of those "promising" efforts. In fact those efforts seemed to be the "game play" of some of the government officials and local intellectuals having a "Harvard Iyer" over the local issues. They were virtually dependent both theoretically and intellectually upon the Western, more precisely the American notion of development. While again in selecting the planning objectives some empirically established variables of some supportive and manipulative sectors and variables were given priority which fitted with their concept and model of development. These, in course of later development, proved supportive for the continuation of the traditional pattern of modification and re-modification of the traditional, colonial institutional and administrative infrastructure and work plan.

It has further been identified by many that the rationality of these models of development are more administrative or organizational, than political. These are typically western notion of social and infrastructural development, which was accepted by Pakistan and consequently by Bangladesh. The borrowed models emphasized physical and infrastructural build-up and a better and assured channel of development funds through those structural arrangements, and perhaps "Cooperatives Society" seemed to be more suitable for such function. This also reflects the philosophy of middle range theory of comparative public administration and development administration experimentation of the mid sixties. But whether these models/approaches are workable, valid, reliable within our socio-cultural and economic context, were never questioned.

The consequent impact of these resulted in a further failure to present the negative trend of productive capacity and capital protection of the rural mass and the decreasing agricultural wage and income corresponding to the purchasing power, resulting in increasing landlessness, poverty and malnutrition. Similarly the land holding pattern show a distinct rise in the other section i.e. among the landed gentry and the "agro-managerial elite". More precisely, the developmental efforts of the last quarter century gave birth of a new elite group "agro-managerial elite" having a new socio-economic and political character. This new class of elite has emerged, by challenging, manipulating and sometime balancing the traditional elite. They could significantly bring a dislocation of the concentration of land holding, power structure and a change in the production relations in rural Bangladesh.

The agro-managerial elite, who are the product of the decade of agricultural and rural development more precisely the product of the "cooperative capitalism" are found to be more progressive so far functional commitment is concerned, than that of the former i.e. the traditional landed elite. They are more exposed to changed socio-political and economic involvement and reality. They have more modern and urban elements in their thinking, aspiration and mode of behaviour. They are more concerned and conscious in respect to their position and their assignment responsibility of the agricultural and rural development as the extension worker of the government. Again the administrative and structural disequilibrium at the thana level leave the government with no other choice or option but to encourage the participation, ^{give} initiative and leadership of these elites. In fact they act as the defacto local bureaucracy assigned with the task to carry out the development functions on behalf of the government under the auspices of the thana level bureaucracy.

The agro-managerial elite are also much more enlightened and seem to be more egalitarian in their approaches, atleast from their class background and are easily accepted by the society as optional choice as against the bureaucracy and the traditional elite.

The power base of the agro-managerial elite is its varying degree of commands, contacts and links with both exogenous and endogenous forces. More specifically till now the power base of the agro-managers is not politics rather the skills, both manipulative and managerial. As a result the development efforts show a decisive trend which is resulted in the

acceptance of the modern institutional/physical technology by the rural masses. But such acceptance is only to ^{that} extent, ^{where it} that/remain under the control of the agro-managers and serve their material and manipulative purpose. The benefits they allow to filter down to the common mass is only a token of allegiance to their class and keep a link with the common to ensure his social position and extent his scope of socio-political and economic control. Hence through the managerial role, particularly through the resource distribution mechanism they strengthen their newly earned status, role and position. They are apparently less commanding and seem to be democratic, but in the name of cooperatives they normally institutionalize the control and command over the institution where he is virtually a unquestioned personality.

The resultant fact of this process is that the farmers including the big landholders act and serve the process to get the provision of services and benefits of the agro-managers and again the agro-managers regulates their own services in such a fashion that it might not disturb his own material and social aspiration.

The brief findings of the present study concludes that the role of the agro-managerial elite can be traced from two different dimensions. One is positive catalyst role while the other is negative catalyst role. It is unique that the agro-managers used to play both the role simultaneously but the negative role seemed to be more dominant than that of the positive. The agro-managerial elite as positive catalyst found to be the initiator, designer, disseminators of new ideas, schemes and innovations and change agents. They could very successfully communicate the government's

"change efforts" and "aspiration" in the rural habitat. Perhaps in such function no one or any agency proved to be that effective. Since these elite are more acceptable and assessable to the remote and ignorant villagers they showed tremendous success in fulfilling the government efforts of agricultural modernization and extension. Not only these the agro-managers are also reported to be the production booster so far the yield of IVV is concern. They could also manage to bring change in the economic dependency and behaviour of the villagers particularly through the management of the resource distribution mechanism. The villagers with their interaction with the imported technology and the guidance of the agro-managers have by now acquired a broader and open world view and have a varied perception about the nature and reality. This change in the life style and perception of the villagers is perhaps the partial credit of the agro-managers.

The agro-managers in the mean time, have also emerged as a negative force as against the development process particularly in term of its diffusion and spread effects. Agro-managers work normally in joint collaboration of the local bureaucracy and that is mostly done parallel to the political authority i.e. the Union Parishad. It is observed that the distribution and mobilization of the external subsidized resources at the village level is being managed, manipulated and controlled by the cooperative societies under the agro-managers. Hence, with the institution of the cooperatives the agro-managers, sometimes along with the traditional elite, successfully organize the "collect" and tactfully keep out the undesirable and potential socio-political and economic opponents. In fact in the changed social dynamics of rural Bangladesh the agro-managers have emerged as an alternative socio-

political and economic force. At present they are not significantly strong enough in the political arena but they are engaged in a process of political maturity and are indirectly involved in some hidden political practices. Moreover, there are ample examples where it is revealed that many of the agro-managers have accumulated a considerable amount of cash surplus in the recent past. They have developed a marked tendency of savings and investment. That might obviously also accelerate their effort to achieve the political power in the immediate future.

It is interesting to note, that at present in most of the villages where the cooperative institution has worked for a considerable period, there is a "competitive dualism" in those villages. In such dualism the traditional elite is fighting for its glorious past and to preserve the declining authority while the emerging agro-managerial elite are struggling their best to establish their emergence as an alternative social force. It is also interesting to note that till now the relation between these two forces did not take a bitter and confronting shape rather in many cases, a compromise and understanding is being observed. It is also been observed that the agro-managers are planning their present functions in such a fashion that might help him in future to attain the formal political power of the Union Parishad.

Whatever the situation is, the economic behaviour of these agro-managerial elites are precisely negative for the overall agricultural vis-a-vis the rural development process. The agro-managers are found to be the sole "despot" who control and manages the irrigational facilities and other agricultural inputs by himself or along with his close associates. The present

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Whatever the situation is, the economic behaviour of these agro-managerial elites are precisely negative for the overall agricultural vis-a-vis the rural development process. The agro-managers are found to be the sole "despot" who control and manages the irrigational facilities and other agricultural inputs by himself or along with his close associates. The present

study reveal that the agro-managers manage group activities at their own "arbitrary" style and allow none to make effective control and supervision over their activities. Not only that the managers regulate the water turn of the irrigation group at their own arbitrary choice. They virtually use the assets and accounts of the group as their "private property" and use and manipulate them for the attainment of their future, both economic and political.

Practically speaking the agro-managers, through their despotic activities frustrate the ordinary farmers to participate and cultivate HYV and other irrigation and technology based cash crops. Present study vividly reveals that many of the farmers deliberately avoided the irrigation group membership simply because of the ill management of the water and other inputs. Hence the agro-managers who are supposed to work as extension workers ⁱⁿ reality/working as a negative force by their arbitrary managerial role. There are specific examples where the agro-managers have proved to be the demotivators for agricultural extension.

It is thus important to evaluate and examine the role of these managerial elites who have made both positive and negative contributions in our agricultural and rural development process. It is perhaps the right time to assess their role when they characterise the rural life as an alternative political force in rural Bangladesh. It seems to be right time to decide how far at what degree and direction the role, function and the emergence of these rising elites would be manipulated, guided and controlled.

Table - 2

Educational Background of the Executive/General
Members/Selected Non-Members of the Irrigation Group.

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member	Non Member
Illiterate	64.28 (9)	14.29 (2)	60.00 (42)	71.43 (50)	48.57 (34)
Primary	21.43 (3)	50.00 (7)	21.43 (15)	15.71 (11)	34.28 (24)
Secondary	14.29 (2)	21.43 (3)	15.71 (11)	8.57 (6)	12.86 (9)
S. S. C.	-	7.14 (1)	1.43 (1)	2.86 (2)	4.29 (3)
H. S. C.	-	7.14 (1)	1.43 (1)	1.43 (1)	-
	100.00 (14)	100.00 (14)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)

Table - 4

Annual Income of the Irrigation Group Executives
Members/General Members and Some Selected Non-Members.

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member	Non Member
Less than Tk. 5000	-	-	1.43 (1)	5.72 (4)	4.28 (3)
Tk. 5000 - 10000	-	14.28 (2)	15.71 (11)	24.28 (17)	15.72 (11)
Tk. 10000 - 20000	-	21.42 (3)	41.43 (29)	48.57 (34)	54.28 (38)
Tk. 20000 - 30000	50.00 (7)	50.00 (7)	30.00 (21)	20.00 (14)	15.72 (11)
Tk. 30000 - 40000	28.57 (4)	14.28 (2)	7.14 (5)	1.43 (1)	5.72 (4)
Tk. 40000 - above	21.43 (3)	-	4.29 (3)	-	4.28 (3)
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table - 5

Nature of Family of Executive Members, General Members
of the Irrigation Group and Some Selected Non-Members.

Nature of Family	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member	Non Member
Joint	28.57 (4)	7.15 (1)	10.00 (7)	4.28 (3)	5.72 (4)
Single	71.43 (10)	92.85 (13)	90.00 (63)	95.72 (67)	94.28 (66)
Total:	100.00 (14)	100.00 (14)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)

Table - 9

Properties Accumulated During the Last Five Years.

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Member	General Member	Non Member
Purchase of land	64.28 (9)	71.42 (10)	54.28 (38)	18.57 (13)	14.28 (10)
Building & Construc- tion of house.	35.71 (5)	42.85 (6)	28.57 (20)	17.14 (12)	22.85 (16)
Purchase Agri. Appliances/tools etc.	50.00 (7)	21.42 (3)	11.42 (8)	27.14 (19)	15.71 (11)
Radio/Transistor	28.57 (4)	42.85 (6)	11.42 (8)	4.28 (3)	12.85 (9)
Bicycle/Motor, Cycle/ Rickshaw.	21.42 (3)	21.42 (3)	7.14 (5)	2.85 (2)	7.14 (5)
Others	28.57 (4)	7.14 (1)	4.28 (3)	4.28 (3)	5.71 (4)

Table - 10

Non-Institution/Institutional Credit Use by the
Different Members of the Irrigation Group and
Selected Non-Members.

	Industrial Credit	Non Industrial Credit
Chairman	14.28 (2)	-
Managers	35.71 (5)	7.14 (1)
Managing Committee Members	5.71 (4)	11.42 (8)
General Members	2.85 (2)	25.71 (18)
Non-Members	5.71 (4)	35.71 (25)

Table - 11

Future Plan for Taking Institutional Credit.

	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Members	General Members	Non Members
Yes	42.85 (6)	59.14 (8)	37.14 (26)	22.85 (16)	12.86 (9)
No	57.15 (8)	42.86 (6)	62.86 (44)	77.15 (54)	87.14 (61)

Table - 16

Future Plan to Participate in U.P. Election

	Chairman	Managers	Managing Committee Members	General Members
Positive hope	28.57 (4)	48.85 (6)	27.14 (19)	7.15 (5)
Not Decidet Yet	21.43 (3)	35.72 (5)	15.72 (11)	12.85 (9)
Do not want to participate.	50.00 (7)	21.43 (3)	57.14 (40)	80.00 (56)

Table - 17

Elected Political Elites of the Union Parisd
and Irrigation Elite : A Comparative Table.

Union Ward	Elected Chairman/ Members (n)	Irrigation Group Members				% of Irriga- tion group Members retur- ned as Poli- tical Elite
		Chairman (n)	Manager (n)	Managing Committee Members (n)	General Members	
Ward I	3	-	-	3	-	100.00
Ward II	3	-	1	2	-	100.00
Ward III	4*	2	-	2	-	100.00
	11	2	1	7	-	100.00

* Ward III includes, three members and the chairman of the Union Parisd.

Table - 18

Relatives of the Irrigation Group Members
Participated in the last U.F. Election

	% (n)
Chairman	42.86 (6)
Manager	35.71 (5)
M. C. Member	37.14 (26)
General Managers	27.14 (19)

Table - 19

Involvement of the Irrigation Group Members in Local
Disputes/Court Cases/Land Problems & Other Related Problems.

Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Members	General Members
14.28 (2)	35.71 (5)	31.72 (22)	27.14 (19)

Table - 20

Consultative Role Offered to Others in Legal Issues/
Local Disputes/Problems by the Irrigation Group Members.

	Chairman	Managers	Managing Committee Members	General Members
Positive Role	59.14 (8)	71.42 (10)	25.71 (18)	11.43 (8)
No Role	42.86 (6)	28.58 (4)	74.29 (52)	88.57 (62)

Table - 23

Link and Relationship with Present a Previous
Local M. P. with the Irrigation Group Members.

Nature of Relationship	Chairman	Managers	Managing Committee Members	General Members
Social	14.29 (2)	7.14 (1)	10.00 (1)	1.43 (1)
Informal	21.42 (3)	35.71 (5)	14.28 (10)	7.14 (5)
Political	14.29 (2)	21.44 (3)	12.86 (9)	15.71 (11)
Known by face	28.57 (4)	28.57 (4)	15.71 (11)	8.57 (6)
Known by name	14.29 (2)	7.14 (1)	34.28 (24)	42.86 (30)
Not known at all	7.14 (1)	-	8.57 (6)	24.29 (17)

Table - 24

Accountability of the Irrigation Executive
Member to the Common Members.

Question: Do you think that the Managing Committee
including the Managers or Chairman are
accountable to the general members.

Degree of Accountability	Chairman	Manager	Managing Committee Members	General Members
Extremely accountable.	7.14 (1)	14.29 (2)	8.57 (6)	1.43 (1)
Accountable to some extent.	14.29 (2)	28.57 (4)	8.57 (6)	5.71 (4)
Accountable to a limited extent.	21.43 (3)	42.85 (6)	44.28 (31)	37.14 (26)
Not Accountable at all	57.14 (8)	14.29 (2)	38.58 (27)	55.72 (39)

Table - 25

Did the Organizers ever Consulted with you
about the site selection of the deep tube well.

Yes	12.86 (9)
No	87.14 (61)

Table - 33

Per-Capita Nutrient Intake of Rural Bangladesh:
A Comparative Table of 1962-64 and 1976-77.

Nutrients	Intake (1962-64) Per Person/Day	Intake (1976-77) Per Person/Day
Calories (K cal)	2,251	2,094
Protein (gm)	57.5	58.5
Fat (gm)	17.7	12.2
Cho (gm)	476.0	439.0
Calcium (mg)	304.0	305.0
Iron (mg)	9.7	22.2
Vit. 'A' (I.U)	1590.0	730.0
Thiamine (mg)	1.47	1.65
Riboflavin (mg)	0.53	0.87
Niacin (mg)	22.8	22.21
Vit. 'C' (mg)	39.6	9.51

Table - 34

Average Intake of Food by Food Groups
in Rural Bangladesh.

Name of Food Groups	Average Intake (In gm)			
	1962-64	1977	1978	1979
1. Cereals and their derivatives.	536.9	542.00	432.5	523.2
2. Starches & starchy roots.	55.5	21.80	18.51	42.2
3. Sugar and Sweets.	7.4	5.17	5.05	7.5
4. Dry Leguminous and oily seeds.	-	5.32	13.9	24.1
5. Pulses and nuts	28.0	-	-	-
6. Vegetables	134.6	186.85	80.8	124.1
7. Fruits	10.2	-	3.7	4.8
8. Meat	8.7	11.3	3.1	5.7
9. Egg	1.6	1.57	0.56	1.2
10. Fish	32.8	53.48	50.9	30.3
11. Milk & milk product	17.3	7.30	20.9	25.2
12. Fats and oils	6.2	4.08	6.8	7.0
13. Spices & miscellaneous	4.6	7.59	3.4	5.3

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